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THE HUMAN BEING IN ACTION

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA

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ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

THE HUMAN BEING IN ACTION

THE IRREDUCIBLE ELEMENT IN MAN

PART II

Investigations at the Intersection of Philosophy and Psychiatry

Edited by

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA



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Paul Ricoeur, Henri Maldinet, R. P. Marcel Régner, Emmanuel Levinas, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (from left to right)

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THE HUMAN BEING IN ACTION

Phenomenology as the Ground for the Interdisciplinary Investigation of Man and of the Human Condition

In our quest after the *irreducible element* in man we are led from the investigation of the SELF AND THE OTHER to that of the HUMAN BEING IN ACTION.

How does the human being reveal himself to be what and who he is? Is it through matter-of-fact observations, scientific hypothesis, our own experience of ourselves, or from our personal convictions and opinions about the world, about our fellow man and about the meaning of existence, that we are enabled to draw conclusive evidence concerning the nature of the unique individual person, or of the human being in general, envisaged in his "essential state"?

Could the phenomenological investigation, which in its classic phases aims at discovering both the objective structure of man's constitutive system and its results in their "essential state", even aim at grasping the human being; were we to take seriously Dilthey's claim emphasized in contemporary existential thought, that man is essentially an experiencing being?

Indeed, in the fullness of his experiential functioning the core of the human being eludes the rational grasp of objectifying rules and structures, categories and principles.

In our investigation of man, then, should we aim exclusively at his inward, spiritual being which in some trends of existential philosophy is made to appear as positively accessible through a specific type of dialectic, while in other trends the failure to assess it opens a human void at the heart of an elaborate theory?

By proceeding in this manner we would so narrow the expansion of the human functioning that its vital roots would be amputated, and the significance of life itself would be lost from sight.

Furthermore, in concrete life we are often awakened from the lofty visions which we have of our self or of our fellow man by sudden reactions, courses of action taken which, arising from some of ours or of his obscure

vital regions, remain at total odds with our self-image. Is this action willful or impulsive? In either estimation it destroys the network of views, opinions and explanations reached by us on rational grounds: broken and disintegrated, this network falls off like a shell that reveals itself capable only of protecting but not of accounting for the flesh of the being it disguised.

More precisely, does the primordial human factor consist in "interpretation" in which the human being bestows meaning upon the course of his passively unfolding interworldly existence, or in "action" in which he exercises initiative to forge it?

1. *The cognitive, meaning-bestowing function of man's life-course* is undoubtedly doubled by an "operational side." The constitutive cognitive apparatus has to be "activated" and entered into "operation" in order that the human being can originate within the world and unfold his existence. In fact, although the Husserlian investigation of the simultaneous structuration of the human subject and of his life-world proceeds through an analysis of the structure constitutive of both, the objects and the processes in which they are constituted, it is conceived as a processlike progress itself. The analysis draws its rational structures and their interlacing links from the maze of otherwise unobjectifiable operations left behind. Nevertheless, approaching the human being from the bias of this meaning-bestowing function, the Husserlian investigation emphasizes the cognitive side to the neglect of the operational. In fact, pursuing structure after structure, throwing connecting links between emerging fragments and piecing them together as they appear in the field of consciousness of the subject, this analysis throws a web of reason over the moving and fluctuating flux covering the streams, cross-currents, and springs of this undertaking itself. Our own approach to the human being which focuses upon *his vital bounds with the Other* rather than upon his singularized being, seems to show that man does not unfold his individuality from his subjective selfhood alone. On the contrary, his very individualization into an autonomous subject within the organic, social and spiritual world-processes by means of a differentiation from the radical Otherness of his condition. He projects himself and his life-world not from his own center alone but, on the contrary, in existential reference to the Otherness of his condition. Consequently, his progress does not consist in "passively" flowing with an inner stream working through him, but by undertaking step by step measures appropriate to the circumstances which would

promote his development. Its progress implies trial and error but also meditated decision-making, impulse but also exercise of will.

In short, the human being unfolds his course not only along the pre-delineated cognitive/constitutive lines, but also through the factor of chance and invention, through lines of continuous rational patterns as well as through the unforeseeable intrusion of the Other; through repetition of forms as well as through their *innovation*.

The Husserlian conception of the meaning-bestowing function as based on a system regulated by a priori principles universally applicable to all human beings is then rightly conceived by Husserl as a "passive synthesis" inasmuch as it is meant as a flux carrying the individual willy-nilly onward. But so conceived, it falls short of acknowledging properly the Other as the essential partner of its undertaking. In fact, although it is through interpretation, appreciation, recognition, discrimination, and construction resulting in meaning-bestowing, that the human being carries on his existential traffic with the Other, that is, through the antennae of cognition and rational order – yet it is from and through the *active thrust* and *response* that the Self and the Other advance in their appraisal of the givenness and in their proposals for forthcoming "action."

2. *Order and Undertaking* appear then as the two aspects of the human origination and advance in existence. Would they both be gifts of Nature, prefabricated and ready to throw man into existence as well as to propel him through it? Or, as we have already suggested, would the undertaking instead of unfolding passively from a precoded operational blueprint, comprise also crucial instances of lines of development freely devised by the human being? After all, as even a superficial – but unprejudiced – view of the world shows, is it not by breaking with the preposed patterns of the universally established course of things and events that man himself introduces the cornerstones of his and the world's progress?

If we ask after the *irreducible specifically human factor*, the above proposed equipoise between order and undertaking (cognition and action), as between two intertwined sides of the human mechanism, tends to balance heavier on the side of action. This shift of weight reaches its apex when we ask after the source from which the uniquely personal significance with which the human being may endow his existence flows. Is it not, indeed, forged in opposition to all the universal patterns and discoverable models with man's own inventive powers? Indeed, as we have already argued elsewhere, man's creative activity – even more than his

moral action – is *the vehicle without which the human being would not be able to endow his existence with a specifically human meaningfulness*.

Thus, following the steps of our inquiries into the *crisis of man*, we are led to revert in the present volume decidedly to the emphasis of the modern philosophy, so radically endorsed by Husserl. From the *cognito* seen as the center radiating man's projection of himself within his life-world, we turn our attention to its enacting, devising and ultimately, inventing. *From cognition – to action*.

3. *The phenomenologically-inspired vision of the human being within his world* has in turn inspired many fields of research in the middle of our century. Stimulated, these fields have been reorienting their approaches, fulfilling the original aspiration of the Husserlian enterprise to lay the philosophical foundation for the sciences. Sharing some of the basic insights, they became, as I have shown in my early work *Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Science*, conversant with each other, fulfilling the same aspiration of phenomenology to be a *mathesis universalis*. However, the vision in its various versions – Husserlian, Heideggerian, Merlau-Pontean . . . quickly exploited – had certainly a great cultural influence, yet faded away and with it the aspiration of phenomenology remained incompleted. Its stress upon cognitive order with ensuing subjectivism fell short to pertain to the *full expanse of the Human Condition*. Sciences themselves have in the meantime changed their criteria; and from the aim to grasp the universe, Nature and life in their “essence” moved in the Leibnizean direction of seeking *to enter into their operations*. However, in doing so, they become more differentiated and separated than before, breaking the image of man to pieces, and losing the focal point of the human being altogether. It may be ventured that the emergence of the perspective of action in the development of the phenomenological investigation-from-within encounters that of the sciences. Is phenomenological reorientation in the perspective of human action capable of what the cognitive/constitutive orientation was not, that is, of tying together the human being and *Elemental Nature*?

From my previous assessments it comes clearly to light that action – unlike a process – cannot be envisaged either as an entity, or as a clear-cut, autonomous instance of becoming in general, or even as an independent strand of human functioning. To be sure, when we speak about “action” we mean “human action”. And such action – as I have hinted at before – is the resultant of the complete array of the human functioning triggered into motion as well as it is simultaneously the instrument of its working. By

throwing up a bridge between blind operation and its meaningful end, by promoting the existential interlinks among things and beings, and by establishing the main arteries of man's partaking in the resources of Nature, action discloses itself as the vehicle of man's origination, individualization, and life-course. Therefore, to approach the human being in the perspective of action not only renders accessible the whole expanse of the Human Condition but also exposes man's specific means for extracting his unique being from other types of beings, things and from an anonymous Nature. These specifically human means are thrown open for a renewed investigation of the human being and his universe.

Thus, in the perspective of action the human being may retrieve his adequate image. He fails to recognize himself in the broken mirror of contemporary philosophy, science and literature, all three of which merely reflect various, incompatible half-truths about himself. But it might well be that these broken distorted pieces will come together transformed in this new avenue of an approach.

"Human action" is already a notion drawing upon the critical appraisal of the vast field of phenomenological inheritance. Not restricted to the human consciousness – nor to the intentional system – the investigation of the human being in action naturally draws upon research in the natural sciences, in the social and behavioral sciences, in the fine Arts, in literature and in mathematics. It spreads also to those areas concerned particularly with human conduct. Thus by encompassing the routes of will and man's self-determination, it reaches to the studies of the sacred and to religion. Would it be too hasty to anticipate that the vision of man that will emerge progressively from this unified, comprehensive research – and which brings all the major arteries of scholarly concern together – will then enter into the heart of these otherwise disparate disciplines and permeate them with its rays? Although they focus upon different sides and processes of man's self-explication in existence – while overlapping in respect of this progressively-to-grow core of common philosophical relevance to the discovery of the human image – might it not be natural for them jointly to develop channels of communication reflecting their common aim?

Indeed, we may hope that the concentration upon the human being in action may offer phenomenology its second opportunity to fulfill its original purpose of establishing the basis for a universal inquiry into all that is not foreign to man.

4. *Philosophy and psychiatry* fall directly into this schema. With the former attentive to the essential state of the universally valid human

functioning, and the latter committed to the study of those factors which seem to hinder or, on the contrary, to promote man's optimal growth, philosophy and psychiatry complement each other's respective focus while they meet in the pursuit of the basic human means and ends. Hence it is psychiatry that in the first wave of the phenomenological inspiration spreading to the sciences of man took the lead by developing with Binswanger, Boss, Minkowski, Straus and others, psychiatric lines of research bringing the elements of the phenomenological approach and of the phenomenological conception of man within his world into their otherwise empirical work. And yet through the cognitive, transcendental prism presenting man in his *life-world*, the elemental condition of the human being did not come to its rights. As I have been voicing it elsewhere, without an assessment of man's ties with *Elemental Nature*, which the conception of the *life-world* alone cannot accomplish, this first so fruitful and enlightening encounter between phenomenology and psychiatry is vanishing from the scene. However, it has been taken up again in a much more extensive form by Henri Ey and his school.

It is then again by the dialogue of philosophy and psychiatry that we may hope to initiate the phenomenological investigation of the human being in the perspective of action. In seeking for the irreducible elements in man through this bias we may find the access to them precisely at the cross section of inquiries, one focusing upon the universal human condition, the other upon circumstances which favor or hinder the human being in his availing himself of his virtualities.

Our phenomenological profile of the human action relates it essentially to the various modalities of the entire system of the human functioning. Hence we cannot but seek to circumscribe it progressively through its relationships to the major arteries of human functions, that is, to the cognitive/constitutive, evaluative, and creative functions.

This orientation, which is expressed in the present selection, documents the nature of the dialogue between those philosophers and psychiatrists who participated in our Paris Colloquium. In fact, the studies published here draw attention not only to the problems pertaining directly to the human being in action but also to the virtualities of the enacting of his existence in the human functioning, e.g. the passivity/activity of conscious life, association, evidence, regulative principles and experience as such. In spite of their vast spread, these approaches fall into a sequence. Focusing in the same direction, they partly complement each other, partly encroach upon each other – mapping in this way the new territory to be investigated.

The sequence opens by the beacon of the human action: imagination. And by imagination it comes to a closure. Breaking the narrow framework of man's bounds with Nature, *Imaginatio Creatrix* brings together his virtualities in the creative activity, the prototype of human action.

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

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ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

INAUGURAL LECTURE

IMAGINATION IN DISCOURSE AND IN ACTION

I. INTRODUCTION: FOR A GENERAL THEORY OF IMAGINATION

The question considered in this essay can be stated in the following terms: Can the conception of imagination, first set out in the context of a theory of metaphor centered around the notion of semantic innovation, be expanded outside the sphere of discourse to which it originally belonged?

This question is itself part of a wider investigation of which I earlier gave the ambitious title of the "Poetics of Volition." The present essay represents one step in the direction of this "Poetics":¹ the step from the theoretical to the practical. It seemed to me that the best test of any claim to universality made by a theory constructed within the sphere of language would be to investigate its capacity of extension to the practical sphere.

We shall therefore proceed as follows. First, we shall review some classical problems inherent in the philosophy of imagination and shall briefly sketch a possible solution worked out within the framework of a theory of metaphor. The tie between imagination and semantic innovation, the core of our entire analysis, will therefore be proposed as the starting point for further development.

The second part will deal with the *transition* from the theoretical sphere to the practical sphere. A certain number of phenomena and experiences will be selected and ordered in accordance with their respective functions at the intersection of the theoretical and the practical: fiction helping to re-describe the action which has already taken place, fiction as belonging to an individual agent's plan of action, or fiction creating the very field of intersubjective action.

The third part will be situated at the very heart of the notion of the *social imaginary*, touchstone of the practical function of the imagination. If the key figures of *ideology* and *utopia* are heavily stressed here, this is because they echo, at the far end of the trajectory we shall follow in this essay, the ambiguities and the contradictions mentioned in the first part of our study. Perhaps it will then become apparent that these ambiguities and contradictions are not the drawbacks of the *theory* of the imagination alone

but are constitutive of the *phenomenon* of imagination as such. Only the test of generalization will give weight and substance to this hypothesis.

A philosophical investigation applied to the problem of imagination inevitably encounters from its very outset a series of obstacles, paradoxes, and checks which perhaps explain the relative eclipse of the problem of imagination in contemporary philosophy.

To begin with, the general problem of imagination suffers from the disrepute in which the term "image" is held following its misuse in the empiricist theory of knowledge. The discredit suffered by "psychologism" in contemporary semantics – in the eyes of logicians as well as linguists – also attaches to references to imagination in the theory of "sense" (in this regard we have only to mention Gottlob Frege and his distinction between the "sense" of a proposition or a concept – "objective" and "ideal" sense – and the "representation" which remains "subjective" and merely "factual"). Behaviorist psychology is similarly anxious to eliminate images, which it holds to be private, unobservable mental entities. Then, too, the zealous pursuit of popular philosophy of creativity has to no small degree contributed to discrediting the imagination in the eyes of "analytical" philosophers.

Behind this repugnance expressed by philosophers for welcoming the "return of the outcast," there lies a doubt rooted deeper than a passing mood or a question of circumstances. This doubt was forcefully articulated by Gilbert Ryle in his *Concept of Mind*. Does the term "imagination" designate a single, coherent phenomenon or a collection of experiences only distantly related? Tradition conveys at least four main uses of the term. It indicates first of all the arbitrary evocation of things which are absent but which exist elsewhere; this evocation does not imply any confusion of the absent thing with things which are present here and now.

Following a usage close to the preceding one, the same term designates portraits, paintings, drawings, diagrams, and so on – all of which have their own physical existence but whose function is to "take the place of" the things they represent.

Stretching the meaning still further, we term images fictions which bring to mind not absent things but nonexistent things. These fictions, however, range from dreams – products of sleep – to inventions possessing a purely literary existence such as dramas and novels.

Finally, the term image is applied to the domain of illusion, that is, to representations which for an outside observer or for later reflection are

addressed to absent or nonexistent things but which for the subject and in the instant in which this subject attends to them call for belief in the reality of their object.

What then do the awareness of absence and illusory belief or the nothing of presence and pseudopresence have in common?

The theories of the imagination handed down by philosophical tradition, far from clarifying this radical equivocacy, are instead themselves divided over what is to be taken as paradigmatic in this wide range of basic significations. For this reason, there is a tendency to construct in each instance univocal – but rival – theories of the imagination. The range of variation found in these theories can be measured along two different axes: with regard to the object, the axis of presence and absence; with regard to the subject, the axis of fascinated consciousness and critical consciousness.

Along the first axis, the image corresponds to two opposing theories, illustrated by Hume and by Sartre, respectively. At one end of this first axis the image is referred to the preception of which it is merely the trace, in the sense of a lesser presence; all theories of reproductive imagination tend toward this pole. At the other end of the same axis, the image is thought of essentially in relation to absence, of other-than-present; the various key figures of productive imagination – portrait, dream, and fiction – all refer in different ways to this fundamental otherness.

The productive imagination and even the reproductive imagination, to the extent that it includes the minimum initiative consisting in evoking the absent thing, also both lie along a second axis, where the distinguishing factor is whether or not the subject of imagination is capable of assuming a critical awareness of the difference between the imaginary and the real. Theories of the image then take their place along an axis – noetic this time instead of noematic – where the variations are ordered according to the degree of belief involved. At one end of the axis – that defined by a complete lack of critical awareness – the image is confused with the real, taken for the real. Here we see the power of lies and errors decried by Pascal; it is also *mutatis mutandis* Spinoza's *imaginatio*, infected with belief as long as a contrary belief has not dislodged it from its primary position. At the other end of the axis, where critical distance is fully conscious of itself, imagination serves instead as the instrument of the critique of reality. Husserlian transcendental reduction, as the neutralization of existence, is the fullest illustration of this. The variations in meaning along the second axis are no less ample than those mentioned above. What is common to the *state of confusion* characterizing a

consciousness which inadvertently takes as real something which for another consciousness is not real and the *act of distinction*, possessing a high degree of self-awareness, by which a consciousness posits something at a distance from the real thereby producing otherness at the very heart of its experience?

This is the knot of contradictions which appears when we survey the shambles of the theory of the imagination today. Do these contradictions betray a weakness in the philosophy of the imagination or do they denote a structural trait of the imagination itself which philosophy will have to account for?

II. IMAGINATION IN DISCOURSE

What new approach to the phenomenon of imagination does the theory of metaphor offer? What it offers is first of all a different manner of putting the problem. Instead of approaching the problem by way of perception and asking if and how we can move from perception to image, the theory of metaphor invites us to relate the imagination to a certain type of language use, more precisely, to see in it an aspect of *semantic innovation* characteristic of the metaphorical uses of language. This shift in attack is considerable in itself, as so many prejudices were linked with the idea that the image is an appendix to perception, a shadow of perception. To say that our images are spoken before they are seen is to abandon what we initially – but mistakenly – take for granted, namely, that the image is first and foremost a “scene” being played out on the stage of a mental “theatre” for the benefit of an internal “spectator”; but this also means giving up a second point we also mistakenly assume, namely, that this mental entity is the stuff out of which we construct our abstract ideas, our concepts, the basic ingredient in some sort of mental alchemy.

But if an image is not derived from perception, how can it be derived from language?

An analysis of the poetic image, taken as a paradigmatic case, will provide the germ of a reply. The poetic image is something that the poem as a certain work of language sets out under certain circumstances and in accordance with a certain procedure. The procedure involved here is reverberation, to use an expression which Gaston Bachelard borrowed from Eugene Minkowski. But to understand this procedure we first have to see that reverberation comes not from things seen but from things said. The question which must be treated first, therefore, concerns the very circum-

stances of discourse which serve to generate the imaginary.

I have studied elsewhere how metaphor functions and the important consequences this has for a theory of the imagination. I showed that this functioning is thoroughly misunderstood if metaphor is considered as simply a deviant use of names, a deviation in denomination. Metaphor involves instead a deviant use of predicates in the context of the sentence as a whole. We must therefore speak of metaphorical *utterance* instead of names used metaphorically. The question then turns around the discursive strategy governing the *use of unusual predicates*. Along with certain French and English authors, I want to stress predicative nonpertinence as the means of producing a sort of shock between different semantic fields. It is in answer to the challenge stemming from this shock that we produce a new predicative pertinence which is the metaphor. In its turn, this new appropriateness which is produced at the level of the sentence as a whole provokes, at the level of the individual word, the extension of meaning by which classical rhetoric identifies metaphor.

The value of this approach lies in shifting our attention from problems of change of meaning at the simple level of denomination to problems of restructuring semantic fields at the level of predicative use.

It is precisely at this point that the theory of metaphor is of interest to the philosophy of imagination. This tie between the two theories has always been regarded with a certain suspicion, as is witnessed by the very expression *figurative language* and *figure of style*. It is as if metaphor gave a body, a contour, a face to discourse. But how? It is, in my opinion, in the instant when a new meaning emerges out of the shambles of literal predication that the imagination offers its own special mediation. In order to understand this, let us begin with Aristotle's famous remark that to "make good metaphor . . . is to perceive the similar." But we should be mistaken as to the role of resemblance if we were to interpret this in terms of the association of ideas, as the association through resemblance (in contrast to the association of contiguity which governs metonymy and synecdoche). Resemblance is itself a function of the use of unusual predicates. It consists in the *rapprochement* in which the logical distance between far-flung semantic fields suddenly falls away, creating a semantic shock which, in turn, sparks the meaning of the metaphor. Imagination is the apperception, the sudden view, of a new predicative pertinence. This could be called *predicative assimilation* in order to stress the point that resemblance itself is a process of the same nature as the predicative process itself. None of this then is taken from the old association of ideas as it relates to the

mechanical attraction of mental atoms. Imagining is first and foremost restructuring semantic fields. It is, to use Wittgenstein's expression in the *Philosophical Investigations*, "seeing as . . ."

In this we find what is essential to the Kantian theory of schematism. Schematism, Kant said, is a method for giving an image to a concept. And again, schematism is a rule of producing images. Let us set aside the second assertion for the moment and concentrate instead on the first. In what sense is imagination a method rather than a content? In that it is the very operation of grasping the similar, in the predicative assimilation which answers the initial semantic shock. Suddenly we are "seeing as . . ."; we see old age as the close of the day, time as a beggar, nature as a temple where living pillars, and so forth. Of course, we have not yet accounted for the quasi-sensorial aspect of images. But at least we have introduced Kantian productive imagination into the field of language. In short, the work of the imagination is to schematize metaphorical attribution. Like the Kantian schema, it gives an image to an emerging meaning. Before it is a faded perception, the image is an emerging meaning.

The transition to the image's quasi-sensorial aspect, usually quasi-optical, is then easily understandable. The phenomenology of reading offers us a sure guide here. It is in the experience of reading that we surprise the phenomenon of reverberation, of echoing or resounding, by which the schema produces images in its turn. In schematizing the metaphorical attribution, the imagination radiates out in all directions, reanimating earlier experiences, awakening dormant memories, spreading to adjacent sensorial fields. As Bachelard before him, Marcus Hester remarks in *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor* that the sort of image evoked or stimulated in this way is less the free-floating image treated in the theory of association than the "bound" image engendered by "poetic diction." The poet is an artisan working in language, who creates and gives form to images through the medium of language alone.

The effect of reverberation, resonance, or echo, is not a secondary phenomenon. If, on the one hand, it seems to weaken and scatter sense in the case of daydreams, on the other hand, the image introduces into the entire process a note of suspension, an effect of neutralization, in short, a negative moment thanks to which the entire process is placed in the dimension of unreality. The ultimate role of the image is not only to spread meaning over diverse sensorial fields but to hold meaning suspended in this neutralized atmosphere, in the element of fiction. Indeed, it is this element which will appear again at the close of our study under the name of

utopia. But it already seems that the imagination is really what we all mean by this term: a free play of possibilities in a state of uninvolvedness with respect to the world of perception or action. It is in this state of uninvolvedness that we try out new ideas, new values, new ways of being in the world. But this "common sense" belonging to the notion of the imagination is not fully recognized as long as the fecundity of the imagination has not been connected to that of language as it is exemplified in the metaphorical process. For we then forget this verity: we only see images in so far as we first hear them.

III. IMAGINATION AT THE INTERSECTION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

1. *The Heuristic Force of Fiction*

The first – and most general – condition for *applying* the semantic theory of imagination outside the sphere of discourse is that semantic innovation is already, within the limits of metaphorical utterance, an *ad extra* application, that is, it has a *referential* dimension.

Now this is not self-evident. It may even seem that in its poetic usage language is concerned only with itself and thus has no reference. Did we not just stress above the neutralizing action performed by the imagination in regard to positing existence? Could the metaphorical utterance then have a sense without possessing a reference?

In my opinion, this assertion only tells half the truth. The neutralizing function of the imagination with respect to the "thesis of the world" is only the negative condition required to free a second-order referential force. An analysis of the affirmative force deployed by poetic language shows that it is not just the sense which is split in the metaphorical process but the reference as well. What is eliminated is the ordinary language reference applied to objects which correspond to one of our interests, our primary interest in controlling and manipulating. By holding in abeyance this interest and the sphere of meaning it governs, poetic discourse allows our deep-seated insertion in the life-world to emerge; it allows the ontological tie uniting our being to other beings and to Being to be articulated. What is articulated in this way is what I call second-order reference and which in reality is the primordial reference.

The consequence for the theory of imagination is considerable indeed. It concerns the transition from sense to reference in *fiction*. Fiction has, so to speak, a double valence as to its reference: it is directed elsewhere, even nowhere, but because it designates the nonplace in relation to reality as a

whole, it can indirectly point to this reality by means of what I should like to call a new "reference effect" (in the way that some people speak about "meaning effects"). This new reference effect is nothing other than the power of fiction to *redescribe* reality. Later we shall see the virulent force of this redescription in the key figure of utopia.

This tie between fiction and redescription has been forcefully stressed by certain thinkers working in model theory and hence outside the field of poetic language. There is a body of work which strongly suggests that models are to certain forms of scientific discourse what fictions are to certain forms of poetic discourse. The feature common to both models and fiction is their *heuristic* force, that is, their capacity to open up and unfold new dimensions of reality, suspending our belief in an earlier description.

It is here that the opposing philosophical tradition concerning images offers stubborn resistance; this is the tradition which holds the image to be a faded perception, a shadow of reality. The paradox of fiction is that striking out perception is the condition for heightening our vision of things. François Dagognet demonstrates this in great detail in *Écriture et Iconographie* (1973). Every icon is a graphic figure which recreates reality at a higher level of realism. This "iconic increase" occurs through the use of abbreviations and articulations as is shown by a careful study of the main episodes in the history of painting and of all types of graphic inventions. Applying the vocabulary of the second law of thermodynamics, we can say that this reference effect amounts to scaling the entropic slope of ordinary perception, inasmuch as perception tends to level out differences and soften contrasts. This theory of the iconic element agrees with Nelson Goodman's theory of generalized symbols in *The Languages of Art* (1968): all symbols – in art and in language – have the same referential claim to "remake reality."

Any transition from discourse to praxis stems from this initial extension of fiction outside itself, following the principle of iconic increase.

2. Fiction and Narrative

The first transition from the theoretical to the practical is close at hand. For what certain fictions redescribe is precisely human action itself. Or, to approach the same thing from a different angle, the first way man tries to understand and to master the "diversity" of the practical field is to provide himself with a fictional representation. Whether this is ancient tragedy, modern drama, novels, fables, or legends, the narrative structure provides fiction with the techniques of abbreviation, articulation, and condensation

through which the iconic increase effect is obtained; this, we have noted, has been described elsewhere with regard to painting and the other plastic arts. This is basically what Aristotle had in mind in the *Poetics* when he tied the "mimetic" function of poetry – that is, in the context of his treatise, of tragedy – to the "mythical" structure of the fable constructed by the poet. This is a great paradox: tragedy "imitates" action only because it "recreates" it on the level of a well-structured fiction. Aristotle is therefore able to conclude that poetry is more philosophical than history which is concerned with the contingent, with the ordinary course of action. Poetry goes straight to the essence of action precisely because it connects *mythos* and *mimêsis*, that is, in our vocabulary, *fiction* and *redescription*.

To generalize, may we not extend this remark to any kind of "recounting", of "telling a story?" Why have all peoples invented so many apparently strange and complicated stories? Is it merely for the pleasure of playing with the various combinations afforded by a few simple action segments and by the basic roles which correspond to them – the traitor, the messenger, the saviour, and so on – as structural analyses of stories seem to suggest? Or, based upon this very type of structural analysis, should we not extend the dialectic of fiction and redescription to narrative structure as well? If this comparison is valid, we have to distinguish between the act of narration and the story structure, in order to then discern in the narration what is characteristic of an act of discourse as such, with its fundamental illocutionary and referential force. This referential force consists in the fact that the narrative act, through the narrative structures, applied the framework of an ordered fiction to the diversity of human action. Between what could be a logic of narrative possibilities and the empirical diversity of action, narrative fiction interposes its schematism of human action. By mapping out action in this way, the storyteller produces the same reference effect as the poet who, in Aristotle's terms, imitates reality in his mythical reinvention. Or, to use the terminology of model theory mentioned briefly above, we may say that the story is a heuristic process of redescription in which the heuristic function stems from the narrative structure and redescription has the action itself for referent.

This first step into the practical sphere is still, however, of limited significance. Inasmuch as fiction is restricted to mimetic activity, what is re-described is an action which is *already there*. Redescription is still just a form of description. A poetics of action calls for something more than a reconstruction with only descriptive value.

Now in addition to its mimetic function, even when applied to action,

imagination also has a projective function which is part of the dynamics of action itself.

3. *Fiction and the Capacity to Act*

This function is clearly shown by the phenomenology of *individual* action. No action without imagination, so to speak. And this is true in several ways: from the viewpoint of projects, from that of motivation, and from that of the very capacity to act. In the first instance, the noematic content of the project – what I formerly called the *pragma*, that is, the thing to be done by me – includes a certain schematization of the network of ends and means, which could be termed the schema of the pragma. It is, in fact, in the anticipatory imagining of action that I “try out” different possible courses of action and that I “play” – in the literal sense of the word – with practical possibilities. It is here that pragmatic “play” overlaps with the narrative “play” mentioned above; the function of the project, turned toward the future, and the function of the narrative, turned toward the past, exchange schemata and frameworks, the project borrowing the story’s structuring capacity and the story receiving the project’s capacity for looking ahead. Next, the imagination shares something of the motivational process as well. It is the imagination which provides the milieu, the luminous clearing in which we can compare and contrast motives as different as desires and ethical demands, which in turn can range from professional rules to social customs or to strictly personal values. The imagination provides the mediating space of a common “fantasy” for things as diverse as the force which pushes as if from behind, the attraction which seduces as if from in front, reasons which justify and establish as if from underneath. It is in a form of the imaginary that the common “dispositional” element is represented practically, marking the difference, on the one hand, between a physically constraining cause and a motive and, on the other hand, between a motive and a logically constraining reason. This form of the practical imaginary has its linguistical equivalent in expressions such as: I could do this or that, if I wanted. Language limits itself here to transposing and expressing in the conditional the sort of neutralizing, of hypothetical transposition which is the condition of figurability, permitting desire to enter the common sphere of motivation. Here, language is second in relation to the imaginary unfolding of motives in what has been termed metaphorically a luminous clearing. Finally, it is in the realm of the imaginary that I try out my capacity to do something, that I take the measure of “I can.” I ascribe my

own capacity to myself – as the agent of my own action – only by picturing it to myself in terms of imaginative variations on the theme of “I could,” or “I could have done otherwise had I wanted.” Here again, language is a good guide. Extending Austin’s brilliant analysis in his famous article on “Ifs and Cans,” we can say that in expressions of the form, “I could, I could have if . . .”, the conditional provides the grammatical projection of imaginative variations on the theme “I can.” This form of the conditional belongs to the tense logic of the practical imagination. What is essential from a phenomenological standpoint is that I grasp the immediate certainty of this power only through the imaginative variations which mediate this certainty.

There is thus a progression from the simple schematization of my projects, through the figurability of my desires, to the imaginative variations of the “I can.” This progression points to the idea of the imagination as a general function of what is possible in practice. It is this general function which Kant anticipates in the *Critique of Judgment* under the term of the “free-play” of the imagination.

It remains to be seen, with regard to the freedom of the imagination, what the imagination of freedom might possibly be. A simple phenomenology of individual action, however, is no longer sufficient here. This phenomenology has, of course, outstripped the bounds of the purely mimetic function of the imagination. But it has not gone beyond the limits set by the individual character of human action at this stage of the investigation.

4. Fiction and Intersubjectivity

We shall make a decisive step toward the social imaginary by meditating on the conditions of the possibility of historical experience in general. The imagination is implicated here inasmuch as the historical field of experience itself has an analogical constitution. This point deserves careful elaboration, for it is here that the theory of the imagination transcends not only the literary examples of fiction applied to action but even the phenomenology of volition as a principle of individual action. The starting point is found in the theory of intersubjectivity set out by Husserl in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* and in Alfred Schütz’s development of this theory. We can speak of an *historical* field of experience because my temporal field is connected to another temporal field by what is termed a relation of “pairing” (*Paarung*). In accordance with this pairing, one temporal flux can accompany another. What is more, this “pairing” seems to

be only a cross-section of an all-encompassing flux in which each of us has not only contemporaries but predecessors and successors as well. This higher order temporality carries with it its own intelligibility involving categories which are not just extensions of the categories of individual action (project, motivation, ascribing an act to an agent who can do what he does, and so on). The categories of common actions make specific relations between contemporaries, predecessors, and successors possible, and among these is found the transmission of traditions to the extent that this forms a tie which can be broken or renewed.

Now the inner connection belonging to this all-encompassing flux we call history is subordinated not only to these categories of common action (which Max Weber discusses in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*), but to a higher order transcendental principle which plays the same role as the Kantian "I can" which is held to accompany all my representations. This higher principle is the principle of analogy implied in the initial act of pairing diverse temporal fields, those of our contemporaries, those of our predecessors, and those of our successors. These fields are analogous in the sense that each of us, in principle, can exercise the function of *I* just as *any other* and can ascribe his experience to himself. It is here, as we shall see, that the imagination is involved. But first it must be recalled that the principle of analogy has, unfortunately, most often been mistakenly interpreted in terms of an argument, in the sense of reasoning by analogy; as if in order to ascribe to another the power of saying "I," I had to compare his behavior to mine and to employ an argument using the proportional fourth term based on the purported resemblance between the behavior of others observed from outside and my own experienced directly. The analogy implied in the coupling is in no way an argument. It is the transcendental principle establishing the other as another self like myself, a self *like* my self. The analogy here involves the direct transfer of the meaning "I." *Like* me, my contemporaries, my predecessors, and my successors *can* say "I." It is in this way that I am historically related to all the others. It is also in this sense that the principle of analogy between the various temporal fields is to the handing down of traditions what the Kantian "I think" is to the causal order of experience.

Such is the transcendental condition under which the imagination is a fundamental component in founding the historical field. It is not by accident that Husserl, in the *Fifth Meditation*, bases his notion of analogical apperception on that of imaginative transfer. To say that you think as I do, that you experience pleasure and pain as I do, is to be able to

imagine what I should think and experience if I were in your place. This transfer in the imagination of my "here" to your "there" is the root of what we call empathy (*Einfühlung*), which can be hate as easily as love. In this sense, the transfer in imagination is to analogical apperception what schematism is to objective experience in Kant. This imagination is the schematism belonging to the constitution of intersubjectivity in analogical apperception. This schematism functions in the same way as the productive imagination in objective experience, namely, as the genesis of new connections. The task of this productive imagination is, in particular, to keep alive all sorts of mediations which make up historical ties and, among these, institutions which objectify the social link and increasingly transform the "us" into "them," to use Alfred Schütz's expression. This anonymity of mutual relations in a bureaucratic society can go so far as to simulate causal connection on the level of objects. This systematic distortion of communication, this radical reification of the social process, thus tends to abolish the difference between the course of history and the course of things. It is then the task of the productive imagination to fight against this terrifying entropy in human relations. To express this in the idiom of competence and performance, the imagination has as its competence preserving and identifying the *analogy of the ego* in all relations with our contemporaries, our predecessors, and our successors. Its competence therefore lies in preserving and identifying the difference between the course of history and the course of things.

In conclusion, the possibility of an historical experience in general lies in our ability to remain open to the effects of history, to borrow Gadamer's category, *Wirkungsgeschichte*. We are affected by the effects of history, however, only to the extent that we are able to increase our capacity to be affected in this way. The imagination is the secret of this competence.

IV. SOCIAL IMAGINARY

The fourth and final step in the study we have placed at the crossroads of theory and practice may possibly have led us too far too fast. Of course, the capacity, mentioned in our conclusion, which delivers us over in the imagination to the "effects of history" is indeed the basic condition of historical experience in general. But this condition is buried so deeply and has been so neglected that it constitutes nothing more than an ideal of communication, an Idea in the Kantian sense. The truth of our condition is that the analogical tie which makes every man another like myself is

accessible to us only through a certain number of *imaginative practices*, such as *ideology* and *utopia*. These imaginative practices are broadly defined as mutually antagonistic and as representative of two different pathologies which completely mask the positive function of each, that is, the contribution made by each in establishing the analogical tie between myself and my fellowman. As a result, the productive imagination mentioned above – and which we considered the schematization of this analogical tie – can be restored to itself only through the *critique* of the antagonistic and semipathological figures of the social imagination. Mistaking the unavoidable nature of this detour is what I meant above by going too far too fast. We must therefore consider a twofold ambiguity, that which results from the polarity *between* ideology and utopia and that resulting from the polarity *within* each of these between its positive and constructive side and its negative and destructive side.

With regard to the first polarity, that between ideology and utopia, we have to admit that since Karl Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* in 1929, it has seldom appeared as the object of study. There is indeed a Marxist and post-Marxist critique of ideologies, forcefully developed by K. O. Apel and Jürgen Habermas in line with the Frankfurt school. But on the other hand, we find a history and a sociology of utopia only loosely connected to this *Ideologie Kritik*. And yet Karl Mannheim had paved the way by showing the difference between these two phenomena on the basis of a common criterion of *noncongruence* with respect to historical and social reality. In my opinion, this criterion presupposes that individuals as well as collective entities (groups, classes, nations, etc.) are primarily and without exception related to social reality in a manner other than that of direct participation, in accordance with the key figures of noncoincidence which are precisely those of the social imaginary.

The sketch which follows will be limited to drawing the basic traits of this imaginary which point up the analogical constitution of the social tie. The investigation will not be pointless if it reestablishes at the end of its course the initial ambiguities and contradictions of the meditation on the imagination.

I have attempted, in another study, to discern the levels of meaning which form the phenomenon of ideology. I upheld the thesis that the ideological phenomenon could not be limited to the role of distortion and dissimulation, as a simplified interpretation of Marxism would have it. We could not even understand that ideology is capable of conferring such true effectiveness on an inverted image of reality if we had not first

acknowledged the constituting nature of the social imaginary. The latter operates at the most primitive level, as is described by Max Weber at the start of his great work when he characterizes social action as meaningful behavior, which is mutually oriented and socially integrated. It is at this radical level that ideology is constituted. It seems related to the need every group has to give itself an *image* of itself, to "represent" itself, in the theatrical sense of the word, to put itself on stage, to play itself. Perhaps no social group can exist without this indirect relation to its own being through a representation of itself. As Lévi-Strauss forcefully affirms in his introduction to the work of Mauss, symbolism is not an effect of society but society an effect of symbolism. The nascent pathology of the ideological phenomenon arises from its very function of reinforcing and repeating the social tie in situations that occur after the fact. Simplification, schematization, stereotyping and ritualization arise out of the ever-widening distance between actual practice and the interpretations through which the group becomes aware of its own existence and practice. The condition of the production of social messages seems indeed to be a certain kind of nontransparency of our cultural codes.

In the same analysis, I try to show that the function of dissimulation clearly surpasses that of integration when ideological representations are monitored by the system of authority in a given society. Every authority, in fact, seeks to make itself legitimate. Now it seems that if every claim to legitimacy is linked with people's belief in this legitimacy, the relation between the authority's claim and the belief which answers to this is basically unsymmetrical. The claim coming from the authority always contains more than the belief which is accorded this authority. It is here that ideology mobilizes its forces to fill the gap between the demand from above and the belief from below.

I think that the Marxist concept of ideology, with its metaphor of "turning the real on its head" in an illusionary image, can be set against this double background. For how indeed could illusions, fantasies, or fantasmagoria have any historical significance if ideology did not have a mediating function in the most basic social tie, if ideology were not contemporaneous with the symbolic constitution of social ties themselves? In truth, we cannot speak of a real activity which would be preideological or nonideological. We could not even understand how an inverted representation of reality could serve the interests of a ruling class if the relation between domination and ideology were not more primitive than the analysis based on social classes and were not capable of even outliving

the class structure. All that Marx contributes which is new and unquestionably valid stands out against this initial background of the symbolic constitution of social ties in general and of the relation of authority in particular. His own contribution concerns the legitimizing function of ideology with respect to the relations of domination stemming from the division into classes and the class struggle.

Finally, however, it is the polarity between ideology and utopia which makes both its founding role and its specific pathology intelligible. The difficulty inherent in the simultaneous study of utopia and ideology lies in the fact that utopia, unlike ideology, forms a definite literary genre. Utopia knows itself as utopia. It clearly calls out its name. Then, too, its literary status, at least since Thomas More, allows us to approach its existence by way of its writings. The history of utopia is staked out with the names of its inventors, in direct contrast to the anonymity of ideologies.

As soon as one tries to define utopia in terms of its *content*, one is surprised to find that in spite of the continuity of certain themes – the status of the family, the consumption and the appropriation of goods, the organization of political life and of religion – it is not difficult to class diametrically opposed projects under each of these terms. This paradox will lead us later to an interpretation in terms of imagination. But we can already at this point begin to suspect that if utopia is the imaginary project of another society, of another reality, this “constituting imagination,” as Desroche calls it, can justify the most conflicting choices. Another family, another sexuality can mean monachism or sexual community. Another type of consumption can mean asceticism or conspicuous consumption. Another relation to property can mean direct appropriation in the absence of law or detailed artificial planning. Another relation to the government of the people can mean employee-run enterprises or submission to a virtuous and disciplined bureaucracy. Another relation to religion can mean radical atheism or festivity.

The crucial point in the analysis consists in tying all these thematic variations to the more fundamental ambiguities inherent in the *function* of utopia. These functional variations parallel those of ideology. The layers of meaning to be found here must be set out in both cases with the same sense of complexity and paradox. Just as we had to resist the temptation to interpret ideology in terms of dissimulation and distortion alone, we must also resist the temptation to construct the concept of utopia on the sole basis of its quasi-pathological expressions.

The central idea should be that of *nowhere* implied by the word itself and by Thomas More's description. For it is beginning with this strange

spatial extraterrestrialness - this nonplace in the literal sense of the word - that we can take a fresh look at our reality, in relation to which nothing can henceforth be taken for granted. The field of the possible now extends out beyond the real. It is this field which is staked out by the "other" ways of living mentioned above. The question, then, is knowing whether the imagination could have a "constituting" role in this leap outside. Utopia is the mode in which we radically rethink what family, consumption, government, religion, and so on are. From "nowhere" springs the most formidable questioning of what is. Utopia therefore appears in its primitive core as the exact counterpart of our first concept of ideology as the function of social integration. Utopia, in counterpoint, is the function of social subversion.

In saying this, we are ready to pursue the parallelism one step further, following the second concept of ideology as the instrument for legitimizing a given system of authority. What is in fact at stake in utopia is precisely the "given" found in all systems of authority, namely, the excess of the demand for legitimacy in relation to the belief held by members of the community. Just as ideologies tend to bridge this gap or to hide it, utopias, one might say, reveal the unstated surplus value attaching to authority and unmask the pretension inherent in all systems of legitimation. This is why all utopias, at one time or another, offer "other" ways of exercising power in the family, in economic, political, or religious life. This "other" way can mean, as we have seen, things as diametrically opposed as a more rational or more ethical authority or the complete absence of power if it is true that power as such is ultimately considered radically and inalterably evil. That the question of power is the central question of every utopia is confirmed not only by the description of the literary-type social and political fantasies but also by the different attempts to "realize" utopia. This basically takes the form of microsocieties, whether passing or permanent, ranging from monastery to kibbutz or hippy commune. These attempts do not attest solely to the seriousness of the utopian spirit, to its capacity for instituting new modes of life; but also to its basic aptitude to come to grips with the paradoxes of power.

The pathological traits of utopia result from this *mad* dream. Just as the positive concept of ideology contained the seed of its negative counterpart, so, too, the pathology specific to utopia can already be glimpsed in its most positive aspects. It is in this way that the third concept of ideology corresponds to a third concept of utopia.

Because utopia stems from a leap into somewhere else, into nowhere, it develops the unsettling features which are easily discerned in the literary

expressions of utopia: a tendency to hold reality in the throes of a dream, a fixation on perfectionist designs, etc. Certain authors have not hesitated to compare the logic developed by utopia to that characteristic of schizophrenia: the logic of all or nothing, standing outside the workings of time; a preference for schematizing space; a disdain for intermediary degrees and a total lack of interest in the first step to be taken to move toward the ideal; blindness to the contradictions inherent in action – either that these make certain evils inescapable in the pursuit of certain desired goals or that they point up the incompatibility of equally desirable goals. To this clinical tableau of flight into dreams and into literature, we can also add the regressive features of the nostalgia for a lost paradise hidden under the guise of futurism.

The time has come to account for this twofold dichotomy in terms of imagination, first, the dichotomy between the poles of ideology and utopia and second, that within each of the terms between the poles of their ambiguous variations.

We must first try, it seems to me, to think of ideology and utopia together in terms of their most positive, constructive, and, if we may say so, healthy aspects. Starting from the concept of noncongruence in Mannheim, it is possible to construct both the integrative function of ideology and the subversive function of utopia. At first glance, these two phenomena are simply the inverse of one another. At a closer look, they dialectically imply one another. The most “conservative” ideology, by which I mean that which exhausts itself in repeating the social tie and reinforcing it, is an ideology only through the gap implied in what we could call, in memory of Freud, the “consideration of figurability” inherent in the social image. Conversely, the utopian imagination seems merely excentric. This is only an appearance. In a poem entitled “A Step Outside the Human,” the poet Paul Celan refers to utopia in these terms: “Inside a sphere directed toward the human, but excentric.” We see the paradox here. It has two sides. On the one hand, there is no movement toward what is human which is not first excentric; on the other, elsewhere leads here. And Levinas poses the question: “What if humanity were a genus which allowed a total break within its logical place, its extension, what if by going toward another man one transcended the human. And what if utopia were not the lot of a cursed wandering but the clearing in which man shows himself: in the clearing of utopia . . . and man? and the creature? – in this clarity.”²

This criss-crossing of utopia and ideology appears as the play of two

fundamental directions of the social imagination. The first tends toward integration, repetition, reflection. The second, because it is excentric, tends toward wandering. But neither exists without the other. The most repetitive, the most reduplicative ideology – to the extent that it mediates immediate social ties – the ethical, social substance Hegel would say introduces a gap, a distance, and consequently something which is potentially excentric. On the other hand, the most errant form of utopia, to the extent that it moves “inside a sphere directed toward the human” remains a hopeless attempt to show what man basically is in the clarity of utopia.

This is why the tension between utopia and ideology is insuperable. It is often even impossible to decide whether this or that mode of thinking is ideological or utopian. The line can be drawn only after the fact and then on the basis of the success of the enterprise – a criterion which, in turn, can be questioned inasmuch as it rests on the supposition that only what was successful was just. But, what of aborted attempts? will they not return one day, and will they not then obtain the success history has refused them in the past?

This phenomenology of the social imagination gives us the key to the second aspect of the problem, namely, that each term of the pair involves its own specific pathology. If imagination is a process rather than a state, it becomes comprehensible that there is a specific dysfunction corresponding to each direction of the process of imagination.

Ideology's dysfunction is distortion and dissimulation. We showed above that these pathological figures constitute the foremost dysfunction grafted onto the integrative function of the imagination. A primitive distortion, a primordial dissimulation are quite inconceivable. It is in the symbolic constitution of the social tie that the dialectic of hiding and showing originates. The reflective function of ideology can be understood only on the basis of this ambiguous dialectic which already possesses all the features of noncongruence. It follows from this that the tie denounced by Marxism linking the process of dissimulation to the interests of the ruling class is only one aspect of this phenomenon. Any “superstructure” whatsoever can function ideologically: science and technology just as well as religion and philosophical idealism.

The dysfunction charactersitic of utopia is no less understandable on the basis of the pathology of the imagination. Utopia tends toward schizophrenia in the same way that ideology tends toward dissimulation and distortion. The pathology is rooted in the excentric function of utopia. It

develops in caricature the ambiguity of the phenomenon which oscillates between fantasy and creativity, flight and return. "Nowhere" may or *may not* give us a new orientation with respect to the "here and now." But who knows whether this or that errant mode of existence is not a prophecy concerning man to come? Who knows even whether a certain degree of individual pathology is not the condition for social change, inasmuch as this pathology brings to light the sclerosis of worn out institutions? To express this in a more paradoxical fashion, who knows whether the disease is not at the same time the remedy?

These troubling remarks at least have the advantage of directing our gaze toward an irreducible feature of the social imaginary, namely, that we reach the social imaginary only through the figures of false consciousness. We can take possession of the creative power of the imagination only through a critical relationship to these two figures of false consciousness. It is as if, in order to cure the madness of utopia, it were necessary to call upon the "healthy" function of ideology and as if the critique of ideology could only be made by a consciousness capable of looking at itself from "nowhere."

It is in this *work* on the social imaginary that the contradictions, which a simple phenomenology of the individual imagination has to leave in their state of contradiction, can be mediated.

NOTES

¹ A French version of this article, written in honor of Mgr Henri Van Camp, first appeared in *Savoir, faire espérer: les limites de la raison*. Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Bruxelles, 1976.

² E. Levinas, 'Sens et existence', p. 28.

THE PROBLEM OF PASSIVE CONSTITUTION*

In speaking of the concept of passive constitution and passive synthesis, we raise the central problem in the interpretation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. It is with the introduction of this concept that transcendental phenomenology distinguishes itself from traditional transcendental philosophies which, since Kant, have considered all syntheses as the "spontaneity of an act of understanding." Yet it is not only the relationship of phenomenology to this tradition but also its own character as a theory of transcendental constitution which is still controversial. Twenty years ago Eugene Fink already pointed out that Husserl's use of the term "constitution" fluctuates "between sense-formation and creation."¹ Instead of "sense-formation" one can also use the term "apperception" which means the apprehending and determining of something *as* something. Husserl's most important and basic operative concepts lack precision, particularly in the case of his concept of "transcendental life." And yet it is only after we have made these basic concepts precise that we can answer the question: who or what really is the "transcendental subjectivity"? In response to this question we do not have, as is well known, a general consensus.

I hope that the following remarks will contribute to the clarification of the problem. They do not claim to be original but rather proceed from and bring together what already has been worked out in the interpretative literature in order to draw a few consequences that I trust will be illuminating. It will become apparent that this fluctuation of the concept of constitution between sense-formation (apperception) and creation cannot be eliminated by making the concept more precise, but rather that it has its basis in the "things themselves" (*Sache selbst*). We must see at what point in the theory of constitution this fluctuation of meaning becomes evident and the transition from one meaning to the other is demanded and, accordingly, how far we are justified in understanding constitution not only as sense-formation but also as creation. This thesis is, of course, based on an *interpretation* which attempts to answer a question which Husserl himself did not pose but for which we can draw several clues from his texts. So much by way of introduction to the task of the following inquiry.

Where do we see this fluctuation in Husserl's use of constitution? To be

sure we do not find it in Husserl's analysis of the phenomena of active constitution and synthesis which themselves are the accomplishments (*Leistungen*) of the positional ego. It is clear that these accomplishments must be understood not as creating acts but rather as apperceptive sense-bestowing acts. The meaning of the phrase "accomplishments of the ego" is completely intelligible here. The ambiguity of the concept of constitution becomes apparent, however, in relation to the passive constitution and passive synthesis which lies before all active constitution and which is, in fact, its presupposition. In this sense Husserl also speaks of it as pre-constitution.

Of course one must distinguish in the concept of passivity between *secondary* passivity and an *original* passivity or "primal passivity." Everything that was once actively constituted becomes an "acquisition" of the ego to which one can always reach back. This secondary passivity must be left out of consideration because it belongs to constitution *qua* sense-formation and our remarks must be restricted exclusively to original passivity.

To this end three theses are advanced which I hope to establish by what follows:

First, the "depth-dimensions" of the process of constitution cannot be attained by the phenomenological reflection.

Secondly, the functions of corporeality belong to the functions of passive pre-constitution and together with it to "transcendental subjectivity."

Thirdly, the primal streaming flow (*Geschehen*) of "transcendental subjectivity" is to be understood as a creative process. The precise meaning of creation is gained from the phenomenological analysis of this process.

I

Let us begin with an exposition of the first thesis which is: *the "depth-dimensions" of the process of constitution cannot be attained by the phenomenological reflection.* This thesis is not new. It was amply established by Klaus Held in his book *Lebendige Gegenwart*.² Here we can only briefly summarize the results of his study.

At the bottom most level of the depth-dimensions of original passivity, according to Husserl, lie the syntheses of the time-consciousness in which the ego constitutes itself as temporal and becomes aware of itself as a stream of consciousness. It is precisely this self-constitution of the ego in

its temporality which expressly became a problem in Husserl's later reflections during the thirties. The most decisive texts concerning this problem are found in the unpublished manuscripts which Held refers to in his book.

Let us begin with a sentence written by Husserl in 1931: "The universal life of consciousness or ego of consciousness that, as a stream of consciousness, extends through a transcendental-immanent time is a founded intentional accomplishment."³ It is first in the uncovering of these accomplishments that the phenomenological reduction obtains that fundamental basis which makes all experience possible. But how is this fundamental basis to be defined? Husserl answers:

If we consider this transcendental life itself, this transcendental ego, or if I consider myself as I am to be posited prior to all my pre-judgements and to all that which is for me precisely as the primal condition for their ontic sense (*Seinssinn*), then I find myself as [the] streaming present.⁴

This "primeval, streaming, living present"⁵ is that to which the phenomenological reduction traces back with its ultimate step.

It is not possible here to follow Held's extensive analysis of the living present and the development of its "riddles." Only this much can be said: in the earlier writings, including *Erste Philosophie*,⁶ Husserl again and again passed over a discussion of these depth-dimensions. Yet it is only such a discussion that can justify speaking of transcendental subjectivity as an absolute subjectivity. This fundamental functioning ego is absolute in as much as it is the primal source for all constitutive accomplishments that are built upon it. It is the absolute ground for all transcendencies which it encounters because no intentional experience can be effected without it.⁷ In this sense it is the

primal phenomenon in which everything else that can be called phenomenon has its source. It is the standing-streaming (*stehend-stromend*) self-present or the *absolute ego* present to itself streaming as itself streaming in its standing-streaming life.⁸

This characterizing of the fundamental functioning ego as the absolute ego leads us with greater clarity to the question: in which sense is "constitution" used here: as sense-bestowal or as creation? Does the word "source" mean the basis of all constitutive functions involved in allowing what is given to appear (*Funktionen des Erscheinenlassens von Gegebenem*) or does it mean the basis of what is given itself? In the latter case the depth-dimensions of constitutive accomplishments would be absolute in the sense in which metaphysics has always spoken about the absolute. But for the moment this question must be set aside.

Let us ask: how is this "primal phenomenon" of the "standing-streaming life" characterized by Husserl? His statements on the subject, found in the decisive C manuscripts from 1931 to 1933, sound contradictory. The streaming life is passive: "passive means . . . that the stream proceeds without the activity (*Tun*) of the ego."⁹ On the other hand, however, we read: "temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is in every respect ego-accomplishment."¹⁰ But this statement is at the same time qualified by Husserl's indication that it is not the case "that this temporalization of living-experience is always active accomplishment" for if

the stationary stream in itself . . . already always had effective intentionality [Husserl means here active intentionality], . . . we would come to an infinite regress.¹¹

How, then, is the relationship between stream and ego to be conceived? Husserl replies: "The stream is always ahead (*im Voraus*), but the ego is also ahead."¹²

The "riddle" of the living present is, therefore, the following:

the entire primal streaming occurrence is not a dead occurrence [dead meaning: foreign to the ego] but rather the accomplishment of the ego is the inner most dynamo.¹³

We find a similar passage in the second book of the *Ideas*:

The ego does not arise¹⁴ originally out of experience in the sense of the associative apperception in which the unities of the manifolds of the nexus constitute themselves but rather out of its own life¹⁵ (it is what it is not *for* the ego but, rather, it is itself the ego).¹⁶

It is clear that *one cannot speak of accomplishment in the sense of an active accomplishment* for "activity in general has, as such, its 'presuppositions,' 'its conditions of possibility,' that do not themselves arise through activity."¹⁷ In the pre-temporalization, in the primal passive streaming (*Strömenlassen*), "an absolutely anonymous ontic sense that is not already [temporally]¹⁸ differentiated is temporalized"¹⁹ and it is only afterwards that it can be pointed to in the phenomenological reflection.

Husserl was well aware of the difficulties encountered in the reflective comprehension of the "primal phenomenon." He even questions the possibility of comprehending it when he says that in reflection

the present which has become objective is objective in an . . . act that itself is not objectively known. Thus what we presume as the last existent, that primal existent which we assume under the title "primal phenomenal present," is actually a "phenomenon" for use and [therefore] not the most fundamental.²⁰

It is conceded thereby that the "amazing being-for-myself in the living present"²¹ cannot become a phenomenon for itself. It only becomes a phen-

omen for itself when it is turned into an object of a reflection and therewith "ontified." Reflection directs itself toward what has already happened, it is an awareness of the functioning of the ego after the fact. It cannot overtake the ego itself *as* it functions, for in the very moment of reflection the functioning has already become another, that is, it has become the performance (*Vollzug*) of its act of reflection, and thus it is not objective for itself. Here we reach a final limit to what is attainable in its self-being through the reflection.

In which sense can we speak of the apodictic self-certainty of transcendental subjectivity in relation to this fundamental basis of all of its active and passive accomplishments? Husserl's reflections lead us to this question and yet it is not really answered by him. What gives us the right, we may ask, to assert propositions about the primal phenomenal sphere? Held cites Husserl's "mollifying statements" with which he circumscribed the question. These accomplishments, it turns out, are to be made evident as such that have always already occurred. As a "non-temporal" and "supra-temporal" ego I know myself as being the identity of the one who now reflects and the one who performs these accomplishments (that have already taken place) upon which I reflect. "What we have called the identity of the one who performs [these accomplishments] is something specifically unique (*ein einzigartig Eigenes*)."²² This, then, is an identity apodictically certain to itself but unable to grasp in reflection precisely that function which allows it to become an identity for thought. If it is in the carrying out of the reduction that we obtain apodictic certainty, how is it possible to define this identity if its being in its depth-dimensions is a primal passive streaming (*Strömenlassen*) in which an anonymous ontic sense appears? Is it possible to overcome this absolute anonymity? Can the ego – to use Fichte's phrase – catch itself red-handed? And if this functioning is at all expressible, then how can it be characterized as a transcendental subjectivity?²³

Who or what, we must go on to ask, is this "transcendental subjectivity"? What does its absoluteness mean and how are we to understand its "accomplishing"? Can it be understood exclusively in the sense of sense-formation if the passive pre-constituted "ontic sense" is an absolutely anonymous sense that, as such, eludes each apperceptive objectification (sense-bestowal), because the reflection upon it already "ontifies" it? Or must this primal passive occurring be understood as creation and what, then, would creation mean?

In order to find an answer to this question we must consider more exactly just what it is that belongs to this occurrence of the primal stream in which subjectivity constitutes itself in its self-temporalization (*Verzeitlichung*). Thus the *second* thesis: *the functions of corporeality belong to the functions of the passive pre-constitution and together with it to "transcendental subjectivity"*; thus the lived body is not only constituted but also constituting.

First we must ask the question: how must one think of corporeality so that it is understood not merely as constituted but also as constituting? For only after we have answered this question can we move to the third thesis and investigate its consequences for the concept of the accomplishments of constitution and transcendental subjectivity.

But now the first question: to what extent could functioning corporeality belong to the passive primal constitution as an accomplishment of a transcendental subjectivity whose most fundamental accomplishments, the depth-dimensions, are syntheses of its temporal self-constitution? How do temporal self-constitution and corporeality relate to one another?

It may appear that all concepts of the accomplishments of the constitution of time-formation would be concepts of mere *forms* of functions that would then need a given content before they could come into play. In the lectures of time-consciousness Husserl understood this content as a hyletic datum correlative to a primal impressional consciousness.²⁴ Hyle in the *Ideas* also means formless stuff.²⁵ In this sense Sokolowski has spoken of the time-constituting functions as mere forms whose employment would depend on a given reality.²⁶ But this concept of the hyle and its corresponding primal impression was later given up. Thus Husserl says in the *Crisis* that with the question about the ultimate and deepest source of verification of all "pure" experience "one must not go straight back to the supposed immediately given 'sense-data,' as if *they* were immediately characteristic of the purely intuitive data of the life-world."²⁷

Claesges has shown in his book on Husserl's theory of space-constitution how this correction of the notion of hyle comes from Husserl's analysis of kinaesthetic consciousness.²⁸ Claesges then asks: what consequences which Husserl himself did not draw out can we establish for the revision of the relationship of mundane and transcendental subjectivity and for the definition of the concept of transcendental subjectivity?

In the first discussion of kinaesthetic consciousness in the second book of the *Ideas* the relationship of hyle and the kinaesthetic functions is described in terms of its meaning for the constitution of something as the object of perception and not for the temporal self-constitution of the ego. The reason is that the notion of constitution found in the *Ideas* is static and the question of genesis is left out of consideration. However, the problem was already touched upon in *Ideas II* in the analysis of the constitution of the personal ego. Husserl remarked there that all capabilities (*Vermögen*) of the ego, to which the kinaesthetic capabilities also belong, are finally traceable back to the "primal capabilities of the subject."²⁹ Husserl was completely aware of the limits of these analyses, as we see in his critical remarks written in the margin of his text, which refer to their incompleteness and especially to the unsolved problems of the "beginning," of the origin of all these accomplishments.³⁰

What does it mean when Husserl says in the *Crisis* that the sense data should not be taken as something immediately given? In manuscript C 7 I the problem is formulated as a question:

... I always need two things: on the one hand the streaming field of the living experiences within which [there is] constantly a field of primal impressions fading into retention and before it, protention and, on the other hand, the ego that is affected and motivated to action by this. But is not [what is] primally impressional already an apperceptive unity, a noematic [something] which comes here from the ego; and does not the questioning-back lead again and again to an apperceptive unity?³¹

This is the same problem we noted earlier when we quoted: "The stream is always ahead, but the ego is also ahead." In the lectures on phenomenological psychology Husserl speaks of the "inner time-consciousness constituting the sense-datum"³² that functions for the new higher level consciousness of apprehending. He also indicates there that affection has the structure of "form and content."³³ Because the hyle, understood as that which is sensed in the act of sensation, is not itself immediately given but rather mediated through the constituting accomplishments of temporalization, the distinction between hyle as formless stuff and animating apprehension as form is no longer in force. Husserl also speaks in the *Cartesian Meditations* of the "passive synthesis providing all matter."³⁴

What then are these accomplishments? They are, first of all, retention and protention in their synthesis with the streaming present. When one speaks in this manner, however, it is based upon an abstraction insofar as *what* is synthesized in this synthesis of temporalization is left out of consideration. In a deceptively clear passage in the lectures on time-consciousness this "what" is called the primal impressional datum.³⁵ For example,

the tone which is constituted in its duration as fading away. But the tone datum – and Husserl does not bring this out there – is only given to us in receptive hearing in such a way that it can become a theme for us. This is not merely an inner act of attention but rather already presupposes preceding kinaestheses, such as the turning of the head to hear. This is easier to see in the relationship between ocular movement and the corresponding optic datum. Husserl says nothing of this in the time lectures. The passive syntheses of time-consciousness has not yet been brought together with the kinaesthetic syntheses. But when one does this, the results are clear: *without impressions there are no time constituting accomplishments and without kinaesthesen there are no impressions*. The impressions are related to the actual kinaesthetic field co-ordinated to the sense-capacities. That the living streaming present is always a primal impressional present means that these primal impressions are already synthetic unities produced in the passive syntheses of association and contrast. Only in them does the individual datum come into relief. And only by disregarding those accomplishments which let it appear, can it be considered as isolated. *In concreto*, however, its appearance is mediated through those passive syntheses which for their part are constituted in inner time-consciousness. Thus one can say with Claesges: “the kinaesthetic consciousness is time-consciousness.”³⁶ Aquirre expressed this in the following way: “The hyle arises (*herkommt*) from me myself.”³⁷ It springs up in the kinaesthetic process without which there would be no living, streaming present. The ego is originally aroused through affection. An awake ego without impressions is not conceivable. But does that mean that transcendental subjectivity owes its affection to itself? If this is the case, the accomplishments of constitution would be creative.

Another citation from Husserl gives us a point of access to this question:

Each sense-datum is a datum constituting itself in consciousness in a most complicated way (in the original consciousness of temporalness). Each ego-act and each “I am affected by an impulse” is an experiencing (*Erleben*) that is only thinkable as streaming here from the ego and as being-directed-toward-it, and thinkable only in the entire nexus of the monad.³⁸

If we only consider that all affection is the primitive affection of the sense organs as organs of my body and that all kinaesthetic movements are the conditions under which the affection of the sense organs becomes possible, it follows that corporeality must be understood not merely as constituted but also as constituting. It is a system of constitutive capabilities (*Vermöglichkeiten*) to which the actual sense fields are co-ordinated, and, as such, it belongs to transcendental subjectivity. What can possibly become a datum

for me is established by that organization of the sense fields related to my body. It is in this sense that the hyle "arises from me myself."

To understand that, is to ask: how do I become aware of my corporeality in an original manner so that I can speak of it's functions as constituting? It is, as Husserl amplified in the *Ideas*, the consciousness of the "I can," the awareness of the "ability-to-rule" (*Walten-Können*) in the body; I can do this and that. Thus it is a practical consciousness.

But, one could object, is not this consciousness of our ability already a constituted awareness? Does it not coincide with the awareness of that movement brought about by engaging my capabilities? For example, I see my hand that grasps. It is thereby already constituted as the object of my perception. Does not my being aware (*innewerden*) of the movement brought about by me already presuppose my body as constituted?

Against this objection one must recognize that the body is first *my* body because its organs are understood as the ensemble of that which I have immediately at my disposal. Obviously this being-able-to-dispose (*Verfügenkönnen*) occurs before we have a consciousness of it. Looking at it genetically, the body becomes gradually assimilated as being at one's disposal. Thus Husserl says in *Ideas II*: "Originally the 'I move' . . . precedes the 'I can'. . . ." ³⁹ And to this we should add that also the consciousness of our I-can, or our "ruling in the body," genetically precedes the developed ego-consciousness. The discovery of what is *mine* (*das mein*) precedes the discovery of the *ego*. ⁴⁰ That means that the spontaneity which we attribute to the performing ego is still concealed but nevertheless ruling in this concealment. It is only in this sense that the words "the ego also lies ahead" (*voranliegt*) are to be taken.

What kind of "knowing" or "being-aware" (*Innesein*) do we have of the ego-consciousness as not yet developed? This "knowing" precedes the reflection and is one with the performance of the kinaesthesen as a satisfied or unsatisfied "body-feeling" (*Leibgefühl*). The expression "body-feeling" is not entirely appropriate because it means something "inward" where an "inwardness knowing itself" is not at all given. Perhaps Heidegger's concept of "having found one self" (*Befindlichkeit*) characterizes this "being-aware" better, for it is not merely a "feeling" but rather it points to the situation as in the middle of all that which it affects and against which kin aesthetic movement is directed. In this sense it is the *first disclosure of the world*. It precedes the reflection and in the immediacy of its performance it cannot be brought before our gaze through the reflection. For, as we have already seen, the objectification of the accomplishments of

the ego in reflection never gives us the ego in the immediacy of its present activity. *There is more to understand about the world and our localisation in the world than can be overtaken by reflection.*

It is a fact, which we cannot further deduce that there is actually such a center of spontaneity. However, this center is not without locality. It is coordinated to a transcendental occurrence in which the world "makes" itself for us as a construct in the immanence of "transcendental subjectivity." Husserl already speaks in this sense in *Ideas II* of the "bedrock (*Untergrund*) of nature" declaring itself in corporeality as a passive structural moment of the constituting transcendental subjectivity itself, and he likewise speaks of the "nature-side" of subjectivity.⁴¹ In *Erste Philosophie* he also speaks of the

absolute being of each ego in itself, the absolute being of each I-thou-relationship and of each communal relationship running from one ego to another ego or to more egos, whose index is called passive nature.⁴²

But how must transcendental subjectivity be understood so that it does not merely have nature as something opposed to it but rather it itself has a "nature-side"? And what then does "accomplishment of constitution" mean?

III

With this we make the transition to the third thesis: *the primal streaming occurrence of "transcendental subjectivity" is to be understood as a creative process.*

First we must clarify what the phrase "the nature-side of transcendental subjectivity" means. This must be understood as an indication of the fact that we only know of nature to the extent to which it is related to the corporeal-kinaesthetic accomplishments of constitution. Thus we cannot know anything other or anything more about nature – and it itself cannot be anything other for us – than what "declares" itself in this corporeal occurrence. All of our knowledge about this occurrence which encloses us as corporeal beings, all of our theories constructed to clarify it are in the last analysis dependent upon this. This occurrence is experienced as an occurrence which penetrates through our body and through the body of all others with whom we share our world. But from the outset it is distinguished for us (1) into an occurrence which we have at our disposal as *our* corporeal kinaesthetic occurrence within certain borders; and (2) into an occurrence that affects us. In the latter case the occurrence is not at our

disposal and thus it is "extra-corporeal." Yet it shows itself to us as an occurrence that is inseparably related to what each as *his* body can experience. If this occurrence transcends my body and encloses it, then *the hyle is not something that is based in something entirely foreign to the body* (as is the case with Kant who used the word "matter" to designate the uncognizable basis of affection) *but rather it belongs to the immanence of transcendental becoming itself.*

To what extent, therefore, is phenomenal corporeality itself constituted and to what extent does it belong to the constituting functions of transcendental subjectivity? *It is the corporeal living-experiences, my consciousness of my to-be-able as ruling in the body, that are constituting, and it is the body as apprehended that is constituted.* Because we can only be aware of the accomplishments of constitution which are uncovered in the reflection after the fact and because the reflection is performed only in linguistic articulation, the primal stream as a creative process cannot be grasped in the propositions which attempt to conceptualize and define it. It escapes all attempts to point to it in reflection. It is beyond the distinctions of inner and outer, subjective and objective, spiritual and material, form and matter – it is, to speak with Kant, beyond everything that belongs to the concepts of reflection. We can designate it, with Aguirre, as an *indifference*.⁴³ But this indifference is not "the night in which all cows are black" (Hegel), for if we look at what it is that the primal occurrence constitutes, then we can state how it must be necessarily thought and, negatively, how it cannot be thought if it is to maintain its status as the basis which itself does not have a basis; that is, as absolute. In this sense it is a creative process.

What, then, does Husserl's puzzling sentence "the streaming is always ahead but also the ego is ahead" mean? It indicates that this streaming cannot be thought as a diffused occurrence whose modalities give us recognizable lawfulnesses – be it of "nature" or of "society" – that would then clarify individuation, but rather in order for it to be such a streaming *it must already bear in itself a principle of individuation.* In this sense Husserl can speak of monadology as a transcendental history that has its teleological objective in coming to consciousness of itself. The process is anonymous and cannot be brought before our gaze in its original performance. However, this can be said: it cannot produce individuation but – and there is more evidence for this – it is this process and it already presupposes an organization which then can be acutally experienced as "my body" and "my ego belonging to it." *Therefore, subjectivity is not indiv-*

iduated through the body as Merleau-Ponty thought. The fact that there is even a body presupposes that one possesses it and has learned to command it before he has discovered himself as an ego. The body does not discover itself as an ego, as Linschoten also formulated it,⁴⁴ but rather it is *I*, that discovers my body. In this sense Husserl's talk of the "pure ego" remains justified when he says that it is only called an ego by equivocation. This manner of speaking points to a *perplexity in regard to the absolute principle of individuation*. It is "pure" because it cannot be understood as corporeal and it is "pure" because it is the presupposition that there can be such a thing as the body.

The ego discovers itself first in a transcendental genesis as transcendental history. It is aroused through affection. Thus Husserl says in a text which handles the problem of the beginning of consciousness: "the ego is created;" there enters the 'inexplicable impetus' (*unbegreiflicher Anstoß*), definite sensations, affections [directed] toward the ego, reactions, ego-acts. . . ."⁴⁵ Does something foreign enter into the primal stream from without? What does Husserl, picking up a phrase of Fichte's, mean by "inexplicable impetus"?

To be sure, this impetus cannot be thought of as one which occurs again and again such that, as is the case with Descartes, the ego would be continually maintained in its unity by God. For in this case one would assume that the stream would already be an occurrence in infinite time. But time must first be constituted in the stream. The impetus, therefore, can be understood only as non-temporal. It cannot mean that each affection is contingent in relation to the stream. Not each affection appearing through affection in the genesis occurs through this impetus. Each hyle is, in fact, already "sedimented history."⁴⁶ The non-temporality of the impetus can only mean that it is the *absolute facticity*. It is *not contingent* in the sense of the *factum brutum* for the distinction between the accidental and the necessary is already itself a constituted distinction; it arises from the reflection upon the conditions of becoming. *Thus in the absolute facticity of the primal stream there is no contingency*. But that it is should not be looked at as a necessity, for all insights of necessity are gained through the eidetic variation. Thus it also is on the other side of the alternative between universal and particular, of *eidos* and *fact*. And because the primal impressional stream goes before and, in the same manner, the "ego" goes before in that equivocal sense emphasized by Husserl, the being of each ego is an absolute facticity in the same manner as the being of the primal stream. It is not just an occurrence of the world

but rather the world (which is none other than the world immediately there for us as actually *my* world and, for the other, as *his* world) runs through all the primal streams in the same manner. *The world which I experience as unique is correlative to the world which every other experiences as one common world.*

Thus the investigation of the manner in which the constitutive occurrence is to be thought as creative by no means leads to a mere negative determination to a negative theology, so to speak, rather it leads to a grounding of the insight that the existence of each ego as one and unique for himself is not derivable from an occurrence which first permits of individuation. The individuation is itself absolute, and only as such can genetically developing subjects be understood as subjects of absolute responsibility and only as such is Husserl's theory of constitution the foundation of a philosophy of absolute responsibility.

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NOTES

*The German version of this article first appeared in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 36, 466–482, Louvain, Belgium, 1974.

¹'L'analyse intentionnelle et le problème de la pensée spéculative,' *Problèmes actuels de la Phénoménologie*, pp. 53ff.

²*Lebendige Gegenwart: Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*, *Phaenomenologica*, Vol. 23.

³Ms C 2 I, p. 11 (1931) after Held, p. 66.

⁴Ms C 3 III, p. 10 (1931) after Held, p. 67.

⁵Ms C 7 II, p. 5 (1932) after Held, p. 68.

⁶*Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), 2 Vols., *Husserliana*, Vol. 7 & 8.

⁷Cf. Held, *loc. cit.*

⁸Ms C 7 II, p. 12 (1932) after Held, p. 70.

⁹Ms C 17 IV, p. 1 (1930) after Held, p. 99.

¹⁰Ms C 17 IV, p. 5 (1932) after Held, p. 101.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Ms C 17 IV, p. 6 (1932) after Held, p. 101.

¹³Ms C 10, p. 23 (1931) after Held, p. 103.

¹⁴Reading *entspringt aus* for *ist aus*. There is an obvious allusion to the beginning of Kant's first *Critique* (Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. B 1). – trans.

¹⁵Reading *aus seinem eigenen Leben* for *aus Leben*. – trans.

¹⁶Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. 2: *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, *Husserliana*, Vol. 4.

¹⁷Ms C 2 I, p. 7 (1931) after Held, p. 103.

¹⁸ After Held who interprets *geprägt* as meaning *gezeitigt*. Cf. Held, p. 103 – trans.

¹⁹ Ms B III 4, p. 59 (1933) after *ibid.*

²⁰ Ms C 2 I, p. 14 (1931) after Held, p. 113.

²¹ Ms C 3 III, p. 33 (1931) after Held, p. 115.

²² Ms C 10, p. 28 (1931) after Held, p. 118.

²³ In this sense Richard Zaner asked in the colloquium on 'Brentano, Husserl and Phenomenological Psychology' at the Philosophy Congress in Vienna: is transcendental subjectivity identical with transcendental consciousness, transcendental ego, individuality and the sphere of what belongs to me (*Eigensphäre*)? These are questions which he further develops in the discussion of Merleau-Ponty in his book *The Problem of Embodiment: Some contributions to the Phenomenology of the Body*, *Phaenomenologica*, Vol. 17.

²⁴ 'Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins? *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893-1917), *Husserliana*, Vol. 10, 1-134.

²⁵ *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. 1: *Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. 209.

²⁶ Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, *Phaenomenologica*, Vol. 18.

²⁷ *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, *Husserliana*, Vol. 6, 127.

²⁸ Ulrich Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, *Phaenomenologica*, Vol. 19.

²⁹ *Husserliana*, Vol. 4, 225.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 250 & 255.

³¹ C 7 I, p. 18 (1932). This quote is the motto which Aguirre takes for his work. See Antonio Aguirre, *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion: Zur Letztbegründung der Wissenschaft aus der radikalen Skepsis im Denken E. Husserls*, *Phaenomenologica*, Vol. 38, vii.

³² *Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, *Husserliana*, Vol. 9, 424.

³³ *Ibid.*, 479.

³⁴ *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, *Husserliana*, Vol. 1, 112.

³⁵ P. 29.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, 120.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, 167.

³⁸ *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, Beilage 27, 486.

³⁹ *Ideen II*, 261.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 258, note.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁴² *Erste Philosophie*, Vol. 2, 506.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁴⁴ Johannes Linschoten, *Auf dem Wege zu einer phänomenologischen Psychologie: Die Psychologie von William James*, p. 237.

⁴⁵ *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, 487.

⁴⁶ Aguirre, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

*Translated from the German by:
Donn Wellan.*

BODILYNESS (*LEIBHAFTIGKEIT*) AND HISTORY IN HUSSERL*

Beginning with Landgrebe's interpretation of phenomenology we will examine a few essential aspects of the difficult relationship between temporality and absolute subjectivity. Our enquiry will focus upon two closely interwoven themes which have in a certain sense remained at the edge of Husserl's central interest, the theme of bodilyness and the theme of the inner historicity of the monads. A deepening of our understanding of such themes would, on the one hand, lead to the necessity of revising the concept of "sensory data" and thus to the clarification of the special sense of the Husserlian "phenomenological-transcendental idealism"; on the other hand, the internal division in phenomenology and its possible convergence with Heidegger's hermeneutics would thereby become clearer.

The treatment of the problem mentioned here must not ignore the new direction in which Husserl struck out in 1917 when he brought a *genetic phenomenology* into play. The question of genetic phenomenology now includes "the *immanent unity of temporality* of the life that has its 'history' therein, in such a fashion that every single process of consciousness, as occurring temporally, has its own 'history' – that is, its underlying *temporal genesis*."¹

Everything which a static analysis at first finds given as an objective unity is, in the light of a genetic examination, seen to be a result of an earlier passive synthesis; an objective unity therefore is built up in layers upon the synthesis of "the universal essential form of intentional genesis," from which all the others derive – that is, from "that of the constitution of immanent temporality."² The different manners in which we apprehend the "world," thus the "categories," in the broadest sense of the word, with which the active experiences of the Ego are formed, point to a pre-constitution in which they become historically that which they now are as "habitualities", or sedimented, acquisitions. And that holds by essence not only for every category of object, but also, as Husserl emphasizes, "even for those of the 'Immanent' data of sensation."³ It is only due to this passive synthesis, which is sedimented in the Ego's history, that the Ego has an "environment of objects. Even the circumstance that everything

affecting me, as a *developed* ego, is apperceived as an *object*, as a substrate of predicates with which I am to become acquainted, belongs here."⁴ Thus, in this sense, everything which is known to us refers to a primordial becoming-acquainted, so that even that which we call unknown still has a structural form of acquaintedness, namely "the form *object* and, more particularly, the form *spatial thing, cultural Object, tool, etc.*"⁵

"Consciousness," so understood, manifestly no longer corresponds to the concept of consciousness in contemporary philosophy, especially in its ahistorical apriority. It was perhaps at first not completely clear to Husserl himself that his attempt to ground a *philosophia prima* in Descartes' sense would lead him, against his own inclinations, to a "departure from Cartesianism," as Landgrebe provocatively labels it.⁶ If time is thematized as the horizon for the determination of the ego, then it is no longer possible to call upon traditional concepts such as reflexion, substance, etc. Above all, in considering reflexion we must take into account the fact that it always grasps precisely the Ego which has already performed acts; reflexion is not capable of grasping the Ego's "not-yet-aspect" – its "future" aspect – and discerning that possibility which belongs by essence to the identity of the concrete ego. Reflexion operates, so to speak, with the model of the constitution of objective unities; it always arrives "too late" to adequately grasp the temporal actuality of the Ego to which it directs itself. Reflexion is a *perception-after-the-fact* (*Nachgewahren*).⁷

These sorts of difficulties for a philosophy which claims to exhibit the constituting origin of all being through reflexion is also clearly attested in the ambiguity in the Husserlian concept of transcendental subjectivity. This concept points on the one hand to the indissoluble correlation of world-constituting performances (*Leistungen*) and the world which is constituted in them. On the other hand, however, the ideal of a free, responsible subject appears in this concept – thus of a subject which always already possesses a prereflexive knowledge of its identity, which cannot in any sense be grasped by means of reflexion.

This immediate, prereflexive "knowledge" of itself has "the ground of its possibility" just in the worldedness (*Weltlichkeit*) of subjectivity "to which its bodiliness belongs, so that bodiliness is not merely constituted . . . but rather itself belongs to the constituting subject which is conscious of itself in its freedom and in its potentialities."⁸

In what follows we will consider a possible way out of this dead end by starting from the thesis in which Landgrebe capsulized what he had already presented in his earlier work (which we have just quoted): "The

functions of bodiliness belong themselves to the functions of passive pre-constitution, and accordingly to 'subjectivity'; thus the lived-body is not only constituted, but also constitutive."⁹ If we put just that concept of association, which has been newly interpreted in the phenomenological sense, into the foreground, and introduce the concept of the lived-body and its corresponding kinestheses, then to Husserl's earlier thesis that without impressions there are no time-constituting performances, Landgrebe adds, "*and without kinestheses there are no impressions.*"¹⁰

That means that the only synthesis which Husserl took into account in his early work, namely, the temporal one, is to be supplemented by the synthetic functions to kinesthetic consciousness and association, which first render the constitution of sensory data possible. So regarded, sensuousness ceases to be merely a product of passive reception; for the sensory "receptiveness" is "not only a suffering of affection, but rather at the same time consciousness of activity and a causal relation between the two, as I can establish when I say, 'because I move my head, and wander around the object, I have viewed it in this perspective, etc.'"¹¹

Because of this peculiar "consciousness of motion" (or kinestheses), sensation is always simultaneously a *self-sensing*. Through the kinesthetic consciousness which is indissolubly linked to sensation, we are conscious of our lived-body as our organ, which is immediately moved by our will. In this sense, the own lived-body has, for its Ego, as Husserl says, "the unique characteristic that it bears in itself the zero point of all orientation."¹² I "govern" in my lived-body, as in the *absolute here*, in the first "thing" which is moved by me, which is coactive in the constitution of everything spatial.

According to this analysis of the constitutive functions of the lived-body, Aguirre's pregnant statement that *the hyle originates with me myself* is well-grounded.¹³ This means that sensation, the consciousness of hyle, is thus no "ultimate fact" in which an existing world announces itself to me, for sensation too is only genetically-associatively possible. "Behind" the sensation (or "before" it), a receptive, conscious subjectivity should be presupposed. But since it is before all primordial differentiation or associative genesis in the realm of sensation, it can be regarded as undifferentiated, and because it "lies" before genesis, it can be regarded as an absolute beginning.¹⁴

Strictly speaking, only through "equivocation", as Husserl confesses in *Crisis*, is the Ego which is obtained in the *epoché* called "Ego", "although this is an essentially determined equivocation."¹⁵

The absolute beginning, the primal-Ego, can never lose "its uniqueness and personal indeclinability";¹⁶ a uniqueness which, according to Landgrebe, is manifestly nothing other than that which Heidegger designates as *mine-ness*.¹⁷ But when I speak of an Ego, I presuppose *other* Egos, or, more precisely, "I speak of myself as I am for others, and not as I am for myself."¹⁸

The uniqueness of the ego – or of the egos – does not, therefore, necessarily imply being isolated, being *solus-ipse*. This difficult phenomenological question can perhaps be answered by means of a detour over the coconstituting function of bodiliness which we have already mentioned. In fact, the egos are the absolute, as Husserl writes in his notes entitled "Monadology," and it is only due to their cogitative life, "that is through and through a cognizing-constituting in the widest sense of the word, that all real substances exist."¹⁹ But every absolute ego, which is the subject of its own history and of its own genesis, would however be an incommunicable monad, and in consequence of this there would be no common human history if the egos did not have a *double being*, which is "*an absolute being and an appearance-for-itself-and-for-others* – from an apperception which they performed themselves – as animal and human subjects, lived-bodies besouling the world and, as animals and men, belonging to the substantial real world."²⁰

In every absolute ego, a "background of nature" announces itself as "material," as it were, for the shaping of the world. It is the lowest level of the world, or of that "nature 'into' which we are immersed and which is operative (*wirksam*) in us ourselves as bodily-physical beings with our 'naturally-given' dispositions and inclinations (*Anlagen und Neigungen*), which is not only around us but which also manifests itself through us."²¹

Only when nature is regarded in this way is a community of subjects which stand in communication with each other possible. For they can appear to each other as bodily subjects only if their bodies are given as material things; for experience of foreign psyches is only possible as "appresentation" in a living body.²² And it is just this fact, that every Ego "has" its lived-body as an organ which it itself controls (since it "governs" in it and can move it kinesthetically), which constitutes the condition of the possibility for the Ego to, so to speak, "actualize" itself, to "embody" itself by means of positing nature (*Natursetzung*); further, it is the condition for one Ego to actively affect another, and for there to be an "exchange" of experiences and memories, and finally also a common history.²³

"Absolutely regarded," Husserl concludes, "every *ego* has its *history*, and it *exists* only as the subject of a – of its – history. And every communicative community of absolute Egos, of absolute subjectivities – in full concreteness, to which the constitution of the world belongs – has its 'passive' and 'active' *history*, and it *exists* only in this history." "History is the great fact of absolute being; and the ultimate questions, the final metaphysical and teleological problems, are one with the questions about the absolute sense of history."²⁴

Having arrived at this point, a paradoxical reversal in the relation of essence and fact seems to appear – a reversal which Husserl first established in *Ideen*. For, in fact, the essential constitution of the world is here grounded on facticity. We cannot now go into this question, to which Landgrebe has recently devoted an essay.²⁵ It must be dealt with in the course of a thorough-going confrontation of phenomenology with the hermeneutics introduced by Heidegger.

NOTES

*Translator's note: Generally speaking, I have followed Dorion Cairns' *Guide for Translating Husserl* (The Hague, 1973), as well as Cairn's conventions of translating *Ego* as "ego" and *Ich* as "Ego"; *Objekt* is "object" and *Gegenstand* is "object". *Leib* is always "lived-body". Where English translations of quoted texts are available, I have utilized them and cited them in the footnotes. (Kenneth L. Heiges)

¹ Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik* (ed. by P. Janssen), Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, *Husserliana* XVII, p. 317. (Translated by Dorion Cairns as *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p. 316.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 318. (Translation, p. 318.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 317. (Translation, p. 317.)

⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, edited by S. Strasser, (The Hague, 1963), *Husserliana* I, p. 113. (Translated by Dorion Cairns as *Cartesian Meditation*, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, p. 79.)

⁵ *Ibid.*, (Translation, p. 80.)

⁶ Landgrebe gave this title to his detailed presentation of these problems of the *Erste Philosophie*. Now reprinted in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie* (Gütersloh, 1963), pp. 163-206.

⁷ Compare Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie*, Part II, edited by R. Bohm, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959, *Husserliana* VIII, p. 89.

⁸ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, p. 205. Compare also *Husserliana* VIII, p. 61.

⁹ Ludwig Landgrebe, 'Reflexionen zu Husserls Konstitutionslehre', *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 36. J., 3, 1974, p. 473. One finds very similar views about *l'être incarnée* in Gabriel Marcel, *Être et avoir*, Paris, 1935, p. 12f. My lived-body is not a fact or a state-of-affairs, something given, but rather precisely a condition of possibility for every givenness whatever. To this extent my lived-body is not an object (that experienceable in an indissoluble felt togetherness. Compare Mario A. Presas, *Gabriel Marcel*, Buenos Aires, 1967.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

¹¹ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Geschichte* (Gütersloh, 1968), p. 139.

¹² Edmund Husserl, *Ideen II*, edited by Marly Biemel, Nijhoff, The Hague 1952, *Husserliana* IV, p. 58.

¹³ Antonio Aguirre, *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion* (The Hague, 1970), volume 38 of the *Phänomenologica* series, p. 167. Compare also Aguirre's 'Tranzendental-phänomenologischer Rationalismus', in the Festschrift for Professor Landgrebe, *Perspektiven transzendental-phänomenologischer Forschung* Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972, *Phänomenologica* 49, p. 126: "The untranscended appearance, or *Hyle*, is my own. Am affected by myself."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁵ *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, edited by Walter Biemel (The Hague, 1954), *Husserliana* VI, p. 188. (Translated by David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1970, p. 184.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* (Translation, p. 185.)

¹⁷ Compare Ludwig Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*, p. 164. Compare also Mario A. Presas, "Von der Phänomenologie zum Denken des Seins", in the *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, vol. 28, H.2., 1974, p. 188f.

¹⁸ Ludwig Landgrebe, 'Meditation über Husserls Wort: "Die Geschichte ist das grosse Faktum des absoluten Seins"' [Meditations on Husserl's words: "History is the greatest fact of absolute being"], *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 36 J., 1, 1974, p. 111. In this inexpressability of the immediate relation of anyone at all to himself, the proposition "individuum est ineffabile" has its ultimate ground. It is not merely a problem of linguistic logic, Landgrebe adds.

¹⁹ *Erste Philosophie*, p. 505.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 506.

²¹ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, p. 56f.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²³ *Erste Philosophie*, p. 506.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Compare Ludwig Landgrebe, "Faktizität und Individuation", in *Sein und Geschichtlichkeit*, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, pp. 275-289.

*Translated from the German by:
Kenneth L. Heiges*

ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY IN THE GENESIS OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESS IN CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT*

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. *Developmental Genesis in Piaget and Husserl*

The perceptive, representative and mnemonic modalities, the categories of space and time and the parameters of formal logic have always been lent to the child (while recognizing, be it in a rather imprecise way, particularities and limitations) deriving from analogous mental activities of adults.¹

An attempt to explain, define and classify the cognitive modalities peculiar to the child in its various stages of development has been made, as is well known, by the schools of psychology, principally that of Piaget.

His procedure was empirical, i.e. based on the gathering of a wide range of observations, well set-out and analyzed according to a deductive modality.

This enabled him to come to numerous pertinent and objective conclusions and to introduce acquired concepts and definitions which are, by now, also diffuse in the clinical ambit of child neuropsychiatry.

The genetic and structural study of cognitive activity in Husserl's phenomenology, on the other hand, obviously follows completely opposite modalities, that is, it is conducted on a general *theoretical* level.

However, many aspects of Husserl's phenomenological analyses can be related to the modalities of thought in very young children, which can be verified empirically, in their progressive evolution and structuration.

Husserl's analyses, in fact, concern that dominion of cognitive activity called "pre-categorical", which one puts into effect and develops in the structuration of egological activity before it approaches apophantic predication and formal logic.

In the terms of genetic psychology, therefore, there first appears the so-called "hypothetical-deductive thought" that makes its appearance only at the end of childhood after the 10th and 11th year.

The paradigm furnished by Husserl's phenomenology can also be used for the better understanding of the conceptual experiences of the child and the modality of its thought.

In this exemplificative and introductive study (to which I am forced to

refer because as far as I know it is the only one) I have tried to make an *approach between Piaget's empirical research and Husserl's theoretical research*, to clarify the modality and the development of child cognitive activity which is introductory to the definition and understanding of determinant problems in psychopathology.

I had, in fact, extrapolated from Husserl's text a series of themes which were compared with the almost experimental observations of genetic psychology and, furthermore, with some personal observations.

Husserl's text is very packed, vast and systematic and, at least for we working-in doctors (largely non-experts), complicated and difficult. The ideas that one can glean are very numerous but, at least till now, not easy to articulate.

My approach (which was preliminary and as such has remained), was, in effect, fairly fragmentary. For this reason, it is impossible to make a short synthesis.

I can here, however, outline with some essential strokes how concepts and terms of Husserl's analyses can be integrated with concepts and terms of Piaget's research, obviously with marked conceptual and terminological simplifications and according to a choice of themes governed by their clinical usefulness.²

1.2. *The Themes and their Concatenations*

Let us assume, as reference points, on one side the theoretically "adult" condition, that modality which extends, in its progressive improvement, the cognitive function and, on the other side (and in contrast) the child condition in its physiological incompleteness; all this naturally as only two theoretic points to compare.

Adult thought, in fact, retains many aspects imprinted by the cognitive modality of its earlier years and, on the other hand, infant thought is in a constant state of dynamic fluidity. In both the one and the other case, cognitive modalities of different levels can be recognized even simultaneously and variously combined.

This is, in part, what Husserl points out in the inseparability of the fact of "predicative spontaneity" from "received experience", in spite of the theoretical difference that must be maintained between the two levels in genetic study of cognitive activity. So, let us extrapolate as examples and in a very synthetical and reduced way the following themes:

- Activity and passivity in appreciation and its structural stages,
- Definition of the frontiers of the Ego,

- Relationship between the Ego and the external world,
- Degree of knowledge of known objects,
- Objectivity of the space-time relationship and objectivity of the actualisation in memory,
- Meaningfulness "sensed" and meaningfulness actually "cognitive",
- Distinction between "fictum" and effective reality.

Each of these themes is here isolated in an artificial manner in that there are between them links and correlations.

2. THE ARGUMENT

2.1. *Activity and Passivity in Appreciation and Its Structural Stages*

These are two *fundamental presuppositions*; the first refers to the passive or active character of the contents of appreciation and the relationship between those passively received from the external world (that world "already clothed with ideas and preformed appreciations" or that "universal plane of inherited beliefs"), and those actively acquired by the I in its "spontaneous appreciation".

Many appreciative contents are already implanted, already derived in passive receptiveness from the external world, and also they can apparently take on the formal configuration of the copulative prediction. Thus, these are seen very clearly in child material; those which Piaget calls "induced or suggested beliefs" differentiating them from "spontaneous beliefs".

Another base presupposition is whether the structural stage or level of appreciation is categorical or precategorical.

The appreciative process at its most elementary structural levels, with which we are concerned here, can be defined as *active* (as ego activity, ontologically constitutive of egological continuous "doing") imbued with the precategorical and ante-predicative modalities based on pre-verbal criteria of equalness or unequalness, similarity or dissimilarity, nearness or distance, connection or non-connection in time and space.

Child thought is imprinted very soon with these modalities. This can be shown by general references. Taking note of objective research about Piaget's investigations into genetic psychology, this fact is shown precisely and specifically in the analysis of the evolution of spatial thought which, for a long period, is informed by so-called "topological" criteria before going on to "Euclidian" parameters.

2.2. *Definition of the Frontiers of the Ego*

In the theoretical "adult" condition one presupposes that the ego is well defined by the external world. But at the more elementary structural levels of cognitive activity, even after one has passed the phase of fusion (non-dualistic, typical of the so-called "pre-objectual" period) the ego, while realising itself ontologically in the "certainty of the co-presence", remains, for a long time, not well differentiated from the external world, has a low level of knowledge of itself, of the objects of perception and of their reciprocal connections. There remains an imperfect capacity for cognitive and representative realisation of egological nuclei outside oneself, self-contained, cut off from "self" as the central reference point of space-time.

This, in the deductions of Piaget, makes the so-called "egocentricity" of the child comprehensible, that is, the fact that he seems closed within his perspective, largely ignoring the perspectives of others.

2.3. *Relation between Ego and the External World*

In the theoretically "adult" condition there are multi-polar connections between the ego and the external world; there is the cognitive realisation not only of other objects but also of other egological independent nuclei with their reciprocal connections.

In the child, the connections between the ego and the external world are mainly unipolar. That is (still in Piaget's terms), the phenomenon of "projection" is still very much alive, i.e. attributing to things and people characters and intentions analogous to those of the ego, or rather giving them his own states of knowledge and his own affective states.

Connected with the phenomenon of projection there is also child "animism", that is to consider alive and conscious objects and entities that, in reality, are not alive.

2.4. *Degree of Knowledge of the Objects of Consciousness*

In the "adult" condition the ego has another stage of recognition of objects of consciousness in their "internal and external horizons of cognition".

At the more elementary cognitive, structural levels, those of children, the level of conceptualisation of the objects of knowledge is imperfect, ownership and horizons of the ones are transposed and rolled into one, into ownership and horizons of others.

This phenomenon is translated, in the terminology of Piaget, into "transduction" and "syncretism".

We find these characteristics not only in child thought but also in oneiric condition and (in psychopathology) in delirious states and in schizophrenic thought.

2.5. *Objectivity of the Space-Time Relation and Objectivity of the Actualisation in Memory*

In the "adult" condition, objective and measurable space and time relationships can be faithfully represented in the ego, i.e. "categorical, valid for every time and place". "Time for me" can be related to "time for others", it becomes "objective time intersubjectively in common".

There is the possibility of representing the consciousness or of "re-actualising in the re-presentation" the objects of perception, in their "received objectivity of data", through memorization, that is, outside the present perceptive act.

This makes possible the capacity for abstraction, chronological organisation of experiences and, consequently, the application of the principle of causality.

For the child there is mainly subjective time and space. There is little capacity to order experiences in an exact space-time connection; to connect present experience with that anterograde and retrograde, and to establish a chronological or historic connection between "the horizon of the present and the horizons of before and after".

Representative experiences are still very dependent on present perceptions and are influenced by them. There is, therefore, a very limited capacity for abstraction.

There derives from this what is very clear in the deductive data of Piaget: the child, up to a determinate age, is not capable of making logical formal propositions or establishing connections of objective causality. The appreciative propositions are not formed according to "categorical" modalities but according to "precategorical" modalities as indicated before; according to immediate criteria of equality or inequality, nearness or distance, connection or non-connection in positions of space and time.

This explains the great possibilities of mistakes of appreciation because of the attribution of total analogies on the basis of only partial analogies.

One can say, in parenthesis, that precisely this particular modality, defined by Sullivan as "paleological", is a fundamental base, in the psychopathological field, for understanding determinant morbid deviations of appreciation brought about by emotional pressures.

2.6. *Meaningfulness "Sensed" and Meaningfulness Actually "Cognitive"*

In the "Adult" condition, the "vital" meaningfulness of the objects of perception and of representative experiences ("their emotional implication" in up-to-date psychiatric language) "affects" the ego appropriately and also the "turning of the ego towards the objects that affect it" is adequate. In the formulation of appreciation there is no prevalence of "vital" meaningfulness (or emotional) over the really "cognitive" meaning (even if in everyday life "practical" interests prevail over "contemplative" interests).

Instead, in the child, "vital" meaningfulness still prevails, "an evaluative and wanting tendency" rather than an "objectivising" tendency.

This explains why the system of causality in children is (in Piaget's terms) of a "projective", "animist" or "magical" type.

2.7. *Distinction between "Fictum" (or Imaginative Experience) and Effective Reality*

The child has little ability to recognize in "subjectives" their own re-presentations and their own appreciations, differentiating them from facts and objective appreciations.

This is understandable in the light of several points that have been made before; lack of definition of the frontiers of the Ego, unipolarity in the cognitive field, low level of understanding of the internal and external horizons of cognition of objects, little objective trustworthiness in the mnesic re-presentation, appreciative capacity mainly "of value" and "of sense" rather than objective, little ability for objective space-time positioning both in contingent perceptions and in mnesic re-presentation.

The limited ability to differentiate the "fictum" from effective reality is the cause of important consequences at the clinical level. It is a fact that may be found in normal experience if one thinks of childish confabulation and fanciful pseudology. It is something that one can also confirm in Piaget's records and that can be documented in typical determinate child activities such as play or drawing, which as far as this is concerned are very expressive and are also valid (up to a certain age) as diagnostic means.

And, it is above all the limited capacity to differentiate the "fictum", i.e. the imaginative experience from "effective reality", that enables us better to explain certain clinical phenomena of the child at the limits of pathology; certain so-called "hysteric" manifestations, or the phenomenon of the "imaginary companion" or certain "phobic" experiences of delirium that are difficult to define.

3. CONCLUSION

The various aspects of cognitive activity that we have briefly touched on and the various levels of the capacity for objective knowledge and of cognition of the "real", progress slowly as the egological structure develops (i.e. in the evolutive years). One must also add that the cognitive function can undergo dynamic modifications and run at various levels and retreat from higher levels to lower levels both in everyday life and in abnormal contingencies. That is, it has a high level of transience.

In physiological conditions, this transience is greater in very young children; the older child is more able to change from the more progressive cognitive modalities to those of a less mature order, even to the extent that these immature cognitive modalities remain (and at times prevail) for a large part in adult physiology.

But, in the adult, regression into "prelogical" or "paleological" systems or modalities often shows itself in some morbid character; *delirium* is the typical condition in which it is revealed, delirium as a psychopathological phenomenon in which the level and the type of appreciative activity in its structural level and its destructurising processes is specially involved.

And, in effect, I have found the application of this parameter useful. In the study of "infantile delusion especially the problem concerned the legitimacy and the limits of the concept as applied to very young children; concerned, that is, whether and to what extent the concept of delusion is applicable to the child.

I can say that it was exactly this clinical problem that brought me to draw on Husserl's phenomenology or, preferably, to that limited and definite part of Husserl's phenomenological analyses.

This represents some kind of gesture to bring us back to the clinical nature of my study. The reference to phenomenological analyses could be a valid instrument for a more incisive approach to fundamental and determinant clinical topics.

4. SUMMARY

The perceptive, representative and mnesic modalities, the categories of space and time, the parameters of formal logic are generally lent to the child, deducing them from analogous mental adult activity while admitting (rather imprecisely) certain peculiarities and limitations.

A wide-ranging and important attempt to define them better was carried on in the field of genetic psychology mainly by the school of Piaget.

The genetic psychologists' study was carried out using empiric and deductive modalities.

The results of this empirical and deductive research can be usefully correlated and integrated with certain analyses of Husserl's phenomenology concerning the lower states of "appreciative", prelogical and pre-categorical activity.

From these integrations one can infer important parameters better to define and interpret some psychopathological manifestations in the child as, for example, the so-called "delusion".

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NOTES

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¹ Although the author has been investigating the relationship of Husserl's phenomenology and neuropsychiatry in his work, *Esperienza e giudizio: l'analisi husserliana rapportata al problema genetico della 'conoscenza' infantile*, *Oauderni di Infanzia Anormale* 12, 1966, the research in this perspective did not advance beyond this work hence the present study making a step forward is not meant as a definitive statement but as a proposal.

² Cf. also by the present writer, 'A propos du développement cognitif: quelques remarques sur le "délire" chez l'enfant', in *Revue de Neuropsychiatrie Infantile* 22 (1974), 393.

PERPLEXITY

Psychopathological and Phenomenological Notes

There are at least three reasons for which *perplexity* deserves attention:

Firstly, from the clinical and diagnostic point of view, *perplexity* is a phenomenon that one frequently notes, but one that is difficult to describe and very embarrassing when one attempts its structural analysis, especially for the purposes of a differentiating diagnosis.

Secondly, from the phenomenological point of view, *perplexity* gives us access to the fundamental psychic condition of the human being after the dissolution of the normal categories, specifically those of "being-in-the-world" and of the "being there" as well as to obtain this access at a specific moment, a moment in which the delusional symptoms have not yet come to be formed, although the patient is already giving signs of the delusory mood (*Wahnstimmung*).

Thirdly, at least in my opinion, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and *perplexity*, representing the acute crisis of coexistence, shows us in a singularly effective manner the dissolution and the deconstruction of the communication pattern with the other and the tendency to reconstitute it by the patient in the world of alienation and no longer in the world of togetherness.

Perplexity concerns *me* as a "body," *me* as "being-in-the-world", *me* as a "project", as "intentionality," *me* as "mundane". More specifically, *perplexity* amounts to the loss of the body as an intermediary of the capacity for being "manipulated" by consciousness. The need for a phenomenologico-existential approach becomes unavoidable for anybody who, going beyond the purely clinical level, desires to undertake the analysis of this peculiar configuration of the human functioning with the intention of penetrating right into its modal "*in se*" (nature),* just as the need for a psychoanalytical approach arises when one wants to provide a *causal explanation* of the psychopathological features.

Here, however, we shall have to limit ourselves rigorously to the ontical aspects of perplexity, i.e. to what it is in actual practice, without in any way considering its ontological aspects ("*Daseinsanalyse*", and not "*Daseinsanalytik*"). There is no need to remain "coldly neutral" vis-à-vis this phenomenon, as Cargnello states in his admirable work on anthropological phenomenology;¹ in my opinion, indeed, the observer must

always be a participating observer if he wants to fathom the full reality of this limiting modality.

Here it will be helpful to adopt the critical formulation of Strasser as expressed in his book *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*,² a study in which he faces up to the radical problem of the potential of the empirical sciences of man as man. Fully respecting the peculiar character of these sciences, he shows that the phenomenological method makes it possible to avoid two extremes, that is to say, the *positivistic scientism*, which reduces man to a mere thing, and also the *antiscientism of certain existentialists*, an attitude that professes an impetuous disdain for the results of science.

Stressing the stimulating influence that phenomenology can exert on the empirical sciences of man as a human being, Strasser shows that these sciences are not made superfluous by the use of this method, but are rather hoisted onto a higher level of intelligibility.

If (following Carl Schneider) we propose to understand *perplexity* – from the pathogenetic point of view – seen as the impossibility of unifying the objective data into a non-contradictory *whole*, we shall have no difficulty in taking the term to cover also those states of “*bewilderment*” that can “normally” occur (during adolescence) just before falling asleep, i.e. at moments when the subject can lose his peculiar personal identity, moments when knowledge and *judgement* become dissociated.

In a more rigorously pathological field we may encounter perplexity in numerous psychoses, meeting it at least as a transitory picture or phenomenon. In this connection, for example, we may mention the perplexity of the hysterical pseudodementia (in which one clearly notes its aspects as something artificial, desired, recited), the far more important perplexity of the senile, the anguished perplexity of the melancholic states, or true amential perplexity.

Perplexity in the true sense of the word in the psychogenic crepuscular states is something rare; whenever it is correctly diagnosed, it should arouse the suspicion of a non-hysterical psychosis, and particularly of the early stages of schizophrenia. The beginnings of schizophrenia, indeed, are not infrequently associated with psychogenic reactions that are very similar to those displayed by hysterics.

Clinical experience shows that the disturbance that eventually gives rise to the perplexity of the senile has to be looked for in perceptual field, in the perceptive processes of knowing. In the senile, on the one hand, the condition for perplexity is found at the level of the “knowing-identifying” (*Auffassung*) and can also be regarded as nothing more than a disturbance

of the objectivizing structure of the thought process. In the anxious melancholic, on the other hand, perplexity has its understandable basis in the affective obnubilation of judgment, of the subject's critical sense, and in the falsification of the objective relations associated with judgment.

Here, i.e. in a state of anxiety, the damage to "perception", to the cognition, may be caused in one of two ways: the themes of anxiety may dominate thinking to the point where they no longer leave any room for grasping and cognizing, or these latter two activities may still be present, but the unambiguous significance of their product, i.e. the perceived, the known, becomes disturbed by the dominant anxiety.

Elsewhere we have already discussed the perplexity associated with *amentia*; here it will be sufficient to recall that, from the clinical and psychopathological point of view, perplexity can be defined as a mixed frame of mind (anxiety and cheerful fatuity, "*läppische Heiterkeit*") that cannot be further described, accompanied by characteristic facial expressions and gestures of hands and body, as well as by oral expressions that have nothing to do with the results of thinking, the final outcome of thought.

The world of the perplexed is a world that is not clear; it is indeterminate, imprecise, vague; a world in which communication is always insufficient; a world full of lacunae, where the quantity of information is inadequate, the semantic haloes are far too extensive, and the fadings either continuous or almost continuous. There is a complete lack of unambiguous determinations deriving from outside. That is drawn in the emotivity. In the truest sense of the word there is a dissolution or eclipse of form. The experience of one's own bodiliness becomes clogged and invalidated to a very considerable extent, almost swept away, and this not only as somato-psychic personalization, but also as in situ-consciousness.

This reflects itself on the manner in which the "being with" of a perplexed person comes to express itself.

Indeed, his being-with-the-other is continuously penetrated by negation, even though it is not yet a "*being-exposed-to-the-influence-of*".

In the paranoid syndrome, as is well known, everything that represents mundanity (persons, objects, relations) becomes alienated, that is to say, it clashes, strikes, hinders, brakes, drags, imprisons, tears in two, takes hold, enslaves. Indeed, we would concur with Gabel that perplexity is a "*false consciousness*", that is to say, it becomes nothing but resistance, ranging from alienation to reification.

In perplexity we may perhaps glimpse an antecedent moment (in logical

order). (Not that perplexity can be identified *sic et simpliciter* with the delusional mood (*Wahnstimmung*); this cannot be done either by formal analysis or by thematic analysis.) But perplexity may already exist, fully and unmitigated, before the relationship between the ego and the world assumes its paranoid configuration.

It is the subject's capacity of "historicizing" himself that becomes suspended, that is called into doubt.

The temporal distension of the perplexed tends to become reduced to a simple succession of moments that bear no relationship to each other; the presence of the perplexed, therefore, can be nothing other than fragmentary. What is lacking is the historical unfolding of the subject, his discursive attitude (proposing himself), the intrinsic and mutual taking one's distance, the different appreciation of the different significances; in short, there is a lack of the proper perspective. Nothing remains that has a clear-cut, unambiguous significance, because everything now can have its peculiar significance. Fractured, split, enigmatic, the manner of being of the perplexed is radically problematical. Indeed, it is a state of abandonment of the subject to an indefinable indecision between all possible stands he may but cannot assume.

The rambling, incoherent nature of the subject's thinking (*Zerfahrenheit*), the fragmentary process of his actions, the sudden disappearance of his purposes, his continuous stopping and restarting, all these are elements that are well known to anyone who has practical experience of clinical psychiatry.

They are also elements that can be found in the acute exogenic type of reaction; but in this latter case they are associated with the well known *obnubilation*, with *motorical excitation*, and with *disturbances of the sense of orientation*. Undoubtedly, however, this resemblance is only a superficial one.³ In the demented there is no thematic choice of any kind, while such a choice can always be noted in the schizophrenic, albeit structured in conformity with the subject's impulses (*triebmassig gestaltet*). There is a great diminution of the subject's actual capacity of synthesis, his ability to grasp things (Gruhle, Mayer-Gross); this difference is not only quantitative, but also qualitative. Demential perplexity is exogenous, it comes from outside, depends on the obnubilation (*Benommenheit*), and is connected with the environment in exactly the same manner as disoriented crepuscular states and delirious anxiety (acute delirious panic); the frame of mind becomes modified in relation to the oscillations of the subject's lucidity and his psychosensorial disturbances. His impulses are often of an iterative nature, incapable of being satisfied.

Schizophrenic perplexity (irrespective of whether it be considered as an "input" or an "output"), on the other hand, seems to have its origin in something that is more intimately connected with the person in the sense of Wyrsh;⁴ it is the "finding-oneself-thus" that is illumined by a sinister light, that is uncanny, strange. It is deformed by the incredible transformations of the consciousness (the alteration of the subject's consciousness of objects, his own body included), the cancellation and the oscillation of all his supports, the physiognomization of the anodyne, the anonymization of the personal. The phenomenological reduction permits one to grasp this basic affective situation, a situation that embraces everything and projects itself onto everything, this fading-out (dissolution) of categorial structures, of interior orders (not in the sense of Zutt, but rather in the sense of Jaspers). Affective discharges are found side by side with deformed and evanescent phantasies, the sense of reality accompanies the oncoming delirium.

Incoherence is, on the one hand, the primary disturbance of the demential perplexed, whose perplexity is relatively distant from the ego (*ich-ferne*). In the schizophrenic, on the other hand, the perplexity is relatively close to the ego (*ich-nahe*), and is therefore incomprehensible at the level of mundanity, at the level of the subject's projecting himself into either the outer world or his interior world; it never goes beyond the bounds of the pathic.

The existence of the schizophrenic perplexed is well characterized from the anthropological point of view: it simply proposes to have no practical projects whatsoever, it suspends its instrumentalization both of the world and of itself.

If, continuing this anthropological analysis in the sense suggested by Zutt, we note in the paranoic the loss of being present, of dwelling and looking (*Stand-, Wohnen-, Erblicken-, Verlust*), we can clearly say that the loss of presence must also upset the subjects ability to manipulate the world, this modal aspect that turns man into *homo faber*, that enables him to think technically and to act.

The perplexed, by very virtue of being perplexed, shows a grave loss of his worldliness: he can no longer control the world. This seems to me to be just as original as the phenomenon of being-beholden and the uprooting of the subject's dwelling. Indeed, the constitution of the human world, the *life-world* (and therefore also the insertion in space of the subject's own body), is the result of looking and manipulating.

It is thus that the well known figure of the schizophrenic, who just keeps looking at his empty hands time and time again, assumes a profoundly

anthropological significance and goes far beyond a simple and more or less primary symptom of perplexity.

Is perplexity itself a primary symptom? I personally put this question to Kurt Schneider. He replied that in formal analysis it was difficult to sustain that perplexity constituted a symptom in the same sense as delusional perception, for example, constituted such a symptom and he suggested that I should attempt a formal analysis taking the quality of being known (*Bekanntheitsqualität*) as my starting point.

In fact, the quality of "being known" is not the same as the experience (*Erlebnis*) of being known, it is not a purely gnostic, cognitive or notional moment. Rather, it is a diffuse affective quality of a "critical" object; a quality that is associated with the sense of concurring, of adapting oneself, of being confident and dealing with familiar things, or with a diametrically opposite sense, i.e. a sense of being extraneous, of not being able to verify things, a sense of insecurity and perplexity.

As psychologically understood, the being-known is described and discussed as an experience of familiarity (*Vertrautheitserlebnis*) in the primitive forms of the memory, a mnestic effect of repetitions (repetitive rhythms) and habits.

This experience of being-known is inextricably linked up with the totality of one's personal circumambient world (*home* or environment) or with a single object emerging from the totality of the others. As far as Höfding is concerned, perception is fundamental if the subject is to possess this new property of the sensorial impressions that is represented by the being-known.

The being-known element is not a diaphenomenic datum (Schneider's *Untergrund*, for example); rather, it is subject to a given moment and can invariably be extracted from, and only from, the phenomenic level,⁵ from pathic and non-noetic strata.

This quality of being-known can be glimpsed rather effectively, albeit in its negative form, in the frame of mind of the schizophrenic perplexed. The subject's estrangement from the world and from himself, his presentiment of something worrisome, his tone of mystery, all these things are the very opposite of the quality of being known, they are the *uncanny*. The distrust, the sudden waves of likes and dislikes unleashed by persons and things, the strange (*Unheimliches*),⁶ the catathymic crises, all these are qualities of the schizophrenic mood, direct results of the subject's loss of certainty as regards the objects around him. It is not so much the perception, but rather the attitude of the subject that becomes altered. And this is the very reason why it seems to me that perplexity can be considered as a *Haltung* and,

more precisely, as the opposite of the *Vertrautheits-Haltung*. Indeed, the being-known is a fundamental and astructural psychic property with a psychopathology that is realized almost paradigmatically in the particular schizophrenic basic mood (*Grundstimmung*) that is represented by perplexity.

In front of this experiential datum we have the objective being known, or *structured knowledge*; but in front of the pathological version of the being-known, *perplexity* to be precise, we have the pathological version of structured knowledge, that is to say, *delusion*.

Perplexity and delusion therefore constitute two psychopathological aspects that not only can be conceptually differentiated, but also seem to be separable in actual practice.

However, the structures of perplexity are not subject to diagnostic objectivization, they do not become visible by means of normal clinical observation (and it is in this sense that we say that perplexity is astructural).

But these structures are capable of phenomenological categorial objectivization, which latter, though reducing the phenomenon to its essential constitutivity, does not lose its essential significance.⁷

It is therefore possible to grasp the being-known (and also perplexity) on the phenomenologico-existential level. It is adumbrated in the "co-existence of the being-in-the-world; it has every chance of being grasped in the subject's unfolding in the interhuman relations, it is in itself a decay of the subject's *world project*."

A first environment of the decayed world project, characteristic of the perplexed subject, is the social one; the perplexed subject, by very virtue of being such, does not enter into a situation with the other; what is more, he *disturbs us* for the simple reason that our *presence*, our *coexistential intentionality* receives a check when we come face to face with him. And thus the perplexed seems to us to be radically detached from our world, from our interhuman articulations; his perplexity is not authentic, and we do not feel in tune with it, because it is not the consequence of a factual reflection and deliberation but rather a mere "paralysis without history that moves on a terrain devoid of foundation".

A second environment, and one that is of fundamental importance for the phenomenological objectivization of the perplexed, is that of the significance, the meaning of the subject's verbal expressions. His words are not longer univocally (unambiguously) determined, they are no longer surrounded by a mere semantic halo of more or less limited proportions, but have become nothing but a halo and are wholly dominated by the

imprecise, the vague, the peripheral, the unexpressed. His meanings lose their specific relief (which, according to Matussek, constitutes the very fulfilment or quintessence of meaning), the thematic highlights that make a person's thinking articulate and logical.

A third ambit, once again a most important one, is that of the subject's interior history.

The perplexed lives in an ahistorical moment. The experiences of the past lose their intrinsic time; they become homogenized and lose both in perspective and in depth. The various significant highlights with which the weft of the subject's interior history is interwoven can no longer be pinpointed, and everything has become ephemeral, inconsistent, and superficial.

The space in which a perplexed person lives is never the space of an authentic coexistence, it never arrives at constituting itself fully as a being-here-now with another, in reciprocity of course, it does not succeed in articulating itself with the other in a single meaning; in short, it always remains an anonymous space.

The same may be said, and possibly even more peremptorily, as regards the temporality of the perplexed. He is constituted in the temporality of the moment, in a mere present that neither receives the currents of the past nor anticipates the future.

From the point of view of subjective phenomenology, moreover, the empathy (*Mit-einfühlen*) with the perplexed is one of the most difficult ends to accomplish. And yet the moment of perplexity exists even in healthy people, they may become subject to a feeling of bewilderment. Why then this incommunicability (in the sense of Gruhle)? I believe that perplexity in the healthy is never wholly negative. A healthy person, on the one hand, always succeeds in getting a hold of himself, in finding a way out of this undercurrent of dispersion of himself, in reproposing himself as an authentic individual with all his vital history. The perplexed schizophrenic, on the other hand, fails to get a new hold on himself, he is obliged to be thus. Indeed, it is the very possibility of ultimate self-redemption that distinguishes the manner of being of normal perplexity from that of schizophrenic perplexity.

A normal person comes out of his perplexity (better called, indecision) by putting into practice one of the various possibilities open to him, by *making a decision*.

The perplexed psychotic, on the contrary never succeeds in arriving at a decision; this because he can no longer refer to his own background.

One may therefore say that, unlike a healthy person, the words of a perplexed schizophrenic and his whole manner of communicating are exiled from the category of historical coexistence with the others. His radical indecision does not succeed in getting the others on the move, does not succeed in associating them with himself in a common understanding and for a common purpose. In a certain sense, indeed, he does not propose himself to us (i.e. he does not suggest his presence from and for something); quite the contrary, it is we who intentionally try to notice him, abstracting him from his radical unproductivity.

Certainly, given the modalities and the dynamics that are inherent in his manner of being, the perplexed loses the recognition of the confines of reality and, consequently, both his sense and his judgment.

In this sense, therefore, one may say that there is delusion in a perplexed, and this even though there are no delusional contents in the true sense of the word.

This delusional quality, however, can be grasped more readily at the level of phenomenological anthropology than on the clinical one.

These are the fundamental reasons that induce us to consider perplexity not simply as a symptom of sickness or as one of the possible basic moods (*Grundstimmungen*) of active functional schizophrenia in the sense of Berze, but also, and above all, as one of the most paradigmatic manifestations of that checkmate of the interhuman articulation that represents the constituent moment of the alienation.

Indeed, perplexity is the most radical problematization of intersubjectivity, of placing oneself in relation with others, of being in situation.

Earlier we briefly referred to the loss of the capacity for manipulating the world. It is essential to underscore this through the analysis of the significance of the body (*Leib*) in psychopathology. In this field Merleau-Ponty has opened rather significant new horizons for us. My body is not a thing among the others; it is *mine*, but it is so in a sense that is very different from the way in which my books are *mine* or any of my chattels are *mine*.

My body, inasmuch as it is mine, is interpenetrated by subjectivity, it is "body-subject", it is something that I *am* rather than something that I *have*. My body is not the objective body of anatomy. In anatomy there is no question of the *ego*, whereas the body is human precisely on account of its subjectivity. Once this point is clearly understood, it becomes practically obvious to consider *my body* as the transition from *me* to *my world*.

My body is the place where I take possession of my world;⁸ it firmly

attaches me to the kingdom of things, it ensures that I will have a solid base in the world, a station, a remaining in it,⁹ a *dwelling* in it.

In this connection we need only think of somatopsychic depersonalization, in which the body is lived as something extraneous, detached, deformed, a mere object, or of the experience of weightlessness due to LSD-25, the loss of the intimacy of staying in the world, of manipulating the world, and we shall readily realize that the above mentioned concepts, although apparently abstract, are very much in line with the facts of clinical psychiatry. My body, then, provides me with an opening towards the world and places me in a situation in the world. This aperture towards the world has to be heavily underscored as regards its dynamic aspects. Here our life is truly "*une récréation constante et nécessaire de la perspective d'une vie à vivre.*"¹⁰ Perplexity constitutes a basic crisis of this aperture, its complete breakdown. The subject's projection of himself into the world, i.e. into the intermeshing space-time-with-the-others, becomes frozen and inhibited.

The temporal modes of activity and work (in which it is quite impossible to do without the presence of the other) become annulled.

Whereas classical psychology enables us to gain access to the constitutive aspects of the perplexed, to his existential structures, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity permits us to penetrate right down to the constituent moments of the perplexed, that is to say, to grasp the most intimate aspect, the essential significance of his inadequate and wholly unsuccessful contact with the others, a failure that imprisons him and reveals his perplexity. And at this point the concept of the world forces itself to our attention. Being-in-the-world is an essential characteristic of being-man, for man is but subjectivity incarnate in the world.

Marcel has very rightly said "*Je dirais pour mon compte que Heidegger à montré d'une façon probablement définitive qu'il est absurde d'isoler le sujet existant et de se demander à partir de lui si le monde existe ou non. Car en fait ce sujet existant n'est tel que dans sa relation au monde.*"¹¹

At the present time, indeed, the truth of this assertion is widely accepted. This mundane aspect of being-man cannot and must not be minimized. The concept of social reality cannot do without a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, which nowadays provides us with an important key for deciphering present-day social life, especially as regards its deviations, our manner of existing in the group, and the intentional structure of the social acts that express this latter.

Indeed, the existence of the perplexed is nothing other than the failure of

the world of intersubjectivity (or, making use of Husserl's language, we would say of the world of apperception).

As is well known, in his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl makes a distinction between three fundamental ways of perceiving the person with whom we find ourselves face to face:

1) As the body of another, placed in the world, and similar to the other object in nature.

2) Apperceiving him (that is to say, perceiving him, but with the addition of what will come later, almost teleologically) as extraneous (as one who has the significance of a stranger).

3) Apperceiving him as someone made in my likeness, that is to say, as someone who exemplifies me as I exemplify him.

Husserl refers to this latter modality as "appresentation", and also uses the term "alter ego" to designate the other.

The appresentation is not the result of an analogic reasoning, but rather represents a particular type of apperception that causes the ego to feel itself in a concordant relationship with the alter ego.

This is the first intentional nucleus of a community that Husserl refers to in *Paris Lectures* as pairing in a common direction of meaning (Buber's sphere of the "We").¹²

In the appresentation the ego and the alter ego become constituted into a common world, into an intersubjective world. For the perplexed person, however, this intersubjective world is no longer brought about, its object instances are no longer available "either for myself or you". The feeling of something in common, of something that is concordant, of a participating presence, of "one-who-is-with-me", can no longer come into being in any group whatsoever; a security agency is no longer possible.

In this sense, therefore, the study of perplexity and other situations of a similar kind constitutes one of the most topical tasks of psychopathology and, indeed, is of fundamental importance for the theoretical justification of an interpersonal psychiatry. Heidegger already stressed that the very deficiency of the modes of coexistence highlighted existence as coexistence. He says, for example, that the experience of being alone is possible only on the basis of a more originary being together.

In fact, as I pointed out (together with Frighi) in connection with the psychopathology of loneliness, the loss of the other is possible only if one's being is a being together; Heidegger writes: "*Das Alleinsein ist ein defizienter Modus des Mitseins, seine Möglichkeit ist der Beweis für dieses.*"¹³ To me, however, it does not seem that the defective modes of this

profoundly human quality represented by coexistence is the essential structural aspect of human existence. Rather, they show that we have to distinguish a number of dimensions in coexistence.

This would be the equivalent of saying that in psychiatry we do not just have the interpersonal dimension, although it is one that we cannot do without (we may think, for example, of the pathology of boredom, Hebb).

Apart from the phenomenologist's obvious interest in the constitution of intersubjectivity (and perplexity highlights the whole of the critical condition in which this finds itself), there is also another aspect of the problem that is of more immediate importance for psychopathology: the *life-world*, as the place of intersubjectivity. The structure of this *life-world* is rather complex and rich;¹⁴ its complete exploration and exhaustive description constitute an important objective of present-day phenomenological research.

Perplexity represents a critical calling into question of the *life-world*, a condition in which the subject is no longer the giver of meanings, of significances, nor the originator of communication.

In this phenomenological sense, then, one may say that perplexity is the paralysis of the body as the instrument for discovery and for the articulation of experience. It follows from this that it is also a paralysis of the subject's projection of himself into the world, a paralysis of the appresentation (someone-other-than-myself is not only present, but is present and participates), an abnormal and aspecific diffusion of the understanding (intention) of meaning, a suspension of meaning brought to completion. The *tua res agitur* will come later. For the moment, just as in the delusory mood, everything that has been perceived in the past (as also all things that are currently being conceived) has lost its customary significance and has not yet received any other meaning whatsoever.¹⁵

We can now conclude by saying that the constituent moment of the perplexed subject is the failure of the appresentation; it is this failure that transfers the perplexed into his alienation. And it is the analysis of his precarious and insufficient manner of linking himself to others that enables us to obtain a *categorical perception* of his particular manner of existing and permits us to penetrate into his schizophrenic world (whose subsequent manifestations, inasmuch as they are further aspects of alienation, always presuppose the moment of perplexity, even though they cannot be directly deduced from it).

It may well be that this conclusion, at least to some of my readers, may seem excessively Binswangerian. But to me it seems that it represents

nothing other than the logical consequence of the greater semiotic insight and the semantic refinement of classical psychopathology which, inasmuch as it is a human science, has nowadays become conscious of the importance of the *socius* and the common world (*Mitwelt*) as a *comunitas* for the life of the individual, and therefore also particularly sensitive to the study of all those abnormal modes of existence that fracture this *comunitas* and lead to a static immobility of the subject in question.

For as long as perplexity was studied only in given individuals, it presented difficulties of description and could be grasped only incompletely, if at all; but when it is seen as here discussed, i.e. projected into the ambit of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it assumes an aspect that can be more readily assigned a place and also renders it remarkably meaningful (impossibility of the common world).

The continuation of the psychopathological analyses in this integrated direction promises to be particularly fruitful for us psychiatrists and members of the human *comunitas*.

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NOTES

* Not by virtue of identification (*Empathy*), but true understanding or comprehending (*Verstehen*).

¹ D. Cargnello, *Alterità e alienità*, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1966, *passim*.

² S. Strasser, *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Nauwelearts, Leuven, 1963.

³ K. W. Bush, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychopathologie*, Thieme, Stuttgart, 1955.

⁴ H. H. Wyrsh, *Schweizerischer Archiv Neurologischer Psychiatrie* 88 (1961) p. 409.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ H. H. Wyrsh, *Die Person des Schizophrenen*, Huber, Bern, 1949.

⁷ Cf. Cargnello, *op. cit.*

⁸ M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Gallimard, Paris, 1953, p. 14a.

⁹ J. Zutt, *Nervenarzt* (1953), p. 177.

¹⁰ E. Minkowski, *Vers une cosmologie*, p. 210.

¹¹ G. Marcel, *L'homme problématique*, Aubier, Paris, 1955.

¹² E. Husserl, *Pariser Vorträge*, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959.

¹³ A. Schütz, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ B. Callieri, 'Aspetti psicopatologico-clinici della Wahnstimmung,' in *Psychopathologie Heute*, Thieme, Stuttgart, 1962, pp. 72-80.

THE WILL-TO-ACT

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CRISIS OF THE WILL AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE WILL

The positivistic prejudices concerning the free-functioning of the human being have tended to diminish or even to deny all validity of the activation role of the will which is subsequently downgraded to a feeling, to the life of the affects. Neither associationism, nor reflexology, nor behaviorism, nor classical psychoanalysis (which is the offspring of positivistic naturalism) succeed in explaining the self-determinism of the human being which results from the workings of the will.

In the field of scientific psychology it is only with the advent of introspective analysis that it has been possible, in particular from a phenomenological point of view, to show that the process of willing reveals itself as an autonomous and original process which cannot be broken down any further. Awareness of a decision is not a reason that would justify the act of will to be split into a cognitive process on the one hand, and an emotive process on the other hand.

The researches of Ach, directed towards finding a way of measuring the force of an act of will which sets itself up in opposition to habitual activity, and the investigations of Michotte and his followers, into the mechanism of the act of will, have given experimental support to the thesis mentioned above.

During the act of will a person is aware of himself as having a unitary centre of consciousness which directs his subjective activity towards a single goal, whereas in the sphere of the emotions he reacts to stimuli which activate the primal self in a kind of chain reaction sparked off by the surrounding world.

The life of the will and that of the emotions neither contradict nor oppose one another. Gemelli claims that there is a fundamental balance between them in which the will governs, directs and restrains the emotions by means of its autonomous dominion. If this control is absent a person succumbs to the drives and impulses of his own emotional states, which can be divided into the several categories making a person unstable, weak, passionate, or impulsive. The upsetting of this balance between the two spheres by psychoanalysis has neglected the role of the will to the extent of

denying its authenticity as an autonomous, irreducible and primary process, with the ensuing grave consequences in the fields of education, law and psychiatry such as we have witnessed in the past few decades.

We consider the will to be, on the contrary, a distinctive psychical function that controls and completes determinate acts by consideration of the desired goal and supplying the means necessary to achieve it; this function is characterised by the "feeling of freedom" that qualifies all really voluntary actions.

Already, the ability to plan ahead which is a fundamental characteristic of the human race is the foundation of the will and the origin of all feelings, emotions and moods. In the literal sense of the word "we exercise our will when we are aware of ourselves as desiring something." During the processes of desire and action the ego commands the feeling to become real and concrete; it confronts its own reality with something which is not the Ego, that is to say the outside world; and it tries to create a new kind of reality. By taking action, the will realizes the purpose of the individual person and therefore can be seen as intention fulfilling the personal self.

It is thus possible to agree with Torres' distinction between the following stages that occur in the process of the activation of the will: *sesation, formulation of purpose, the desire appropriate to the action, the action itself*.

The Victorian idea, which is based on the assumption of the power attributed to the individual will, distinguishing these four stages, has placed excessive emphasis on the capacity of man to control nature and to manipulate himself as he does his environment, as if he were an object, and to denial of irrational impulses and infantile desires.

Freud, on the contrary, has pointed out the unreality of this extreme position which considered it a simple matter to define one's own life according to the rational and moral principles of the culture of the age and which had their premises precisely in the faith in "will-power". Out of Freud's criticism there derived, as is well-known, the discovery of the rôle of stimuli, anguish, unconscious fears and instinctive drives in motivating behavior. As a result of these discoveries the will turned out to be a mass of rationalizations and of self-deception. Men were no longer the controllers but were themselves controlled. "The deeply-rooted belief in psychical freedom and in the possibility of choice", Freud wrote, "is completely unscientific and must yield to a determinism that exercises the real dominion over one's mental life".

Leaving aside the validity or otherwise of this position, Rollo May

rightly observes that it had an enormous practical significance, encouraging and rationalizing the widespread tendency of modern man to consider himself as a passive agent, as a product, willy-nilly, of the indisputable and tyrannical dictates of his instincts in exactly the same way that at the socio-economic level Marx had upheld man's dependence upon economic factors.

All this has undeniably had the effect of weakening individual responsibility since the will has lost its own prestige in favor of the unconscious mind. As the psychoanalyst Wheelles states, the attempt to recover from neurotic illnesses by one's own efforts, apart from being out of fashion, even runs the risk of earning the name of an "anti-phobic manoeuvre" rather than being seen as a powerful exercise of will, by which the human being is trying to control his own destiny.

II. THE VINDICATION OF THE WILL

1. *The Crisis of the Will in Psychiatric Research, Therapy and Its Social Influence*

The fundamental cause of modern man's neurosis is precisely this weakening of his sense of "being in command", the decline of his desire and capacity to make decisions.

The crisis of the will is the disease of our age which thus can be defined as the "age of the confusion of the will" as Leslie Farber has declared so incisively.

The values of will and love, which in the past were presented as an answer to the problems of life, are coupled together as problems today in an age of transition when the points of reference which give meaning to life have grown less and less.

To judge from events that are chilling by the degree of coldness, indifference, emotional paralysis of human individuals that they display toward others: such events which reveal the apathy of witnesses of vicious crimes (for example the incident at Albany when a crowd called a young man who was hanging from a balcony in a state of indecision as whether or not to commit suicide a "coward" and "chicken"), it is possible to claim that an attitude of emotional passivity is increasing.

It is possible, therefore, to speak of apathy as the real opposite of love, and of alienation as the opposite to the "engagement of the will". It is not only an ethical problem but the intimate feeling of impotency which makes

one think that even when the will is being exercised, it is impossible for the human being to achieve anything of value. Pressures from the science which has produced the atom bomb, organized crime, international terrorism, anonymity and loss of control over organized political and social forces appear to have further coerced and blocked the will-power and the decisiveness of individuals for whom the claim has become truer than ever that "the nuclear age has destroyed man's faith in his ability to control events".

Thus, blaming Victorian society for its reduction of the will to a function of displacement Freud developed psychoanalysis as a system which ran counter to the will. Ricoeur observes that in Freud the will is annihilated between the dialectic of the instincts on the one hand, by authority in the form of the Super-Ego on the other.

Silvan Tomkin, for his part, points to psychoanalysis as a didactic system of indecision. Whereas, in fact, the need to rely on the will in psychotherapy is clearly felt by the same psychoanalysts some of whom denounce the inherent contradiction between theoretical and practical aspects of psychoanalysis. Every psychotherapeutic treatment aims at a change which definitely will not be achieved without the intervention of the patient's will; for the sake of which towards the end of analysis the patient is urged to make decisions, to take on responsibility in blatant contrast to psychoanalytic theory and technique which are founded on antithetical premises.

Expressions such as "one must help oneself", "nothing worthwhile is achieved without making an effort", "you must try", are indicative of the therapist's hope that the patient will show more "go", more determination and a greater exertion of his will.

Freud himself contradicts his own theory when he writes that "analysis does not tend to abolish the possibility of morbid reaction, but rather to give the patient's Ego the freedom of choosing between one kind of life and another".

In reality this freedom is in the Freudian perspective considered a pure illusion in the face of the pervading forces of the Unconscious, as Knight admits when he declares that during the course of therapy he, along with other psychotherapists, assume the task of cultivating the "illusion of freedom" in the patient, and afterwards attempt to rationalize this in theory.

But psychoanalysis reveals its inability to resolve the problems arising from the weakening of the will and decisiveness more clearly today than in the past when revelations about the unconscious had a certain shock value

for hysterical patients. Today when everyone has heard of the Oedipus complex, and speaks about sex with complete unself-consciousness, using a vocabulary that would have scandalised the patients of Freud, with the inclination towards repetition and the more frequent pathology, it is necessary to talk about a "crisis of the will" and to take steps toward its solution.

A solution to these theoretical and practical considerations could be to add to the use of the concept of 'intentionality' some structure which gives meaning to pre-intentional level of experience since it exists prior to the will and decisions and renders them possible.

It is necessary to overcome, as phenomenology has proposed, the separation made by Descartes between consciousness and reality, but even more the separation between consciousness and will; a conception of intentionality which would place the problems of determinism and liberty on a more profound level may succeed in this task.

It is interesting to point out how the concept of intentionality introduced by Brentano in his Viennese lectures was interpreted by Freud and by Husserl.

The intentionality of Brentano, even if it is not mentioned explicitly, crops up in the Freudian approach to free associations, dreams, fantasies, whereas Husserl enlarges the concept of intentionality to apply to the whole field of knowledge.

According to this, for example, the consciousness never exists in a subjective vacuum, but is always consciousness of something.

Consciousness not only cannot be separated from the objective world, but in effect it constitutes its world.

To give meaning is one of the purposes of the mind, says Husserl. For this reason actions and experiences of the same consciousness are continually forming and reshaping our world. In an inseparable relationship of itself with objects, of objects with itself, the self interacts with the world and at the same observes it, neither being conceivable without the other.

The memory too is a function of intentionality: in the same way as with perception the patient cannot remember something until he is ready to take up a position with respect to it. It is also necessary to distinguish between "intentionality" and "purposefulness" and "voluntarism". The first is to be seen as a basic structural vehicle of the subjective world – subject constitution and consequently of epistemology; it offers a base which renders the other two functions possible. The obscure, irrational

and demonic aspects which Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud have spoken about together with aspects of the body's participation may all be referred to intentionality which serves as the language of communication between the consciousness and the body. Only in this way can one talk with Ricoeur, of the will as an "incarnate will."

With regard to this the inability of human individuals to conceive of themselves in the future, which we psychiatrists look for as signs of illness in our patients, especially in depressive states, expresses definitively the desperation, the loss of capacity and ultimately the turmoil of the will.

In this way we have come to discuss the will in psychopathology, beginning with the knowledge of its total absence, through the defect or absence of the exercise of the category of possibility. It is the awareness of the impossibility of planning which can be defined as "adinatia" and accompanies the derealization, the depersonalization and modification of subjective time, which is thus limited to the present and the past. This can be observed in many serious cases of melancholia and in serious forms of psychoneurosis, in which emotional states are characterised by anguish.

The inadequacy of the will reveals itself in the moment in which it is necessary to carry out *an act of will* – that is to say – to translate a desire into action. There have also been cases of neurasthenics and melancholics who would have liked at the start of their illnesses to continue with their normal activities, but the effort required aroused such feelings of repugnance and listlessness, that they ended up by doing nothing.

Indecisiveness on its own does not constitute the pathology of the will, thus when the various reasons for realizing a plan or the possible choices involved create indecision, this may be indicative of wisdom or reflection or else the particular character of certain individuals.

If the conflict of purposes and doubt as to the validity of their results invests almost all actions, then enter into the realm of "pathological indecision" which can be seen in unusual forms of obsession and in melancholics. Pathological indecision can also derive from a person's underestimation of his own judgements or from uncertainty as to his real wishes.

The exercise of the will involves the translation of plans and thoughts into practice, and only rarely of feelings unless these are accompanied by the sensation of will. It can be seen in serious cases, especially of schizophrenia, occasionally during mental confusion, and is often combined with delusion of being oppressed and psychic hallucinations. It can be distinguished from obsessional pathology in which the obsession presents itself and continues as something undesirable, but not external to the Ego, never imposed from outside, and always recognizable as unhealthy.

When an idea is imposed from outside the consciousness takes steps to clearly inform the patient that he has not produced it and that he does not want it.

The rule of the will can manifest itself either in single action or in the greater part of the patient's behavior and can be distinguished from the feelings of loss of will-power that can be observed in seriously ill psychoneurotics and melancholics who complain, "as if" they were automatons, that it is not up to them to act. When the will is exerted, the action "is" purely and simply imposed by the outside world.

With impulsive actions the act of will and sensation of desire which respectively precede and accompany voluntary actions are strongly reduced or entirely absent. Bostroem defines impulsive actions as "those in which a powerful impulse imposes itself on the consciousness with such primal force that it cannot be held back or repressed by the critical faculty". This can be confirmed in the case of intense emotional states (fear, anger, sexual desire). Impulsiveness, that is the tendency towards impulsive acts, can be permanent and therefore constitutes a characterological or transitory fact as can be observed in many psychoses (mania, hysteria, melancholia, encephalitis, epilepsy).

In schizophrenics impulses occur in a form that is totally incomprehensible to the observer and to the patients themselves in whom purpose, the act of will and the consciousness of desire are absent or at least are not accessible to the observer. Different from this is the psychogenetic mechanism that becomes comprehensible when the impulse is accompanied by prevailing hallucinations or by delirium. Impulsiveness can arise out of the excessive ease of ideation (flights of fancy, tachypsychosis) as happens particularly in maniacs; through the excessive speed of the transition from formulation to execution of the motivating purpose (representation of movement), as happens especially in epileptic psychopaths, in chronic alcoholics, in many oligophrenics and in some cases of *dementia*. Depending on the length of time (very short in the first case), we are able to distinguish between two forms which an impulsive action can take: the explosive action and the action of limited duration which can also last a few hours.

In the case of the weakness of the will, which is that to which we would like to draw most attention in the present study, we say that it can even become so serious as to cause complete loss of will-power. It can depend on the inadequacy of the critical faculties which do not allow the formulation or the choice of motives (indecision); from emotional inhibitions resulting from the pessimism which pervades ideation and inhibits the will;

from associative inhibitions of an obsessive order (obsessive doubt); from the generic inadequacy of the same driving mechanism as in extrapyramidal disturbances which provoke stress, fatigue, suffering and hence inhibition of action.

From the point of view of energy it must be remembered that a voluntary act takes place at maximum levels and demands a considerable consumption of energy and heightened psychical tension in order to resist, for example, the instincts. Every disturbance of the nervous system obstructs or abolishes the voluntary activity while at the same time can still carry out automatic activity.

Suggestibility is the capacity to accept an idea communicated directly or indirectly by a word, a gesture, or a sensory message. A certain degree of suggestibility is the common heritage of man and can be the cause of useful attainments or else of corruption. It also seems that, as a result of the mass-media, suggestibility has increased in so-called 'normal people' who are less protected from it in our times than before, despite the growth of the media-cultural level of massive publicity campaigns and of propagandist publicity by those in power and of organized ideological corporations. In the field of psychopathology one comes across an increase in suggestibility in hysterical patients as a result of their emotional exuberance; in oligophrenics as a result of their credulity which results from the deficiencies of their intelligence; in catatonics in whom the dominant automatism is easy to observe, and in catalepsy.

A factor that combines all the neuroses according to Boss is the diminution of the "sense of being in the world" along with the reduction of the possibility of coping with the decisions and responsibilities of human existence. One is therefore dealing with a radical failure of the activity of volition that amongst other things, does not succeed in the effort of conquering the symptoms, the most important of which are those deriving from the fear of death and of alienation, terror of the dissolution of the self and of the disintegration of oneself as an individual.

The loss of religious belief, of faith in magic or in superstitions today exposes man to that existential fear that causes neuroses, to that existential human insecurity which reminds us of the guilt, the solitude, the boredom and the anguish that Kierkegaard wrote about. It is not surprising, therefore, that so many investigations conclude that neuroses are on the increase even if diagnostic difficulties in differentiating between, on the one hand of tension and unhappiness that can be considered as within the sphere of normality, and on the other hand of psychosomatic syndromes

and depressive syndromes, raise problems as to the investigations undertaken towards this end. Nevertheless, the researches carried out by the General Register Office in England and Wales in 1964 and of Halliday in Scotland in 1948 tend to prove along with the increased incidence of neurosis (14% of the population) a definite increase in neuroses between the two World Wars. However certain scholars such as Bender, for example, are inclined, instead, to think that there has been an increase in simple psychogenic reactions (vague morbid conditions incidental to existential conflicts and problems) and not a rise of really and truly structural neuroses.

At the heart of every neurosis there is an existential inadequacy, defined by Torre in the following six points:

- (1) The inability to grasp and recognize the positive aspects of the events of the world,
- (2) The inability to establish valid interpersonal relationships,
- (3) The imbalance and the inadequacy of the interaction between emotions and thoughts in the judgement of a situation,
- (4) Reserve and irresolution when it comes to living the real situation and the inability to grasp existential values,
- (5) Retreat and refusal to take action in the face of basic choices,
- (6) Inconsistency of defences (and of the sense of objectivity) in the face of frustrations.

In almost all of these points, but certainly in four of them, one can easily perceive a defect of the will of which one can discuss the constitutional origin or its psychoambiental genesis, but of which one cannot ignore, however, the real concreteness, confirmed by clinical analysis which demonstrates the existence of the "adinatia" syndrome in almost all neurotic cases.

With regard to the problem of the genetic or environmental origin of the disorder of the will, as of all the neuroses, it must be remembered that today both biologists and psychogeneticists shy away from posing the problem in radically different terms since they appear linked inseparably with biological developments. This makes the study of neurogenic factors more difficult, but must not lead to fatalistic defeatism concerning the quest after all those elements whose elimination can reduce the release of neurosis in predisposed cases. Seen in this light the psychogenic situational conflicts have an important place. And in reality the prevailing atmosphere of permissiveness both in the family and scholastic sphere, in its reduction or elimination of frustrations, reproaches, pain, conflicts, competitiveness (to the extent of the recent suppression in Italy of marks which tends to eliminate even competition), has been moving onto this territory.

It would seem that a analogous situation has developed in the sphere of work and in the social sphere in competition, bureaucratic intrigues, the exercise of patronage in circles of power, the ruthless rivalry of capitalist society and the asphyxiation of personal initiative, rigorous controls with all the (attached) suspicions all prevail, along with the gigantic development of bureaucratic, technical, economic and political concerns which insist on planning the lives of all citizens in socialist societies.

It is sufficient to read the correspondence of newspaper readers in the West and East in order to have a full "*cahier des doléances*" (case-book of grievances) which abundantly demonstrates that insecurity, in one of its several forms, as a result of social isolation, changes in customs, the absence of values, economic uncertainty, dissatisfaction with one's work, which has become repetitive and lacking in satisfaction, and creativity, brutal urbanization, lack of understanding in the family whose individual members are in serious crisis, reigns supreme in all the so-called civilized countries. Freud's statement in "Civilization and its Discontents" seems to foretell of these facts: "in a sophisticated society the incidence of neurosis is higher; the less sophisticated the society the less the degree of neurosis there is likely to be".

There emerges therefore a clear split in the formative period of a person for whom for good or for bad is developed the utopian dream of the elimination of conflicts, stresses, frustrations, competition, failure, even if there remain vast areas of shadow constituted by the inadequate presence of the parents (the mother who works, the father caught up in the spiral of success in his work); the increase of divided families, in whom one can still speak of an emotional deprivation to a greater extent than in the past, a retarded period of maturity in a society which is falsely obsessed with youth to such an extent as to flatter young people by giving wide attention to their fashions, music and habits; by the widespread ease of all studies in higher education. In reality they are a long way from achieving true integration into society such as that which derives from occupations requiring full assumption of personal responsibility.

In this prolonged and enforced adolescence of so many young people who are no longer even such from an official point of view and in the grave difficulties of adults involved in their work, along with the generation gap, sociopolitical uncertainty, a widespread and serious sense of unease which expresses itself in every human relationship, the illusions which are cultivated at an early age as to the possibility of obtaining everything without effort immediately vanish in the arena of life which is by its very

nature crammed with difficulties and demands the ability to make sacrifices and a continuous and tenacious effort. In the face of this, men and women, unequipped and unprepared readily collapse into neurotic decline, into depression or else flee into the artificial worlds of drugs and alcohol.

Also a certain attitude towards vindicating one's own rights, of each and every right – to the neglect of all corresponding obligations – seems to have had its day and does not for that reason, even in an illusory way, allow any compensation for so many frustrations. There remains, as we have unfortunately been witnesses of recently, as the final resource the discharge of one's accumulated anger in senseless and irrational violence.¹

The most recent genetic studies have allowed us to discover that the genetic load is double in the polar form in respect to the mono-polar form of depression (Winokour) and as the bi-polar forms do not seem to be increasing it is necessary to confess to a major intervention of psycho-ambiental factors in the determination of mono-polar depression. It is also useful to notice how delusions of guilt are disappearing while hypochondria is increasing in depressives who go so far as to have delusions of incurable illness. Finally there are the interesting observations made by transcultural psychiatry which distinguishes between the depression of the Frenchman who is less inclined towards suicide and less excitable, and acknowledges guilt feelings more than the German, who is more excitable, and the Pole and Scandinavian who all display religious inclinations and desperation. Nor must we forget the recent important findings in the subject of the bio-chemistry of depression, in particular the contribution of Cazzullo and his school which made a decisive step forward in the therapeutic field – a thrust ahead into a thorough examination of the psychosocio motives that impel a man of today more than in the past to lose his vital impetus and to fall into the inertia of desperation when time flows by passively without any significance. We maintain that the will, no longer hardened in the crucible of experience, yields inexorably before painful events such as grief, or financial failure, and also before events of less weight such as setbacks on one's career, a disappointment in love, marital disorganized

2. *Toward the Vindication of the Role of the Will as the Essential Factor of Action*

After the citation of the above facts we can permit ourselves to conclude this report on the "crisis of the will" by pointing out those tendencies in the

therapeutic field which are moving precisely in the direction of reinvigorating the will, worn out by the comforts of the Welfare State and by the distorted educational methods of a partially misunderstood psychoanalysis.

Certainly we do not yet possess a medicine for the will even though psychopharmacological progress will end up by bewildering us with the sheer profusion of drugs that are constantly being developed: antidepressants, hallucinatory drugs, sedatives, tranquillizers and "appets".

All the same our clinic experience shows that in different cases it is possible to give a good boost to the will by modifying the "timical" layer and improving mental processes by correcting the metabolic changes that the nerves suffer from. There is also a reasonable hope that in the future it will be possible to prepare chemical substances which will be more useful in this sense, *but it is sheer utopia to imagine that one can resolve man's problems and in particular that of the crisis of the will with a "magic potion"*. It is however, legitimate to maintain that psychopharmatherapy, after the first manifestations of mental disease should let itself be linked to psychotherapy.

This brings us to the core of the problems: which psychotherapy has to face.

From a general point of view there can be distinguished two positions: one maintains that the analysis of the interior life of an individual is sufficient to liberate him from his mental afflictions and even his moral problems; the other maintains that analysis in itself is not sufficient to effect a change and that therefore it must be linked to a method of re-education which, similarly to pedagogy – which propounds the education of children – is definitely "psychopedagogy" or "the education of the mind." It is a question of supplying the patient with a new and improved scheme of life by means of the reintegration of his disorganized mind. Obviously in this case the therapist can no longer remain an impartial observer but must take up a formal position suited to the *ideal convictions of the patient*.

The Kronfeld was correct when he advised his patients to be stronger even in *moral questions*. In order to effect a refinement of the will, it is easier to work with patients who have religious or political beliefs because these can constitute a positive base on which to erect a constructive plan of life.

Jung maintained that a therapy that does not examine fundamental notions of the political, economic, religious and philosophical nature or neglects to recognize their real influence, is not worthy of its name.

Similarly Adolf Meyer supports the thesis that the patient must take an active part in his own cure and the doctor must elucidate the importance of a personal reaction before the facts of the illness and of the necessity, in order to achieve a lasting recovery, of reconstructing the personality, following a new pattern of life, and forcing him to acquire the values most appropriate for himself.

Moore emphasizes the importance of a healthy philosophy of life for the patient, intending by this "an interpretation of life, an idea, even a provisional one, of the sin of one's life and a body of principles to govern one's conduct in the problems and the difficulties of life itself, hence either for internal mental problems or for directing one's external relationships with other people".

Compared with Moore, Rollo May and Hiltner, who postulate a position of central importance of God, Fromm confronts the problem of human destiny from a point of view that is not theistic yet he also upholds the necessity of an orientation that takes into account the meaning of life.

We must remember too Adler's well-known idea about restoring the patient's interest in society, and defeating his fundamental egoism by replacing the individualistic will-power with the desire to serve the community. Even if the method is debatable and runs the risk of persuading the patient to accept conformity, many American psychiatrists, apart from the already-mentioned Meyer and Sullivan, claim that the principal aim of psychiatry is to give the patients "an understanding of the social order in which they live". Following this direction, however, one can arrive at the paradoxical position of Soviet psychiatrists, or at least of those who in all good faith consider those who criticize the existing regime as "mad" and subject them to therapy treatment to lead them to "self-criticism." A solution to these drawbacks might come from the suggestions of Frankl, according to whom ethical values should have priority in the hierarchy of values in the light of a healthy ethical system.

But obviously the problem arises as to what is meant by a "healthy ethic"; and yet leaving aside considerations that generically we can call 'metapsychiatric', we can state that a correct psychotherapy must tend to revive the values that are inside each person. By strengthening the "voice of conscience" it will perform the best service for the patient.

The problem remains open as to whether all this permits the "neutrality" of the psychiatrist in the same way as one concedes the "neutrality" of the scientist. And moreover, in what sense can one speak today of the neutrality of science and psychiatry and to what extent finally can psychiatry be considered a "science"?

These are complex problems which I had the opportunity of dealing with last year in a report on scientific research in psychiatry and in the conclusion of which I expressed the opinion that psychiatry, according to Windelband's distinction of "nomotetic" and "ideographic" science belongs to the latter, that it is necessarily interdisciplinary, like so many other branches of medicine, that it can be of some help to scientific truth, guaranteed the rather restrictive and transient present-day connotations but still valid nonetheless.

One can agree with Hutten that science is fallible but deceptive like magic, above all if one trusts in the morality and freedom of the researcher.

In the field of psychotherapy, psychoanalysis maintains that the therapist must always keep himself absolutely and totally "neutral". In the course of the therapeutic situation two people are faced with an attempt to build a relationship but, this remains external to the analysed person who instead expects an emotional commitment on the part of the therapist towards the requirements of his internal renewal. Instead the situation has come to be interpreted by existential psychotherapy as a rashly established relationship between two subjects attempting to grow and to mature right from the beginning.

If a neurosis expresses the fear of failure in life it is necessary to insist on the concept of learning, development, evolution, integration, the creation of values, in conclusion to succeed – in contrast to failing – by means of a profound exploration of the self without "moralising", and the discovery of a plan for one's life with the help of therapy, but judged by the patient, who by these means will end up by giving a meaning to his own life.

And thus we move into the sphere of Frankl's "logotherapy", but following the fundamental criteria used in Chinese psychiatric practice: that of communication and that of mobility. We consider that besides the fundamental relationship between doctor and patient being carried out in Balint groups, therapy must also include the use of gymnastics, dance, music therapy, "autogenic" training, yoga, hypnosis, group therapy, ergotherapy, play therapy, occupational therapy and behavioral therapy. In all these techniques, to a greater or lesser extent the *will is pressed into service*; it is kept busy with the exercise of training its self-control, of controlling the body, in the acquisition of competencies. In our clinic we have experimented with the autogenetic training of Schultz and the therapy of systematic desensitization by the method of Wolpe; in both cases, with the aid of the electronic control of the variations in the cutaneous resistance – calculated by a sophisticated apparatus, which was constructed by one of our colleagues, Scrimali – we have achieved a

system of feed back of self-control which subsequently engages the will in activity.

But in particular we are awaiting fruitful results from Assagioli's psychosynthesis as it tends specifically towards the re-awakening and development of the will and sets store by techniques, exercises and methods from various sources such as autogenic training, transmutation and sublimation of bio-psychical energy, the guidance of the imagination, evocation and cultivation of higher feelings (peace, serenity, joy, love, compassion) and also silence, catharsis, chromotherapy, relaxation, suggestion, humor, and symbolic mental images.

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NOTES

¹ Therefore, one can see how depression is on the increase, definitely at least, in those neurotics in whom psychic and sociogenetic factors have much more prominence. It has been calculated that 30-40% of all the cases admitted into English psychiatric hospitals are for depressive syndromes and that in U.S.A. between 8 and 10 million people are in need of treatment for depression.

The frequency, therefore, of these various dystemic forms is on the increase, and according to some statistics, it involves around 3-4% of the general population (Lehmann, 1972).

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DEPRESSIVE DOING AND ACTING

A Phenomenological Contribution to the Psychoanalytical Theory of Depression

... if he walks, it is with slowness and apprehension, as if there were some danger to avoid; or, on the other hand, he walks with precipitation and always in the same direction, as if his mind were profoundly occupied. . . .

... tormented by chagrin or fear, his eye and ear incessantly on the watch. . . .

... for the lypemaniac, the day is without rest, the night without sleep. . . .

At times, the sensibility concentrated on a single object, seems to have completely abandoned the organs; the body is impassive to all impressions while the mind fixes on a unique subject which absorbs all the attention and suspends the exercise of all intellectual functions. The immobility of the body, the fixity of the facial features, the obstinate silence betray the painful concentration of the intellect and the affections. The pain is no longer one which agitates, complains, cries out, weeps, but rather one which remains silent, cannot cry, and is impassive.

... the slowness, the monotonous repetition of movements, the actions and words of the lypemaniac, the depth to which he has been plunged, would allow little hope if one were to judge the mind to be as inactive as the body, but the attention of the melancholic is highly active, directed by a particular object with almost insurmountable intensity; concentrated entirely on the object which thus affects him, the patient cannot divert his attention or direct it towards other objects foreign to his concern.

ESQUIROL, *Des maladies mentales considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-legal* (1838).

Depression is *a shape or a figure of the body*, the expressiveness of which is corporally present in the impression, which we directly receive from the aspect of a face as sensitive as a mirror, extended or strained weight of limbs, visibly sharp and painful sensitivity of the skin – this figure is not an image. It is a shape of the body itself, thus abandoned to the pure, transparent expressiveness of a physical feature which shall be considered as *the limit which defines the vigilance of an absence of what may be called the “psyche” or the “person”*. This is a curious and paradoxical inversion which signifies that the psyche, which, in fact, is considered as the subject of depression, could be *this absence of which the body is the immobile figure of transparency*. The impression becomes expressive once the body *physically* depicts, with the entire mass of its immobility, the incessant

movements of that which acts, as if the absence which designated its "place" were the position (perhaps even the posture!) of watchfulness in the silence of a night which stirs.

For months a man recounts in each of his sessions the "ennui" to which he has become a prisoner – since his wife left him two years previously on his turning fifty. At first it was as if his existence, suddenly uprooted, had been thrown into a period of wild activity, acted out in defiance of loss. "My wife was such an active person that it caused me anguish; I had trouble living at her rhythm," he reports. His wife's leaving causes him to undertake multiple projects that were hitherto not possible. Exactly as if he were reenacting the absent person, he busies himself with adventurous commercial affairs, audacious banking operations, and unusual amorous conquests: "I thought I couldn't be luckier, I was in a state which was unfamiliar to me and which I had never known. I was drunk with activity. . . . And yet I think now that this resembled a suicide or a murder." To be "in a state" unfamiliar to him: this *state*, taken literally, designates the *reenacting* of the other one in her absence, in such a way as he was able to undertake through imitation – and it is, of course, his own condition as well. Suicide or murder? What difference does it make here since – in this impossible "mourning" of the loved one – the putting to death concerns, in the reenacting, the reenacting itself. A psychopathology of depressive mourning – distinct, certainly from "normal" mourning and melancholic mourning – must take into account the strange, imaginary seduction exerted by the reenacting of the absent person. Or perhaps it derives its power from the absence itself. Meynert's *Amentia* and Freud's hallucinatory psychosis of desire seem to me fundamental notions to an intrinsic and disjunctive understanding of depression (especially with relation to melancholy) and to the identification of a meaningful structural unity between depression and mania. Depressive mourning would have this subjective particularity of an impossible death, as if the curing of depression, conceived as the accomplishment of mourning, depended on the scandalous paradox of a suicide or a murder. The man, our patient, was vaguely aware of the fact that he was acting and being agitated by a condition – the body of the *absent person* – that "carried him" while an interior, watchful immobility terrorized him. "I imagined myself to be a gigantic fire, the ashes of which, however, I never for a moment stopped watching."

This passing remark was valuable; it showed me the therapeutic possibilities of our analytical work. This point of internal immobility –

even if caused by terror – signified the denunciatory attention of the “condition” and thus the impossibility of its allowing delirium to take hold of the self entirely.¹ A seemingly minor incident brings this condition abruptly to an end, deflating it like a balloon in the space of a few hours: a woman whom he had followed to a hotel stole his wallet, containing money and “identification papers.” Returning to the hotel as soon as he realized what was “missing,” he was confronted by the young woman’s obstinate denials, to the point that he says he came to doubt that she could have stolen his “identification papers.” Following this incident, he experienced the “painful” feeling of not being able to act in one way or another; he felt ridiculous and ashamed when he wanted to report his misadventure to the police, and said that his “shame kept him from bringing charges.” He was then “seized by a continual desire to cry,” lost interest in everything, and expressed the fear of developing a venereal disease which would either paralyze him completely or make him incurably ill. He thought that he will never be given new “identification papers” and considered himself to be, in any event, unworthy of any concern or interest which those nearest him might express. It is in this state, however – which one can qualify as the beginning of delirious melancholy accompanied by certain paranoid thoughts – that he accepted hospitalization in a psychiatric clinic. The psychiatrist (who referred him to me upon his release) described a further evolution typical of the melancholic stage which this patient was going through (the feeling of total unworthiness, the painful review of past mistakes, the anguished lamenting over all the wrong he said he had done since childhood, etc.); various pharmacological medications are used (particularly lithium); and at the end of seven weeks the melancholy seems completely cured. When he comes to see me upon leaving the clinic, he was, indeed, completely calm and in his conversation there was no noticeable trace of the melancholic ideas which he previously expressed. He spoke to me of the conditions in which “his illness” began, and said that he does not wholly understand what happened to him but knows that he is now much better. He admitted that he does not yet feel capable of returning to professional activity and that he feels “inferior.” “I feel completely hollow,” he repeats, “and I have no interest in anything.” He told me then about his constant feeling of “ennui” so that what he sees means nothing to him.² “My life is, at present, always the same. I have no more anguish, and no thoughts either. I only want to sleep. I eat, I’ve gained weight. I smoke one cigarette after another. I drink a bit . . .”; and he adds, “I feel like a pile of cold ashes. I remain seated for hours on the

edge of my bed or in my chair, and I couldn't even tell you what I think about. I have the impression that I don't think about anything. I wait, but for what, I don't know." This leitmotiv will be present in his conversation for several months during the early part of his treatment; he makes of it, as it were, an expression of his good faith, meant to discourage any hope of a therapeutic effect from the treatment. It is only when, following a dream, he is able to begin talking about his wife that he perceives what could wake him up. In this dream (he habitually said, as if to excuse himself, that he never dreamed), he sees his wife throw herself out a window, and when in anguish he approaches the body sprawled below, he realizes that it is "just an old, worn-out dress," a dress which he usually used for polishing his car! Upon awakening in the morning and remembering his dream, he was surprised to find himself smiling, and in the session he expressed the idea that this dress/corpse which he had found *down below* could very well resemble the snakeskin which "one took for a snake"! If we consider the mind's functioning to be "at a low level," "in an immobile body" held captive while waiting for an unknown object, then could not this be that object, "the form" of which has left it, leaving only an old, worn-out dress in the end? But there is more: "Seated for hours on the corner of my bed or in my chair, my body is the grotesque image of my mind, the latter watching the former. I think of my wife, but I no longer picture her to myself, and I don't suffer because of her absence. Sometimes it occurs to me that I am pregnant with her or, further, that it is she who has paralyzed me this way and made me swell up with stoutness. Since she left I am enveloped in a stagnant mass. I observe myself. If I manage in a day to change a detail of my life, I congratulate myself. Yesterday I washed my socks, today I filled out a social security form."

This considerable effort which the most banal, the most everyday, customary, and familiar act represents is, however, a very valuable technical indication of the development of the treatment. One must take the time here to note the associative link between these acts which mark, each time, the evolution of a disengagement – the latter forming part of an unconscious elaboration of acting in the desire to free oneself from this absence which invades the immobile body with the other person, too present to be lost. It is as if the act, whether as banal as "washing one's socks," "filling out a form," displacing an object on a table, etc., became possible only in that moment in which the man rediscovers the temporality of a project, once the interminable soliloquy with the absent person falls silent within him.

This case, the pathological history of which I have briefly and partially related, allows the exposition of several aspects of *depressive acting*:

(1) The first problem to arise could be characterized as of a nosographic order. It could be formulated as follows: what is the structural and dynamic relationship between the pair mania-melancholy and the pair mania-depression? (I do not qualify the relationship melancholy-depression as a pair.) During the course of the observation period, one realizes that the phase of hyperactivity included – according to the patient's own indications – an internal point of fixed attention (“the ashes”) and of subjective terror immobilizing the self in a unique thought: this unique thought explains, or reveals, manic acting to occupy the silent place of the absent one. In the course of his treatment, the patient will recall having had the impression, if not of an internal doubling, at least of someone subsequently identified in a dream as “a woman,” then conceived of as *a double*, and finally compared to the analyst. It is thus very important to stress here this function of an attentive *self*, the immobile and silent representative of the absent one. The degree of melancholy in the look being exchanged during analysis for that in the listening in no way alters what I myself consider as the imaginary, subjective figuration of the psychoanalyst in the mania (consider the grotesque representations of the “super-ego”), his topical function relative to dreams, and his intra-persecutive pseudoactualization in the melancholic phase.

We have seen that the “manifest” unleashing of the attack of melancholy was brought on by a threat directed at the patient's sexual integrity and his recovery of his identity. Unfortunately, I cannot at this time take up this essential point. I would, however, like to note that the apparent inversion of “humor” cannot be accounted for merely in terms of emotional or affective orientation. In an attack of melancholy, we are witnessing – at a point structurally isomorphic to the manic phase – an activation and a persecuting return of the self representing the absent person. The mortifying self-accusations in which the patient suffers and laments resemble an interminable mourning, insomniac, or, further still, the unrelenting attempt to exhume the child which each person carries in himself. In melancholy this child is a dead one! In these conditions it cannot escape us that melancholic acting – often conceived of as being paradoxically inexistent – is set in motion in a period of culpability which represents the persecuting activation of the absent person.³ Following the cure of the attack of melancholy, there follows a long period of depression, taken in hand by the analytical treatment. The corporal immobility of the patient indicates, as

we have said, the invasive and enveloping presence of the absent person; the body is immobilized by the seduction exercised by this absence. (Seeking to express thoughts which come to him while he is seated on the edge of his bed, one day our patient describes the tormenting presence of a scene which afflicts him and in which he imagines his wife in an intense activity of amorous and sexual conquests, in a night club, for example, or even walking the streets of an unknown city and seducing the men who pass by.) This *activity of the absent person* in depression would allow us to better understand the true nature of a *depressive passivity*. But we shall limit ourselves to noting that one rediscovers in depression, in an inverted but thematically identical form, *the activity of the manic form*.

(2) Thus the isomorphism of the pairs – called cyclical or intermittent, or even circular – of “opposites” (mania-melancholy and mania-depression) cannot simply be conceived in the descriptive, semiological mode alone. One is confronted with a double isomorphism – the understanding of which, phenomenologically, existentially, and metapsychologically (psychoanalytically) – involves the unveiling of the intersubjectivity’s modes of breaking off (see the work of Binswanger, Kuhn, etc.) and thus those of subjectivity⁴ as well as the elucidation of the topical organization, dynamic and economic, of the relationships between the id and the *ideal ego*, the ego and the self, the id and the super-ego. This structural isomorphism could seemingly profit from being conceived in view of a unitary psychosis (consider the notions of *monomania* or of *Wahn*),⁵ provided that this would not veil or mask the structure’s displacements and transformations during the development of the case history of the subject. In the case I have reported, it is entirely obvious (to single out just a single and partial aspect) that the depression which follows the symptomatic healing of the attack of melancholy has a preventive function and corresponds to a new economic, defensive organization (depression as a defense against both melancholy and mania at once).⁶ But this point of view, the success of which we recognize today in psychoanalytic theory, is insufficient in its ability to explain behavior if it is not based on a comprehension of what is called intersubjectivity, subjectivity, subjective temporalization of the body within the life history (*Lebensgeschichte*) and, intrinsically to the latter, the history of the illness (*Krankheitsgeschichte*).

(3) Depression can both be compared (or even assimilated) to a *process of mourning* and conceived as an initial, narcissistic organization protective of and defensive against mourning. These aspects – seemingly contradictory – create the complexity of the depressive phenomenon. In the

case of our patient, one can say, of course, that his depression is therapeutically initiated as a true mourning for his wife who has left him. *But is this mourning?* Because death does not create the same absence – the same temporality of absence – as does the breaking off of an affair or the abandoning of a sentimental attachment. *In depression it often happens that, in the course of the treatment, the patient resorts to a period of mourning in order to free himself from his condition.*⁷ We have seen that, for our patient, the inhibition opposed to acting was dominated by the invasion of an absence in which the *absent person*, which eventually represents psychic activity and which comprises the latter in its entirety, was represented in a quasi-hallucinatory scene of intense seductive activity. Identified with this scene, the extremely mobile psychic activity makes the body an immobile figuration, expectant, completely impressionable, and “transparent” in all its features. The impossibility of making the slightest gesture, of performing the slightest act, the weight with which the day-to-day demands of life make themselves felt, the heavy slowness of a corporal aspect which traces the boundary of a fortification, always *engarde*, reflect the import of watchfulness in which the period of absence is precisely that of an impossible mourning; the body is not so much terrorized by the seduction of a scene in which a reenacting is carried out, as it is through its silent immobility, made into the lookout who is immediately sensitive to everything that happens. In a completely subtle and precise manner, our patient, several months after having emerged from his depression, can speak of the significance of immobility and the inability to act: “When I remained seated for hours in my chair or on the edge of my bed, I felt as if I were permeable and transparent to the slightest external impression. When the idea of moving, of willingly pulling myself out of this state, would occur to me, I would immediately realize that the gesture I had found was one of my wife’s gestures and that I made it because it contained the present reminder of my wife’s gesture. If I acted, it was in imaginary imitation, and the achievement of this imitation would become yet more painful. . . . To do nothing, to remain immobile, to eat, to sleep at least protected me from the illusion of making her return to our apartment.” Let us add that sleep, technically regulating after a fashion, the disposition of the treatment, has here the relation of a therapeutic nature to depression, such that dreaming and also the memory and recounting of the dream in the session, together form the conditions for an elaboration of the mourning – a mourning of the self placed in the form of the absent person – and for the slow discovery that one is able to be alone. That is the symbolization of

absence. When our patient finds first one gesture and then another which seem to disengage from the tense and silent immobility of his body, he realizes that they are his alone, *created* by himself, "washing his socks," displacing an object, filling out a form, and then "repairing the light by his bed"; or, finally, "planting a tree in his garden," in the course of a long and painful underground process. Here, acting concerns the basic affirmation of an *act* in a *word*. The act - with regard to what is called the "realization of an act," or even "acting" - is to be interpreted as a breaking with *reenacting*, and thus as the temporal strength of a project. This transformation, which assumes a veritable elaborative labor on the part of the body in which the least gesture is understood to be a dynamic element of association - concerns in the final analysis the restoration of intersubjective communication and, correlatively, the reconstitution of subjectivity.⁸

(4) I have developed elsewhere the idea that the metaphysical confrontation between mourning and melancholy seems to me less pertinent than those between mourning and sleep, on the one hand, and between dream and melancholy, on the other.⁹ The idea of interpreting depression in light of mourning and vice versa could be all the more fecund precisely because of what sleep brings to our comprehension of depression. But it is important - I point out again - not to assimilate death too easily to absence, or mourning to the loss caused by the breaking off or "abandoning" of an amorous relationship. In a discourse devoted to nervous depression,¹⁰ Roland Kuhn cites a passage from a novel by Jeremias Gottleif entitled *Hansjöggel, the Inheriting Cousin*. This text is interesting especially for the very prosaic simplicity in which mourning is expressed:

A strange feeling weighs upon the inhabitants of a house where a corpse lies. Everyone has the impression that there is in the house someone peacefully sleeping after a long illness whose rest one must not disturb. One speaks less loudly, one walks less noisily, and nevertheless a feeling of emptiness and affliction draws us once again to the deceased; one has the impression that one should wake him or find him awake in his bed. Moreover, one does not want to work; in everything that one undertakes one must think of him and ask: "would this really please him or would he perhaps prefer it otherwise?" One has the impression that with the passing of this life one's own life has been paralyzed, one's own strength lost. For naught can one find courage or desire; barely has one taken something up but one drops it again, looks off into the distance, and goes to the corpse.

... Finally Babeli got hold of herself, took in her hands the reins of the house, but with heavy limbs, so that she often had the impression that the whole earth must be sleeping, long before the time for the deceased's burial came, and she wept effortlessly.

... Babeli had obeyed the wishes of the magistrate; she had prepared a meal but no one took pleasure in it. The food stuck in their throats. All had the impression that they must take

leave of their home and their land forever. Such a leave-taking removes hunger; other forces fill the soul, commanding even the body to contract its muscles and opening the depths of sorrow. No one speaks; no one wants to show his anxiety to the others.

It is certainly a sort of depression, this "strange feeling" which "weighs upon the inhabitants of a house where a corpse lies." But must one not wonder whether depression itself, here, keeps the corpse while at the same time, protecting itself against the death which it represents. As for the mourning itself, it is indeed, the *strange occurrence* within the family, within that which is *heimlich*, and which involves the disturbing intimacy of the unknown (see Freud's *Das Unheimliche*). As if the familiar – consisting of an interlacing of gestures and words which are part of *thinking* and *living*, bound together in the temporal relationship between people, things, and places – suddenly went limp and diffracted to show what was hiding within; the fascination of the self in the death of the other. The words and gestures no longer *hold firm*; they drag, languish, lengthen in an aberration which they contain. They fall from their own lassitude, are discouraged to find themselves held captive by thoughts of the deceased. The writer knows how, in this passage, to evoke the expressions signifying depression in mourning. That which weighs on the house is the void which opens there, but the corpse still resides therein. The pace of life slows and goes dull, and each, despite himself, returns toward the corpse. The immobility which the deceased provokes corresponds to a kinesthetic expectation with regard to the corpse (thinking to see it move). One expects to "find him awake in his bed."

The silence stirs, we have said, and, at this moment, death becomes all-powerful to idle gestures, making memories and thoughts return in a flood, giving a strange echo to words in normal speech. If each person abandons all interest and appetite for surrounding objects and remembers a period which adds depth to the situation, a new violence is done to outlook. *Shame, mourning and self-consciousness* are the critical characteristics which constitute a subjective temporal existence of the body in which the silent and withdrawn immobility seizes control and reengenders the mode of acting. In the experience of mourning, the outlook forms a reflecting chamber, through which the reinforcement of the self's protective boundaries is made clear.

I will not pursue here this description of the experience of mourning. I believe that its phenomenology would allow us to understand better the distinctions between depressive mourning, *melancholic mourning*, and manic mourning. It would also encourage us to discover the relationships

between mourning and playing, celebrating and *joy*. Let us simply say that these phenomenological approaches would help us to clarify and specify better the psychopathological phenomenon of *depression* – especially with regard to the creativity in which acting takes its meaning.¹¹

The problem which we have dealt with and which we have here formulated in a first approximation can be situated historically in two perspectives. German-language phenomenological studies like subsequent studies in French and English, have for a very long time been interested in melancholic depression, and one cannot help but note, in this regard, a surprising tradition of thought in which descriptive and genetic approaches to melancholic depression seem to complete themselves adequately within the phenomenological process of analysis itself.¹² One cannot, therefore, speak of any sort of “application” of phenomenological theory to psychopathology; the unveiling of existential structures and, through them, the description of the modes constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity is carried out in a process synchronous to that which is bound up with the phenomenological investigation of depression. I could perhaps venture the hypothesis that *depression generates the phenomenological model of inquiry through its efforts to understand the temporal foundation of subjectivity*.

If one compares this historical development of phenomenological research on melancholy and depression to the development of psychoanalytical theory in the same thematic field, one is at first somewhat surprised by the rarity of exchanges between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Anzieu has clearly established in what conditions Freud undertook his self-analysis: “. . . it was in the struggle against his depressive tendencies that Freud undertook his self-analysis and also so that his elaboration of psychoanalytic theory, particularly in its dynamic and economic aspects, should illustrate the manner in which obsessional defenses are pitted against depressive anxiety.”¹³ The link between depression and the analytical process, according to Anzieu, is of course dominated by the *problematics* of mourning and of the loss of the object. I will not treat here the interesting history of the elaboration of theories of depression.¹⁴ I wish only to stress that the return to the theme of depression in present-day psychoanalysis takes on, in entirely new conditions, the sense of the phenomenological contribution to the psychoanalytical technique and theory of depressions. From this point of view, it is remarkable that, within its own movement of questioning the limits of what can be

analyzed, psychoanalysis discovers an interest in concepts long since put to use by phenomenological thinking (such as, for example, the self, the void, subjective space, the temporal existence of depression, etc.) and which can thus in phenomenology find their veritable foundation. The technical, psychoanalytical specification of concepts which thus come to be discovered in the course of research cannot mistake the extremely rich contribution of phenomenological thought.

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NOTES

¹I have, in an article entitled, 'The Great Enigma of Mourning, Depression and Melancholy,' *Revue Française de Psychanalyse*, 1977, (issue devoted to the Congress of Rhaeto-Romanic Psychoanalysis, Geneva, 1976), stressed the *impossible death* in depression.

²Cf. my article, 'The Follower,' *Bulletin de Psychologie* 29 (1975-1976), p. 322.

³I have developed this theme at great length in a seminar devoted to *Mourning and Melancholy* (not yet published).

⁴Cf. 'Clinical Perception and Comprehension in Psychology,' *Bulletin de Psychologie* 270, no. 21 (1968), pp. 15-19, and 'The Dead-end or the Transparent Couple,' *La Nef* (1971).

⁵Cf. my work on Esquirol, published privately.

⁶*Revue Française de Psychanalyse*, Congress of Geneva, June, 1976.

⁷Cf. my article, 'The Tale and the Zone of Falling Asleep' (*Le Conte et la Zone de l'endormissement*), *Psychanalyse à l'Université* 1, no. 1 (December, 1975).

⁸Cf. my article on 'The Great Enigma of Mourning.'

⁹*Ibid.*, and 'The Hypochondria of Dreaming,' *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse*, no. 5 (1972).

¹⁰In *Revue de Psychanalyse et des Sciences de l'Education* (Louvain), 4, no. 2 (1969).

¹¹I have dealt with this theme in my seminar on 'The Object,' *Psychanalyse à l'Université*, nos. 3, 4, 5 (1976).

¹²In an essay devoted to 'The Phenomenology of Depression,' Arthur Tutossian has traced precisely and well the historical movement which leads from a "static phenomenology of melancholy" (Minkowski, Straus, Von Gebsattel) to the "pathogenesis of melancholy of Tellenbach," and finally to the "genesis of melancholic subjectivity of Binswanger," *Psychiatrics*, no. 21 May-June 1975. Notably, he writes, "The specifically phenomenological genesis of melancholy is simply not treated until 1960 with the book of Binswanger, *Melancholy and Mania*. This long interval (the works of Minkowski, Straus, and Von Gebsattel date from the years 1923 to 1928) is not without significance. The phenomenology of the 1920s, doubtless had the conceptual means sufficient for an historic approach to the human being. It hoped to find them in a developed anthropology, rightly or wrongly, starting from *Being and Time* of Martin Heidegger (1927), and taking the direction of the existential analysis (*Daseinanalyse*) of Binswanger, fastened on the most "historic" of the psychoses, schizophrenia. It was with regard to melancholy that in 1960 Binswanger returned to a more

purely phenomenological approach, better understood in the meanwhile in its genetic import, thanks to the appearance of previously unpublished works of Husserl and thanks also to the reinterpretation of the thought of Szilasi. . . .”

¹³ D. Anzieu, ‘The Self-analysis of Freud and the Discovery of Psychoanalysis,’ P.U.F., Paris, 1975.

¹⁴ See especially André Haynal, ‘The Meaning of Despair. The Problematics of Depression in Psychoanalytical Theory.’

LES CRISES DE L'HOMME AGISSANT

Le mot 'crise' est dérivé du grec *crinein* qui signifie faire une différence, discerner, discriminer. La possibilité ou le pouvoir de faire des différences implique la capacité de nier que A soit B, ou d'affirmer qu'ils ne sont pas identiques.

Or, nier ne va pas de soi. Il y faut la force de s'opposer à une affirmation reçue. Il y faut le courage de décider que *le bleu* n'est pas bleu, mais plutôt gris clair – ou qu'il n'est pas du tout une couleur –. Bref, il y faut le courage de douter des faits qui paraissent évidents.

Et nous voilà déjà en plein cartésianisme. Philosophie de la mise en doute et du questionnement universels, Descartes provoque la crise de tout ce qu'il met en doute: le monde, Dieu, l'homme. "Être ou ne pas être," dit Hamlet, ce contemporain de Descartes – Hamlet, le héros tragique, parce que précisément le doute l'empêche d'agir.

Ainsi, la négation, ou simplement la mise en question, mène au doute et finalement à la crise, à cette obstination à poser des différences là où auparavant il n'y avait qu'un tout, une identité vécue. Décider qu'il y a des différences signifierait que la crise, l'acte de discrimination, aurait trouvé sa solution: elle se terminerait dans la discrimination même. Mais maintenir la négation ou le doute sans aboutir à l'affirmation d'une différence – sans décider si ce *bleu* est gris clair ou bleu – implique que la crise reste un pur état de doute dans lequel rien ne se décide et où le sujet n'agit plus.

Un tel état se rencontre par exemple dans les névroses de doute et de compulsion, ou dans la folie du doute, qui, empêchant le malade d'agir, changent la crise du doute en un état chronique de douter. Le malade doute de ses propres tendances, des objets ou des personnages de son monde, et par là il rejette toute leur *évidence*.

Mais le plus grave serait que le doute, devenu une crise permanente, empêchât l'homme de prendre toute décision pratique et d'agir. Entre la folie du doute et le doute de Descartes, il y a peut-être des affinités encore mal reconnues.

La crise de l'action est le doute, mais nous savons d'autre part que toute réflexion commence par le doute, par la question: "Pourquoi? D'où venons-nous, qui sommes-nous, où allons-nous?" Avec Aristote, nous

savons que la dignité de l'homme naît de sa faculté d'étonnement (*Thaumastlein*). Cet homme même, Heidegger l'appelle "das fragende Wesen".

De fait, ce que la crise du doute ou de l'homme en doute nous révèle c'est une multiplicité de décisions ou d'actions possibles. Par exemple, nous doutons d'un objet que nous ne percevons pas nettement: serait-ce une table, ou une chaise, ou un autre meuble? Nous pouvons aussi douter d'une personne, de certaines phrases qu'elle a dites: pouvons-nous la croire? Bref, dans notre incertitude, nous pesons, nous évaluons les possibilités de cet objet, de cette phrase, de cette personne: nous cherchons à deviner, à comprendre, à interpréter . . . *en envisageant et en projetant les diverses possibilités de ce qui pourrait être.*

Aussi longtemps que nous nous trouvons dans cet état de doute, nous ne pouvons pas prendre de décision au sujet de cet objet, de cette phrase ou de cette personne. Incapables de décider, nous tâtonnons dans l'obscurité du ce qui pourrait être. En d'autres termes, *le doute nous ouvre la perspective sur le possible du monde. Ce qui se présente à l'homme qui doute, c'est une catégorie ontologique encore plus fondamentale que l'être: le possible.*

Mais, d'autre part, cette vision du possible nous empêche de nous décider et de passer à l'action, c'est à dire de reconnaître l'évidence des choses et d'agir selon cette évidence. Prendre une décision – oui, cet objet n'est qu'un table, cette phrase signifie ceci, cette personne peut être crue – c'est écarter toutes les autres possibilités. La décision dont dérive toute action (Ricoeur) passe par la restriction, la résignation, l'interdiction et la répression: il s'agit de renoncer à la fascination multicolore du possible. *Nous disons non au possible et oui à l'action.*

La crise de l'action humaine se situe là: dans cette limitation des possibles entrevus, dans la nécessité de s'abandonner, par l'agir, à la facticité du constitué. Quant à l'action même, elle inclut à la fois la réceptivité sensorielle et la représentation de l'homme agissant sur les voies motrices – par exemple, parlant pour donner des ordres. Le percevoir et l'agir s'entrelacent dans le *Gestaltkreis* (Piaget, v. Weizsäcker).

Nous avons vu qu'être au monde, être humain, implique la nécessité du doute, la mise en question de soi-même et du monde. Mais comme l'homme ne pourrait exister sans agir, il ne peut rester dans la crise du doute, il faut qu'il la transcende, qu'il la dépasse pour parvenir à une décision. La permanence de la crise comme incapacité de se décider, mène à différents états psychologiques. Il semble que la condition de l'homme dit "sain" ne se réalise que dans un équilibre entre la perspective de diverses

décisions et actions, d'une part, et le renoncement aux multiples possibles par l'action, d'autre part.

Mais le doute, comme expérience mentale-noétique, serait-il le seul obstacle qui se dresse entre l'horizon des possibilités et la facticité du monde constitué par l'action?

Que dirions-nous des innombrables conflits dans lesquels se développe l'homme dès sa naissance – conflits qui ne se limitent certainement pas aux conflits entre différents désirs ou entre désirs et une règle morale auxquels ils furent réduits par Freud. Conflits intersubjectifs entre personnes, conflits de sympathie ou d'antipathie, conflits dans l'orientation même de l'homme, dans ses prétendues idéologies, conflits entre orientation et sentir, entre idéologies et volonté, entre la *Stimmung* et le devoir, entre les limites de notre corps et notre vouloir de les dépasser par le pouvoir, le travail (*Leistung*), – ne constituent qu'un petit nombre des conflits possibles qui ne furent guère observés par Freud et ses disciples.

Conflits qui constituent notre être dès sa naissance, qui empêchent notre agir pas moins que le doute réservé aux fonctions mentales.

L'homme en conflit ne peut se décider, il se voit affronté à diverses possibilités d'états pathologiques, de souffrance. Il se sent incapable de se commander par un acte de volonté, – tiraillé qu'il est en des sens opposés.

Les conflits révèlent la profonde ambiguïté de notre être au monde. Ils nous montrent que l'homme, à la racine même de son existence, se constitue à partir de forces contradictoires. Un conflit aussi banal et quotidien que celui de devoir et désir, ou entre l'obligation de terminer un travail (*Leisten*) et de refuser intérieurement ce même travail, engendre le doute et par là, fait réfléchir aux diverses possibilités: ne pourrais-je pas simplement rester au lit au lieu de prendre le métro, ne pourrais-je pas faire l'amour au lieu d'organiser mon ménage, ne pourrais-je pas abandonner telle idéologie pour une autre qui me conviendrait mieux. . . ?

Le conflit, paralysant la décision et l'action mène à la crise, et voilà encore maints états psychopathologiques, soi-disant psychosomatiques, qui peuvent s'interpréter sur l'arrière-fond de conflits souvent insolubles.

Ainsi par exemple, tel marxiste peut avoir abandonné depuis longtemps cette conception de voir le monde, mais sa femme y tient encore. Extrêmement attaché à cette dernière, il se sent incapable de la quitter. Malgré cet attachement et une parfaite harmonie sexuelle, l'aliénation entre les deux devient inévitable. Ils commencent à douter de leur amour, à inventer des raisons pour expliquer la crise de leur mariage. Et la crise, le doute sur leur relation mutuelle, éclate lorsque le mari tombe gravement

malade ou est victime d'un accident. Elle éclate parce que, dans cette crise, de nouvelles possibilités de vivre sont aperçues: un amant, une séparation, un changement complet d'habitudes, d'ambiance, de problèmes, sont pressentis. La crise dévoile le possible et révèle la métamorphose du vécu.

Ce sont-là des événements quotidiens dans la pratique de la psychothérapie et psychiatrie – conflits qui révèlent la transformation continuelle de notre vie par l'interruption de la crise, du doute et du possible.

Regardons ce jeune étudiant qui se prépare pour ses examens et commence à être saisi d'angoisse: il ne trouve plus le sommeil, perd appétit et poids, et subit un changement de caractère et de tempérament. Brusquement, il se voit confronté avec le doute: Ai-je choisi la juste profession? Deviendrai-je pour le restant de ma vie, ingénieur, avocat, médecin? Comment s'est-il fait que je me sois lancé dans cette carrière? Qui me l'a ordonné, conseillé? Une fois saisi par la crise du doute, de nouvelles possibilités surgissent: changer de carrière, abandonner les études, choisir un autre but dans la vie; des possibilités se présentent qui, auparavant, étaient bien refoulées.

Où regardons cette jeune fille qui ne vivait que pour passer d'une rencontre érotique à l'autre, jusqu'au moment où, pour la première fois dans sa vie, elle tombe passionnément amoureuse. Elle se voit tout d'un coup confrontée avec autant de complications et de conflits humains. Elle renonce à sa vie de plaisir, elle veut gagner cet homme-là qui, malheureusement, est marié, père de famille, sérieux, puritain et qui ne se laisse pas séduire par les chants de sirène de la belle. Elle perçoit pour la première fois la possibilité d'une liaison sérieuse, qu'elle ne peut réaliser: elle se fait des scrupules sur son passé, elle ne peut plus envisager son avenir sans cet homme; elle voit des possibilités surgir, irréalisables.

Et dans cette crise de l'agir, ses règles cessent, elle devient anémique, maigrit, tombe enfin gravement malade d'une dépression. Ici, comme dans les autres cas, la maladie éclate au moment où la crise ouvre la perspective de nouvelles possibilités et d'une vie pas encore vécue. Cette jeune fille, par exemple, se voit incapable – pour quelque raison que ce soit – de réaliser la possibilité d'une liaison durable, possibilité auparavant cachée et refoulée.

Qui vient en premier – le doute noétique dans le sens cartésien ou le doute pathologique, engendré par nos passions, sentiments ou desirs? – Dans la conception anthropologique, phénoménologique ou existentialiste, selon Heidegger, la question d'un prétendu "premier" ne se pose plus, parce que nous existons comme êtres corporels pas moins que comme être sensuels, passionnés, noétiques, réfléchissants. Notre unique existence au

monde est en même temps multiple et antagoniste, corporelle, sensuelle et mentale. Dans ce fait se révèle une des plus profonds paradoxes de l'existence humaine, être en même temps un et multiple.

En tout cas, c'est toujours ou la crise causée par le doute intellectuel ou le doute causé par la crise émotionnelle qui fait surgir et découvre cette ontologique fondamentale: le possible.

La maladie révèle cette dimension de notre être au monde, cette balance continuelle entre la vision du possible et la nécessité d'agir ou de se décider. Il suffit que cette maladie se développe au cours d'une crise qui ne trouve pas d'issue pour l'agir ou la décision. La perpétuation de la crise pourrait conduire non seulement à une destruction graduelle, chronique, mais aussi à la mort. Peut-être devons nous tous mourir parce que notre existence elle-même est une crise perpétuelle entre le possible et la facticité de notre être au monde, crise surmontable seulement dans la mort.

La découverte du possible qui se réalise dans le doute ou dans la crise n'est certainement pas toujours de valeur positive, développant, élargissant et approfondissant notre communication avec autrui et le monde. Elle comporte également la possibilité de la souffrance et peut conduire le malade à des états extrêmes de non-communication: états de somnolence, perte de conscience, apathie, pour ne pas mentionner tous les troubles liés à des lésions organiques de notre système nerveux. Certainement, au début, la crise offre la possibilité d'un changement du vécu et de la vie. Mais une fois dans les griffes de la maladie et du dérèglement physique, elle détruit de plus en plus les possibilités de notre existence au monde, ouvrant comme elle le fait, la perspective de la mort d'abord comme possibilité, ensuite comme événement inévitable. Voilà, que sous la couche du possible, entrevue par le doute et la crise, se révèle la possibilité que notre être au monde comporte de ne plus appartenir à ce monde même.

Nous arrivons au bout de notre propos sans avoir eu le temps de discuter deux autres aspects de l'homme agissant: d'une part, le problème de l'aliénation très important aussi pour les malades et leur aliénation au monde; d'autre part, le fait que chaque rencontre inter-subjective, chaque communication avec autrui, suggèrent la possibilité et même la réalité, d'une mise en question de l'autre et de sa destruction même. Nous savons que la communication la plus amoureuse, caritative, protectrice, bienveillante implique que l'autre – comme sujet de notre bonté ou de notre *amour* au sens chrétien de ce mot – se sente menacé. En nous attachant autrui, notre bienveillance limite ses propres possibilités de développement. Par cet attachement, nous entrons dans une relation avec l'autre qui

déjà produit les germes du conflit, la possibilité d'anéantir celui qui a prouvé un amour soi-disant surhumain pour l'autre. Ainsi l'agir pose-t-il toujours le problème de la culpabilité – ce que nous savons depuis la philosophie du Vedanta jusqu' à Heidegger et à Ricoeur. Il semblerait qu'aucune action humaine ne soit possible qui ne mette autrui en question.

Ne pouvant traiter ces deux problèmes, agir et aliénation, agir et culpabilité, je voudrais terminer cette conférence en revenant au doute et à la crise primordiale de Descartes. Rendons donc hommage à Descartes malgré son influence néfaste sur notre civilisation en tant que civilisation technique, établie selon lui, sur les sciences naturelles. C'est un hommage à Descartes dans le sens spécifique ou tant qu'il y aura des êtres humains qui mettent tout en doute, qui se lancent dans la crise existentielle d'être ou ne pas être, de nouvelles possibilités de l'être au monde surgiront, qui seront des chemins vers la liberté, dépassant la nécessité des faits, et ainsi des chemins vers un nouvel espoir.

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THE SUBJECT OF ACTION

Phenomenology and Psychotherapy

This park in Paris was raised for several hours last summer to the meta-physical dimensions of the Garden of the Academy. It was there that I heard Dieter Wyss examine being and becoming in an attempt to discover what it is that makes the psychotherapeutic act possible. This act, so widely used, obliges us to raise the question of the nature of man, the trajectory of whose existence we are attempting to correct. To what idea of man, of the subject, of the ego, of the existent does our own action bring us up against, if not in the sense of an ontology of the subject which is "dynamic" enough to ground his lost direction and his recovered time, that is, the possibility for any change within his existence.

We thus came face to face with the problem of the "center," the "core" of being. This is the problem which contemporary ideologies attempt to cover up so as to scatter the being of the self (the subject in its force) in the periphery of its milieu, to cause it to disappear in an off-centered worldliness to the point of losing oneself in the infinite line of its horizon. This is the essence of the thoughts I had while listening to the talk of our erudite colleague as I recalled the chapter from his latest book¹ which discusses changes in the inner life of the subject. For me the essence of this topic is the necessary counter-revolution of the idea of the self in the orbit of its metaphysical, but also practical, sense. It is the opposite of the ideological movement of modern times which claims to annihilate it.

So many schools (though paradoxically consolidated paradoxes from Nietzsche to Michel Foucault, or paradoxes contradictorily manipulated by behaviorism and objectivist structuralism – both of which deny an abhorred subjectivity) have proclaimed a destruction or a primitive abolition of the self. Though they still sometimes require it, they deny man the possibility of being at the center of himself so as to provide a foundation for "human sciences" in which man has no place whatsoever.

We must clearly realize first of all that any phenomenology of existence cannot be allowed to *reduce action* (whether subjective action or inter-subjective actions) *to simple movement*. The mechanism of stimulus and response (which is governed by the physical laws of the psychophysiology of sensations), or reflexology, necessarily reduces all human actions to the energetic, thermodynamic or cybernetic regulations of the conservation of

energy and of the calculus of probabilities. In this respect, behaviorism – by recording behavior in quantitative and measurable terms – is the archetype of a psychology or a psychosociology which invokes a scientifically required suspension of any activity by a subject or by his will or freedom. There is another model which is just as pernicious and widespread and which has the same negative influence: this model, too, reduces all acts to motions, which are in this case governed by a determinism of ideoaffective “complexes” which, as in the case of conditioned reflexes, are “mounted” upon memory traces. In this respect there is certainly no paradox in assimilating psychophysiology and psychoanalysis, both of which are equally “associationist.”

By thus indicating, at the very beginning of our examination, in what way human action cannot be reduced to such naive reductions, we intend to indicate in which direction we ought rather to undertake the grasping (the comprehension, the genesis, the origin, the end and, in a word, the sense) of human phenomena *par excellence*: *acts*. This seems to be a clear statement of the problem discussed at this meeting held under the sign of phenomenology.

The question arose as to how it was possible that Husserl's descriptive intuitions of pure consciousness – that is, phenomenology – could appear as a philosophy of *action*. For my part I believe that what is discovered at the groundwork of all the intentional structures which make up the totality of the means and ends of consciousness, is precisely the human act *par excellence*, the realization of a possibility which produces the efficaciousness of the subject insofar as *Homo sapiens*, and even *Homo mythicus* and *Homo faber*, and can only be Man creating by creating himself. He has no representation which is not, if not an act of will, at least a bud of action, a seed of creation.

In opposition to the spatial or mathematical-geometric analyses which unfold the subject's actions in a certain fashion without him, and only in a horizontal, linear and unidimensional space (and this is as true for the feedback of reflex schema as for the Freudian topology), man instead appears in response to the question of his being as organized in his own power of acting. For to understand, to think, to perceive, to act, to will and to imagine are all forms through which action diversifies its particular ontological modes. In this way the temporality of its being (in the very sense which Heidegger intended to give to the existent) asserts itself. If for Heidegger existence is to reflect oneself in the interrogation of one's being, it is also to place oneself in one's finitude. The ontology of this being for

itself which is Man is made up by precisely those acts of an interrogation which through its question encroaches upon the urgency of a response which is a bestower of meaning, and those acts of a perspective which is always open upon its own end. To say that man necessarily is the subject, the agent, the producer of his being in a series of successive ecstasies, is to say at the same time that he is a being in time and with an end. The problematic of this being who is in question and in search of his finality constitutes the very form of his existence insofar as it is incessantly this quest and this inquietude to which at every moment of the time of his history each decision of his will, by wrenching it out, answers to his anguish and his irresoluteness. In this manner the human being presents itself by making itself present - I was about to say by raising itself up in the verticality of the arrow of its time which is the very statute of its elevation. Each person's self, the ego, the existent, far from being nothing or only a "poor little thing" (*ein armes Ding*, Freud called it), is the existential axis in relation to which one's whole system of vital relations is set in order, to the extent that this system is not merely a relation of reciprocity with others, but is a relation pertaining to oneself. The subject is the plenitude of the acting being, creating and creating himself.

This reality of the self as subject and the author of all experience and all human existence is too often ignored or systematically denied by the widespread contemporary ideology which takes up the idea and constantly repeats that "the self is the other," that the self is only the reflection of the other, that in the other the self is not nothing, that the self is "conditioned" by the environment or that it is only the illusion of desire. All these "annihilations" of the self devalue humanity to the exact degree that in its institutions, works and history humanity can only be not merely the sum but the creative totality of all the individuals which make it up. Each one of them is the seat of the indetermination and freedom which produces or creates the acts through which history, culture, knowledge and humanity are built, and which are the actualizations of its destiny (which is not fated, but is always and ever unforeseeable). The being of the existent, the essence of man is such that it is radically contingent in and through his acts.

There is, then, nothing surprising in the fact that throughout the development of psychology, sociology and ethics insofar as they attempt to be sciences of man, the idea of the subject - of course not a subject which is so absolutely transcendental that it would be external to its own constitution, but one which appears as the root, the "seminal reason" of its existence, the

director and executor of its own program of existence – this idea constantly shows up (even when it is hidden, under various forms or in different degrees), in most major modern systems of philosophy.

On this subject we must not overlook what has traditionally and constantly been present in French thought since the time of the Cartesians (whether outmoded or simply past) from Maine de Biran to Bergson, Maurice Blondel, Lavelle, Emmanuel Mounier and Maurice Merleau-Ponty: the introduction of a dynamics of effort or of force, of a construct or of mind-energy as a dimension of psychical life. The French movement of “dynamic psychology” corresponds to the development of German Gestalt psychology, particularly that of the school of Graz. It corresponds to the English language movements represented by William James’s psychology of the stream of lived experience. For to criticize the constancy hypothesis, the “Mind-stuff Theory” or psychological atomism is one and the same thing. But it is especially the philosophy of intentionality which, with Brentano and Dilthey, has *centered* psychological descriptions on the very activity of the subject.² In this respect the notable work of Bergson must not be overlooked, as is too often stylish among unthinking minds, even in France. The profound intuitions of *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, of *Creative Evolution*, and of *Mind-Energy* easily equal the existentialist analyses of which we shall now speak, and which are models for contemporary philosophical thought.

The Ideas of Husserl and the Dasein of Heidegger have made their appearance in this profound vitalist or even spiritualist – and in any case “dynamist” – movement of the reflection of thought upon itself, that is, the ontogenesis and ontology of thinking and acting being.³

Moving away from the pure rationality of the *Logic* and of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl undertook to clarify the constitution of the *Ideas* which form the structures of pure consciousness. The operational field of Husserlian phenomenology is situated in the space between these two movements. This phenomenology takes itself as a grasping of experience when its lived experience is reduced to its essence, that is, to the noetic-noematic configurations of its constitution. Far from being in the “idealist” category of a pure subjectivity, which is challenged by the operation of the reduction, the phenomenology of the configurations and structures of consciousness ties together in the same immanence both reality and the sense of intentionality, in such a way that the problem of the *Subjekt* must emerge or remain (cf. *Ideen*, §§33–50 and §§76–86). Even if the self is, in abstraction from its eidetic components, indescribable,

states Husserl, it cannot be eliminated with a stroke of the pen. The fact of being directed, of being occupied, of experiencing, etc., necessarily includes in its essence its own particular and irreducible purity. As we have emphasized above, this essence is phenomenological time, insofar as it is the necessary form of the transactuality and the survival of lived experiences. The whole long exposition of the implications of lived experience beyond the empirical contents of the natural attitude carries Husserl's phenomenology to the animation of each psychical structure by the sense which supports – or more exactly produces – the intentionality of the subject.

The metaphysics of Martin Heidegger, that of *Sein und Zeit*, makes the possibility of being, the instability or the precariousness of existence, the foundation of its temporality. It does this to the extent that it is in the incessantly vacillating and problematic course of a time which is constantly bringing itself back in question in its projects and rejections, in the concerns (*Sorge*) of a negative but nonetheless indefinite finitude: Dasein. The abandonment of the existent causes it to oscillate between the *Uneigentlichkeit* and the *Eigentlichkeit* (inauthentic and authentic existence), as between the enveloping off-centeredness of the impersonal “one” (*das man*) and the resolute centration (*Entschlossenheit*) of Dasein. It is very rash, even simplistic, thus to summarize the sense of Heidegger's metaphysics in a few more or less arbitrarily chosen words; but I believe that I have not been untrue to it in saying that by seeking the core of the existent in temporality, in Dasein's resolutely directed process, this metaphysics sees it as the seat of his freedom.

By dispersing Dasein, by off-centering (*ex-centrant*) him in the ecstasy of *Mit-sein*, by diffusing this being-in-common towards an infinite and continuous horizontalness of *Mit-dasein* which are more agglutinated than distinct, that is, by *risking* insufficiently to separate existents one from the other, the later developments in Heidegger's philosophy (after *Sein und Zeit*, especially in the *Einführung in der Metaphysik*) lay themselves open to a psychosocial exploitation, to a political recuperation, that of the annihilation of the ego in the mass of a worldliness, of a “one” in which the first-person subject dissolves. This appears to be an extrapolation which is incompatible with the profound sense of *existentialist* analysis, at the point where it joins and continues the analysis of *existence*.

Before, during (and after) the development of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, a strong “existential” current has continuously “enlivened” the drama of the unhappy consciousness, by making it enter

into the very constitution of the subject. According to Kierkegaard (and Pascal), to exist is to be for death, in that finitude of being which is a prey to a truly original sin, as it is ontological and is inscribed in the anguish and the vertigo of freedom, the tragic sense of existence and the very direction indicated and accomplished by its subject. Also, though we cannot here develop its import for this subject, we should point out the decisive importance of the individualistic phenomenology of Karl Jaspers which has become as well known (not more, not less) in his psychopathology as in his philosophy of freedom, each of which refers us to the other.

We have now said enough to be able to grasp what it is in the ontological structures of being that represents the organization of its existence as centered on and through the subject. It is also evident – without being “a matter of course,” since this evidence must be discovered by phenomenological description – that this organization,⁴ the ontogenesis and the ontology of being presuppose the implicit content of the Unconscious which is contained by the structures of conscious being and becoming. These are the configurations of consciousness which appear as the forms of power and of will. It thus happens that the Unconscious, which is the object of a retroactive hermeneutic (Ricoeur) of the positivity of desire (such is the sense of Freudian psychoanalysis), is opposed to conscious being and conscious becoming, as the subject of a deliberation of the acts of individual freedom. These several formulations – heavy with so much philosophical and historical meaning – are able to validate, if not to prescribe the notions of normativeness and of psychopathology.

The task of the psychotherapist seems to me to be validated and prescribed by this image of the organization of the “psychical body” to the degree that this can be considered not as an aggregate of corpuscles – and this is true on the molecular level as well as on the atomic level – but as the very center of indetermination, that is, of the autonomy of the existent. For it is the inverse image of this organization which appears to us in psychopathology. From this moment onwards, the task of the psychotherapist is clear. He must accomplish a restoration of a subject who has fallen into the “pathos” of inauthentic existence or into the damnation of the Unconscious. He is able to do this, of course, only in an *Einfühlung*, an empathy which demands a sort of anastomosis with the patient’s Unconscious, and this requires the interpretation of his symbolism and the bond of transference. It is just as clear that since the psychopathological event resides essentially in the subject’s loss of freedom, secured by the formal configurations of his conscious being, psychotherapy cannot be

reduced to this subterranean work of undermining. The psychotherapeutic act must apply itself directly to the activity of the subject and must consequently be resolutely active, so that in the category of forms it might be able to aid the subject in redoing that which the psychopathological process had done badly or had undone. Its benefit should be that of a liberation of the subject, a restoration in the path and the sense of what Freud himself had prescribed for it: 'Wo es war soll ich werden . . .' ("There where was the id, it is the ego who should come into being . . .").

NOTES

¹ Dieter Wyss, *Beziehung und Gestalt* (Gottingen, 1973), pp. 223-260.

² The notions of schema, of attitude, of Gestalt, of *Einstellung*, of set (or in the Soviet psychology of the contemporary Georgian school, of *ustanovska*), indicate this sense given, which is demanded of the foundations of a dynamic psychology.

³ Cf. Henri Ey, *La Conscience* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd. edition, 1968; English translation by John H. Flodstrom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), Part One, Chapter 2 and Part Three, Chapter 2. Also cf. *L'Inconscient: Colloque de Bonneval, 1960*, edited by Henri Ey (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), especially the articles by G. Lantéri-Laura, Alphonse de Waeblens and Paul Ricoeur.

⁴ This problem of organization encompasses that of the relations between the foundation of thought and the brain. I have dealt with this subject in *La Conscience* (1964), *Traité des Hallucinations* (1973), and *Des idées de Hughlings Jackson à un modèle organo-dynamique en Psychiatrie* (1975).

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SUBJECTIVITY AND THE IRREDUCIBLE IN MAN

I. STATUS QUAESTIONIS

The problem of the subjectivity of man seems to be today the center of many-sided interest. It would however be difficult to explain in a concise way the reason and the manner of this situation having arisen in the past, and continually arising today.

There are probably very many reasons, and they do not all belong to the field of philosophy or science. Nevertheless, philosophy, and above all philosophical anthropology and ethics are the privileged field for the manifesting and objectivization of this problem. The heart of the matter is precisely found at this point: *we feel today a greater need than ever before*, and we also see *greater possibilities of the objectivization of the problem of man's subjectivity*.

In this respect modern thought seems, so to speak, to lay aside the old antinomies which have arisen above all on the basis of the theory of cognition (epistemology), and which constituted a line of demarcation between the fundamental tendencies in philosophy. The antinomy, subjectivism-objectivism, and the antinomy of idealism and realism which may be discovered within it, created an unpropitious climate for the study of the subjectivity of man, owing to the fear of being inevitably led into subjectivism. These fears of thinkers who professed realism and epistemological objectivism were to a certain degree justified by the character, or at least by the subjectivistic or idealistic "overtones" of the analyses based on "pure consciousness."

In consequence there became fixed in the field of philosophy a line of demarcation and of opposition between the "objective" or objectivistic conception of man – which at the same time was the ontological conception of man as being – and the "subjective" or subjectivistic conception, which seemed to cut man off entirely from that reality.

We are however witnessing the breaking down of this line of demarcation, and that to some extent for the same reasons which had contributed to its establishment. For the same reasons – that is to say: also under the influence of the phenomenological analyses, conducted on the basis of "pure consciousness", by applying the "epoché" of Husserl, that is, by putting existence (which means the reality of a conscious subject), "into

parenthesis". I am convinced that this *line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (or idealistic) and objectivistic (or realistic) conceptions* in anthropology and ethics *must break down* and actually is doing so *in human experience*.

As a matter of fact this experience liberates us from pure consciousness, understood as a subject conceived and presupposed "a priori", and introduces us into the whole concreteness of the existence of man, that is, to the reality of the conscious subject. Having accomplished all the phenomenological analyses, carried out on the principle of that presupposed subject, that is, of pure consciousness, we can no longer treat man only as an objective being, as an object, but we must treat him as a subject, and this to the same extent, in which consciousness constitutes his specifically human subjectivity.

It seems that precisely this is subjectivity conceived as personal.

2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE QUESTION

This problem demands a wider explanation, within the framework of which we must touch upon the question of the "irreducible" in man, and so, in some measure, of what is primordially or essentially human, of what constitutes the entire originality of man in the world.

The traditional anthropology of Aristotle was based, as is well known, on the definition: *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον νοητικόν*, *homo est animal rationale*. This definition not only corresponds to Aristotle's requirements as to defining species (man) by the nearest genus (a living being) and the factor differentiating the species in this genus (gifted with understanding). At the same time, *this definition* is built in such a way that it excludes, at least when we approach it directly and forthrightly, the possibility of enhancing what is irreducible in man. It *carries*, at least in the first instance, *the conviction of the reducibility of man to the level of the world*. The reason for this reducibility was and is the need for understanding man. *This type of understanding* may be called *cosmological*.

The usefulness of Aristotle's definition is unquestionable. It dominated metaphysical anthropology and fathered many different branches of science, which treated man as an "animal" with the specific difference of rationality. The whole scientific tradition of the complexity of human nature, of the spiritual and bodily *compositum humanum*, which through scholasticism passed from the Greeks to Descartes, moves within the limits of this definition, that is, on the basis of the conviction as to the

essential reducibility to the level of the world of that which is essentially human. It cannot be denied that enormous fields of experience and particular sciences, based on the principle of reducibility, follow this conviction and are working to ground it even more firmly.

On the other hand it seems however that *the conviction of the primordial originality of the human being*, and hence of his *essential irreducibility to the level of the world* and of nature is as old as the need of reduction, expressed in Aristotle's definition. This conviction is at the base of the understanding of man as a person, which has also a long history in the annals of philosophy, and today is at the foundation of the growing enhancement of the person as subject, and of many efforts aiming at the interpretation of the personal subjectivity of man.¹

In the philosophical and scientific tradition, which emerged from the definition *homo – animal rationale man* was above all an object, *one of the objects of the world*, to which visually and physically he belongs. *Objectivity* thus conceived was connected with the general principle of the *reducibility of man*. Subjectivity however, to say the least, signalizes that man cannot be reduced to or adequately explained by the nearest genus and the specific difference. *Subjectivity is the synonym of all that is irreducible in man*. While introducing opposites into this text, we are not opposing objectivism to subjectivism, but only two philosophical, and also practical and current ways of treating man: as an object and as a subject, for the subjectivity of man as a person is also objective.²

We must admit that the manner of treating man as an object does not immediately result from Aristotle's definition itself; and especially that it does not belong to the metaphysical conception of man in this philosophical current. It is well known that the objectivity itself of the conception of "man as being" demanded *in the first place* the statement that man constitutes a separate *suppositum* (that is, a subject of existing and acting) and *in the second place*, the affirmation of his being a person (*persona*). The traditional doctrine on man as a person, expressed in Boethius' definiton: *rationalis naturae individua substantia* accentuated however rather the individuality of the substantial being of man, as possessor of a rational or spiritual nature, than the whole specificity of subjectivity essential to man as a person. In this way the definition of Boethius determines above all the "metaphysical site", or in other words the dimension of being in which the personal subjectivity of man is realized, creating, so to speak, the right conditions for building upon this "site" on the ground of experience.

3. "EXPERIENCE LIVED THROUGH" AS AN ELEMENT OF INTERPRETATION

It seems that the category for which we must reach in order to accomplish this "building" is that of "experience lived through" (the German *Erlebnis*). It is known in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The categories that are closest to it, *agere* and *pati* (and the corresponding Greek *ἄγω* and *πάσχω*) cannot be identified with it. These categories express the dynamic nature of being, and also perfectly differentiate that which only "occurs" within man from what man "does" or "makes".³ However, while explaining thus the dynamic reality of man, there remains each time (also in the case of *agere* and *pati*) the respective "*experience lived through*" as an aspect not directly included in this metaphysical explanation or "reduction", since it is an irreducible element. From the point of view of the metaphysical structure of being and action, and therefore from the point of view of the dynamics of man when he is conceived metaphysically, dealing with this element may seem unnecessary. We may acquire a sufficient understanding of man, of his action and of what occurs within him, also without it. For many centuries on such an understanding the whole edifice of anthropology and ethics was being constructed.

But as the need of understanding man as an only and unique person grows, and especially as the need of understanding the personal subjectivity of man in the whole dynamics of action and occurrence proper to him keeps growing, the category of "experience lived through" gathers meaning, and what is more, a key meaning. It is not only a question of metaphysical objectivization of man as the acting subject or the agent of his deeds, but the chief aim of this is to show the person as a subject living through his own deeds and experiences, and thanks to all this, his own subjectivity. When this demand is made upon the interpretation of "man in action" (*l'homme agissant*), the category of "experience lived through" (*Erlebnis*) must find its place in anthropology and ethics and, what is more, must to a certain degree take its place in the center of respective interpretations.⁴

A question may immediately arise, namely, whether by giving such a key position in the interpretation of man as a personal subject to the "experience lived through", we are not condemning ourselves inevitably to subjectivism. While dispensing with excessively detailed considerations of this problem, we can briefly state that adhering sufficiently strongly to the integral experience of man, we are not only not being condemned to sub-

jectivistic and idealistic conceptions, but *we safeguard the authentic subjectivity of man*, that is, *his personal subjectivity thanks to a realistic interpretation of his being*.

4. THE NECESSITY OF DWELLING UPON THE IRREDUCIBLE

The interpretation of man on the basis of "experience lived through" demands introducing the aspect of consciousness into the analysis of the human being. Man is thus given to us not only as a being specifically defined, but as a concrete "I", as a subject "living himself" (*qui se vit lui-même*). The subjective being and the existence proper to it (*suppositum*) appears in experience precisely as the subject "living himself". If we dwell upon him, he will reveal his inner structures which constitute his concrete "I". Revealing these structures which constitute the human "I" does not necessarily mean rejecting reduction and the specific definition of man, but signifies a methodological operation which could be defined as "*dwelling upon the irreducible*". It is necessary to stop in the process of reduction which leads us in the direction of understanding man within the world (the cosmological type of understanding), *to be able to understand man* in himself. This second type of understanding might be called "personalistic". *This personalistic type of conceiving man* is not an antinomy to the cosmological type, it is its complement. We have mentioned before that the definition of a person, construed by Boethius, had only determined the "metaphysical site" for the personal interpretation of man's subjectivity.

The experience of man cannot be exhausted by way of "cosmological" reduction. It is necessary to dwell upon what is reducible in him, upon what is only and unique in him, upon what makes him simply a person, a subject, and not just "that man". Only then shall the image of man be correct and complete. There exists no possibility of completing it by way of reduction alone; on the other hand, remaining solely within the bounds of the "irreducible" could mean to some extent the inability to transcend one's own "I". It is necessary to complement cognitively the one with the other. Taking under consideration the different circumstances of men's real existence, it is expedient to leave more room in this cognitive effort to the irreducible, to *give it a certain preponderance* while considering man both in theory and in practice. For the irreducible signifies also what is invisible in man, what is absolutely interior and through which man is as if an eye-witness of himself, of his humanity and of his person.

The experience lived through reveals not only the acts and experiences of man in their profoundest dependence on his own "I"; it also reveals the whole personal structure of self-determination in which man discovers his own "I" as the one who possesses himself and dominates himself, or in any case may and should possess and dominate himself. The dynamic structure of self-determination tells man every time anew that he is simultaneously given to himself as a gift and imposed upon himself as a task. That is the way man appears to himself in his deeds, in the inner decisions of his conscience: as someone who is an assignment to himself, who must constantly affirm, test, and thus to some extent conquer the dynamic structure of his own "I" which is offered him as self-possession and self-domination. At the same time this structure is both wholly interior and immanent. It constitutes the real endowment of the personal subject and to some extent *is* himself. *While experiencing self-possession and self-domination man experiences the fact that he is a person and that he is a subject.* Each of us experiences the structure of self-possession and self-domination as being essential to the personal "I", as forming the personal subjectivity of man, while he is experiencing a moral value, good or evil. This reality appears perhaps more intensively when it is threatened by evil than when, for the time at least, it is safe. In any case we are taught by experience that the *morale* is deeply rooted in the *humanum* and still more so in what might be defined as the *personale*. Morality determines the personalistic dimension of man in a fundamental way, is its subject, and may be properly understood only in this dimension.

The "morale" is at the same time the fundamental expression of the transcendence proper to the personal "I". The decisions of man's conscience manifest at every step that he is a person consummating himself and outgrowing himself toward values accepted in truth and therefore realized with a deep sense of responsibility.

5. PERSPECTIVE

All this has deserved many penetrating analyses, some of which have already been achieved, and others are being continued. Not undertaking to carry them out further, we only wish to state that all this rich and many-sided reality of "experience lived through" constitutes in our cognition of man not so much a single element or aspect, as a peculiar dimension. And it is precisely necessary to dwell upon that dimension, if the subjective structure, and also in the same sense the personal structure of man is to be fully outlined.

What does this *cognitive dwelling upon the "experience lived through"* really signify? It should be understood *in relation to the irreducible*. The traditions of philosophical anthropology do in fact teach us that it is possible to by-pass this dimension and to omit it on the way of abstraction which tends toward the specific definition of man as being, or in other words toward the cosmological type of reduction (*homo - animal rationale*). But there arises the question whether, by defining thus the essence of man, we do not then lose to a certain extent what is most human, since the *humanum* expresses itself and realizes itself as the *personale*. In that case the irreducible would indicate that man cannot be only thus cognized, and understood exclusively in this way. This is what contemporary philosophy of the subject seems to be saying to the traditional philosophy of the object.

But this is not all. The irreducible also signifies what essentially cannot be reduced, but only manifested and revealed. *The "experience lived through" essentially opposes reduction*, but that does not mean that it escapes our cognition. It only demands to be cognized in another way, that is, *by such a method and through such an analysis as reveals and shows its essence*. The method of phenomenological analysis permits us to dwell upon the "experience lived through" as being irreducible. This method is not only a description registering individual phenomena (phenomena as Kant understood them: what is grasped by the senses). Dwelling upon the "experience lived through" as irreducible, we endeavour to penetrate by cognition its whole essence. In this way we also grasp the essentially subjective structure of the "experience lived through", or in other words its structural tie with man's subjectivity. *The phenomenological method* is in the service of transphenomenological cognition, it *makes understanding possible* not by reduction, but *by revealing*, as profoundly as possible, together with an analysis of the "experience lived through", *who in fact the subject experiencing it is*. This fashion of revealing, as profoundly as possible, seems to be the indispensable way to the cognition of man in view of his personal subjectivity. This subjectivity is at the same time a definite reality; it is a reality when we try to understand it in its objective totality whose name is "man". This designates at the same time the character of all the stages of cognition. For *the experience lived through is also above all a reality*. The correct method of showing it can only contribute to *enrich and deepen the whole realism of the conception of man*. The personal profile of man enters the sphere of cognitive vision, while the complexity of his nature not only does not get obliterated, but is outlined more precisely. The thinker who by philo-

sophical methods seeks the ultimate truth about man does not limit himself to "purely metaphysical ground", but finds abundant elements which prove both the spirituality and the corporality of man and visualize them both in a better way. They are precisely the elements of the further philosophical construction.

There always remains still the question whether the "cosmological" type of understanding man and the "personalistic" one ultimately exclude each other? Do reduction and indicating the irreducible in man meet anywhere, and do they indeed ever meet? In what way should the philosophy of the subject indicate the objectivity of man and of his subjectivity itself?

These questions seem to indicate today the perspective of reflection upon man, the perspective of contemporary anthropology and ethics. These are essential and burning questions. Anthropology and ethics must now be envisaged in this difficult but promising perspective.

NOTES

¹ One of these efforts is the study of the author entitled: *The Acting Person*, and lately, still more to the point, the elaboration entitled: *Person – Subject and Community*.

² Cf. the chapter: 'Subjectivity and Subjectivism', in *The Acting Person* (Osoba i czyn Kraków 1969, p. 56).

³ The study *The Acting Person*, is construed to a great extent on this basis.

⁴ We may notice this when comparing, e.g., *The Acting Person* with the recently published work of Fr A. Krąpiec OP I *Man, an Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*. Lublin 1974.

ETHICAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Philosophical and Psychiatric Perspectives

INTRODUCTION: CONSCIOUSNESS, ETHICS AND PSYCHIATRY

In this essay I wish to present and to compare two conceptions of consciousness and action and of their place in the structure of man, namely, that of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła and of Henri Ey;¹ one a philosopher, the other a psychiatrist.

The starting point of Cardinal Wojtyła's interest in man and in the place of consciousness in man's structure was ethics; in particular, an analysis of the ethical thought of Max Scheler, and, naturally, of the main target of Scheler's criticism – Kant. This analysis has led him to a deeper investigation of the essence of ethical experience – the ethical *Erlebnis* – and of its connection with the human action which, as he writes, "contains as its root factor the act of deliberation and decision."²

He has then attempted to show "that this factor draws upon the complete organization of the individual's *personality*. Although it possesses also the rational internal structure, it is not to be reduced to the intentional act no matter how complex. Just as the nature of personality involves the interplay of the faculties of man and is to be seen as distinct and more specific than the intentional consciousness, so the act as the root factor of the human action involves the specific interplay of the personal system. As such it does not, like the intentional act, stop at one rational element; on the contrary, it represents the complete personality, that is, the complete man. Thus considering it in general, we shall call it 'human act.'"³

In this way, starting with Scheler,⁴ the author of *The Acting Person* undertakes to show briefly how the insufficiency of Scheler's emotionalism has led him "halfway back to Husserl and yet . . . beyond him in the analysis of the person";⁵ that is, as it seems, to the revalorization of the rational element in the human act connected with a stressing of the transcendent, real, and dynamic character of this act, i.e., to the restoration of the integrity of the fully human, free and responsible action as the most essential manifestation of man. On the other hand, as we shall see, he shows that the traditional, Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency does not suffice to render the peculiarity of this manifestation and that the term "human act" used by Aquinas rather propounds the problem than solves it.⁶

Henri Ey, a prominent French psychiatrist, cocreator of the "organodynamic" theory of mental diseases, starts from psychopathology. His basic line of approach to the problem of the structure of the human person and of the place of consciousness in it are investigations concerning the disintegration of both of them in mental diseases.⁷

But, one could ask, why discuss and compare just these two conceptions? My reason is that, while starting from different points of view, operating in very different milieus and using very different languages, the two authors give, in fact, very similar accounts of man and of his consciousness. And, on the one hand, this affinity, precisely when we take into account the differences of their lines of approach, seems indeed to be an argument in favor of the presented results; on the other hand, taken together, the two investigations made from such different positions, seem to give an amazing plasticity to the ensuing picture – one could say, a stereoscopic picture – of the *dynamic structure of man*. It may therefore be argued that to create such a picture, to integrate the different aspects in which we cognize ourselves is the most important task which humanity sets itself – or, at the very least, should set itself – in this century; the essential agreement of the two approaches, the one from the ethical "highest level" of human action, the other from the depths of its desintegration, seems to show that the realization of this task is not as hopeless as it might appear to a superficial observer of the burning controversies concerning human nature.

I. HUMAN ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN CARDINAL WOJTYŁA'S *THE ACTING PERSON*

1. *The Point of Departure: the Acting Person*

In different fields of learning that have as their object man's acting, particularly in ethics, action is investigated in the light of an already presupposed idea of the person. In his study Cardinal Wojtyła desires to reverse this relation by a line of inquiry in which "action reveals the person and we look at the person through his action."⁸ Thus, as stated in a subtitle⁹ "the argument begins with the fact that man acts which is given in phenomenological experience"; according to the author we may, and should, start from the immediate, phenomenological givenness of the dynamic reality of man as revealed in his action.

This line of inquiry is not chosen at random, because, as we read in the Introduction, "action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of

the person and allows us to understand the person more fully.”¹⁰ If, as the author writes, action is the special moment of apprehending the person, then naturally we are not concerned with action as the content constituted in consciousness but with the dynamic reality itself which simultaneously reveals the person as its efficacious subject.”¹¹ But this reality always manifests itself through consciousness. “Accordingly, both person and action have to be discussed in the aspect of consciousness,”¹² and the first task Cardinal Wojtyła sets himself is to “examine the interrelation of consciousness and the efficacy of the person, that is to say, of consciousness and what constitutes the essence of the dynamism pertaining to man’s action.”¹³

2. *Acting Consciously and the Consciousness of Acting*

“When we speak of conscious acting – writes Cardinal Wojtyła – without stressing the *consciousness* of acting – then we point only to action, to its constitutive property that proceeds from cognition. What is implied here is the kind of cognition that makes action also voluntary.”¹⁴ Thus, the phrase “conscious acting” says nothing directly of the consciousness of acting. But, in order to analyze conscious acting, it is also necessary to analyze the consciousness itself as an aspect of the dynamic whole person and act, to thematize it; for man “is aware of both the fact that he is acting and the fact that it is he who is acting” of the action as well as of the person in their dynamic interrelation.¹⁵ Moreover, consciousness is not only a necessary condition of voluntary action, but has also an interiorizing function of subjectivation, of enabling us to live through our experiences (*Erlebnisse*) and thus fashions the person and his acts in a specific manner. (We shall return to this function in the section following.)

Naturally the thematization of consciousness, undertaken by the author before the discussion of efficacy in order to lay out a better ground for the analysis of the latter, is not intended to be read in isolation, but is undertaken “in strict association with the dynamism and efficacy, just as in the reality of the human experience the consciousness of acting is strictly associated with acting consciously.”¹⁶

3. *Consciousness, Knowledge, and Self-Knowledge: Mirroring versus Intentional Acts*

In accordance with his dynamic and realistic conception of man, Cardinal Wojtyła, while granting that, speaking generally, the function of consciousness is cognitive, does not ascribe to it the power of investigating, of

intellectually objectivizing, and of comprehending its objects; for in its cognitive function "consciousness seems to be only a reflection or rather a mirroring of what happens in man and of his acting, of what he does and how he does it. . . . Consciousness is also the reflection, or rather the mirroring of everything that man meets with in an objective relation by means of any and all of his doings – also cognitive – and all the things happening in him. All this is mirrored in consciousness."¹⁷

Thus understood, consciousness in its mirroring function is "the derivative of the whole actively cognitive process and of the cognitive attitude to the objective reality, like the last 'reflection' of the process in the cognizant subject"; as such it possesses "the specific quality of penetrating and illuminating whatever becomes in any way man's conscious possession." But this illumination "is rather like keeping objects and their cognitive meanings in the light" and "is not tantamount to the active understanding of objects and subsequently constituting their meanings."¹⁸ This power and efficacy of active understanding, says Cardinal Wojtyła, we owe to knowledge, and, inasmuch as it is the person and his actions that are so understood, to self-knowledge, "The meanings of things and of their relations are given to consciousness, as it were, from outside as the product of knowledge, which in turn results from the active comprehension of the objective reality and is accumulated by man and possessed by him by various means and to different degrees. Hence the various degrees of knowledge determine the different levels of consciousness."¹⁹

Among the different forms and kinds of knowledge there is, according to the author, self-knowledge, which consists "in the understanding of one's own self and is concerned with a kind of cognitive insight into the object that I am for myself." It "introduces a specific continuity to the diverse moments or states in the being of the ego because it reaches to what constitutes their primary unity that comes from their being rooted in the ego" (the author explains that "here the ego means the subject having the experience of his subjectiveness and in this aspect it also means the person").²⁰ Hence self-knowledge is more consistent with consciousness than any other form of knowledge: "for its subject matter is the ego with which . . . consciousness remains in an intimate subjective union."²¹

Thus, self-knowledge objectivizes the ego and its actions furnishing consciousness with their objective meanings. The coherence of self-knowledge and consciousness is, as the author stresses, "the basic factor of the equilibrium in the inner life of a person, especially so far as the intellectual structure of the person is concerned."²² Being the subject man is also the

object for himself: "In this respect self-knowledge seems prior to consciousness [writes Cardinal Wojtyła] and cognitively relates it to the ego and its actions, even if consciousness in itself was not intentionally directed toward them."²³ This objectivizing turning of self-knowledge to the ego and to its actions is also a turning to consciousness as such.

In accordance with the assumed distinction between knowledge and consciousness, the author assumes different meanings of "intentionality" and "intentional act" than those accepted generally in phenomenology of the Husserlian type.

It lies in the essence of cognitive acts performed by man to investigate a thing, to objectivize it intellectually, and in this way to comprehend it. In this sense cognitive acts have an intentional character, they are directed on the cognitive object; for they find in it the reason for their existence as acts of comprehension and knowledge. The same does not seem to apply to consciousness . . . acts of consciousness are not essentially intentional by nature . . . while comprehension and knowledge contribute in an intentional way to the formation of the object it is in this that consists the inherent dynamism of cognizing – consciousness as such is restricted to mirroring what has already been so cognized. Consciousness is, so to speak, the understanding of what has been comprehended. . . . The intrinsic cognitive dynamism, the very operation of cognition, does not belong to consciousness. If acts of cognition consist in constituting in a specific way the meanings referring to cognitive objects, then it is not consciousness that constitutes them, even if they are indubitably constituted also in consciousness.²⁴

Thus, *intentionality* means for Cardinal Wojtyła a dynamic, active aiming at something; an intentional act is for him an *actus* in the traditional, Aristotelian sense of the word; therefore, "an act of consciousness" has for him but a derived, improper sense; it is solely a projection in consciousness of the act proper, an aspect of its result. The mirroring function of consciousness, though derived from the truly intentional, active cognition, is nevertheless strictly opposed to it as something static and powerless. Acts of consciousness are "consciousness of something," but they do not owe this peculiarity to themselves, and this characteristic is not sufficient for ascribing intentionality to them.

4. *The Reflexive Function of Consciousness: Subjectivation in Erlebnis*

According to what has been already said, "Consciousness is the ground on which the ego manifests itself in all its peculiar objectiveness (being the object of self-knowledge) and at the same time fully experiences its own subjectiveness. Thus emerges into view the other function of consciousness, another trait of it as it were, which in the living structure of the person complements the permeating and illuminative function of mirroring and in a way endows consciousness with the ultimate reason for its presence in the

specific structure of the acting person.”²⁵ It is called by the author the *reflexive* function; in its reflexive function, consciousness subjectivizes the objective: “While constituting a definite reality which as the object of self-knowledge reveals itself in its own peculiar objectiveness, the acting person, owing to his consciousness, conditions his experience of the action being performed by him as the person, and therefore secures experiencing the person in its dynamically efficacious relation to action. But then everything that constitutes the intentional ‘world’ of the person also becomes subjectified in the same way. This world . . . , if it becomes the material of experience [is] definitely incorporated into the sphere of the individual subjectiveness of every human ego.”²⁶

Thus, the reflexiveness of consciousness is something different from reflection as cognizing our own acts of thinking. Its turning to the subject is of a quite different sort: it makes the subjectiveness of the experiencing ego appear, it directs everything back to the subject, and it makes the ego experience himself as the subject.

As Cardinal Wojtyła stresses, however, reflexiveness as both an essential and a very specific trait of consciousness “becomes apparent only when we observe and trace consciousness in its intrinsic organic relation to the being: the human being, in particular the human being in action. We then discern clearly that it is one thing to *be* the subject, another to *be cognized* [objectivized] as the subject, and yet another to *have the experience* of oneself as the subject of one’s own acts and experiences.”²⁷ “An experience is more than but a reflex that appears as if on the surface of man’s being in action. Indeed, experience is that specific form of the actualization of the human subject which man owes to consciousness. Because of it the actual and ‘objective’ energies contained in man as a being, the energies, which when taken together make up the multifarious and differentiated wealth of his potentialities, are actualized according to the pattern of subjectiveness proper to man as a person.”²⁸

What the reflexive function of consciousness has to accomplish is “in fact even more than merely to make appear the subjectiveness of the ego”; for it “penetrates the subject constituting it experientially every time an experience is had.”²⁹ Experiencing himself in action, “as the one who acts, as the subjective agent of action,”³⁰ man experiences also as his own the moral value of good and bad – in an attitude, at the same time emotional and appreciative, that is assumed by him toward these values: “he is not only conscious of the morality of his actions but he actually experiences it, often very deeply.”³¹ While objectively belonging to the real subject these

values function "in a thoroughly subjective manner in experience, which consciousness conditions by its reflexive function rather than only mirrors it because of self-knowledge, for this would still give but an objectified awareness of the action and its moral value."³² Thus man has the experience of good or bad in himself, that is, he experiences himself as good or bad.

5. *Subjectivity versus "Subjectiveness"*

As these analyses show, man is not only a subject, but he also has an experience of himself as being a subject. It is on the ground of this experience that the dynamic interrelation between the person and his action is realized. And consciousness is an essential factor in the constitution of the human subjectivity by allowing this experience to take place. "He experiences and therefore he is the subject in a strictly experiential sense. Here understanding springs directly from experience without any intermediate steps, without any reasoning. He also experiences his actions as the acting of which he himself is the agent."³³ Therefore, without a detailed analysis of man's subjectivity "it would be impossible to grasp the full depth of the dynamic interrelation of person and action," writes Cardinal Wojtyła.³⁴ Owing to consciousness, the interrelation of person and action "obtains its final, subjective form" – the form of an experience. The objective facts of this efficacious interrelation and "of the moral values that germinate in this dynamic system"³⁵ hold their objectivity and reality only in the subjectivity of man.

The explanation of the subjectivity of the human person is, then, fundamental for the proper understanding of man; it also furnishes the proper material for a refutation of subjectivism, i.e., of a complete detachment of experience from action and a reduction of moral values which emerge in this action and in the acting person to mere contents of consciousness. An investigation of consciousness as an aspect serves only to gain a better understanding of the subjectivity of man, in particular of his inner relation to his own acting. Taken as an absolute, consciousness becomes a substitute for the subject of experiences and values in moral life and deprives them of their reality. And, with this approach, consciousness itself ceases to be anything real, but becomes only the subject of mental contents.

The author concedes that this subjectivistic attitude is to a certain extent corroborated by the purely conscious character of the acts of consciousness in their mirroring function. Therefore "the boundary of objectivism and realism in the concept of man . . . is marked by the assertion of self-

knowledge. In spite of its specific conscious character, consciousness integrated by self-knowledge into the whole of a real person retains its objective significance and thus also the objective status in the subjective structure of man."³⁶

6. *The Human Dynamisms: Human Action and Something-Happening-in-Man*

There is, as Cardinal Wojtyła stresses, a fundamental difference between our experienced dynamisms, namely, that of acting and doing, and mere happening: something-happening-in-man, or as the author calls it, an "activation." Although both are experienced by us, in order to analyze the latter it is not sufficient to rely on the inner experience: it comprises everything that takes place in the human body, and we have no adequate spontaneous evidence of all our bodily precesses. We must supplement it by the objective knowledge we have of man.

These two varieties of dynamics may appear to correspond to the Aristotelian categories of *agere* and *pati* and, as these categories, they are conditioned and determined by each other; but, at the same time, they are distinctly correlated in the sense of a certain parity: in both man stands as the dynamic subject. On the other hand, the pair of concepts *potentia-actus*, in which all sorts of dynamism were described in the traditional philosophy of the Aristotelian orientation, is here seen as insufficient to render the specific nature of the human action as opposed to something merely happening in man: it does not render its specific difference.

7. *Efficacy and Subjectivity*

It is, says Cardinal Wojtyła, the moment of efficacy, our experienced "being the agent," that decides on the difference between human action and mere happening. To this experience there corresponds an objective efficacy "for experiencing this opens to our insight the structure of the efficacious ego."³⁷ When something merely happens in man, his ego is not the cause in the same way that it is in an action. In action, man must accept it both as his own property and also as the domain of his responsibility: "Both the responsibility and the sense of property invest with a special quality the causation and the efficacy themselves of the acting person."³⁸

Thus, by the way of our experience of our efficient causation, we are led to the objective order of being and existence. In conscious action man is at the same time immanent and transcendent relatively to his acting; the transcendence of being experientially the agent of one's acting passes into the

immanence of the experience of the acting itself: "The 'efficacious ego' and the 'acting ego' form every time anew a dynamic synthesis and a dynamic unity in any particular action. It is the synthesis and unity of person and action."³⁹

It is, then, the moment of the peculiar transcendence of the person with regard to his action that unites the person with his action and, at the same time, brings about a special dependence of acting upon the person. As the creator of his action, in particular of his moral action, man shapes it. In accordance with the fundamental distinction of actions and activations there appears, says the author, a particular difference, or even opposition, between the subjectiveness and the efficacy of man; while the former appears in something happening in man, the latter is, as we have seen, the essential factor in acting. But, on the other hand, it is one and the same human being that acts and that is the subject of happening – the same dynamic unity; and in this perspective we may speak of subjectiveness – in a broader sense – which lies at the roots of both these structures of human dynamism; and both these structures flow from the basic constitution of man as an existing, dynamic subject.

Acting and actualization, as fundamental dynamic structures by whose synthesis the person is made up, "cross in the phenomenological field of experience but they join and unite together in the metaphysical field"⁴⁰ – in the ontic subject; while essentially different from one another, and in this difference constituting the actual wealth of the human dynamism, they are both consequences of the dynamism of the being which is a person.

8. *Potentiality, Consciousness, and the Unconscious*

One of the chief aims of his study, says Cardinal Wojtyła, is to grasp and define the specific character of man's acting from the point of view of human potentiality. In ascertaining man's dynamism we at the same time ascertain his potentiality, we assume the existence of a source of his dynamization. In traditional philosophy, the source of different forms of human dynamism were assumed on the strength of their differentiation and called faculties. The author does not follow this path of traditional metaphysics, but wants to go by "the basic intuition of the person, as it manifests itself in action,"⁴¹ and to analyze more precisely the relation of consciousness to potentiality.

In order to achieve this, Cardinal Wojtyła takes into consideration two kinds of dynamism and potentiality or, as we may say, two structural levels of the dynamic man-subject: the psychoemotive and the somatovegetative

level in their experiential presentation. Their relation to consciousness is fundamentally different; while we are essentially aware of the former, the latter, in general, is not and even cannot be mirrored in consciousness. It is connected with the living body and its dynamic facts are not accessible to us directly, but solely by means of bodily sensation. Thus, it is not owing to consciousness that the dynamic unity of the man-subject is achieved at the vegetative level, for "dynamic unity is antecedent and primary to consciousness in both its mirroring and reflexive functions. In the man-subject it consists – at least at the somatic level – primarily in the unity of life, and only secondarily and, as it were, accidentally in the unity of experience."⁴² Therefore, potentiality is, in a way, prior to consciousness. This priority seems also to be valid at the emotive level, in spite of the essential role of consciousness at this level. Also the unconscious, as thematized by Freud, "designates a different source of the content of human experience than the source that feeds consciousness"⁴³ – a potentiality connected genetically with instinct and, in a sense, prior to consciousness. "But priority does not mean superiority or predominance. What it does mean is structural priority and consequently priority in the terms of interpretation and hence of understanding: it would be impossible to understand and explain the human being, his dynamism as well as his conscious acting and actions, if we were to base our considerations on consciousness alone. . . . Consciousness . . . does not constitute the inner structure of the human dynamism itself."⁴⁴ Thus, the unconscious "brings out all the more clearly the dynamism and the potentiality in man."⁴⁵ Indeed, the considerations referring to the unconscious are of special importance for an analysis of the human being as the subject of dynamism, for: (1) "they clearly show the potentiality of the subject in the inner aspect itself." (2) "They help, at least to some extent, to see the inner continuity and cohesion of the subject" because the unconscious "brings into view the transition between, on the one hand, what only happens in man owing to the natural vegetative, and possibly also emotive activations, and, on the other, what man consciously experiences and what he considers to be his actions." (3) The unconscious, with its continuous relation to consciousness, allows us to see the human being as internally subjected to time and thus having his own internal history. This history is determined and formed to a great extent by factors in man's dynamic structure itself. (4) The unconscious "brings out vividly the hierarchy of human potentialities. There is something highly significant in the constant drive toward consciousness, in the constant urge" in the unconscious "to attain consciousness and to be consciously

experienced." Hence its existence and functions "indubitably indicate that consciousness is the sphere where man most appropriately fulfils himself."⁴⁶ Making conscious what has been unconscious and genuine objectivation of the unconscious is – as the author says – one of the chief tasks of morality and education.

9. *The Becoming of Man*

All forms of human dynamism – states Cardinal Wojtyła – are associated with correlative forms of becoming of the man-subject. They make something and somebody of him. This becoming is differentiated according to the corresponding dynamism, it is, e.g., different in the somatovegetative and in the psychoemotive sphere. In particular, although both are forms of activations connected with a certain passivity of the subject, nevertheless, while the formation of the latter depends – or may depend – predominantly on the person, the former is, in general, directly inaccessible to his decisions.

The fruit of the action of the personal ego is morality "conceived not in the abstract, but as a strictly existential reality pertaining to the person who is its own proper subject. It is man's actions, the way he consciously acts that make him a good or a bad man – good or bad in the moral sense."⁴⁷ Becoming moral – says the author – "is *the* decisive factor in determining the realistic character of goodness and badness, of the moral values themselves."⁴⁸ Moral conduct is a reality that forms part of the reality of human actions as a specific trait of man-subject. In this integral structure of becoming inheres freedom as its real and integral part: it also "constitutes the root of man's becoming good or bad by his actions"⁴⁹ and forms part of efficacy. The experience of "I may but I must not" furnishes the best visualization of freedom. It is not merely the content of consciousness that is given to us in this experience: it is a manifestation and actualization of the dynamism proper to man. Its correlate in human potentiality is the will.

II. HENRI EY'S ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND OF ITS PLACE IN MAN

1. *The Twofold Duality of the Conscious Being*

Having investigated – in the third volume of his extensive *Etudes psychiatriques*⁵⁰ – the structure of the field of consciousness by analyzing different forms of its disintegration, and intending to devote the fourth volume to the

problems of personality, Ey feels the need of answering the following questions: (1) To what, in the structure of the conscious being, corresponds that duality which consists in its living the actuality of its experience, and being at the same time a person in its world? (2) What sort of unity of the conscious being may be built up by the conjunction of these two modalities of being conscious which is always at the same time a becoming conscious (or a conscious becoming – *un devenir conscient*)? To these two basic questions there has to be added, according to the author, a third, concerning the problem of the relations between the conscious being and the unconscious, as they show themselves in psychopathological facts.

La conscience is an attempt at answering these questions. Before presenting these answers we have to explain Ey's understanding of the term *être conscient* – the conscious being; he stresses that this term renders better than "consciousness" the fundamental ambiguity of the latter: on the one hand, it denotes a certain predicative modality of an existing subject (*être conscient*, *Bewusst-sein*); on the other hand, a certain objectively characterized being (*un être conscient*, *bewusstes Wesen*). Thus, says the author, we see more clearly the fact that "consciousness" is not a simple "function" of this being, but its very organization insofar as it allows the conscious being to be at the same time a subject and an object.

2. Ey's Idea of Consciousness

"To be conscious, writes Ey at the beginning of his book, means to live the particularity of one's own being while transferring it into the generality of one's knowledge."⁵¹ Trying to give, on the one hand, a general characterization of the conscious being and, on the other, a detailed description of the basic structures inherent in it, he stresses the necessity of assuming a point of view which is either overlooked or denied by most philosophical schools and authors, namely, to start from a hypothesis concerning the organization of the psychical being.

Ey tries to render the dynamic structure of the conscious being by the following four assertions formulating successive approximative descriptions of this structure.

First, the conscious being implies an autochthonic organization. Conscious phenomena appear as such on condition that a "milieu" constitutes itself – a milieu which puts an autochthonic organization between the vegetative life of the organism and the surrounding world to which the organism in question is related. This "milieu," says Ey, is the relation of the milieu of the psychic life to the milieu of the world, the

relation of the center to the horizon of the human existence, both unceasingly referring to one another. This milieu is not spatial but resides, so to speak, in the movement itself which encloses the objectivity of the world in the subject's representation; it shapes consciousness in its connection with its own movement.

Second, the conscious being objectifies and mirrors itself in a model of his world. This autonomy is not to be confused, says Ey, with the subjective interiority; for consciousness does not constitute itself as a product of the ego; on the contrary, it is the ego that presupposes consciousness constituted as an object. Thus, consciousness is for man the possibility of constituting himself as an object for oneself and for the others. Therefore, this constitution of a model of the world is something essential to man; it is, as Ey expresses it, not only his task but his being itself.

Third, "the conscious being has himself at his disposal in the order of his temporality. . . . The law of his temporality is the *order* which he commands to govern while assigning to the movements of his body and of his world the ideal in which he personalizes himself."⁵²

Fourth, the structure of the conscious being is – says Ey – "like a reflection of the self in his lived experience. It demands that its ego should be transcendent to his experience."⁵³ While lived experience enters into consciousness as a property of the ego, it is only by becoming conscious of himself that man becomes the lord of his experience by objectifying his being in his own ego.

These approximations lead to a general characteristic of the conscious being as one who can incorporate into himself a model of his world, a model in which his own experiences are ordered and of which the person disposes. Ey's schematic formula is, then, that to be conscious is to have at one's disposition a personal model of the world. Stressing this availability by the subject, Ey opposes his idea of man both to psychological subjectivism and to the structuralistic idea of consciousness without the Ego as well.

Having at one's disposal a personal model of one's world is, says Ey, at the same time a way of managing time. This rule is founded on temporality as a fundamental dimension of the structure of being. The temporal structure of the conscious being is the structure of his memory, which enables him to dispose freely of time – to concentrate on the actuality of the present and to polarize it in the project of existence. "Consciousness, by the very organization of its temporal structure, is for the subject an articulation of these two ways of disposing of his experiences and of

surviving them. The conscious being is composed according to these double coordinates; consequently, his temporality, his memory, and this twofold constitution are the same."⁵⁴

Two fundamental levels of the conscious being correspond, according to Ey, to this duality: "consciousness which stops at the actuality of the lived experience and consciousness developing itself in the system of the person"⁵⁵ – the level of the lived experiences and that of the self. A most common error, says Ey, consists in confusing those structures. By their complementarity, these two articulated systems assure to the conscious being the objectivation introduced by him into his own being in order to cognize and to direct it toward his own ends.

The basic structure of consciousness is, according to the author of *La conscience* – the actualization of the lived experience connected with its organization into a field. In order that the conscious being may be able to live his experience, the latter must appear to him in a present introduced between the past and the future as an interval, as a "space" of time; thus, consciousness introduces the space of representation into the actualization of its lived time. The lived experience, connected with the body and with the data of sense, needs a structure of consciousness which would assure to it a legislative orthetic function of assigning to the presented data the exact values of objectivity or subjectivity. This (*noematic*) legislation of the (*noetic*) experience implies a constant formal structure of consciousness which may be investigated, says Ey, by a phenomenology of the Husserlian type.

To the mentioned formal structure of actuality corresponds – according to Ey – the second structure of potentiality and implication of the conscious being, that of a self; the self which in his historical development constitutes himself into a person by constituting his own system of values. While the first structure has the character of a *field*, "the self plunges into the past or aims at the future according to an unstopping [axiological] trajectory which ties the existence to its beginning and to its end as its own fate."⁵⁶ This transcendence of the being conscious of itself may solely be described, says Ey, in the style of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalyse*.

But neither these two structures nor the methods of describing them may be fully separated. They are intimately connected by the dialectic of being and having – "experiencing something, that is, incorporating to oneself an experience, constitutes the functional substrate of the *being* conscious of itself."⁵⁷ Nevertheless, in this reciprocity there appears also a subordination of the field of consciousness of the self – not that of an

absolute rule, but because the self represents the very system of values of integration to which the whole lived experience is subordinated. In its full exercise, resulting from the highest degree of attention, reflection, and freedom, this twofold structure of the conscious being does not show itself (and still less do its substructures). The full perspective of the organization of consciousness appears only in the processes of its disintegration in sleep and in the clinic of mental diseases.

3. *The Field of Consciousness and Its Organization (Ey's Phenomenology of the Lived Actuality)*

Investigating the organization of the field of consciousness from this point of view, Ey comes to the conclusion that its disturbances form a continuous and irreversible order, corresponding to the constant and continuous structure which underlies this organization. He stresses the need of considering the field of consciousness as "a dynamic whole, organized and living";⁵⁸ "It cannot be reduced to its static aspects (a state) nor to its concrete aspects (its contents or data), nor to an empty form; and, therefore, it is never simply a space, or a stream, or a rigid frame – never except on different levels of its disintegration. . . ."⁵⁹ In the continuum of its substructure Ey discerns three main levels: (1) the constitution of the experience directed toward the world; (2) the constitution of the space in which the relations of the subject and the world are interlaced; and (3) the constitution of the present. They build themselves one over the other in this order in the ontogenesis of man as the main stages of the vertical movement of consciousness constituting itself, while the disintegration of consciousness progresses in the opposite direction. When we wake we pass them all immediately, coming directly to the highest level.

The "field" is always determined by its sense. In accordance with the Brentanian idea of intentionality, consciousness is, says Ey, "a certain aiming at something, and the field appears as if in order to answer to this aiming by representing its object." "The 'time' of consciousness is the duration which carries the desire toward its object and the distance which separates it from its goal. Its 'space' is that in which appear the representations giving rise to the aspiration for the goal."⁶⁰ The object of this first vectorial organization is the simplest field in which consciousness can constitute itself. It rises from an obstacle put between the desire and its object. On this model, says Ey, reduced to its simplest expression, all the configurations of consciousness may build themselves up and develop. Thus

understood, the intentional relation as the first and basic bilaterality of consciousness opens and orients the field by presenting to the subject its object. Such intentionality appears even on the most primitive levels of consciousness, in dreams, but there the field is very narrow, concrete, and experience does not develop in it; it is, so to speak, "imprisoned by the perceived or desired object." In contrast to this, on a higher level, "this embryo of significant representation is orchestrated into a multitude of reflexive probabilities which form the complex and unrestrictedly open multiplicity of its experience."⁶¹ In this case there appears a situation, a problem whose sense is not fully given. "Thus [concludes Ey] we see clearly that if the sense is the *Urform* of the field of consciousness, its matrix, it does not reduce itself to intentionality for the intentionality is also subordinated to a structure of possibilities or of instrumentality of the meaningful [*de signifiants*]"⁶² At the same time, the semantic essence of the field as its most general trait cannot explain the categories of reality of its appearances.

On a higher level, to make possible – claims Ey in reference to Bergson – "the cinemalike possibility of a simultaneous presentation of successive or implied plans,"⁶³ the structure of the field of consciousness must give to the subject a possibility of disposing of a necessary space in order that the presentation might spread out. Therefore, the field appears now as a place, as a "stage," at which the thematic vicissitudes may present themselves; but it is not an empty, homogenous space, for it cannot be separated from its "content." It is not solely any of the varieties of the field of perception, for it comprises all these varieties, being the "place-of-spaces-lived-in-actual-experience," "an analogical structure which combines time and space as the *medium* of its 'representation.'"⁶⁴ Ey speaks of "representation," and not solely of "presentation" for, as he stresses, in this case experience constitutes itself as an action taking place inside the subject. This "inside" means the lived space of the living body, the symbolic "space" of reference and movement; it is the simultaneity of things which constitutes the order of the present and is, therefore, in time and in motion – it is itself, says Ey, "only motion."⁶⁵ As a way of being in time, it spreads out as a memory (Bergson), as a recognition which needs a pause of time in which the simultaneity of its objects may come together. To be lived, the field must organize itself as a coherence of feeling and of the motions of the living body; and "the body" brings out space and qualities only by incorporating the lived experience into the temporality of its movement and by living it in its representation."⁶⁶

This "space," lived as the scenic field, is "occupied," "filled," and structured as a system of relations, communications, information, and messages which open the human experience to the other. In this way, the field of consciousness becomes the field of language. Among the "representative aspects" (*aspects figuratifs*) of the field, besides temporality and motion, corporeity and verbalization, Ey specifies also sensibility and aesthetics, the aesthetic compact of this "piece" enacted before the subject. These aspects are ordered and oriented in centripetal and centrifugal movements. The *thetic function* of consciousness discerns and segregates in all its movements and modalities what belongs to it and what escapes it or against what it struggles. In an experience of this sort there incessantly takes part: (1) what is outside me in the objective order of the outside world; (2) what I owe to my desire and imagination; (3) what emerges from the impersonal world of my unconscious; and (4) what comes to me owing to my communication with others. Thus, in (3), the scene of consciousness communicates with the wings behind the scene, i.e. of the unconscious.

On this level consciousness acquires the possibility of opening toward the present. "To be present in one's world means to organize the present as a situation in which action comes in."⁶⁷ On the inferior levels there appear some experiences deprived of the "dynamics which make an act from actuality"; it is "the present which can hold the time" (*un maintenant qui peut maintenir le temps*). It is not solely an aiming at something or a place at which something may appear. "It has its own quality of duration, of the necessary pause, of the rest needed in action . . . it is . . . a space of time."⁶⁸ Thus we have come to the "*ethical temporality* as an integration of desires, emotions, and exigencies of intellectual motivations which is the functional finish of the actualization in the present of the lived experience."⁶⁹ It is an experience guided by a distinct plan actually realized in it. It can admit lived experience only "as an act, and not solely as an actuality, an act which, to develop its plan of being, needs the new factor of willing."⁷⁰

The field of consciousness, writes Ey,

"organized into a field of action, does not constitute itself into a flat surface or as a static order. Action which develops in it the vicissitudes of its lived experiences [*vécu*] bores in the present a multiplicity of perspectives which are like film shots and according to which each phase of this development may appear or disappear, oppose itself to the others, interfere with them, succeed them without abandoning the thematic shaping [*gestaltisation*] of the field. The present is not an aggregate, but a functional unity of this multiplicity; and the movements – centripetal or centrifugal – singling out a detail or grasping the whole, directed toward the surface or plunging into the depth, etc., all those figures drawn by the subject around its object are like dimensions of the present; dimensions elastic and fluent, which receive solely from

the thematic sense of the field the capacity of facultative drawing, in the reality of the lived experience, the shape of their field of action."⁷¹

This operational structure of consciousness is no more a "stream of pure consciousness," for the "data" inherent in it are incorporated into a directed order of the movement of the field and need, at least the agreement if not the attention of the subject, in order to appear as free.

It is precisely the ordering of the field of consciousness into a "present" that makes it possible for the subject to have it at his disposition. The most amazing thing is, says Ey, that "this entanglement of perceptions, representations, recollections, ideas, abstractions, and words does not endanger the order and the category of the real data of the lived experience [*l'ordre et la catégorie des réalités du vécu*]."⁷² The organization of consciousness, which is essentially fieldlike, "is necessarily shaped and ordered by the subject constituting it – and, when it is already constituted, controlling its shape, its limits, and its positions."⁷³

It is therefore essential to consciousness to constitute itself into a field according to a perspective of radical bilaterality. Subjectivity (*la subjectivité, die Selbstheit*) is a dimension which connects consciousness with its world. But it is possible only at a certain level of being conscious. Here, the subject is not only a structured center of the field, but, as the ego (*le je*) of the lived experience it is, in this perspective, the creator of its experience. The "facultativity" of the field is a *property* of its subject, although this property, as we know from the investigations of the unconscious, is not as absolute as one used to think. Present and ruling its field of consciousness, the subject enacts his "legislative power" in judging and evaluating reality, exacting his thetic function or, as Janet called it, the function of reality: he assigns a certain category of reality to all his data, operations, intentions, decisions, whatever their reality or fictitiousness might be: also the fictitious is taken as *really* fictitious.

Thus, the subject appears as the ego (*je*) of all feeling, perception, and thought. "He is the author of the sense which he takes from his unconscious. He is the spectator of his presentations. He is the actor of his presence."⁷⁴

The described substructures or levels of the vertical organization of consciousness appear in a normal, grown-up man as essential properties of the field of consciousness. As separate structures, however, corresponding to the succeeding phases in ontogenesis, they appear to an adult man only – but then necessarily – in pathological cases.

When we speak about the mobility or changeability of the field, it is, as Ey stresses, a very important thing not to confuse two totally different structural varieties of this changeability; the first is the just described vertical development of consciousness owing to which, in its mature form, it makes possible free movement, the facultativity enabling the subject to perform its thetic function and to act consciously; this facultativity and activity connected with it is the second variety or – if we like – the second meaning in which we can speak about the mobility and changeability of the field of consciousness.

While – as Bergson said – my present consists in my being conscious of my body, the historicity of the ego is constituted, according to Ey, outside of this corporeity, by the identity of the ego being formed and its rule over its property being confirmed. But these two systems are not parallel: on the level of “presence” the ego is neither solely a spectator nor a subject passively receiving or recording data, but in the first place the “director of its consciousness,” the warranter of the value of its action. It performs an “axiological function.” Although it appears on different levels of constituted consciousness, the ego builds itself up solely in the course of constituting consciousness, incorporating the others into the system of values which is formed by it while speaking to itself and to the others.

As Ey stresses, the philosophical conceptions of consciousness as *cogito*, opposing the description just given, most often regard consciousness as something placed outside of the field, structuring it but being itself devoid of any structure. Others regard forms of its disintegration as its essential features.

His analysis of the field of consciousness has made it possible to discern – writes Ey – its three basic characteristics which give to human experience its primary order and enable it to develop itself discursively.

(1) Its *verticality* – the vertical movement owing to which the field of consciousness passes all the levels of its constitution (levels appearing in its pathological destruction) and reaches the stage of organization *as a field of presence*;

(2) Its *facultativity* consisting in the field of consciousness being able to shape a variety of experiences disposable to the subject’s thetic position and direction;

(3) Its *legality*, its being, on all its levels, an order, a form of organization.

According to Ey, the first of these features suggests the need of explaining the problem of wakefulness and of the relation of the organ-

ization of the lived experience to that of the brain, the second is connected with the problem of the person, and the third directs our attention to the problem of the unconscious.

4. *Consciousness and the Person*

Ey's analyses of the person, i.e., of "the ego or the being conscious of oneself" (the title of Part 3 of the book) start, as those concerning consciousness, with psychopathology. In the first place, referring to a book by G. E. Störing,⁷⁵ he stresses that contrary to the frequent confusing of the two, psychopathology of personality (concerning the pathological modalities of man's relations to others) is a sphere distinct from psychopathology of consciousness. This is proved by the fact that while disturbances of consciousness always have their repercussions in the sphere of personality, the converse does not hold: disorders of personality may take place without any distortion of the basic structure of the field of consciousness itself. Clinical experience shows, asserts Ey, that the problem of alienation of a mentally ill person is not "only" the problem of consciousness in its general or common features: what is also at stake here are the peculiar ways of being human, the peculiar deformations of the consciousness of oneself, i.e., the problems of the pathology of the self.

According to Ey, the person in his self-construction and persistence in time integrates temporality, values, and the experience of man. In its basis, its ontogenesis coincides with the maturation of the nervous functions, but as the building up of man's personality it lasts as long as life. The past phases of this process remain included in the structure of the psychical organism (this is connected in particular with the substructure of the unconscious). The forms of construction of the person, accreting gradually, are the dynamic levels of integration; what comes from a lower level is not only "integrated," but is always, at the same time, an "integrating" part of the *Gestaltkreis* (V. v. Weizäcker's term). The self forms itself always in its relation to the objects and in its body. Its first separation from the object, according to Ey (best described by Freud) comes into effect owing to the resistance which it meets in the realization of its needs. One's own living body is the most primary experience of the ego. In the course of this objectivization, starting from the simplicity of the agglutinative French pronoun *je*, we come to the separation of a distinct subject, of the complex structure of the subject - *moi*. This is followed by the logical construction of the ego and by its introduction into the subject's thought. Being a

primary stage of ontogenesis, it develops in the history of the person, being like an axis of his rationality.

The ego develops in its function of the world or of reality, adjusting this reality not only to the rules of its reason, but also to the movements which project its desires, bringing it nearer to or farther from the others, etc. In other words, it constructs its representation of the world.

The consciousness of one's own identity is then added to this representation as a certain value: what is now at stake is to assume a certain role, to identify oneself with a certain personality which we want to become. It is an obligation, an assuming of an ideal. Therefore, writes Ey, all the psychoanalytic theories of personality, failing to find this ideal (i.e., something transcendent) in the very structure of man (i.e., in the immanence) must necessarily deny its existence.

Thus, the character of a person is neither ready-made, nor does it solely constitute itself for the person – it is something which is “taken,” and the process of this taking cannot be described as a simple phase of the self-construction of the ego: it announces the history of the person in its proper meaning and is itself its history. The formation of character, says Ey, does not take place at the beginning, but at the end of man's ontogenesis.

The structure which transcends the present and which secures for the subject his basic features, namely, unity, power, and the historical continuity, is his memory. Ey understands here by memory neither immediate memory, nor Bergson's “pure memory,” but “the memory which is the very form of existence of the self.”⁷⁶ The self is a being conscious of its inactuality.⁷⁷ This inactuality is a structure which is opposed to that of the field of consciousness, a modality totally different from temporality: “Like actuality for the field of consciousness, inactuality is for the self, its proper mode of existence for the essence of the Ego's being its potentiality [*virtualité*], the power which it comprises and the history which is to be continued.”⁷⁸

In this way the self, owing to its self-consciousness, adds to the basic synthetic structure of the field of consciousness its diachronic dimension, its dynamic structure of *including* and *holding* in itself the moments of its own history.

This dynamic axis of the subject appears as a trajectory which begins in the constitution of first experiences and is directed toward its later experiences and its final ends; “the very finality of the subject and also of the person as the agent of his existence in his first structural feature.”⁷⁹

The self exists in its directedness while creating its own system of values.

They come mostly from the outside, but they "should be incorporated into this system in order to shape the informations, logic or morality, the syntax or the social rules of this personal *axiology*."⁸⁰

Thus, consciousness organizes itself into a field of actually lived experience only in relation to the subject which constitutes itself out of it. In ontogenesis, the self grows out of the constitution of consciousness; but later their direction and organization diverge. The ego draws its substance from experience, but it transcends it: "to be conscious means, in turn and simultaneously, to *live an experience* in one's present and to *direct one's existence* through its fields of the present";⁸¹ "The dynamic aspect of the constancy of the self [writes Ey], does not consist in its simplicity, but in its potentiality."⁸² It was constantly asserted that consciousness and the ego are "the same." But, says Ey, "this book has been written precisely to contradict this erroneous simplification."⁸³

But it is not enough to state the difference between the ego and consciousness. One must say more; namely, that in a normal, grown-up and conscious man the field of consciousness is subordinate to the system of his personality. The integration in the history of the person of the succeeding moments of his lived actuality "is a taking into possession of the field of consciousness by the intentionality of the Self."⁸⁴ "When the self actively directs his experience, on this 'summit,' in this highest region of the psychical being the self and the field of consciousness coincide. But this relation of coincidence can be interpreted neither as an identity, nor as a full correspondence."⁸⁵ It is the relation of subordination. The field of consciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of the formation of the person.

5. *Becoming Conscious*

In the second edition of his book, Ey adds a fifth part, entitled "Becoming Conscious," which contains a summary presentation of the organization of the psychical being and of its relations to human values. This is done mainly in a critical examination of the basic ideas of Sigmund Freud, in consequence of which Ey outlines a modified schema of the relations of the systems consciousness-unconscious (Cs-Ucs). This sketch, referring partially to the analyses of Paul Ricoeur, seems to be an important step toward a further clarification of the author's position.

The relation of the conscious being (Cs) and of the unconscious (Ucs) is, according to Ey, that of inclusion, i.e., the latter as included, is endowed by the former with its form. But, while constituting itself, the conscious

being rejects, represses the Ucs, placing it in its interior. This is done in two ways, according to the two-fold structure of the Cs. In the field of actuality of consciousness it means the subordination of all the phenomena to the law of objectivity. The unconscious may appear in the actuality of the conscious being only by escaping his vigilance, in the lacunae and implications of his discourse.

In the second modality of the conscious being, that of being conscious of oneself (of being somebody), the subject excludes the unconscious – not only by rejecting it from the contingent space of his property, from his field of consciousness, but condemning it to be alien, to be the other; this is the modality described in particular by Freud.

These two ways of having one's Ucs are shown, according to Ey, even better by psychopathology than by any sort of *Daseinsanalyse*, for it is precisely psychopathology which may explain how *becoming unconscious* means precisely that one becomes expropriated by ones unconscious. To these two modalities there correspond the aforementioned two ways of this expropriation: that of the collapse of the structure of the field of consciousness and that of an alienation of the consciousness of the self. It is true, says Ey, that this duality was perceived by Freud; but, he adds, the division of the Freudian unconscious into the preconscious and the unconscious proper corresponds rather to the two modalities of the conscious being and is not a genuine division of the unconscious; it is impossible to radically separate as two heterogenous and distinct spheres the system conscience-preconscience-reality and the unconscious proper. "One should rather say [writes Ey] that the unconscious is the same in its preconscious and in its radically unconscious form. The difference is rather that of the modalities of the conscious being which represses it, either in the name of the principle of reality, or in the name of moral censorship."⁸⁶ To bring order into the Freudian topography, it is enough, according to Ey, to state (1) that the Cs admits both the ego and the ideal of the ego (the genuine superego) and (2) that the unconscious is composed of the id and its antipulsions (death instincts and the underego, abusively called superego). After correcting in this way Freud's topography, Ey proceeds to a description of the dynamic structure of the psychical being who "owns his unconscious as he owns his body, but a body which he has himself created."⁸⁷

By applying to the psychical being the term "structure," says Ey, he has already implicitly assumed a relational, energetic, or topographic model of it; this model is necessarily asymmetric, as is any molecule or living system. The sense of this asymmetry, the subordination of the field of conscious-

ness to the ego, presents the problem of value implied in the relation Cs-Ucs. Referring to Paul Ricoeur, Ey states that the psychical organism is so far different from a biological one that the embryo from which it has developed remains in its structure: the exigencies of life remain, but they are integrated in the progress of man's self-construction in which he aims at his liberty by adapting himself to the laws of reason. And the sense of the nervous organization is precisely that of a memory of the past constantly recurring according to the exigencies of action. Integration presupposes order, and its possibility is necessarily reduced to choice, differentiation, and control – it is essentially *inhibiting* or, as Ey prefers to express it, a *function of negativity*. Freud himself, remarks Ey, ~~has~~, in fact, subordinated the Ucs to Cs by describing it as the repressed and thus presupposing a negative action of the conscious being. As a realm of desire (or of its equivalents), of instincts, the Ucs is in a way one of radical *positivity*, and if the desire may be described as an absence, a hiatus, its dynamic, conative character is the fundamental positivity of the unconscious. This conative or energetic ground of the conscious being is twofold, being divided into the tendencies subordinated to the “life instincts” and those of the “death instincts.” This duality of instincts makes the conflict of the Freudian agencies partly superfluous. But the primary structure of the stratum of instincts, says Ey, is obviously different from the Freudian unconscious. It is solely the unconscious of an “unconscious being” in the sense in which an animal *is* unconscious but does not possess its unconscious. It is only by adding the *repressed*, which had not been known before, to the generally accepted unconscious that Freud has really discovered the unconscious. It passes from the status of an adjective to that of noun precisely by being prohibited and repressed, thus cumulating the power of instincts with that of repression. In other words, it constitutes itself into the unconscious proper solely owing to the organization of the conscious being which represses it. But there is no unorganized, unbound energy in man. The “formations of the unconscious” get their form from the organization of the conscious being. Human “drives” are never pure instincts, occurring always already in a halo of representation which they owe to consciousness. The field of the unconscious is constituted by the derivations of the instincts and of consciousness.

In accordance with the above, Ey proposes a modification and simplification of the Freudian schema: the trinity id-superego-Ego reduces itself to two poles: the positive one (Ucs) and the negative (Cs), both strictly complementary in their dynamism. The Cs is not simply subject to the action of the Ucs but, repressing it, forms it and takes it into its possession.

The id and Freud's superego form the lower part of the unconscious, being rather the id and the antiid. The superego proper as the "ideal of the Ego" is a project situated above the ego.

From this diagram as Ey states, it follows (1) that the structure of the conscious being enfolds the Ucs and represses the id, endowing it with figures of complexes which are the symbolic representations of the instincts, and (2) that the matter of the Ucs is constituted by the id, an id composed, however, from the conflicting powers of the *libido* and the *destrudo*.

"If it is characteristic of the psychical life to constitute a milieu between the instinct and the world, the main characteristics of the human phenomena is to constitute a verbal milieu in which the will of the subject and the representation of his world are brought together";⁸⁸ as Ey puts it, all this is nowadays a banality. But the unconscious may only occur provided that the discourse of the conscious being introduces into the beings organization a milieu in which his relations to his Ucs become articulated. This is precisely the topic of all the reflections on the relation of nature and culture.

Although, as Freud used to stress, language belongs essentially to the system Cs-preconscious, it allows of levels of organization; those levels, proceeding from more or less "automatic" functions, represent the articulation of the conscious being and his Ucs. Man becomes conscious precisely in language and through the functions of language. As a symbolic medium of all the subject's relations, language is, says Ey referring to Benveniste, suspended between intentional and instinctive infralinguistics which he expresses, and the superlinguistic, logico-ethical system, the law of which he proclaims.

Ey describes becoming unconscious as letting one's unconscious manifest itself in and through one's language. Even in dreams, delirium or hallucinations there appear stories which can be lived only by being told. The process of becoming unconscious does not tend precisely toward a zero of consciousness, but tends precisely toward a symbolic, linguistic manifestation of the unconscious proceeding by the way of displacement of representations and utilizing all the functions of substitution. In this sense, the structure of the unconscious is like that of language and it constitutes the *primary denotations* which are secondarily repressed.

To become conscious means, on the contrary, to reduce one's own unconscious to silence. This is tantamount to subordinating one's thought and action to the laws of discourse, to allow them to be structured by language. Becoming conscious is, says Ey, not only to dispose of a (neces-

sarily verbal) model of one's world, but also to deny – by becoming radically unconscious of it – what cannot and should not enter into the assumed discourse; in short to constitute one's unconscious. This constitution proceeds by means of the verbal form received from the social milieu.

By denying the omnipotence of the unconscious, asserted, in fact, by Freud, we come to the problem of the metamorphosis of human energy, speaking of which Ey refers, once again, to P. Ricoeur. "The process of sublimation, writes the French psychiatrist, is the very movement of the conscious being by which – owing to the symbolic apparatus of which he disposes and which is like a medium of this mediation – it passes from the positivity of the unconscious to the positivity of the transcendental consciousness or of the ego."⁸⁹ Becoming conscious of one's unconscious appears, in this light, as a double negation of it; in consequence of this process, by which the conscious being adds to his property what has been alienated before and, as Ey expresses it, articulates once more in a new language, what has before been mumbled by the unconscious.

Concluding his work, Ey expresses his opinion that – although he did not plan to write apologetics of any sort – precisely the new picture of the relations of the conscious being to his unconscious given by him is a guarantee of the distinction of human nature against its purely naturalistic interpretations. Paul Ricoeur, quoted by Ey, wrote that a representation comes not only under the law of intentionality which makes it an expression of something, but also under another law which makes it a manifestation of life, effort and desire. Ey himself thinks that it is more true to say that there exists another law of intentionality rendering a representation more as an expression of somebody than of something. Following Ricoeur, he also stresses the sense of the Hegelian dialectics as a teleological model of consciousness connecting consciousness with conscience: "In this dialectics truth resides in the following, and not in the preceding movement."⁹⁰ Thus, says Ey, the problem of sublimation, the great aporia of the general relation of ethics and instinct, and of the particular relation of the unconscious and the conscious being in the conception of Freud, can only be resolved by a negation of the determinism of the Ucs in the sublime (or sublimated) forms of the conscious being. But some people – the mentally ill – are more and differently determined by their unconscious in their thoughts, actions and language than the others. Thus, psychiatry turns out to be a *pathology of freedom*.

III. A COMPARISON. MAN AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Let us now compare the presented conceptions. The topic of *The Acting Person* is man as he appears through his action. *La conscience* is, in principle, devoted to a more narrow problem of consciousness. Therefore, although Ey's analyses also present consciousness in the broad context of the acting man and, moreover, seem to show the necessity of such an approach, the first book contains many considerations (omitted in this presentation) transcending the immediate interest of this essay, but culminating in an elucidation of an important aspect of the conscious being, not discussed by Ey, namely, his situation among other people and the role of the others in his formation. On the other hand, and for the same reason, Cardinal Wojtyła's approach to consciousness is more concise and synthetic; that is so in particular since his approach is more philosophical in the sense of seeking to express the achieved insights in general and abstract, ontological or metaphysical concepts. *La conscience*, situated between medical anthropology, psychology, and philosophy is much more concerned with detail. At the same time, in his phenomenological analyses, Ey aims at a maximal "visualization," at a most vivid description, bordering on poetic language and imagery, characteristic of the recent French philosophical tradition. Therefore, the two books are not at quite the same level of conceptualization, and *La conscience* may partly be regarded as giving ample material for some more abstract philosophical or ontological formulations – or, in other words, as a phenomenological, descriptive substantiation and expansion of a possibly more abstract philosophical approach.

When we take into account Ey's final remarks, however, we may perceive that the points of departure of the two books are not as remote from one another as they may have seemed in the beginning. For if psychiatry is, in fact, the pathology of freedom, and ethics, broadly speaking, its ontology and deontology, then the two approaches turn out to be strictly complementary. And when one tries to analyze, as Cardinal Wojtyła does, the basic reality of human action in order to understand the human person and, subsequently, the ethical laws governing his development, or if, as Ey, one wants to analyze this person starting from the pathology of his freedom, the topic of the inquiry is, in principle, the same: human action as flowing from the person and enabling him to expand his freedom or making him loose it and revealing this freedom or the lack of it. In this context, the strict parallelism of the results of the two investigations and,

as I would venture to add, the humanistic import and the practical fertility of the picture of man ensuing from them, seem also to confirm the assumed lines of approach.

1. *Foundations for a Phenomenology of Action*

The famous disagreement between Locke and Hume concerning the existence of a "clear and distinct idea of active power, as we have from reflexion on the operations of our mind,"⁹¹ decided by modern sensualism and transcendentalism against Locke, has been revived in this century and has received in the development of phenomenology and psychology a new elucidation. The scales seem to turn in favor of Locke.

In one of his most interesting texts, the short essay "Man and Time,"⁹² written gradually between 1936 and 1945, Roman Ingarden begins with a statement about the close connection between the realism-idealism issue, the problem of time, and the controversy about the nature of man. In the final parts of this essay he seems to come to the conclusion that the occurrence of free and responsible human action is a decisive argument for the existence of a person transcending the stream of consciousness and enduring in time – and, consequently, for the reality of a world transcending consciousness. In his last treatise *On Responsibility*⁹³ Ingarden gave an analysis of the ontological foundations of responsibility specifying among the conditions of its possibility the existence of a substantial, self-identical subject, his freedom, the objectivity of values, etc. These assertions are formulated as ontological in the phenomenological sense, i.e., concerning *possibilities*. But, connected with the *fact* of human responsible action which Ingarden seems to acknowledge in "Man and Time," they may be taken as basic statements of an anthropology starting from this fact, from responsible human action.⁹⁴ Ingarden did not give a phenomenological description of the experience of such a real action and of the transcendence of the person connected with it. This seems to be mainly due to his adherence to the Husserlian, transcendental conception of consciousness. The ensuing lacuna seems to be the main root of Ingarden's caution in formulating the results of his analyses: being actually convinced that we *do* experience our "power" of acting freely, he could not give its adequate description, to *show* it phenomenologically in the cadre of the transcendental, pure consciousness. It seems that, to do this, one must acknowledge the Lockean "clear and distinct idea of power" or, according to Cardinal Wojtyła, the primary, immediate experience of real efficacy:

and, by the same token, to change one's idea of consciousness, to abandon the exclusive primacy of "pure experiences."

The main postulates of phenomenology at its beginning were: (1) the Cartesian program of philosophy conceived as an exact, indisputable knowledge, and (2) the postulate of its foundation on immediate experience, of starting from a detailed and unprejudiced description of the given of any sort. Those postulates were united in the demand for an ultimate substantiation of all knowledge. As Ernst Tugendhat stated, this demand allows of two different interpretations, named by him the critical and the dogmatic motive of Husserl's philosophy.⁹⁵ They lead, in fact, to two radically different theories of knowledge. The first which solely seems to agree with the phenomenological attitude expressed in the "principle of all principles" is the idea of a progressive clarification and justification of all knowledge. In accordance with the intentionality and ad-perceptiveness of any consciousness, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl stresses the essential modifiability of all experience by possible subsequent information, connected with the necessity of an identification of the cognized object.⁹⁶ Thus, in this variety of phenomenological epistemology, absolute indisputability is merely a goal which is being approached but which cannot be really reached. In contrast to this, the dogmatic interpretation consists in assuming pure consciousness as the domain of indisputable experience which, therefore, essentially does not need any further justification.

The "dogmatic" program, leading to the conception of "pure consciousness" and connected with the conviction that any assertion concerning the real world is dubitable, seems to be the main reason for the denial of the validity of our experience of efficacy in modern philosophy. The "critical" attitude, on the contrary, granting to *any* "originally giving experience"⁹⁷ a relatively justified pretence to validity, seems to demand an acknowledgment of this experience along with any other – provided that it is "originally bestowing"; and this is precisely what the analyses of Cardinal Wojtyła and of Henri Ey aim at showing.

In a critical theory of knowledge, the final substantiation of our insights does not consist merely in our "seeing" the apodictic evidence of a particular assertion or set of assertions; it is achieved by constructing a coherent picture – or, applying Ey's term to knowledge in the objective sense – a model of the world from partial, relative evidences. Thus, in contradistinction to a certain atomism of the dogmatic doctrine it may be described as holistic: the substantiation of knowledge does not depend on

particular, absolutely valid principles, but on the coherent structure of the whole "model" of what exists, the general evidence of this model being built up from the particular relative evidences of all originally giving experiences. The actual stress of substantiation lies on the whole, not on the parts, although the evidence of the whole is derived precisely from the partial evidences of these parts.

In accordance with this, and with our everyday, commonsense experience, Cardinal Wojtyła states the immediate, phenomenological givennes of the dynamic reality of man as revealed in his action, action given originally as flowing from the efficacy of the person. Similarly, by showing the complex structure of the conscious being and the transcendence of the person in the mature form of the field of consciousness, Ey seems to substantiate the necessity of taking into account the dynamic structure of efficacy in any full and adequate consideration of human consciousness.

This positive picture of the human reality, and of the place of consciousness in it, is in both the discussed works accompanied by critical considerations showing the inadequacy both of an absolutization of consciousness and of insufficiently acknowledging its role and importance. Moreover, the fact that both authors manage to show the structure of the human person on a broader basis allows them also to explain the source of more one-sided views and their partial limited substantiation at the levels of inquiry at which they emerged.

2. The Conception of Consciousness

According to the broader experiential basis they assume, both authors speak differently of mental acts and of intentionality than did traditional phenomenology. This is shown in Cardinal Wojtyła's ascribing intentionality in the first place to "knowledge" and only derivately and improperly to consciousness,⁹⁸ and in Ey's remark about a second law of intentionality "rendering a representation more as an expression of somebody than of something."⁹⁹ This is accompanied by Cardinal Wojtyła's preference for the traditional, dynamic conception of act¹⁰⁰ and by Ey's remarks about experience on the highest level of organization of the conscious being admitted only "as an act and not solely as an actuality, as an act which, to develop its plan of being, needs the new factor of willing."¹⁰¹

According to Cardinal Wojtyła, objectivization being the function of the faculty of active understanding, consciousness does not objectivize.

But, in its function of mirroring, it comprises a picture of the person's world or, as Ey puts it, its model. This model encompasses also, as a sort of object, the subject itself. In this sense we may speak of the acts of consciousness and of itsthetic function, 'function' understood by Ey not, as it appears in Husserl, as the creation of the world itself, but solely of its model. This function may, therefore, be best described by an expression coined by Roman Ingarden: "acknowledging something in its being." Taken in the function of mirroring, consciousness is, for Cardinal Wojtyła, the same as Ey's "stage of the lived and spoken present" or, in a broader meaning, his "model of the world."¹⁰²

In the reflexive function of consciousness, as described in *The Acting Person*, we are directed to Ey's "field of presence" (*champ de la présence*) of the subject: to the experience of the ego present in his actuality and identifying himself with his actions and activations but, at the same time, transcending this actuality, i.e., enduring in time and directed toward the realization of his goals. The dynamic concatenation of consciousness with self-knowledge or – more broadly – with active knowledge in Cardinal Wojtyła's understanding appears here, in the first place, as an active interference of the subject's "legislative power," on the level of the scenic field the acquisitions of knowledge and self-knowledge are solely reflected.

3. *The Conception of Person*

Cardinal Wojtyła stresses the difference between the two structures "man acts" and "something is happening in man," of actions and activations. A broader discussion of the functions of these structures, given in the second part of *The Acting Person*, is devoted to the problem of the integration of the person in his action, and not presented in detail in this essay. In this context, the role of the living human body, of psychosomatics in human dynamism and the particular importance of the unconscious in this dynamism are also stressed. We have seen the role of these factors in Ey's views; he demonstrates in extensive analyses the creation by the "activations" of, as it were, a certain ground for the act of a person who enters the organization of the field of consciousness on its supreme level as the actor of his acts and transforms this field into a field of his dynamic presence. Ey's discussion of the role of the unconscious may also be regarded as an expansion and substantiation of the other authors more general and succinct remarks on this subject.

The dynamic approach of both authors makes also understandable their stress on potentiality as the fundamental dimension of man, connected

with the "dynamic structure of including and holding" (Ey) characteristic of him. An attentive reader of this essay and, preferably, of the presented works may state without difficulty the far-reaching accordance and complementarity of the analyses of the person as the agent of his acts and as the subject of his activations presented in them.

According to Cardinal Wojtyła, it is not enough to say that a person is an individuation of human nature; at the basis of the integration of his own humanity by a person there must appear a dynamization by the personal mode of existence. This assertion finds not only its expansion and parallel in Ey's extensive analyses of actualizations and acts and in his whole conception of the person's dynamics but also in his views on memory and potentiality and on the axiological directedness of the ego as the proper mode of human existence; it is dynamics which transcends the limits and the mode of existence of a subject which would have his consciousness as merely a stage of a certain happening – a consciousness in which himself and his world would be "constituted," but which would be devoid of the particular junction with his field of action and of the particular tension introduced into the "private model of the world" by the person's conscious action.

In conclusion I should like to mention one more similarity between the two authors: neither of them is a "professional" philosopher in the sense of making philosophy his chief occupation. Perhaps, therefore, it has been easier for them not to become members of an ancient body of learned scholars, bent over old books in the search of truth, seeing whom Diogenes is said to have exclaimed: "And when will they have time to practice it?"

The close connection of both these works with human, social *praxis*, together with the deep conviction of their authors that ours is the task of making our actions rational, their belief in the primacy of human reason, seems also to place them in the main line of the Western philosophical tradition. It could even be asserted that, in the meeting of the phenomenological, ethical, psychiatric, and biological thought as exemplified in the confrontation of the works discussed above this tradition is beginning to find a new substantiation and fulfillment.

NOTES

¹ Cardinal Wojtyła's position is best presented in his *Osoba i czyn*, Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, Kraków; 1969. A revised English translation of this work will shortly be published as *The Acting Person*. Ey's analysis of our problem may be found in his *La conscience*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1963 (2d rev. ed. 1968); there is also a

German translation: *Das Bewusstsein*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1967. There exist also a Spanish and a Japanese translations.

I quote *The Acting Person* from the typescript of the English translation which may not be identical with the final edition of the text. Ey's work is quoted from the second edition, and I should like to thank Indiana University Press who are preparing the English translation for the permission to quote from *La conscience*. The translations are mine.

This essay is a rewritten and expanded English version of my article 'Czyn a świadomość' ('Human Action and Consciousness'), published in *Logos i Ethos*, Polski Towarzystwo Teologiczne, Kraków, 1971, pp. 83-113.

² Karol Wojtyła, 'The Intentional Act and the Human Act that is, Act and Experience,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. V, 269. Cardinal Wojtyła's conception of man's self-determination has been introduced to the English-speaking public by Hans Köchler, *Analecta Husserliana* Vol. VI, p. 75 (The Editor).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 269f.

⁴ Cf. Karol Wojtyła's book about Scheler: *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (On the Possibility of Creating a Christian Ethics Based on the Assumptions of the System of Max Scheler), Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin, 1959.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁶ *The Acting Person* consists of four parts: the first treats of the relation of consciousness to efficacy, the second and the third are devoted to the transcendence and to the integration of the person in action respectively. The fourth part is an outline of a theory of participation as a person's relation to the humanity of other people. In my presentation I shall concentrate on the first part of the book as it analyzes the role of consciousness in human action and self-development which is the topic of this study.

⁷ The first edition of *La conscience* consists of four parts; the first is devoted to the conscious being — man, in particular to the problem of the definition of consciousness. In the second part Ey analyzes the field of consciousness, describing in the first chapter the dissolution of it in sleep and in psychopathological states, and presenting in Chapter 2 an outline of a phenomenological description of the field of consciousness, Chapter 3 (which takes up more than one-fifth of the book) is devoted to neurobiology of the field of consciousness; the author tries to develop a theory of an isomorphic correlation between the functional substructures of the brain and the levels of integration of the field of consciousness. In Part 3 Ey proceeds to a discussion of the human subject as a being conscious of himself, starting once again from pathological phenomena (Chapter 1) in order to describe in Chapter 2 the self-constitution of the human person. Part 4 is devoted to a discussion of the unconscious. In the second edition of this work Ey expanded the fourth paragraph of this part, "The Unconscious in the Conscious Being: The Structure of the Conscious Being," into Part 5 of the book, entitled 'Becoming Conscious (The Organization of the Conscious Being and the Problem of Human Values)'.

I shall not dwell in this essay upon the author's neurobiological considerations or on his discussions of the views of different authors and schools, nor shall I present in detail the psychopathological considerations by which he substantiates his final analyses. I want to concentrate on the core of his descriptions: his idea of consciousness and his description of the structure and development of man as a conscious being.

In his discussions of different philosophical, psychological, and psychiatric views, Ey treats them mainly as material for his own synthesis, often not using their terms in precisely the same sense in which they had been used by their creators nor entering into detailed discussion

of the respective differences (one of the important exceptions in his careful analysis and criticism of the basic ideas of Freud).

⁸ *The Acting Person*, Introduction, para. 2c.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 2b.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2c.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 4b.

¹² *Loc. cit.*

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, chap 1, para. 2a

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 2b.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 2a.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2c.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3a.

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

²² *Ibid.*, para. 3b.

²³ *Loc. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 2c.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4a.

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4b.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4c.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 4d.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 4e.

³¹ *Loc. cit.*

³² *Loc. cit.*

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 6a.

³⁴ *Loc. cit.*

³⁵ *Loc. cit.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 6b.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. 2, para. 2a.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2b.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 2c.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 3d.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, para. 6c.

⁴² *Ibid.*, para. 7a.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, para. 7c.

⁴⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7d.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 7e.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 8c.

⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 8d.

⁵⁰ Henri Ey, *Etudes Psychiatriques*, 3 vols, ed Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1948-1954.

⁵¹ Henri Ey, *La conscience*, 2d ed., p. 1.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵³ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁷⁵ G. E. Störing, *Besinnung und Bewusstsein*, Thieme, Stuttgart, 1953.

⁷⁶ Ey, *La conscience*, p. 350.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

⁷⁸ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁹ *Loc. cit.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁸⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁸⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 470.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

⁹¹ John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. 2, chap. 21, para. 4. Cf. an interesting discussion of Hume's polemics against Locke in Lorenz Krüger, *Der Begriff des Empirismus*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin, 1973. pp. 89–99.

⁹² Roman Ingarden, 'Człowiek i czas' ('Man and Time'), *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow 1972. Part of this essay was Ingarden's contribution to the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy (Congrès Descartes) in Paris: 'Der Mensch und die Zeit,' in *Travaux du IX^e Congrès International de Philosophie (Congrès Descartes)*, Paris, 1973, VIII, 129–36.

⁹³ Roman Ingarden, *Ueber die Verantwortung, Ihre ontischen Fundamente (On Responsibility: Its Ontological Foundations)* Reclam, Stuttgart, 1970.

⁹⁴ Cf. a discussion of *The Acting Person* by T. Styczeń in *Analecta Cracoviensia*, V-VI, 107-15 (in Polish).

⁹⁵ E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 2d ed., de Gruyter, Berlin, 1970, pp. 194ff, 208f.

⁹⁶ E. Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, Halle, 1929, pp. 139ff, 251f, 254, Cf. Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 207.

⁹⁷ Cf. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, bk 1, sec. 24, 'Das Prinzip aller Prinzipien.

⁹⁸ Cf. above, p. 7ff.

⁹⁹ Cf. above, p. 140

¹⁰⁰ Cf. above, p. 119. This conception of act was not completely alien to the later Husserl's Cf., e.g., G. E. Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972, 213, 218f.

¹⁰¹ Cf. above, n. 70.

¹⁰² The ambiguity implied in this seems to be an important point in any discussion of consciousness, but a broader analysis of it and of other ambiguities and problems connected with different aspects of consciousness would demand a separate essay.

ON MORAL ACTION

RESPONSIBLE ACTION*

We have treated the question of the responsibility that exists after the completion of an action. But how does the problem of responsibility that grows out of action present itself? How does action take place when it is undertaken in the first place with regard to (or for) the fact that it will result in a particular responsibility on the part of the actor?

It is possible to act without concerning oneself at all with any "responsibility" that one may have for the action. One may simply surrender to the action and aim at bringing about a result. Nevertheless, a person who acts in this way incurs the responsibility for having acted in this way, unconcerned about anything. But one can direct all one's action in such a way that it can result in something evil or something good, aiming to avoid the former and to achieve the latter. One who acts in this manner also takes into consideration that – aside from the possible harm that may ensue – guilt or merit may be assigned to him, the actor. One can act in such a manner that one asks himself at every step of the way whether one's action is "just." The actor must then retain the overview of the values that may be achieved or destroyed in this way, for it is on the scope of this overview that not only the course of his actions but also his responsibility for them depends. Various possibilities unfold here. One's perception of values can be more or less clear or dark, causing their qualities to be only bluntly or unclearly outlined. Above all, much depends upon whether there is a clear view of the connection between the possible values, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the nature of the action that is unfolding, or that may be developed, as well as the circumstances in which it is to develop. It can happen that precisely this connection is not transparent and – still worse – that one has no time to devote to a grasp of this connection. Thus a peculiar uncertainty enters the whole process, since the actor cannot devote himself fully to the action, but is preoccupied at the same time with becoming aware of the dangers, that is the threatening non-values, or at least feels that he should be occupied with them. As a result he

*This section and the following are the first English translations, by Dr Barbara Haupt Mohr, from Roman Ingarden's work entitled *Ueber die Verantwortung*, which appeared originally in German, Reclam *Universal-Bibliothek*, Stuttgart, 1970.

carries out the individual steps of the action with some uncertainty and with a lack of precision. Because of this, his responsibility for his action becomes diminished. A point may be reached at which the actor grasps neither the values in question nor their connection with the action that is to be performed, but is unable to interrupt the action already begun and feels himself increasingly compelled to carry the action further and perhaps to carry it to a bad end. If he then surrenders everything and lets matters take their own course, then he acts irresponsibly, but then precisely for that reason he becomes responsible for that mode of action. Yet even here his conduct may determine the degree of his responsibility. For one thing, he can deny any responsibility, so that in a sense he declares that he is not responsible at all; or he can admit inwardly that he is acting badly, and can stand ready to take on the burden of responsibility for his actions and for his irresponsible conduct and can voluntarily acknowledge the consequences of his conduct. Finally, he can simply despair and allow anything at all to happen to him.

Responsible action takes on a special form and threatens one with an accountability that weighs all the more heavily if the actor is striving to carry out a value which other people oppose and consider to be evil, or when the prevailing legal situation forbids the realization of this value. But in this case the actor does not only strive to realize but also stands behind it; he underscores the worthiness of the value. His action consists of a struggle for the realization of the value. His opponents condemn him then all the more sharply and burden him with all the greater responsibility, but he himself not only stands in opposition but also hopes that justice will be accorded to him and that he will be freed from the burden of what might be called the negative responsibility and that his merit will be acknowledged. He finds his support on the one hand in the clear grasp of the value-quality of the success on his action and also of the worthiness of this value in itself, and on the other hand in his own courage, which helps him to fight alone against other people and willingly to take on the unjust punishment that will meet him after the success of his action. The opposition between the evil of the (unjust) punishment that he meets with and the positive value of his genuine heroism, which vouches for his deeply responsible action, is something he must not become conscious of. But if he does achieve this and then struggles – not for the sake of reward for his heroism, but, ultimately, in the consciousness of the genuine worthiness of the value which he aims to achieve – then, at last, his action is really responsible and unfalsified in its high moral value. These events run a tragic course if it

emerges at the end that his grasp of the value for which he has fought has led him into error and that he is ultimately wrong. Then a very complicated situation arises, and it is difficult to decide justly for what value or non-value he is finally responsible. But there can be no doubt about the fact that even then he is responsible to a high degree for his conduct and that therefore the appropriate merit of heroic perseverance in his ideal and tenacity in the struggle is not to be denied him.

With these diverse kinds of responsible action it becomes apparent that the actor must be equipped in a particular way, both in his ontic, categorical structure and in his character traits. Thus, not only responsibility itself but also responsible action, taking one course or another, has to have definite ontic foundations if it is to be carried out at all. To find these foundations is the task that is set before us.

VALUE AS ONTIC FOUNDATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Certain values and non-values are linked in essence with responsibility and the demands for restitution that derive from it, as well as with the discharge of responsibility. It is the existence of these values and non-values, their mutual interconnections of being, the possibility of their concretization in real objects and matters of fact, as well as the demands that emerge from the value material, that first determine the meaning [sense], and the possibility, of responsibility and especially the bearing of responsibility. Thus it is necessary above all to call to mind just which values or non-values come into consideration at all. To be brief, they are values of the following objectivities:

A. 1. The value or non-value of the success brought about by the act of the doer,

2. The value or non-value of the deed that leads to this success,

3. The value or non-value of the will, or the decision and the intention, of the doer,

4. The value or non-value that accrues to the doer altogether, as a result of carrying out his deed and of his conduct.

B. 1. The value of what is realized in restitution and that disposes of or "counterbalances" the harm (injustice) done to someone,

2. The value of the attitude – particularly, for example, of remorse, which annuls or counterbalances the non-value of the misdeed that burdens the doer,

3. The value of the reward or recognition which is appropriate to the value of the possible merit.

Among the values or non-values of group A there are what one might call 'generative relations-of-being'. The value of the success calls forth the realization of the value of the deed and, as a further consequence, of the doer.¹ The value of restitution or of the act of remorse often calls forth a new act on the part of the person who was injured by the action of the doer, and this act is the act of forgiveness ("excusing"). This act is one of positive value in itself. The absence of this act where it really should take place is of negative value, in the moral sense; it derives from a character trait of the person that one could call obstinacy or callousness. At the same time there are interconnections of determination among values: the value material of success determines, of itself, the value material of the deed, and the latter, for its part, determines the value material of the doer's value. On the other hand, the values of Group B exercise more or less distinct unreifying functions against the values or non-values of Group A. The value of restitution, or of that which is realized by restitution, annuls the non-value of the harm or of the injustice perpetrated, and the value of the doer's remorse annuls the non-value of the evil deed, etc.

Above all these values and the interconnections of their being and purpose, there stands the value of justice. It can be realized by fulfillment of the requirements made of the doer by the responsibility he bears.² It could also be said that justice poses the demand for all suggested "counter-balancings" that ought to come about between the non-values perpetrated by the evil deed and the positive values realized by the restitution which responsibility requires.

If there were no values and non-values, nor the interconnections of being and determination that exist between them, then there absolutely could not be any genuine responsibility and also no fulfillment of the requirements they pose.

This statement brings into view the first sight of the ontic foundations of responsibility. The existence of values and of the interconnections prevailing between them is the first condition for the possibility of both the idea of responsibility and of the meaningfulness of this postulate directed at the doer: to take on the responsibility for his deed and to fulfill its requirements. This is also the condition which makes possible that the responsibility for his deed weighs on the doer and that he can be freed from this burden. Here, finally, is the ultimate reason for calling someone to account, and thereby this course gains its ultimate justification. Even

responsible action would be meaningless and purposeless if one were not to reckon with the reality of values in the process, if one were to take no account of their existence or possible destruction. All of the situations of responsibility that we distinguish lose their meaning in the context of justice, and also the possibility of their realization in the concrete case, if values in no way exist.

From this consideration there arise important theoretical tasks for general ontology of value which cannot be solved simply in any way one chooses if responsibility is not to lose its meaning and if the requirements it poses are not to lose their justification. The first thing that must be clarified in this respect is what kind of values and non-values come into question at all with reference to the various specific kinds of actions. Without a doubt it is a matter of essential alliances between types of human conduct and values or non-values. Most important of all, however, are the problems concerning their existential status: the questions as to the existence of values and as to their mode of being, questions which are meant to grasp the essence of responsibility and its realization. What is required of responsibility in this matter, is something we can call to mind best if we make clear to ourselves which theories of values actually annihilate responsibility. Basically there are three ultimately skeptical theories: the theory of the so-called "subjectivity" of values, the theory of their social origin and the theory of their "relativity," which includes, among other things, the theory of their historical determination. To be sure, all of these theories are ambivalent in different ways, and they do not endanger the meaning and reality of responsibility in all of their significances. Their shared background is formed on the one hand by the dualistic interpretation of the world and on the other hand by sensualistically toned empiricism. I cannot, here, treat all these interpretations and their connection with responsibility.³ Therefore I shall limit myself to discussing a few selected conceptions.

The psychological conception of values, according to which they are said to be something psychic, or more exactly, a matter of consciousness, is probably no longer current, although it predominated for a long time. Yet there is still a rather widespread conception according to which values are "subjective" in the sense that they do not really pertain to entities of various kinds (things, works of art, persons, human conduct, such as moral acts, logical structures, such as theories), but are merely certain illusions or fictions on the part of individual persons, who for manifold reasons ascribe them to certain objectivities, giving rise to the illusion that

they really pertain to those objectivities. The reasons for this illusion, according to this conception, arise predominantly from certain human feelings or strivings or ultimately from certain utilitarian motives. All of them, at best, allow certain phenomenal characteristics of appearance to emerge in the respective subjects, but *sine fundamento in re*. Now as soon as these reasons or motives are absent, as is said to be the case with perception, then the corresponding objectivities prove to be entirely free of those illusional characteristics and are, in their being and constitution, strictly value-neutral, that is, "objective." In any real being and in nature in general, values do not exist at all. In any case, as is said, they are merely "subjective;" at most, they are illusions on the part of the persons who experience them. Let us here pass over any further argumentation for the "subjectivistic" theory of values, understood in this way.⁴ For, what is important for our main theme is only the consequences of this theory for responsibility. It is clear that if none of the values cited above would pertain to the objectivities and conduct under consideration, there would not be responsibility for anything. Then how one acts and what one incurs by one's action would be entirely irrelevant. The mere authorship of a deed – even if it were fully proven – and its outcome, would not constitute any reason for bearing responsibility for it. There would also be no justification for calling anyone to account if the deed led neither to anything good nor to anything bad. All punishments or acknowledgements of merit would be entirely senseless. To be sure, someone ignorant of the true state of affairs might be inclined to take on responsibility for his deed and perhaps might even try to undertake a restitution. In that case he would find himself involved in a remarkable illusion that would lead him into purposeless and senseless conduct.

The subjectivistically oriented deniers of values try, however, to rescue responsibility and also the action of calling-to-account in this manner: they attempt to derive values from socially or politically based requirements (commands) and from the establishment of whole judicial systems by various social organizations, more specifically, from requirements and judicial systems that are directed to the individual and that burden him with various "duties." In case these requirements are not fulfilled or observed, the judicial systems allow for the person's being called to account.

In actual fact many such social requirements and judicial systems are set up, to which the individual does have to submit and which he often cannot contradict even in cases where he regards these requirements as

unfounded. In this respect, however, there are two possibilities: either these demands are objectively founded,⁵ meaningful and purposeful. Then they presuppose the effective existence of the appropriate values, immanent to the corresponding objectivities. Thereby the derivation of the values from social decisions proves to be invalid. Or this "derivation" of the values means only that there are *no* existing values that are "objective" *cum fundamento in re* and that are independent of social decisions.⁶ In that case these social or political precepts and requirements are first of all purely arbitrary decrees that lack any concrete basis. That is so even if it is asserted that these decrees are published "for the good of" the rulers, dictators or ruling classes. Even if this "good" would mean no more than usefulness or sensual pleasure, it could not lead to the denial of *all* objectively prevailing values, since one would at least have to grant an effective value to this usefulness or sensual pleasure. The *general* subjective interpretation of values becomes, precisely in this way, untenable. But the possibility is created of, at least in *one* case, acknowledging the meaning and reality of responsibility, if the success that results from the personal deed of one person possesses the value or non-value of usefulness or pleasure. Meanwhile, if there were responsibilities in which success possessed a moral value or any other value different from the utilitarian values, they would be made impossible by means of the denial of all values that are different from the utilitarian values. Thus if one wishes to sustain the meaning and value of being responsible even in these cases that are usually dealt with first, then one must abandon not only the generally subjectivistic value theory but also the one-sidedly utilitarian value theory. This point of view is further buttressed by the fact that conscious bearing of responsibility, also, as well as the assumption of it, and the whole posture that results therefrom, possesses a positive value (or, in the case of failure, a negative one), and it would be entirely mistaken to assign a utilitarian value to it, or a pleasure value. For the doer it is often extremely useless to act in a responsible way or to fulfill conscientiously the requirements that responsibility makes of him, while the genuine value (the moral value) of - in this case - restitution, remorse, etc., *grows* and is not at all diminished by the uselessness of this mode of conduct. Thus utilitarianism as well as hedonism in the theory of value stands in contradiction of meaningfulness and the reality of responsibility.

Utilitarianism is a threat to the possibility of a genuine responsibility for still another reason. Namely, it often leads to relativism in the theory of value. For the sharp edge of the utilitarian theory of value is not only

directed against the specificity of the moral as well as the aesthetic values. Its trend goes basically much further, by means of its emphasizing that the utilitarian values are only – as they say – “relative.” What represents a usefulness and thereby a value to one person does not need to be similarly useful and valuable for another person. This conclusion, applied to the historical aspect of existence, then declares: everything that is useful in one historical epoch can be useless in another epoch. And in the utilitarian natural generalization this proclaims: all values have only a “historical validity,” and since the historical world is always changing, all values have only a limited validity for a historical epoch and naturally lose it in another epoch.

This relativity in theory of value can, however, be interpreted in various ways. Among others, it often takes on the form in which it comes into conflict again with the postulate of responsibility. Then it is argued BY ITS PROPONENTS: when something, without itself changing, is at one time felt to be good (beautiful, useful, etc.) and another time is felt to be bad (ugly, harmful, etc.), then that means nothing more than that it is in itself neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly, etc., and that it lacks any such value altogether. And if it is considered “beautiful” at one time and “ugly” at another time, that means, additionally, that it only *seems* to be that way. Thus all further values are merely a “subjective” illusion and not something that really and effectively pertains to a subject and can pertain to it. In this way, relativism in value-theory transforms itself into a skeptical subjectivism according to which there can be no genuine responsibility for anything at all.

But not all value-relativism is of this sort. Therefore one must look for another interpretation of the relativistic view of values, one in which genuine responsibility would still be possible in spite of the agreement that many values are really “relative” in a sense other than the one just cited. In addition, one must also evaluate whether the moral values that are of primary consideration for the situation of responsibility can be considered “relative” values at all.⁷ For this purpose let us choose two interpretations of the “relativity” of values that come into consideration for the existence and the meaningfulness of responsibility. In one sense “relative” refers to what pertains to an entity only in a system that consists of at least two entities. It finds its adequate and perhaps also necessary foundation only in this system, or in all entities belonging to it, and not in any random, individually chosen part of this system. For example, we say, rightly, that hay is nourishing for horses and thereby useful, but not for dogs.

Similarly, meat is nourishing for dogs, but not for horses. Here, both hay and meat are "nourishing" (and more generally, "useful"), not merely in themselves but only in relation to entities in a certain realm which can use them (hay or meat) as "nourishment." Nevertheless the "being-nutritious-for-something" is not a fiction or illusion of the animals that eat the hay, but an entirely substantial and genuine qualification of the particular foodstuff without which the particular animal could not live at all (unless it is substituted by another equivalent means). Therefore it means a most substantial value for this animal, while the same foodstuff is no nourishment at all for other animals and for just that reason has no utility-value for them at all. To take hay and oats and other foodstuffs from a horse is bad. And whoever did that, would be responsible for it just as if he killed these animals (horses) without a purpose. Therefore the existence of a value that is in this sense "relative" forms the sufficient condition for one's being found guilty for the destruction of such a value and therefore for the possibility that one can be responsible for the way the production of such foodstuffs for certain animals can count as a merit. Naturally it is presupposed that the life of the animals in question is in itself somehow valuable. This final condition of being valuable can perhaps be "relative" in the same sense, but it does not have to be. That does not in any way change the genuine existence of the thus understood relative values.

In a related sense, a value of something is "relative" when it exists only for a specific finite realm and not *per se* for all objectivities. This is the case with all those values that have their sufficient foundation, and therewith their existence, only in one system, but are not "relational,"⁸ as in the previous case. For example, it is only to a human being that one can do moral harm by forbidding him, or taking from him, his freedom of thought and of the expression of his convictions; one cannot do it in this way to a dog or a horse because this freedom is altogether inaccessible to them as a value. But that harm done to the human being is not, for that reason, either "relational" in the previous sense nor in any way illusional or non-existent. Thus one does moral evil to a human being in this way, and for exactly this reason one is responsible for it, and one can be called to account for it because thereby a human being is deprived of an established and original right to a value which is necessarily owing to him as a human being, aside from the fact that deprivation of freedom means, itself, a non-value for a human being.

No one should counter to the above that freedom of thought and expression or freedom of conscience has not always been considered a

value and that the recognition of this value is a "historical product" of a particular human culture (the European mind of this or that social class or of the liberalism of the nineteenth century, etc.). Of course it should not be denied that this historical development of recognizing freedom as a value took place. But those who emphasize the historical situation of this development basically want to declare that this value does not exist *per se* at all. Unjustifiably they identify *the fact of being acknowledged* or *acknowledgement* or, finally, the *appearance* of the value with its *existence* and with the sufficient *founding* of the value in an object or in a system of objects. Naturally one can be in error when one ascribes a value to someone or debars him from association with it. An analogous error is possible in the recognition of physical characteristics of particular material things. But in both cases it does not follow from this fact that the particular value, that is, this characteristic, cannot exist in other cases. Precisely where one is dealing with something that is autonomous in its being and specifically substantial [material], it is always possible that errors may be made in recognizing it and that it is not until long efforts have been made that one succeeds in recognizing that a particular value or a characteristic pertains to an object. The fact that in many epochs personal freedom of thought and belief was not considered a basic human value, or that perhaps historical times will come again in which the value of freedom will be denied, does not prove in any way that it is only a fiction or a delusion of certain persons or that it is not a moral non-value when this value is taken away from man. It proves only that human insight is imperfect on this point and, at most, that further investigations into the essence of freedom and of human nature are desirable. This is all the more necessary – as history shows – because of the danger that the interpretation of freedom as a value may be flawed, falsified, or violated by non-epistemological considerations and powers. The real existence of these values is not dependent on this historically conditioned development of concepts and on the failure to recognize them.

In other words: the fact that certain values have been restricted, in their accessibility and achievability, to one milieu (for example the value of freedom for human beings) should, above all, not be derived from the historically changing recognition of these values, and this changing recognition should not be used as an argument for the notion that these values do not exist at all and are only a phantom, a delusional image, on the part of certain persons. Whoever considers values to be historically conditioned delusions of humanity (delusions, because people often give

their lives for them!), must in any case come to terms with the fact that thereby he denies the possibility of any responsibility and consequently must desist from requiring that human beings take on any responsibility.

To be sure, something still more exact can be determined about the subject of the existence of values (or non-values) – something twofold: In the first place it concerns the sheer “existence” *in idea*, as value or valuable (or non-value), of such things as “justice,” “freedom,” “remorse,” “mercy,” “self-sacrifice,” “righteousness,” etc., and on the other hand, for example, “willfulness,” “cruelty,” “hatefulness,” “stupidity,” “coarseness,” “brutality,” etc. The question here is whether such *ideal value qualities* exist, admitting of a concretizing in the individual case and thereby making valuable individual entities possible. But secondly it is a question of whether the concretizing and individualizing in an individual case really exist and whether they possess in the individual entity (thing, conduct, event) the adequate condition for their existence. In both cases it is customary to speak of the “existence of values,” and in both meanings this “existence of values” comes into consideration for the feasibility of responsibility. In the first sense it is a matter of the indispensable condition for the possibility and the meaningfulness of responsibility altogether; in the second sense, on the other hand, it is a matter of a situation in an individual case where the corresponding factors do in fact contain individual concretizations of those ideal value-qualities through which the actual entrance of responsibility occurs at all.

In this way I believe I have pointed out the first ontic foundation of responsibility. But there are still other foundations of that sort, which must be discussed in sequence.

NOTES

¹ It can also occur, however, that the action of the doer contains in itself a positive or negative value, independently from the value of the success, for example, when it is carried out in an especially responsible manner. It can, for example, be morally “good” if an actor, in full consciousness of personal danger threatening him, nevertheless plans to realize a value.

² The question of what it means that certain values “annul” other values, or “counter-balance” (*ausgleichen*) them (come into balance with them) or “elicit” them, is an especially difficult problem which as far as I know has never been treated or solved. Nevertheless this remarkable relation between values or their meaningfulness and possibility is everywhere silently presupposed. Without it no justice would be possible at all, and its meaning could not be comprehended.

³ I have analysed, in part, the ambiguity of the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity in ‘Betrachtungen zum Problem der Objektivität’ in: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*,

Heft I and II, 1967. Cf. also my article '*Quelques remarques sur le problème de la relativité de valeurs*' in *Actes du III Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française*, Bruxelles-Louvain 2-5 September 1947, Paris, 1947.

⁴ I consider this interpretation to be entirely false, but I do not deny that sometimes illusions of that sort arise, or can arise.

⁵ And not merely by means of a dictatorial edict.

⁶ Besides, it is entirely incomprehensible how such requirements, orders or judicial systems could, of themselves, create any kind of values. What has been commanded or demanded does not somehow become "better" (valuable) because it has been commanded or demanded; nor does its non-fulfillment therefore become somehow "bad" because, as a command, it has not been fulfilled. Therefore it should not be asserted that the fulfillment of what has been commanded is "better" for the individual because he gains something thereby and the non-fulfillment of it contains something bad because he will be "punished" for it. For, what has been commanded does not, thereby, become "more valuable" than the opposite. But even this erroneous argumentation presupposes precisely what it means to dispose of, that is, the acknowledgement that in certain cases values or non-values are present.

⁷ I am inclined to deny this. Cf. the already mentioned article '*Quelques remarques sur le problème de la relativité de valeurs*.' Now in *Erlebnis, Kunstwerk und Wert*, Tübingen, 1969.

⁸ The word "relational" for such values as the utilitarian ones was introduced by Nicolai Hartmann in his *Ethik*.

CONTEXTUAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVITY

The diversity of metaphysical systems as well as the variety of concomitant methodologies which have been proposed throughout the history of philosophical reflection often inspire the judgment that philosophy is nothing but idle speculation, if not pure imaginative construction. Husserl's effort to establish philosophy on a rigorously scientific basis may be seen as a radical attempt to preclude the validity of such an assessment. Beginning from the imperative, "*zu den Sachen selbst*," Husserl wanted to ground the entire sphere of human cognition on an absolutely apodictic foundation. By a strict adherence to this self-imposed requirement, Husserl's inquiry developed from an original focus upon static eidetic structures toward a concern with the dynamic development of genetic constitution.

Roman Ingarden followed Husserl in this methodological fidelity to the things themselves. He rejected, however, the universal scope of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction under which Husserl's inquiries were always carried out. His formal-ontological reflections were oriented toward distinguishing various ontological regions according to their ideal structures, which structures were not, as in Husserl, considered as objects of possible consciousness.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's development of the phenomenological line of research at first continued the thought of Ingarden, but later opened divergent avenues of inquiry. Nevertheless, even after the emergence of her own problematic, we can still detect the same allegiance to the principle of rigorous adherence to the things themselves. Indeed, she claims that it is precisely this principle which explains the internal developments within phenomenology. From Husserl's transcendental perspective through Ingarden's formal ontology to her own articulation of a "contextual phenomenology," we find that the things themselves demand new outlooks and pose new problems, thus motivating the passage from one definitely elaborated framework to the next. In her new interpretation of Ingarden she acknowledges that his development of an ontological pluralism, in which various domains of objects are distinguished as irreducible to each other, goes beyond Husserl's transcendental monism which considers all objectivities as relative to the constitutive performances of consciousness.¹ Tymieniecka maintains, however, that "they both break

down at the same point: the pre-conscious life-conditions of man and the world."² In performing the epoché, Husserl opens up a new sphere of cognition, one in which our corporeity and the world are reappropriated, but always in terms of those eidetic structures which belong to human existence as such. Likewise, in Ingarden's formal ontology, "... we remain with a set of abstract structures as mere possibles without any way of relating them to actual existing beings."³

The reason for this difficulty common to the transcendental and formal-ontological stages of phenomenology, Tymieniecka holds, may be found in an implicit assumption which guides the reflections of both Husserl and Ingarden. Although both philosophers reject presuppositions inherent in any given scientific theory or common sense viewpoint, their inquiry proceeds from an initial cognitive predecision that ultimately entails a certain metaphysical delimitation of reality. On the basis of the Cartesian demand for apodictic certainty (within the context of intentional consciousness or of ontological structures), the cognitive criterion of givenness in bodily selfhood is interpreted in terms of an objectifying intuition of *things*. In the final analysis, both Husserl and Ingarden fall prey to the Cartesian conviction concerning the absolute sovereignty of reason. The key to this postulate of rationality lies in the assumption that "things themselves," whether noematic or formal-ontological structures, are absolutely distinct from one another in virtue of a specific rational nucleus.

Tymieniecka feels that this predecision in favor of essence, that "radiant center of rationality," must be challenged. In opposition to Ingarden's focus upon formal-ontological structures, she proposes to begin with a reflection upon contingency. She maintains that it is only by turning from essential structures toward concrete existence that the full human condition can be adequately grasped. In a parallel fashion, as David Carr has noted, she criticizes Husserl's view of intentionality on the ground that it "... is not capable of dealing even with the nature of man in his fundamental aspect."⁴ The reason for this insufficiency in transcendental phenomenology lies in Husserl's refusal to raise certain fundamental metaphysical questions. To this extent, he stands in basic agreement with Kant. In the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant remarked: "The chief question is always simply this: – what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not: – how is the faculty of thought itself possible?" (A xvii). Within the perspective of Husserl's epoché, the transcendental Ego is the ground of the phenomenologically reduced world. Like Kant, Husserl refuses to raise

the question of a transcendent foundation of subjectivity itself. In agreement with Descartes, Tymieniecka feels that this issue is of crucial philosophical importance. Yet unlike Descartes, she does not seek the foundation of the *cogito* by rational deduction from innate ideas. She argues that both the transcendently constituted world as well as transcendental consciousness itself must find their basis in the "transsubjective universe."⁵ She maintains that since "... the limits of the transcendental world [are] fixed at the explication of the human *life-world*, it is the *real world of nature*, in all its concreteness, in its inner workings, which accounts for the emergence of consciousness as such, its final rules and regulations extending unto the *Cosmos*, which, in turn, appears as one of the tasks of the third phase of phenomenological endeavor."⁶ Thus, the results of the transcendental and formal-ontological stages of phenomenology are not to be rejected, but rather reinterpreted and placed within the wider framework of contextual phenomenology.

As Tymieniecka has indicated, the wider framework requires a cosmological perspective. In her book, *Why is there Something Rather than Nothing?*, she rejects the rationalistic assumption of totally discrete and separate beings and holds the position that relatively distinct beings emerge only out of relational patterns within the entire world context. For justification she appeals to an evidence at once so fundamental and so primitive that it has escaped attention. Within the transcendental perspective, the primary task is an elaboration of the structures and processes of cognition. "But prior to the differentiation of his functions into volitive, cognitive and judicative, man enjoys reality *immediately* as a living being, involved vitally with the rest of the universe through his original openness to the elemental world process, and his *presence* in the universal becoming."⁷ The priority of presence over other differentiated functions is not a temporal priority, however. Nor is presence a special kind of experience distinguishable from and yet coordinate with other types. On the contrary, presence is the "... natural condition and vital background of every type of experience,"⁸ which reveals the primal ground of motion and change from which we emerge. Thus, the human being (the most notable instance of the real autonomous individual) represents a mediation between universal flux and the unchanging stability of ideal structures.

Reflection upon the real autonomous individual reveals that it exists in various modes of contingency. The living body appears as "an inwardly-outwardly oriented functional system," requiring an external energy

supply which must be received into its very "substance," the organic cell. After transforming this material, the cell discharges any unusable by-products formed in the process. "This two-way passage of various substances is a continuing current, through which the world process flows to and fro through the living being, as if carrying that being on its tides."⁹ Yet this process is not chaotic or haphazard, since its course is regulated precisely by the teleologically oriented functions of the real individual itself. These functions prescribe a route of development and thereby guarantee at least relative stability within the context of universal flux. It is important to note that the real individual, considered as a functional system, represents only relative stability. As such, it is the ground for both perdurance and change: "... change because it is support for processes and events, and perdurance because it directs the forces of change toward articulated patterns of relatively stable phenomena."¹⁰ In its dual aspect of perdurance and change may be discerned the real individual's first mode of contingency: *existential transitoriness*. This temporal dimension, in human beings at least, is present not only on the level of biological development from birth to death, but also on that of the lived duration of conscious experience.

Besides being existentially transitory, the real individual appears contingent in two further respects. Not possessing within itself its own origin, the real individual is *existentially derivative* and, ultimately, *lacking its own sufficient reason and final cause*. These three modes of contingency necessitate, of themselves, a transition to the world order. Since the generative process of the individual cannot be accounted for simply by an appeal to the individual's own functional organization, we must postulate a universal order of beings within which the individual has its existence. The contingency of the individual indicates its own insufficiency and demands factors exterior to it.

The next step of inquiry, then, involves a reflection upon the world order, that is, the constructive design outlining the formal sequence of types of beings within the world context. One discovers, however, that the world order itself exhibits various modes of contingency. Like the real individual, the world order appears transitory and lacking within itself the sufficient reason of its origin, as well as its final aim. Furthermore, even though the world order presents the succession of structures, it does not explain the principles upon which these structure, and not others, were selected. Hence, the world order indicates the necessity of a superior level of planning: the architectonic project of the universe. This project must be

postulated as transcending the actual sequence of forms toward the principles of their selection. The ultimate constitutive factors of the project are, we find, the real individual being and the constructive world design. These two factors indicate all others: the ideal possibles (ideas); ideal qualities; ultimate laws of structuration; and intentional beings.¹¹

It is quite clear at this point that Tymieniecka, unlike Husserl, refuses to attribute a privileged status to intentionality. As Erling Eng remarks, she "inverts the picture" by "... reversing the usual Husserlian priority given to intentionality, and pointing out what Husserl for most of his life left out."¹² Indeed, even in its cognitive function, intentionality is not an absolute, since it must be guided and regulated by transcendent ideas.¹³ However, although intentionality, in Tymieniecka's view, is contained within an all-inclusive project of the universe (instead of being the ground of that project), it takes on an additional role, distinct from the specifically cognitive function attributed to it by Husserl.¹⁴ "Human intentionality at a certain level of development acquires a most particular 'creative' structuration, which consists in an inventive constructiveness of forms, in which ... new forms that escape the jurisdiction of regulative functions of ideas are invented."¹⁵ Thus, within the complete system of human functioning, we must recognize not only a cognitive function, but also a creative function which, although conjoined with cognition, is nonetheless autonomous in its operations.

The necessity for positing a creative function of consciousness in addition to the constitutive becomes manifest, Tymieniecka believes, when one attempts to account for the human world in terms of the latter alone. Passive genesis, flowing onward according to preestablished regulations, guarantees consistency and stability in the world of experience. By means of the constitutive function of consciousness we are able to accomplish the most complex cognitive operations in a manner which is both effortless and involuntary.¹⁶ Yet these operations simply maintain the *status quo* by an essentially rational structurizing and, hence, are unable to account for the appearance of novelty in the form of those innovative types introduced by artistic creativity.

Paul Ricoeur has also noted a somewhat similar difficulty in Husserl's account of consciousness. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, the horizontal structure of potentiality contained in every act of consciousness could have opened a way for a new reflection upon freedom. Yet Husserl's concern for objectivities and the manner of their constitution allowed him to overlook the possibility of a free creativity. Ricoeur observes that "...

Husserl never undertakes to consider the creativity of consciousness unless led by a 'transcendental guide,' the object. This guide ties creativity and binds its genius to a 'something' which can be expressed at a higher level of consciousness. . . . Consciousness is the father of the logos in that it moves beyond itself into the identical. The problem of the 'same' keeps Husserl from leaving the rationalistic framework of his investigations."¹⁷ Tymieniecka insists that an adequate understanding of creativity may be achieved only by transcending the limitations of the constituted world.¹⁸

Let us explore this thesis in more detail. The phenomenological sense of the "constituted world," Tymieniecka notes, includes both the world of nature as well as the various frameworks of social and cultural outlook.¹⁹ The order, stability and continuation of this constituted world are due to the universal and necessary structures of constituting consciousness. Thus the *telos* of classical phenomenological reflection resides in the effort to render a cognitively adequate description of the essential structures of the genesis of the world. Even though Husserl progressed from a static description of essences toward the assessment of the dynamic process of consciousness in building up an ordered world, this dynamism is still viewed from the perspective of a rigorously scientific grasp of necessary laws. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl states: "after transcendental reduction, my true interest is directed to my pure ego, to the uncovering of this *de facto* ego. But the uncovering can become genuinely scientific, only if I go back to the apodictic principles that pertain to this ego as exemplifying the *eidos* ego: the essential universalities and necessities by means of which the fact is to be related to its rational grounds (those of its pure possibility) and thus made scientific (logical)."²⁰ When we recall that the pure ego is ultimately the human monad (that is, the multiple *cogitationes* of the identical ego with its habitualities and its world), we see that this scientific grasping of the eidetic structures of the ego involves at the same time a rigorous delineation of the constituted world.

In the process of creativity, by contrast, we find activities which are neither universal nor necessary, but rather individual, unique and freely executed. If constitutive consciousness were the sole human function, we should not be able to account for the innovation and novelty which do appear intermittently and break constituted frameworks by reorganizing our view of ourselves and the world. Yet in spite of the novelty of the creative product in comparison with the given structures of the constituted world, creativity is not carried out in a vacuum. On the contrary, the

creative process begins by *assuming* the given world, albeit negatively, as being unsatisfactory. Then, when the process has reached completion, the creative product is inserted into the constituted world, thus widening the scope of that world and enriching its significance.

Moreover, creative activity exhibits certain structural similarities to the process of constitution, insofar as the foundation of both lies in perception. We notice that the perception which yields a constituted object is not a merely instantaneous occurrence. Rather, it involves a certain temporal extension in which multiple *Abschattungen* progressively coalesce in a teleologically oriented fashion toward the constitution of a unitary perceptual object. In creative perception we discover this same temporality of a succession of phases. But in this instance, the temporal succession is teleologically oriented toward the construction of a work of art. "The perceptual glimpses which carry along both processes are confused, fragmentary, inexplicit; they are in need of clarification, they demand to be completed. Perception, creative as well as constitutive, is this progressive clarification, in which discriminated elements are re-established as significant parts of a new synthesis."²¹

Although the formal structure for both types of perception is the same, however, the concrete operations differ in the two cases. Going beyond the tenaciously maintained position of Husserl in which all transcendence appears as a transcendence-within-immanence from the transcendental perspective, Tymieniecka argues that in order to account for constitutive perception, one must posit a transcendent (transsubjective) realm of ideas to act as regulative principles of this process. When new material is brought into the perceptual field, there results a certain disintegration which must ultimately be reorganized toward a unitary synthesis. This reorganization is effected by reference to those ideal structures which ground the order of the constituted world. Hence, the disintegration of the perceptual field in this case is merely relative. The new element will be re-absorbed and reintegrated within the established framework.

In creative perception, however, the chaotic disintegration of the field is radical. Not only is new material introduced within the perceptual field and, hence, the actual interconnections disassociated, but the framework itself, into which the material would be absorbed in constitutive perception, is here broken apart. Thus there is a disintegration of the perceptual context "... at all levels that an imagination suggests as possible, so as to make those elements vary freely (as prospective constituents of a

pattern) at any level subsequently and tentatively chosen."²² It should be noted that this description of imagination as making elements vary freely, although Husserlian in terminology, goes beyond the classic phenomenological position. As Tymieniecka has pointed out, imagination plays a dual role in Husserl's philosophy. First of all, it functions as the neutrality modification of positional acts which allows the free variation of the given which is necessary for the grasping of essence. Secondly, within the actual perceptual process itself, imagination allows for flexibility and change within the stream of continuity.²³ In either case, imagination is dependent upon the framework of constitution.

In creative activity, however, imagination is directed neither toward a variation within the continuity of the perceptual process nor toward the grasping of eidetic structures, but rather toward a *telos* which the creative process gives itself. Yet this *telos*, at least at the beginning, is not a univocal and essential structure which consciousness grasps apodictically. It is rather a *theme* which both guides the creative process and is transformed by it in a complex dialectic carried out as the creation proceeds. The creative process which is initiated by creative perception involves deliberation, choice and a *radical* questioning, in contrast to constitutive perception which resolves all questions in terms of the framework already established.

In creativity is found a cooperation between affectivity and intellect, impulse and deliberation, body and consciousness. In the creative process, there is, to be sure, a break with the objectively constituted world. But the process is carried out by an interplay between intellectual deliberation, now freed from the constraints of the constitutive framework, and the dynamic forces of affectivity. It is the creative imagination which acts as a mediator between these disparate human functions by presenting the elements of feeling and sensation in an evocative way to the deliberating agency, not allowing them to fall back anonymously into the established framework of constitution. As the process continues, the interaction of judgment and affectivity, mediated by the presentative power of imagination, works toward a clarification of the initial theme. Ultimately, this process results in the finished work which, being placed within the world of culture via the medium of an intersubjectively perceptible object, serves to reorganize this world and offer new ways of seeing.

Given the view of creativity as entailing the interaction between the objectifying function of judgment and the dynamic forces of affectivity, we might wonder whether this position can be reconciled with Tymieniecka's critique of Ingarden's aesthetics.²⁴

According to Ingarden's treatment of the literary work of art, Tymieniecka claims, we have not yet transcended the objectifications of constitutive consciousness. Since the metaphysical values grasped through the work are ultimately founded in a priori ideas, we remain within the perspective of Cartesian rationalism. Tymieniecka here suggests that the work represents something beyond and prior to its objective content of aesthetic values. Indeed, the final significance of the work lies not in the qualities of the work itself, but in a certain "vision" or "message" for which the work acts as a mere medium. She contends that "artistic accomplishment can be measured precisely by releasing experience *capable of breaking through the intentionally enclosed framework, man-world, and opening it toward a radically unobjectifiable perspective.*"²⁵ Yet, if creativity involves an interplay between Logos and Eros, how can the ultimate aesthetic perception be totally unobjectifiable?

The difficulty here, however, is only apparent. In order to see this, we must refer again to Tymieniecka's cosmology. In doing so, we will see that her theory of creativity is not a *mere* aesthetics, but is, like Nietzsche's metaphysical aesthetics in *The Birth of Tragedy*, an attempt to articulate humanity's relation to being. The same theoretical framework which Tymieniecka uses to account for creativity – the mediation of Logos and Eros (form and formless; *stasis* and *kinesis*) – serves also to interpret her cosmology. The opposition and its mediation appears at various levels within the scope of her theory. First of all, the real autonomous individual represents a mitigation of the primal ground of universal flux. As an inwardly-outwardly oriented functional system, the living body is the ground for both perdurance and change. Furthermore, on the level of human consciousness, the flowing temporality of consciousness itself mediates the unchanging realm of ideas by which the constitutive process is regulated. In the process of creativity, both the affective dimension as grounded in the functional nature of the body as well as the intellectual operations of consciousness (now freed from their subservience to the given order) are reorchestrated into a new productive cooperation. The creative process appropriates, first of all, the dynamic functioning of the body which, in the rational organization of constitution, is forgotten. This, in turn, opens the way toward that original presence to the universal flux which even the body's relative stability mitigates. I would suggest, therefore, that the creative "vision" involves, initially, a reappropriation of the body, that teleologically organized system of *functions* which, as such, is unified without being an objective unity. This initial appropriation of the functional dynamism of the body allows the revelation of our original

presence in the radical flux of universal becoming which is normally hidden by the screen of imposed forms.²⁶ Hence, we can understand Tymieniecka's insistence that the significance of art transcends the perspective of objectivity.

Yet although the "message" of artistic creativity involves our immediate presence to a non-objectifiable dimension of being, the vision cannot remain at this stage. Since artistic creativity is directed toward the work and the *communication* of presence through the work, it must necessarily express the non-objectifiable through the objectifying media of Logos. Just as the body would be submerged in the universal flux without the relative stability of its functional systems, and just as consciousness would be submerged in the dynamics of biological functioning without the transcendent regulation of a priori ideas, so too our original and inarticulate presence would remain mute without the organizing and deliberating functions of creative consciousness oriented toward the production of the work. It is the work of art which allows our original presence to become truly *present* in a new way.

Thus, when we say that creativity looks toward the work as a medium for introducing a novel form, this orientation toward form must be distinguished from that which is found in the constitutive process of perception. In the constitutive process, the *telos* resides in the form precisely *qua* form. The multiplicity of perceptual glimpses and the dynamic flow of the process are guided toward an objective unification according to the ideal of a transcendent essential structure. In this instance, we find a one-way orientation only: from multiplicity and process to unity and stability. In constitutive perception, the actual process is masked by the form toward which it is teleologically directed, so much so that without the phenomenological ascesis, we do not see the *process* at all, but rather the perceptual *object*. In creativity, by contrast, we find a double movement in relation to form. Beginning from a non-cognitive appropriation of original presence, the creative process aims at a novel form through which this presence could be expressed. In constitutive perception, the orientation toward form is one in which the process is lost and ultimately absorbed into the schema of a univocal structure. In creativity, however, the form and, ultimately, the work in which this form is embodied, do not absorb or veil the process, but rather serve to reveal it. Hence, instead of the one-way movement from flux to the stability of form, we find a double orientation: from mute, unarticulated process toward a form which, in turn, reveals precisely that process itself.

In this way, we can understand more completely the double relation of creativity to the constituted world: "... it situates itself *between the two different temporal phases of the constituted world by stemming from it and breaking off, then, breaking back into it in order to transform it.*"²⁷ Initially, the revolt against the automatized constructs of the given world is carried out in the name of that original presence to the dynamism of the cosmos which is hidden by these very structures. This negative phase, however, takes on a more positive moment when the creative process looks toward the novel form which will finally be embodied in the intersubjectively accessible work. It is only through the objectification instituted by a creative production of novel *forms* that the radically non-objectifiable dimension of being can be raised to a level which precludes our passive submergence.

This creative *poiesis* is, in Tymieniecka's view, not merely one example among others of human activity, but is the prototype of human action as such. Within the framework of Husserl's transcendental constitution, the "active performances" of consciousness are always carried out according to inviolable universal laws. Moreover, even in Ingarden's treatment of moral action, we find that freedom is limited by the element of responsibility which requires an adherence to transcendent values. In the creative process as Tymieniecka conceives it, however, human functioning is released from its submission to a priori structures so that "... man transcends the absolute rules of rationality toward the freedom of action."²⁸ Thus, the issue of creativity appears as the focal point of interest within contextual phenomenology. By reflecting upon the creative process, on the one hand, and the creative product, on the other, philosophy is able to grasp and articulate both the fundamental specificity of human nature and the cosmic ground from which it is derived.

NOTES

¹ A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl: The Contextual Phase of Phenomenology,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. IV (1976), p. 245. (Referred to hereafter as 'Contextual Phenomenology.') Cf. also A. Ales Bello, 'Rinascita della Fenomenologia in Italia?' *Vita Sociale*, n. 6 (1976), p. 400.

² 'Contextual Phenomenology,' p. 245.

³ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Why is there Something rather than Nothing?* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Company, 1966), p. 15n. (Referred to hereafter as *WSN*.)

⁴ David Carr, 'Discussion,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. V (1976), p. 101.

⁵ *WSN*, p. 4.

⁶ 'Contextual Phenomenology,' p. 398.

⁷ *WSN*, p. 17.

⁸ WSN, p. 19.

⁹ WSN, p. 31.

¹⁰ WSN, p. 43.

¹¹ WSN, p. 156.

¹² Erling Eng, 'Discussion,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. V (1976), p. 99.

¹³ Cf. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Ideas as the *a priori* of the phenomenological constitution,' *Kantstudien* Bd. 55, Heft 3 (1964), pp. 368–383. In addition, see the discussion of Tymieniecka's view concerning the role of ideas in transcendental constitution by Mary Rose Barral: 'Problems of Continuity in the Perceptual Process,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. III (1974), pp. 168–182.

¹⁴ A. Ales Bello has expressed doubt as to whether proper credit is accorded to cognition within Tymieniecka's system. (Cf. 'Intersubjectivity and Creative Consciousness,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. VI.) Yet given the fact that Tymieniecka does not reject the cognitive function of intentionality, but rather sees the necessity of positing a complementary function, this criticism does not appear justified.

¹⁵ WSN, p. 154.

¹⁶ A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Imaginatio Creatrix,' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. III (1974), p. 8. (Referred to hereafter as 'Imaginatio Creatrix.')

¹⁷ Paul Ricoeur, 'A Study of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* I-IV', in *Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 99.

¹⁸ Tymieniecka sees, too, that Husserl's reflections on *imagination* might have provided the means to account for creativity. But in the final analysis, his view of imagination "... is relevant only to the problem of imitation in the issue of the relation between reality and art in *representational art*." ('Imaginatio Creatrix,' p. 24.)

¹⁹ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Eros et Logos: esquisse de phénoménologie de l'intériorité créatrice* (Louvain and Paris: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1972), p. 119. (Referred to hereafter as *Eros et Logos*.)

²⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, tr. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 72.

²¹ A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Originality and Creative Perception,' *Proceedings of the 2nd Congress of Aesthetics* (Amsterdam: 1964), p. 1000. (Referred to hereafter as 'Originality and Creative Perception.')

²² 'Originality and Creative Perception,' p. 1001.

²³ 'Imaginatio Creatrix,' p. 18.

²⁴ Cf. 'Contextual Phenomenology,' pp. 309–334.

²⁵ 'Contextual Phenomenology,' p. 331.

²⁶ Cf. *Eros et Logos*, p. 92: 'L'esprit lui-meme, sous son aspect d'intelligence discursive, s'est préparé un écran le séparant du monde.' Thus, I would disagree with Helmut Kuhn's interpretation of the ultimate import of Tymieniecka's view of creativity in *Eros et Logos*: "Die Verfasserin kommt hier einem Gedanken nahe, der den Theologen des Mittelalters geläufig war und der in unserer Zeit von Paul Claudel erneuert worden ist: den irdisch Liebenden ist im Akt der Vereinigung eine Teilhabe an dem göttlichen Schöpfungswerk gewährt." (*Philosophische Rundschau*, Jul. 1976, p. 136.)

²⁷ 'Imaginatio Creatrix,' p. 10.

²⁸ 'Contextual Phenomenology,' p. 412.

CLOSURE

THE PROTOTYPE OF ACTION: ETHICAL OR CREATIVE?

I. ACTION AS THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF BEING

1. *The Philosophical Argument*

When we use the term "action", whether it is qualified as "social," "cultural," "political," "legal" or any other type, it is meant always as performed by a specific individual and we understand it, in fact, basically as an action performed by a human being. "Action" essentially indicates motion as opposed to rest, dynamism as opposed to inertia, activity as opposed to passivity, process as opposed to an instantaneous event and behavior as distinguished from an anonymous chain of causally-connected occurrences of motion. This last distinction indicates that we could hardly call "action" either a succession of disconnected occurrences or a concentration of causally-organized and purposefully-oriented movements performed by an anonymous mover which does not program his own movements. Indeed, we do not talk about "action" of an automaton nor about the eruption of a volcano – we talk about "activity" – and we call "wild" or "irresponsible action" the behavioral manifestations of a man who cannot control his conduct. In short, action involves deliberation, choice between a conscious and a rational activity. Indeed, the conscious activity of deliberation and decision-making cannot suffice in order to result in action. "To act" it must find means of its outward manifestation, to enter by a rational subject the current processes of the present *life-world* and to exercise an impact upon some of its elements.

Thus, action takes place within the *intersubjective* and *objective* world and yet it is performed by the individual human *subject* and planned, oriented by this subject's most complex functional system drawing upon its full extent. The impulse for it stems obviously not only from the conscious subject's involved strivings, but also from the subject's existential partaking in this subjective real world and his particular situation within this world's actual progress. It springs forth in its specific orientation from the subject's will to play a role or to assure his own existential continuity within this world. In both cases, it manifests the subject's desire to his real partaking in the world's affairs: his effort to *inscribe* himself constructively within the *interworldly network of meaningfulness*. The meaning of this inscription, that is the choice of the target at which its

impact is oriented, of the nature and direction of the intended impact itself with all the reasons for such a choice, stem from the conscious rational deliberation. Deliberation involves on the one hand, the estimation by the deliberating subject of his own position within the *life-world* and of his own tendencies and desires with respect to his role in it. On the other hand, it is surreptitiously drawing upon the subliminal tendencies, emotional strivings, and fixations, preferences of tastes, likes and dislikes which do not appear in the open light of our conscious life.

Finally, the action of the subject has its source not only on the side of the natural conditions of the human being in this *Elemental*, passionate ground, having its roots in its recess of Nature. Is not the execution of the rationally-devised plan of action referring also to the interworldly conditions? The *life-world* situation of the conscious agent refers to the principles, rules, conditions of the *life-world/constitution*. Furthermore, the means with which the subject is – or is not – endowed (with physical strength, presence of mind, specific technical capacity and skill, etc.) refers action to “skillfulness” of the performance and its virtualities within the *material* conditions of reality.

It appears then that action, taking place within the *life-world*, as devised by the conscious subject and performed by him within this world with objective means presents a thread of continuity between the segments of the complete spectrum of man’s intimately his own, *subjective* “faculties” and his functioning within the *outward life-world* process.

In order to emerge as a project, as well as in order to manifest itself within the *life-world* progress, action digs deep down into the human Subliminal realm as well as into his and the *life-world*’s elementary conditions in Nature. Action seems then to be the privileged factor of unity among the otherwise phenomenologically irreconcilable realms. It remains to be seen whether action may be phenomenologically inspectable. Only then it may promise to accomplish the unification which cognition failed to do.

Should action approached from the right angle prove itself upon careful investigation in depth not only phenomenologically inspectable but also capable to project a unifying thread of phenomenological thematization throughout the complete spectrum of the dimensions of being, we would find the key to its unity and to the actual existence, a key sought in vain by the classic phenomenology.

2. *Transcendental Monism versus Ontological Pluralism; the Unity of Being and Actual Existence*

Laying down the principles of phenomenology, Husserl had aimed to found the unity of the scientific experience and consequently had foremostly the question of continuity on his mind. In the phase of his eidetic inquiry it was the ideal *eidos* and insight to serve as the principle of unity for the regional ontologies. Switching to the genesis of the scientific forms in pure consciousness he sought the thread of continuity in the transcendental genesis of consciousness itself and of the life-world, assuming the constitutive power of pure consciousness as the sole principle of reality. However, as I have attempted to show it elsewhere, the intentional thread of the constitutive unfolding pursued in reverse to its natural course down to its originary, elementary forms where the constitutive faculty confronts the primordial givenness, does not reach either the mechanical or the subliminal regions of the human functioning in a philosophical interpretation. Together with these regions the forces, virtualities and workings of the Elemental Nature fall beyond its grasp. Thereby the unity of the order of being is restricted to the furthest outposts of the intentional system of the transcendental consciousness. We remain within its bounds and the actual existence of things and beings is lost from sight.

Ingarden, who, aiming at its retrieval, has reacted against the Husserlian transcendental monism, which in his view, deprives the types of being and things of their existential distinctiveness with respect to each other and of their own existential status, has taken up again the methodological principle of the eidetic analysis. His ontological differentiation of fundamental types of objects aims at recovering their essential distinctiveness lost in the Husserlian monistic reductionism, by establishing their formal-ontological "transcendence" with respect to each other.

However, the eidetic principle of unity manifests a mere methodological significance and usefulness. While the continuity of the transcendental principle blurred the distinctive contours of things and beings, the eidetic analysis having brought out their essential differentiation, has shown another flaw. It has left them in the state of a disconnected inventory of possibles.

In point of fact, the gigantic ontology of Ingarden yields a series of types of objects defined with respect to three principles: their foundation in being;¹ the simplicity of their internal composition;² their relation to temporality.³ Thus we distinguish

(a) autonomous objects (the real individual in his variants), the ideal

individual object (a-temporal: mathematical objects, values), Absolute Being (Supratemporal);

(b) heteronomous objects having their existential foundation in the intentional acts of consciousness (works of Art, social and cultural institutions, languages and linguistic groups, games, etc., etc.);

(c) universal ideas and ideal concepts;

(d) simplest ideal qualities;

(e) simplest temporal events;

(f) temporal processes.

This differentiation of the basic ontological structures establishes, in a radical contrast to the Husserlian genetic continuity, and monistic simplification, a pluralistic foundation for the philosophical reconstruction of the universe of Being. It lays also cornerstones for the universal order. Nevertheless, the differentiated objects do not belong naturally to a common encompassing system; they remain disconnected. They may well represent the foundation for several possible modes of existence and yet the possibility to ascertain an actual existence of any of them is missing.

With the Ingardenian ontological universe, as in Husserl's transcendental one, actual existence is out of sight. The door to enter the path leading to it is closed by both: the transcendental as well as the eidetic approach.

Already in the second volume of *The Controversy about the Existence of the World* Ingarden has sought after existential links among the structurally fragmented fragments of the universe. He has established among them the existential connectedness between the ideal structure and the intentional process in aesthetic experience, between the ideal moral value and its concretion in moral action, etc. These, and some other segments of ontologico-existential links establish fragments of unity among the otherwise differentiated structures. He does not, however, manage to discover the underlying existential nexus between the ontologico-formal and ontologico-material elements of structures, in terms of which he has determined his structural universe of objects.

In his inquiry into the nature of consciousness he makes a deliberate attempt in this direction by relating the pure consciousness, with the pure ego at its center, with the concrete living person. Embodying the concrete living person into the dimensions of the empirical "soul", he has extended, indeed, the region of the soul – and with it the reach of the transcendental intentionality – into the "soul-body territory".

However, in this conception body remained "body as experience." The

system of ontologico-existential links which Ingarden believed he had projected within the system of consciousness expanded to that of the monad-soul, breaks down at the borderline of the intentional structure. Ingarden himself acknowledges that "body in its essential state" remains inaccessible. Thus, the network of ontological links having its center in consciousness is interrupted and does not reach the realm of Nature in any of its dimensions. Since, without retrieving this realm within a common territory with consciousness, the question of actual existence or of possible structures can be neither formulated nor solved, Ingarden sees the crucial point for both, the unity of things and beings as well as consequently for the problem of their actual existence, to lie in the classic *mind-body* relation. However, the classic epistemological formulation of the mind-body relation is already overcome. Upon the background of the Husserlian and Ingardian inquiry we are not concerned any more with the truthfulness and reliability of a *specific type of cognition*, but with the *ontologico-existential relationship* between the system of soul-consciousness and the body. Body extends into the realm of Nature, and remains beyond the intentional network.

In this perspective, it is only natural that Ingarden has switched his quest after the existential links between the different realms of Being from the structural approach to that of *action*. First, he sought in the investigation of the causal linkage within the real world the unity between the ideal structure of the real autonomous individual and the actual real forces and dynamism animating it. Then, he turned to moral action.

He encounters the same obstacle in our analysis of his twofold attempt, first of the *mechanical* action within the domain of the real world and then in his renewed effort in which the inquiry of the "responsible action," that is, *moral* action; here we attempt to encompass the Platonic ideas and ideal values, through consciousness and decision-making reaching down to its roots in the physical condition in the real world of its performance. It is only on the borderline of the intentional and the empirical realm that his unifying links may carry. The links beyond their limit in his formulation do not belong any longer to the philosophical discourse. Enunciated in scientific empirical terms they remain below a philosophical thematization: the body, the natural conditions of man, and with them, actual existence, Nature, again escape the phenomenological grasp.⁴

The question of the *mind-body* relation, in the Ingardian sense, seems to be the center, with respect to the issue, of the unity of *Being* as well as the key to approaching the problems of actual existence of things and beings.

Formulated in the epistemological perspective, assuming the primacy of cognition in the understanding of man within his universe, the classic *mind-body* problem which has dominated modern debate, did not advance toward the solution of these two issues. We may explore the new formulation by considering "action" as the possible access to the unity of *Being*.

3. *The Key to the Unity of Being: Moral Action or Creative Activity?*

Twice action has been proposed in phenomenology with the intention of answering the questions under discussion. First, creative activity has been investigated by the present writer and has revealed the meeting ground of mind and body at the subliminal level of their common resources in Nature upon which they draw in devising the creative process. Second, as we have already pointed out, action was called upon by Ingarden to perform the role outlined above. It has been the ethical (or moral) action through which Ingarden tried to bind the dissociated and severed realms of being. As we have developed it elsewhere the ethical action fails to accomplish this task.

The question then arises, what type of action, if any, could be considered as the privileged *access to the inner workings of the constructive progress running through the realms of Nature, human being and the life-world*. Approached from the point of view of cognition, they are since Descartes either torn apart or their unifying thread is – as in phenomenology – broken before encompassing their whole expanse. Should we, as Ingarden does, in differentiating first the "causal action" (mechanical action), occurring within the real world and "moral action" performed by the person and comprising also the former, see in moral action *action par excellence*, and give up our pursuit along these lines altogether? Or, in our quest after the unifying principle of the human universe in its conditions should we not leave behind the specific types of action and aim at the *prototype of human action and activity*? The *prototype* of action would be expected to account for the progress of the complete array of man's functioning, which in its full development would account for man's freedom from the strict bonds of Nature and his own survival orientation to promote the novelty and originality in the world's progress.

Indeed, our investigation of ethical action has already indicated not only with which philosophical problems of paramount importance the issue under discussion is essentially related, but also what postulates action should fulfill in order to play the role expected of it.

Regarding the first, it is the problem of freedom, of regulative principles and of the significance of human existence that lie at the heart of our discussion.

Regarding the second indication, we may introduce our reserved investigation of action by enunciating the following postulates:

The prototype of action should reveal itself as capable of bringing together in a phenomenologically thematized fashion the complete sequence of things and beings together with their ties with the subliminal and Elemental Nature on the one hand, and man's life-world conditions on the other hand. Furthermore, it should establish the situation of human freedom with respect to the Elemental Nature on the one extreme, and the *life-world* on the other extreme.

In the present study we propose the creative activity as the *prototype* of action.

II. THE CREATIVE FREEDOM OF THE POSSIBLE WORLDS: THE PARADOX OF FREEDOM

The problem of action has at its heart the question of freedom. The antithetic feeling of being constrained, if not submerged by the world, life, nature, other men on the one hand, and the imperative nostalgia, if not urge, to become free from it on the other, lies probably at the very root of human life, and springs violently forth in various forms in every age of humanity.

There seem to be, in general, six major lines along which this antithesis emerges and is interpreted. Although the question of freedom seems most essentially to concern the freedom to act, we shall see that it concerns simultaneously the freedom to be and to become. We will attempt to delineate them showing that in each perspective the interpretation carried out to the end involves a paradox. The paradox lies at the level of the human condition in Nature and with respect to the life world.

The question which leads to its succinct presentation is whether it is the approach from the point of view of moral or creative action that offers a solution.

(1) To begin with, at the crossroads of its development a person as well as individual man becomes aware of his being in this development determined by the others: by social and cultural forms of life, by individual as well as personal propensities, tendencies of his surroundings: parents,

friends, milieu. And yet, if as we see it mirrored in contemporary literature, e.g., in Camus, Beckett, Witkiewicz, Mrozek, Kurt Vonnegut, etc., man attempts to despoil himself of all his allegiance within a given culture, and culture as such, by severing his human ties and all types of relatedness toward others. The liberation he seemingly gains leaves him not only naked and disarmed – that is, without means to exercise this supposedly acquired “freedom” – but also without aims and targets to enact it. Hence the paradox.

Man goes further in seeking to set himself free; we see in contemporary culture, e.g., in Sartre – as it happened often before – a revolt against nature itself, with the endowments each of us receives from it, and by which we are predisposed to such or another life, against propensities, innate urges and even against natural instincts from which Orestes in the *Flies* tries to free himself ultimately by killing his own mother. But Orestes set free from all predispositions imposed by nature has annihilated his very *life-world*, the *locus* of his very own existence. His “liberation” means the loss of the world as the field in which he could exercise his “freedom” and enact his newly despoiled and life-withdrawn being. The only possibility that remains for him to enact it – is death.

(2) Secondly, man revolts against the framework of the world still in a more specific way.

Claiming, as is particularly strong nowadays, to draw all the consequences from the acceptance of such a primitive condition of a despoiled man as a start, he interprets the right of the individual to freedom as the right to leave him free in his development, education and growth, from the instant he appears as a prospective individual within the actual *world-context*.

In fact, the basis of erroneous, empirical and pragmatic theories of man is the assumption that to be “free” man has to preserve the possibility of discovering things by himself, and that, consequently, education has to remain void of “indoctrination” both in the domain of ideas and ideals to be offered him, and with respect to the methods of educational devices applied – which would mean already a selection in developing certain talents and virtualities to the neglect of others, and, finally, in letting man make all decisions concerning himself personally instead of switching him into a life routine proposed as a frame of reference. However, it can be doubted whether these ideas and ideals for life as well as the principles of a personal decision will spring forth from the individual left alone to himself. Or, it may be, on the contrary, that their very discovery – even if it

should break with the inculcated ones and replace the old frame of action with the new one – depends upon the first ones, and that the decision for an unprecedented initiative depends upon a framework adopted passively at first.

(3) There is moreover to be mentioned the paradox of the social liberalism which – in order to guarantee individual freedom – goes to the extreme by letting each individual decide for himself about all his concerns and his relations with others. But can man by himself really know what is good for him and for others in that matter? Can he rely solely upon his own judgement and the right impulse in the given situation, as well as upon his will? In other terms, can man exercise freedom without guidance, responsibility and restriction? Or is it the role of the state to provide him with a set of rules to guarantee his proper choice of proper conduct?

Thus, it appears that we face paradoxical situations in all these three directions in which man sees the possibility of his freedom. If we analyze them closer it would appear that the way in which man conceives the possibility of freedom is determined by a specific rational standpoint in which he envisages himself. This rational standpoint, however, reduces him in fact to a rational mechanism; he proceeds in a strictly logical way and functions merely at this level.

And yet, the paradoxes this interpretation involves seem to vindicate some other dimensions of man that cannot be logically controlled.

(4) *The Paradox of Moral Freedom.* Ingarden was not unaware of this great issue in which all fundamental dimensions of the world, physical, anthropological and social, as well as human, are involved. We have already mentioned the physicalistic level of his concern with the determinism-indeterminism issue. The crucial point of his sketchy reflections on man lies precisely in his conviction that time, the very pulp of man's life, and man's intimate freedom to choose for himself makes an axis of human existence. We may, however, ask whether he really reached to the roots of this conviction? Interpreting his views we may find that he opposes the course of nature to that of man's will oriented by values.

We continue our survival as individuals in the natural flow of time along the cyclic process of nature within the texture of the actual world. After unfolding of what is virtually foreinstalled in us by the great, anonymous scheme of Nature – in which we play just an insignificant role – and after spending all our resources, we vanish into oblivion.

We may go also against that otherwise irreversible flux of events, when through our dedicated and self-denying efforts we choose to play a part in

human existence. We may thus, indeed, choose to devote the natural life to tasks of our innermost concerns which we believe in. We believe in their intrinsic value that is verified at various levels of our personal life, higher than merely survival and well-being. And we may put all at stake to serve this innermost call from within. By these most intimate decisions man is "free" to follow his innermost concerns no matter what; he reverts thereby, step by step, the inexorable flux of change.

Moving that way against the inexorability of time which works from within him, man builds a refuge of moral "freedom" that gives new significance to his existence and unbreakable strength to his purpose and dedication. This counterprocess and moral "freedom" however, do not spring out of nothingness! Neither are they preinstalled nor pregiven to man or wrought out naturally. On the contrary, in Ingarden's thought they seem to be the fruit of our conquest over ourselves in a permanent struggle with our very own nature, with our inborn passivity to flow with the flux of life, with out innate turpitude lulling us to sleep, and deep sleep, letting things take their course, and letting – as Heidegger says – "das Man," the common doom, take over. Therefore, we must remain continually aware of what there is in us. But can we discover it otherwise than in this perpetual immersion in "das Man" of the common doom? Without feeling it down to the marrow of our bones, how could we distinguish, distill from the anonymous texture of natural life these uniquely innermost concerns? Without being in the midst of the incommensurable and yet anonymous *chaos* of this on-rushing flux, how could we discover and sift through our entire system of functioning that what truly matters to us, our own unique task and vocation?

(5) Although in his little treatise on action and responsibility Ingarden deals chiefly with the mechanism and the regulatory principles of moral action as an outward impact upon the world, yet, in the view here under discussion, the emphasis falls upon the question of the being of the acting agent.

Indeed, the question of "freedom to act" is to some degree always concerned with the "freedom to be." At its limit, it concerns the "freedom to be" or "to become" what one considers "oneself." Over against the stereotypes of the present day humanity, we long to be "our very own self"; that is, either to dig from our very depth, or to unfold creatively, *such* a form of our being that would correspond to our deepest longings.

Along the same line, we may long to extricate ourselves from our naturally unfolding life-course, specifically our own meaning. That is,

instead of participating in an anonymous way together with the naturally unfolding and otherwise meaningless cycle of the world, we would like to *inscribe ourselves* with our specifically devised course of existence in a meaningful pattern of humanity. In short, the "freedom to act" would mean also the "freedom to forge" our unique *destiny*.

(6) However, once we leave the anonymous pattern of the natural existence, how will we devise this meaningfulness of our life with which we want to inscribe ourselves in a meaningful pattern of humanity? Already the conception of it as inscription in a larger pattern indicates that this meaningfulness to conquer cannot be a work of a solipsistic being: it cannot be accomplished otherwise than in relation to an other self. Is the other self also ready to undertake the same task in common? Even if ready, is he free to engage in such a common adventure?

We see then that to be free to become our own self entails the question of the freedom to be in a specific relation with an other self.

Here lies the vast paradox: even at this point of man's freedom, at which he appears to be the master of his own being and his personal life-world, against all the other elements of the actual world-context, he has to wring out of the complete innerworldly complex, social, cultural, elemental nature which carries on the progress and threatens his fragile system of functions at every point: social conflicts and obstacles, cultural conditioning, disease, accidents, cataclysms, etc. And yet, it is through this system alone he could wring out his "moral freedom."

In Ingarden's thought there is no articulated delineation of man's channels through which his decisions are brought about and stimulate his actions and work in the contrary life-course. We are left here at the best with isolated sets of rational operations at one extreme, and abstract, ideal values at the other.

It appears that in order to grasp this dilemma, with more precision, we must reach far beyond both frontiers of Ingarden's *philosophical* framework.

We propose to investigate the paradoxical situation of freedom at the level of *creative activity* which, as a *prototype of human action*, reaches beyond the level of organized systems and above the sets of fundamental rationality of ideas and ideal structures. We will, therefore, attempt to approach the problem of freedom from the point of view of man's *creative function*. The major problem concerning man-and-human-condition in this respect is the problem of the *world and its origin, as well as man's role and status in it*.

III. THE CREATIVE PROCESS AS THE PROTOTYPE OF ACTION

1. *Mind, Soul and Body in the Creative Conflict*

We would say that all poets, painters, composers, in short, creators, have lived in the acute awareness of a conflict between the mind and the body. We might perhaps add that the creative process arises from that opposition. However, what side should the artist take in this conflict? Assuredly not that of natural life. It would submerge him, and it is precisely against natural life that the conflict arises: He becomes a poet only in claiming his rights against the amorphous dominion of that life. On the other hand, all too much has been said about the "evasion" of reality adopted by romantic poets, surrealist poets, etc., as well as about their refuge in dreams. Escaping also means that one admits defeat, that one turns his back to an essential point.

In the conflict of the mind and the natural man, the sides are almost even: Each has its merits. To find a solution, we must lend an ear to both. There is no question of dismissing them back to back, escaping toward the open sea, but rather of reconciling them above their contradiction, in a *tertium quid*, by attempting to pass through a narrow door. For creation is nothing else but the mode of reconciliation between the pure mind and the natural self.

The artist or inventor who escapes in ideal constructions, who wraps himself in dreams, forever cuts himself off from reality. Whereas creation is a resumption, not an abandonment of reality: It is not a definitive desertion, but a conscious and desired reconquest of that which, passively accepted, threatened to submerge us. Therefore it is a question of reconquering the already established form of natural reality by the creative mind under the form of a new universe.

The body and nature are the first stakes in this rebirth of man to himself. It is undertaken in the creative process. Each instant requires an extreme effort and each instant stretches on indefinitely to bear up that new universe to emerge in its slow origin, an effort that only a total confliction can sustain. A battle is indeed engaged between the effort sustained by the will and the natural self which made of abandon to tendencies born of a vast context more sensed than known. This latter is encroaching, it requires no effort, and asks rather that one draw more tightly to oneself the lines of concentration, of that ultimate attention limited to one sole point. The abandon draws toward a complicity, a contract, a passive, easy self-absorption with nature.

The mind is the call toward eternity, the absolute, the true; the natural self, on the contrary, is submission, the changing course of a dream to which one is abandoned, inscrutable, fugitive and factitious. "Thing of harmony, ME" differs from a dream which is imposed, from a dream governed by a law, because the mind has chosen; it disappears without a trace, whereas the mind has the power to direct its own course, to sustain itself in the eternal.

In return, the movements of the mind correspond to higher aspirations, and can accord with the vanity which is the definitive judge, and consult "the slightest stirrings of my visions between night and the eye. . . ." The delusive promises of "natural dreams" can only be "foul." Foul, for they are manifested by the first stirrings of our being which, like the first stirrings of the earth before springtime, presage the renewal of life, a course that nothing could stop in its development as far as its final decrepitude. The mad and fugitive passion for life, which allows itself to be disclosed and tries to arrange an entry for itself, will have to be established on the "distances," the bases painfully acquired by the mind. These first stirrings, so profound, presage an upheaval similar to childbirth: It is the subterranean advance of life seeking to burst forth in the nature which plays in us. Hidden forces buzz, dormant energies re-animate the body, and behold, the first concrete form of the temptation: the feeling of our own corporeal force. The feeling sets us ablaze like a rapture, suddenly seizes us in our innermost heart. The mind discovers itself identified and, moreover, buried in the body. It is by an analogous upheaval that the earth, just before springtime, suddenly kindles and is transformed under the magic stroke of life.

The mind still has the possibility of arising "erect," but soon it is gasping for breath. A dialogue is born: It is the dialogue between life and death, and that, before the Immutable. With it appears the seductive privilege of doubt. Radical doubt, sparing nothing, establishes itself sovereign in the dialogue of the two "me's" who are thus presented in equal terms. The stirrings of the world, of an earth swirling in the reborn self, dizzies that self to the point of giddiness and introduces it to the heart of nature: "The newborn year. To all my blood foretells secret impulses. . . ." And whereas "rueful the frost relinquishes its last diamonds" – of a sublime but insensible beauty – the natural self is manifested in an *overture of sensation*.

This time, not only by the dynamic extension of our limbs but by an upheaval of our identity, spring comes to our corporeal substance, to that which is nature in us. But since it is the whole man who is engaged in that

spontaneity which is released, could sensation, involving only a part of ourselves, be maintained on the surface for long? It is transformed into emotion. On the horizon, like an exterior dominating the pure foyer, nature suddenly appears; but it is an exterior provisionally separated, for the trees, the woods, enter into us by all our open senses, impregnate us, and we there discover ourselves, feeling swollen up again with the same new fluids, vibrating with the same designs aborning. Then this interior spectacle is immolated in a universal emotion. Is emotion anything other than the union of the interior and the exterior in a sensation which renders us masters of ourselves and makes us open forth to a zest, to a fullness without limits?

However, our opening in sensation to ourselves *qua* nature, the emotive bursting forth which immerses us in a unique whole, only prepares the terrain where the phenomena of nature may arise and expand. Becoming imperious, in effect, the appeals of vital forces raise the entire body like sap which becomes agent of generation: the flesh arises like a flower bearing in itself the promise, the germ of a fruit which all the combined forces of the plant impel to be born. This emotive complex makes the drunkenness of a heart which beats, of a bosom which burns, of the thirst and infinite desires which the contact with beings raises in us.

How are body and mind defined in this interior debate?

First of all, the mind is characterized by the perfect clarity, the transparency of its articulations; it appears entirely determined in its structures, its causes, and its consequences, like a domain of which the reflective self has complete mastery. Its perfect intelligibility renders it immutable, and it draws a supreme pride from its aspiration to the absolute. Moreover, it is revealed as the agent who organizes, establishes connections, and who, thanks to its transparency, concentrates reflective action. For the mind appears as reflective activity itself which, while being a cognitive activity, has this in particular that its object, whatever its structural extension – that can be the entire universe – is reducible to a unique core, to an acute point totally graspable in its causes and its consequences. It is absorbed by the reflective function and experienced in complete identification with the act of reflection: Those are the silences, the peaks of the pure mind!

To the mind thus conceived is opposed passivity, the initial inertia of the body. For what is the feeling of our vital forces if not the awareness, all thought disaggregating, which possesses itself of our will in order to unbind it? What is the opening out of sensation, if not a passive sensation (for it has long since been shown that there is no sensation without the

active cooperation of the mind), at least if one considers prereflective sensation, that is, sensation abandoned to confused and unsorted regions where the awareness of the flesh is primary? Emotion and sensation are born in the moment in which we become conscious of our flesh, in which we identify ourselves with our body; in virtue of this, they disperse us in an opaque consciousness whose density is such that we live it without attempting to reduce it or to order it. The carnal stirrings which provoke emotion – some of them are what we call erotic feelings – put an end to the arrogant isolation of the mind and lead to a spontaneous union with the rest of nature. Thus are abolished the contours which the mind jealously traces around its domain. We are then led toward the anonymity of sovereign nature, where our place is nothing more than that of a link without autonomy in the impenetrable cycle of life. Emotion attracts us for, in unbinding us, it gives us the illusion of being liberated; in submitting us to anonymity, like a cog in a mechanism, it seems to open to us a horizon immense because escaping examination.

2. The Emergence of the Subjacent Thread of the Creative Molding

It is remarkable that already in the initial phase, when the debate between the pure mind and the body has hardly been outlined, an unexpected index appears. In effect, its form indicates the manner of its resolution. It is now no longer a debate between the mind and the body taken in their objective forms in the bosom of a mundane conflict. On the contrary, we have since then withdrawn from the objective world and its habitual forms; the world, the body, nature appear as they are experienced by an individual consciousness. We are therefore assisting at an interior drama, at a dialogue of the self with itself, in which the protagonists are reduced to what they represent for consciousness: They are present in their lived qualities.

But what must be noticed most particularly is that the protagonists in this conflict, who seem to be separated by an abyss if one considers the lived qualities they represent, are not at all opposed in a radical way. For the peculiar trait of this form of our debate is that both appear in the field of consciousness, as objects of reflection. That which appears irreconcilable in its mundane forms is not necessarily irreconcilable on another plane.

The debate is possible only because the pure self appears as the harmonious self, source and agent of all organization, of all unity. There is manifestly a link, an underground passage connecting the antagonists who can

one at a time become objects of reflection. If this passage seems buried too deeply under the sedimentations of constitutive consciousness, it can be disclosed in the field of consciousness in conflict. Like a Fate who spins the chain of our destiny from disparate elements, the "harmonious" self produces a threat "whose fine-spun trace is blindly followed." In reality, this thread of the pure self, agent of relation which renders objects translucent, is also what surreptitiously connects the pure self to the natural self. Thus it is the guarantor of a possible commerce. Beneath forms, beneath layers of constituted forms, we are here touching upon the nature of the mind itself. To the extent that this thread is the conductor of a conscious activity, it becomes the guarantor of conscious activities which, in the light of the mind, transform the lived forms of the body, thus the guarantor of a new form of life. Nonetheless, at the heart of the combat, the raptures and retreats, the desires and refusals, the doubts have not at all been detached and annihilated into oblivion. The thread, "whose fine-spun trace blindly followed to this shore" of the flesh, has carefully rejoined them. By it, the two "me's" are bound together and "amid my own arms, I become another. . . ." Always erect, at this second stage of the debate the pure mind surveys a transformed empire, an empire which is not that of "brute" life. For one has escaped nature in its common and fugitive type. This thread leads toward the carnal extreme, but it brings back from it something other than passive submission to the dream, abandoned to the eternal return. The nature which is revealed in us is entirely transformed by the reflection which forms it to its very blooming: It has left behind its inert opacity and its elements, which, when they arise, are already bound by the thread of the mind to the reflective life. It is thus a *nature born in the effort, the supreme effort, of the mind*.

To the dilemma born of the impossibility of creation, the Young Fate has succeeded in finding a solution by adopting a mode of life in which creativity's adversary, conceived in objective terms, is found to be transformed. After her interior conflict, the battle she wages, which is no longer that of a natural existence abandoned to its orders, is revealed to be other than a battle whose stakes would simply be winning or losing. It is on the contrary a struggle in which the loser wins. Of the two apparently distinct terms, neither has proven definitively determined: for in a slow transformation invisible to consciousness the two terms have been transfigured.

This conflict, with its unexpected outcome, outlines the combat of the creative process in a rough draft for us. For, as we speak of consciousness in its discursive function, or in its constitutive function, so we can without

any doubt speak of *consciousness in its creative function*. What essentially characterizes it is that it is borne by a dramatic unfolding: It acts by a conflict, across a dynamic and active dialectic. Far from being a refusal of life, it is placed at life's very heart, not to undermine it, not to explode it or to lead it to defeat, to the inertia of elementary static forms, but to transform it into a complete life, made of games and efforts, consciously directed toward an end which surpasses the established current. The artist, the scholar, the philosopher have often discovered for themselves a tragic existence, like that of Socrates; but without considering that existence as a defeat, they have on the contrary conceived of the creative effort as a means of resolving their own tragedy while contributing to the liberation of humanity.

3. *The Creative Process as a System of Transformation: Sensibility – New Source of Meaning at the Origin of the World*

If creation can reconcile the two extremes – on the one hand the immutable forms founding the identity of that which incessantly evolves, on the other what variability itself is and what each form can only congeal and betray – that action should bear on the whole extent of the conflict. Because it is a question of finding a point of contact between the extremes, we must try to grasp what essentially concerns both. Apart from its secondary aspects, the created work is only a *new opening toward an original experience*: for by its form it blows up the framework of the constituted world, by its content it bursts the provisory limits that consciousness imposed upon forms previously projected.

But it is by sensation that we will find the world again, not at all the Kantian myth of “the world as it is in itself,” but the world as it is projected on the basis of its autonomous laws, and man as he is crystallized in himself in relation to the rules of operation of consciousness in their nascent state.

But exactly what do we mean by “sensation”? The term is one of the most ambiguous, and each current of thought has charged it with different presuppositions. Let us leave to one side the physiological aspect of the problem, however important it may be: The natural sciences study constitutive mechanisms in a particular perspective. That reservation made, it is, we think, appropriate to see in sensation the germ of the human world.

Sensation has been shown, in effect, as laying the foundations of that world, in so far as it is a sensed world, an affective world, a meaningful

world. For our emotions, our sentiments, our value judgments make our world just as much as do the structural lineaments around which are organized the forms of bodies, of other beings, etc. Moreover, just as our affective states, far from being "blind" (that is, qualifiable only by their intensity and their duration) are on the contrary organized, formed by their connection to objects, in sum drawn into the net of objects and the attitude of the feeling subject with regard to them, so the objects and beings which compose in our eyes the world called "objective" – that is, which does not belong to the affective complex of the subject – are never shown to us in their "objectivity" except under the conditions of the psychological laboratory, when we abstract from the natural state in which we see them in ordinary life.

In ordinary life, in effect, objects, structures never appear to us as abstract forms, but always in an affective fullness in which their very form is crystallized. We are not thinking of the apple in its *eidetic* structure – fruit of an affective abstraction – rather we see it as an object of taste, corresponding to our gustatory sensibility, aesthetic sensibility, etc. For the objects of nature, as Bachelard discovered with rare penetration, are neither simple, vital utilities nor abstract structures: They are the correlatives of our emotions, the sensations which we incubate in the depths of our being. Everything is at the same time emotion and form (an entirely academic distinction anyway); everything that man senses has a meaning in relation to the lineaments of the whole, everything he distinguishes is sensed or connected to the sensed. In short, sensation marks the origin of this world which is lived and sensed, but lived in so far as it is meaningful.

From that point on, if we consider sensation as the root of meaning because it makes a world simultaneously sensed and signifying arise in us and around us, then meaning becomes an encounter of the intelligible and the sensible. In the constitutive process, the forms of sensibility seem to be pre-established: Their extent is transmitted to them, imposed by the molds and automatisms of consciousness.

The creative act, on the contrary, reveals itself to be that which institutes new forms of sensibility. Consciousness in its creative function can therefore be considered as a transformer of sensible forms, as a forge of new sensibilities.

Sensation thus understood as a "signifying root" should first of all account for what we are accustomed to consider as relating to the body, to the "sensorial," in short, to the physical.

In reality, if we observe sensibility in its changes of possible forms, it is

manifest that what we call our body is "ours" and "body" only to the extent that we become aware of it by sensation. The most primitive forms of sensation are those most directly linked to our passive being – are precisely those which make the awareness of our body in its articulations arise. The body as hands, head, internal organs becomes "ours" only by the consciousness we have of them as the extent of our sensations, by the mastery we have over the movements of our limbs, by the attention the functioning of our organs demands of us. Our stomach or our liver would never be "ours" except by interference and indirectly – like the parts of a system – if they were not directly manifested, at certain moments of life, by a sensation.

Becoming aware of certain stirrings of our body, of its rhythms and exactions, discloses "nature" to us in certain of its aspects.

At a higher level, sensibility mobilizes more extensive faculties of our being and gives birth to emotion. The latter, which makes us become aware of our natural powers, as for example in erotic emotion, reveals nature to us in its functions and in its works. On all emotive levels, thanks to sensation an entire universe is sketched for us in the objects of our desires, of our judgments, of our joys and our sufferings. For, as Poe noticed so well, the plan of the universe finds its symmetrical replica in the structure of the mind; both meet in sensation. The body is their intermediary: It becomes the measure of the universe, being itself an awareness of the extent of our forces.

To return to our subject, we can only speak of creation if, as we have seen, in transforming the forms of sensibility we enlarge the field of experience, and if, in accomplishing a new crystallization of man, we burst, by new objects, the limits of the constituted world. The creator is on the track of original forms and that pursuit obliges him to begin again the dialogue with diverse aspects of the human being. He cannot hope to reach his goals except by a new synthesis of those aspects, a synthesis which he alone can achieve. Creation is therefore placed at the level of conscious functions, superior to those of sensation as such. However, the process of creation is – we have indicated why and we hope to have demonstrated it concretely – strictly and inevitably bound to the process of transformation of the forms of sensibility and of affectivity; more than that, it is a question of establishing a new relationship between the mind and the body, man and nature, the world, others.

At present it is a matter of showing that the advent of the creative process reverses at once the reality of the life which was, thanks to the auto-

matism of the constitutive process, guaranteed as a foreseeable and established reality, a public place of security and stability. That is because creation totally upsets and remodels the constitutive, stereotypic genesis of the universe by man. At a higher stage, for he provisorily leans upon the constituted world, the creator penetrates into a vertiginous process: before him, an infinity of possibilities, an interminable road of choices. It is a universe that he reconstructs in constructing a limited work. Each station on his road is marked by an act, not by the nearly passive act of the constitutive automatism, but by an act resulting from a choice, that is, an act of will as much as of knowledge. A creative act knows itself, and knowledge is not separated from will nor from action. Thus this progress of conscious transformation becomes a new form of life which englobes natural life and is erected above it.

4. The New Form of Life Being Reborn in Creative Reality

The creative function of consciousness reveals itself to be essentially transformative of that which was pre-given, understanding by "pre-given" here what was already constituted or what ranks in the system of possible constitutions. In effect, in the rebirth to the world, to life, it is a question of the first conditions of sensation, of emotion, of sentiment. The creative conflict has made us penetrate as far as the hidden depths of consciousness, whence arises the possibility of transforming these first conditions. Therefore, it is seemingly behind the scenes of the creative function that we are entering. Let us first specify these universal conditions in opposition to the particular conditions of constitution.

Nature as much as the body, as they are ordinarily understood – that is, when they are not fundamentally grasped in relation to the notice that we take of them – remain brute and mechanical notions. In relation to lived experience, they are endowed with a sense. And this sense is indispensable in order that physical and mechanical concepts not remain empty, like the concept of numbers before one applies them to a qualitative content. Only too much has been said of consciousness as the source of quality. And the effort of the constitutive function is precisely to grasp the world at the instant of its genesis before its forms congeal and are emptied of their lived content. If it is true that life clothes itself with sensed qualities and thus becomes their source for the discursive mind, it should equally be true that "quality" is not identical to "quality."

Already Socrates was intrigued by the interval which separates the physical blow given the foot, whose reaction is no doubt instantaneous,

and the pain felt by us, which we attribute to the blow as to its cause. Such an interval seems necessary to allow the instantaneous reaction of the foot to run across the ensemble of the nervous, physical, and psychic mechanism, to reorganize itself there in order to produce a phenomenon different from that which is purely mechanical – the shock of one body against another – which is attributed to it as its cause. As Heidegger has justly noticed, the most minute sensation, when it arises from the confused pit of functional mechanisms to penetrate into the field of consciousness, already forms a complex.

Moreover, and this goes against the empiricists, it arises not as a witness, spokesman of virgin truths, but in function of reference points already established. M. Piaget has shown us at length how one constructs the framework in which new sensations come to be placed as the work proceeds. However, these reference points are neither entirely subjective – submitted to the rules of the consciousness which must transform them to appropriate them to itself, as lived experience – nor entirely objective – conforming to a world already constituted and exterior to consciousness. They are at the same time one and the other. Constitutive phenomenology has in effect shown that the world is constructed in relation to the consciousness which penetrates it everywhere. From that it follows that the individual destiny of man is the result of his subjective dispositions and of the world he has created for himself. However, as in the process of the constitution of the world, there is a “natural” assimilation, a quasi-automatic organization of the new sensation in comparison with the pre-existing context of the individual world. In the case of poetic creation, the equilibrium is reversed: Each phenomenon of one’s own body which attempts to arise in the field of consciousness passively undergoes a sort of milling, which is opposed to the as yet unqualified spontaneity that it bears with it. There is something astonishing in that.

In effect, whether a landscape not yet seen, a symphony never before heard, or the first song of the birds in springtime brings us something new, or merely comes to be added to the inert mass of our current knowledge, should depend only on our own dispositions at the moment. In certain states of stagnation of the senses and the intellect one believes himself never to see, never to hear, never to read anything new: The world seems forever to have exhausted its resources. Evidently, in the case of constitutive genesis, everything that comes to us by the intermediary of the consciousness of our own body is received automatically as into a mold, itself inert, which plays the role of a screen between the nascent sensation and

the self, ultimate point of reference. This self itself has limited its functions to the automatism of natural constitution and remains hidden behind this mold that it has given itself as screen, thus creating for itself a peacefully formless existence. But the creative conflict scorns that factitious peace: It throws man into a struggle which demands the participation of that which is most specific in him, of that by which he is most essentially himself. Neglecting intermediaries, he should expose himself directly and undertake the combat in plain daylight. For Valéry, the pure self is always an absolute point of reference. And all his work leads back to the search for the laws of the mind, to an exercise which has as its goal to make them disclose themselves or to master them.

Returning to a natural world after having lived apart in an absolute world, this natural world is no longer part, it is other. It is not a passive world, simple place of habitation, but a world which speaks and moves us like an entirely new phenomenon. In reality, the world of art is always so new, so different in comparison to that of natural life, that those who lack a poetic initiation hardly find their way there and must translate it into the terms of the ordinary world.

Would there then be two worlds superposed? The constituted world is entirely of thoughts, of ideas, whereas the artist "speaks" in terms of sensibility.

Would there then be two sensibilities, one ordinary, the other created? Or, in opposition to ordinary sensibility, aren't there as many forms of sensing as there are great artistic movements?

These suppositions are false. There is only one world, and only one life, subject to universal rules. They leave room only for one sensibility: It begins with the awareness of our body which is revealed in our awareness of the forces which animate it. Every life begins only with that. However, counter to the constitutive mechanism which jumbles the paths, there arises the effort, the creative inspiration which returns its active role to the mind, clears the paths, and takes up everything anew. In reality, in Valéry's work, we penetrate to the level where there arises in the field of consciousness a double current of the sensible which becomes a resource for the development of life's phenomena. This new form of life is woven on the basis of a direct commerce between carnal consciousness and activity, on the one hand, and lucid choice and pure mind, on the other. In everything the body has as its point of reference the mind in its absolute lucidity which weighs, chooses, and decides for it. It would be hard to find an expression of ideas more sensual than Valerian poetry. But the most sensual emotions

are not uniquely felt in relation to the natural system obedient to the laws of the eternal return of generation and corruption; the sensation which arises from consciousness of vital forces enters into a less passive and more reflective system. The natural mechanism of constitutive forces is broken up in advance. Sensation is directly related to absolute mind and the latter examines, compares, and chooses anew each time. And sensation is thus found to be introduced into a system where ideas are likewise found, for the mind mixes what is necessarily united in the natural context with what belongs to separate systems. Narcissus is conceived in this mixture.

Related to the world of ideas, the primitive emotions of the body are interiorized, transformed under the hold of reflection and become translucent to the eye of the mind. The other Narcissus speaks to us.

Interiorized, the sentiment of the body retains its savor and its spontaneity. The body is liberated from the objectivating forms which constituting consciousness imposes upon it and is incarnated in other forms, those of the mind. Thus, far from being opposed to the mind, one furnishes it with a body, a place where it can act and be completed. Escaping the hardened schema of "physical" interpretations which sealed it off from the mind, sensation comes to be endowed with attributes the mind has chosen for it. The latter, which is itself thus placed in another context, cannot turn away from it. What in the nascent state was destined to enter into a certain series of the constitutive system is grasped by the mind and led into a series of another order. That order is part of another system, little by little being realized on the plane of the unity of the flesh and of ideas. Each of these systems is governed by its own laws.

The new system, which the mind seems constantly to invent and reinvent, retains nonetheless its filiation with regard to the constitutive system. Even the means of translation from one to the other are preserved, for one and the other are in fact in constant commerce thanks to the magic thread of the mind which runs from end to end across all the systems and all the series.

In this process of transformation every human factor has its own function. The senses find there a double employment, "exterior" and "interior": What one loses to the eye in detaching it from brute "reality," one gains for "inner use," for the "inner eyes." Thus, on the level of creative sensation, the constitutive distinction between what is and what is not vanishes.

An inverse current, that of the "exterior," also collaborates in this transformation. For it is equally at the level of sensation that the interior is incar-

nated in the forms of the real world. The creative effort means the refusal to be bound by the chains of nature in its course, the refusal to be enchained by its laws.

But this bondage which, within the system of nature, is only a natural condition, assumes an entirely different meaning when the poet sees its extension in the human condition. The sentiment, peculiar to man, of being bound by the bonds imposed by the very laws of nature, and of being unable for that reason to take flight with the mind alone, penetrates the opacity of the brute facts of nature and is explicated by them. Thus the facts of nature which appear first of all in a narrow framework are thereby seen to be replaced in a more extensive whole. For this parallelism reserves a place in nature for the mind and thus institutes a universal system in which the natural fact ceases to be a brute fact because it participates in cosmic laws.

Conversely, man ceases to be imprisoned, in his aspirations to flight, by the natural condition as well as by the "unconditional freedom" proper to the mind in its closed circle; these aspirations being found reflected in natural facts, the mind sees itself extended in a series of phenomena no longer directly "brute" but thenceforth cosmic. This series is not in the order of pure subjectivity, it is in an objective order, that of the processes and laws in which the mind as well as nature participate. In being incarnated, the mind throws a bridge across the abyss which separated it from nature. Natural being, like the mind, cannot escape the laws of the cosmos, which limit both in the same sense if not in the same order. Mind and nature are found to be in an analogous situation if we consider both in relation to an ultimate framework which englobes them. A complete communion of the beings of nature is forever impossible. And yet – Plato sensed it – it seems that in the beginning beings were created for a complete communion. But the laws of nature have limited this first grandiose plan which allows itself to be divined by poets.

Like the mind which cannot rise above its own domain, a domain where it can at most penetrate to the bottom of its own creative activity, to the roots of its own functions, so the plane tree can only participate in its own germination, in the passage of its own powers to action. As a natural fact, that sap would only be a mechanical and biochemical operation; but the creator, transporting this creative power into a natural process, transposes both of them into their common framework, that of the universal designs of the cosmos. By incarnating the meanings of his interiority in the natural fact of growth, he gives a soul to a natural being. That soul remains

entirely sensitive but it is raised to a level parallel to his own, to the spiritual level.

Thus, in a first movement, the corporeal is led toward the mind and interiorized by reflection, and in the inverse movement the inwardness of the poet goes toward the natural in its most primitive functions and is incorporated there.

The mind is incarnate in living nature, and finds in its processes and its generative forms a destiny parallel to its own. Thus arises a network of connections, which assigns its place to each phenomenon after having orchestrated all of them in the same symphony, to use the image dear to Leibniz. Living nature and fabricated nature bear the stamp of universal designs and have a role in the cosmic symphony.

In the whole of the universe, the mind could not be content with the separate forms that constitutive consciousness proposes to it; it seeks therefore to establish parallels, correspondences. Symbolism is a manifestation of that creative search. In creative reality we find a complete reality, universally englobing, differentiated by degrees but at the same time entirely unified by sensibility.

Thus, thanks to the creative process, the body, first repulsed, is reconquered. But it reappears in a new system of sensations: In becoming aware of itself, with the aid of reflection, it reconnects the phenomena arising from the "senses" with those of the mind and integrates both into the order of cosmic laws. And, for him who has examined in depth its organization and its mechanisms, it is the body itself which makes its need for extension seen, and that limitation shows that it is born to function in a vaster scheme.

Between these two extremes of mind and body the creative process projects laws which constitute as it were the invisible "loom" on which the possible will come to be woven. Their mysterious presence gives a distant horizon to the new possible forms of human reality.

5. The Encounter of Consciousness and Body in the Creative Function – Inexhaustible Source of Possible Worlds

In the relations of consciousness to the body, within the creative weft, we find the Archimedean point. In itself, consciousness "judges itself to be deeper than the very abyss of animal life and death." Being consumed in its own activities, consciousness rejects in itself the forms of sensibility, the modes according to which connections are made, continuities arise. It discovers, to quote Valéry, "fields of force in which we follow strange circuits

between the poles of fear and desire . . . non-Archimedean realms that defy movement . . . surfaces that cave in. . . ." In itself again it finds "abysses literally of horror, or love, or quietude. . . ." The true matter of these constructions comes from consciousness: It is time. Consciousness sees vibrating and holding together the skeleton and the substance on which "the pattern of this world" comes to be sketched. To the gaze of consciousness which penetrates to these depths, they seem neither real nor unreal. However, while the world thus pierced in the light of day appears to consciousness to be accidental, fragile and so to speak degraded, that separation, if it is sufficiently examined, leads consciousness, which considered "its body" and "its world" as "almost arbitrary restrictions imposed upon the scope of its functions," to rediscover a juncture, a common framework, a remedy to its opposition to the world that it has raised up itself. In effect, there can no longer be any question of the being or non-being of the world and things once one has discovered their crucible; "the wonder is not that things are, but that they are *what* they are, and not something else." For consciousness comes to suspect that all constituted reality is only one actual form among many others. It discovers in itself many more possible solutions, more internal combinations that practical occasions require.

On the other hand, particularizing and particularized constitutive consciousness discovers the necessary mechanisms which prescribe an essentially and universally identical result. That universality is the great privilege of consciousness, for it explains that "so many individual universes can participate in a common, intersubjective world." However, in recognizing itself as author of the world as well as its effect, it is enclosed within the walls of its work, even in projecting beyond that work a closed subjective horizon. It can ask *how* things are as they are (it will answer with its constitutive laws, which made things that way); but in the transcendental system it projects, the question *why* has no sense.

Consciousness, naturally englobed in the world it made arise by engulfing in a perpetual resumption that which renders the world inert and hardened, suddenly understands, in the creative act, that it is the engineer of this world. Moreover, it discovers the elements of its employment, the arsenal of instruments and materials, above all the inexhaustible abundance of architectonic elements and of ideas of planning: It possesses "the secret of inventors." Creative consciousness, while having constructed its own world, "in convinced that things could be *sufficiently* different from what they are without its being *very* different from what it is."

The relationship between the body and the mind is revealed in the

creative function of consciousness as the "Archimedean point" of the world.

How can that be? How can one conceive of a possible world, other than that which is given, if man seems to be alienated not only by brute nature but also by his own means of feeling and conceiving?

To undo one's acquired education in order to arrive at a deep education, this goal as dear to the phenomenologist as to the poet, cannot be attained by just any agent of the mind. What will be the modalities of the relations between mind and body, their respective powers, the modes of their encounter in the creative junction which could explain man's possibility of a choice of universes? For to rediscover the first sources of the world is to find once again what lies beneath the commonplace. But constitutive consciousness, just like discursive intelligence, in undoing their links will finally lead us only to the sources of the experience in its universal form, to the laws of knowledge as a process of the formation of objects, relations, systems, in an abstraction further and further removed from lived experience. Having arrived at these sources, how can one stay there, how reconstruct a world less amorphous and more authentic on the basis of them? All one can do in such conditions is try to reduce intellectual speculation and to be aware of the *arbitrary* character of the objects that one constructs in relation to experience. That is what constitutive phenomenology is employed in doing: It sweeps away prejudices and reconstructs the world, without prejudgments, certainly, but always following universal laws.

But the creator, for his part, is otherwise demanding. To acquire deep education in a positive manner, to reconstruct an authentic world, he has to recognize past faults, find or forge a mode of knowledge not taking him away from its course, and a world which in its very essence would remain vibrant and would refuse to be enclosed in an arbitrary form (lazy solution).

6. *Consciousness: Inventor in Potency*

It is a matter of seeing how, in the mind-body system we have just sketched, consciousness plays the role of an inventor in potency.

It is the mind which, with the body as its instrument, organizes the world and divides it; we grasp the extension, the continuity, the density of beings only by our awareness of our body. Our organs, with their carnal consistency, their pluridimensionality, their functions as instruments, permit us to project an analogous awareness upon the elements furnished by sen-

sations, to organize them in a contexture which, while taking a certain distance with regard to us, remains homogeneous with our awareness of our body. Thus the other beings of nature cease to be separate objects – simple spectacle for intelligence – they become an integral part of our emotive complexes, they constitute a spare universe. While retaining their objective form, they are grasped from within, an inside as vibrant as living consciousness and attached to the same frame of reference as it is. It is a framework which transcends both of them, for it involves the laws of the cosmos. The secret networks of the body and those of the mind open themselves in effect upon these laws, and it is upon this base that they have arisen to be completed. What the ultimate designs are, even the architect Eupalinos does not know. Only one thing seems sure: *Consciousness in the creative function in its intimate interplay with the body, is not only an engineer limited by its plans, it is not enclosed by necessity, it disposes of its own resources not yet utilized and perhaps inexhaustible.* From a certain angle, it appears as an *inventor in potency.*

IV. IMAGINATIO CREATRIX AS THE AGENCY OF THE NEW WORLD

A question arises concerning the source of this remolding of experience. Apart from imagination, what other origin is there to the novelty and originality of the progressive transformation of the mind/body interplay at the level of the originary shaping of sensation? What we call “inspiration” has its source in the work of imagination. Following the unfolding of the creative advance of the new creative orchestration as its indispensable and central factor, we see that it proceeds from the revolt against the given world and by an initial, critical scrutiny of its forms. As we have shown elsewhere, imagination is triggered by the process itself. The dismembering of the elements of old molds of experience inherited from the already well set trend of the constitutive genesis of the *life-world* and ourselves within it serves as the groundwork of the creative quest.

This quest, after a new form to give to the Real, advances then, comparing, contrasting and associating anew the elements which now, freed from the congenital contexts, float in a void. It is the vision of this new form on the horizon – one which provides an orientation for the artists, inventors and writers – that serves as a point of reference for the initial discriminative process. However, the vision serves merely as a postulate of renovation, a demand imposed upon our innermost quest to seek for the unprecedented and original forms. Whereas its initial impulse

animates this quest, alerts our faculties, mobilizes our powers and elicits from their initial turmoil, a new weaving loom, a projection of a new thread among the creator's faculties and conditions, finally a new inspiration and horizon of possibilities.

It is not a specific faculty of man; nor is it – as Husserl would believe – one of the functions of memory which unfolds infinite variations of the range of possibles, their fall under the rule of an eidetic structure. Again, what then, offers the horizon of possible new forms, which to be radically new have to stem from beyond the jurisdiction of the universal rules of the ever-recurring constitutive categories?

It is not an independent factor spinning artificial universes, as Sartre would have it. Instead, it is on the one hand a resultant of the complete functioning of man. On the other hand, it emerges from their intimate interplay with the forces and principles of the natural reality in which the *life-world* is founded. *Imaginatio Creatrix* draws upon and takes both into account, while leaving illusion aside; it deals therefore with existing reality. However, enlisted in the service of the quest after a new and original, unprecedented and unique form to give to the world, life and the creator himself, the complete system of the human operation acquires a novel type of orchestration. *Imaginatio Creatrix* emerges from this new orchestration progressively, shaping itself in response to the ever-new demands put on it by the progressing search.

In its own emergence and work, *Imaginatio Creatrix* draws upon all functional agencies of the creator and in turn, it imposes on each of them a specific task, thus drawing it into its service: its fruit are the new forms that appear in hazy outlines and are proposed to the creative agent for consideration, transformation, selection in the process of the search. The glimmering outlines or glimpses of new forms are chiefly due to the generative virtualities of associative moments of the dismembered elements themselves. And yet in contrast to the passive coalescence or interpretation of the constitutive association only penetrated by the complex system of imagination, they appear in the full richness of otherwise hidden, evocative virtualities. Contrasted and confronted with the postulates of the dimly outlined vision, they become the ground upon which the inner eye of imagination invents myriads of possibilities to be scrutinized by the creative agent himself.

We have outlined our conception of the *Imaginatio Creatrix* elsewhere and shall return to it in our subsequent research. At this point it is sufficient to emphasize, as mentioned above, that it draws upon not only

the complete range of man's resources down to the subliminal and archetypal realms of his natural condition, but that it is partly checked and partly also stimulated and inspired by the complex network of the creative process of which it is the pivotal factor in its three constructive phases: the *initial*, the *inward* and the *transitional phase*. The creative vision marking the origin of the process and presiding over its complete course while being progressively crystallized into an object is the guiding star. Whereas, in each of the otherwise closely knit phases, emphasis falls upon a working out a different specific functional segment of the creative process.

Indeed, the roots in reality of the *Imaginatio Creatrix* are also definitively established by its concern – with the created object intended to enter into the *life-world*. It is the last phase of the creative process, that of transition (*techne*) which by its restrictive rules upon the seemingly undefinable freedom of *Imaginatio Creatrix*, as well as by its inspiration, counterbalances this seemingly unlimited freedom of possibilities.

The direct aim of the creative process is an object (poem, painting, monument, play, scientific theory, etc.) in which the vision of the new human universe is supposed to be crystallized. On the one hand, in its origin, it is drawing on the creative orchestration of the human functioning in the “inward phase” of the process in order to acquire an outline of a formal structure; while on the other hand, this form takes “body” in the last phase of the process, encroaching upon the previous one, but prolonging it in one way, namely, in the phase in which the creative planning makes the deliberate transition into construction of the object by concrete means. These two phases are intertwined almost from the beginning and yet they may be distinguished with respect to different emphasis to be put first, upon the conscious inward process and, secondly, upon the physical embodiment of the intentionally devised project.

After having attempted, in the first part of the present study, to sketch the roots of the creative activity in the mind-body territory, in the phase of the creative inwardness, we will now briefly outline the extension of its progress into the constituted real world and its regulations and principles, that is, in the phase of transition to the *life-world*.

Techne: Style, Artistry, Skill, Movement

a) *Style as element of transition*. Style is not merely a specific feature of the use which we may make of language, colors, shapes, tones, behavior, appearance, etc. The essential function of style behind which it should remain unobserved, is to serve to an object as a specific mode of self-

presentation. However, style refers not only to the intent of the presentation but also to the means and operations by which this presentation is accomplished. That is to say, style lies on the borderline between the nature of the presented object and the way or "technique" in which this object may be presented.

The inscrutable personality of Mona Lisa as a work of Art is considerably due to a mode of presentation; the unique completeness of the mode of presentation in which minute and in themselves imperceptible moments in the expression of the woman's eyes, in the inclination of the neck, in the leaning of the hand are brought to a most concentrated intensity of expression in her smile. A smile for which no precise movement of the lips or detectable sparkle in the eyes could account, but is the result of an expressive synthesis not only dense but also guided by a specific intent. 'Style' may be called this mode of presentation according to an intent: as the swanlike bend of the neck of the ballerina – which may give a unique type of expression, a unique feature to a dancer, seen as a "work of Art" – is certainly the result of endlessly practiced movements, selected for the sake of this specific intent, so in general the style as made of presentation is grounded in skill and artistry. Infinitely repeated, these movements are coalescing, harmonizing with one another, being polished till beyond its level of the physical exercise of the muscles or of the dance as such, and yet reaching above it, this unique line of the posture is acquired. This style in which the ballerina presents herself, *her* style, is created in order to convey the essence of the message of *her* dance. Thus, it appears that the style is invented together with the creation of the artistic object itself and is subservient to the aim of evoking from the object its innermost secret for the sake of which it is created.

Simultaneously, however, it commands as well as depends upon the skill and artistry of its production.

b) *Artistry, skillfulness.* Already, in an inward phase of the creative process, envisaging the projected form of the *Real*, occurs the decision about the type of object in which it has to be incarnated. To choose the objective form of a poem involves the material medium of language in which it is to be incarnated: of a painting, it is the canvas, paints, brushes, etc. which have to be considered; in architecture, the building material, site, ground, purpose, etc., in scientific theory, the relationship to the reality which it is supposed to construct in its own way, etc. In other words, each of these choices implies a set of specific conditions, which have to be

considered in the plan of the created work in order to crystallize the new vision of the *Real* in these general types of objects.

A twofold set of conditions has to be fulfilled in the transition-planning of the object. First, a relationship between the condition prescribed by the working material to sustain the vision in a concrete realization and the projected vision itself. The way in which this vision is to be conveyed to the recipient of the work of creation should not be betrayed by the nature of the objective form in which it will take shape. The conditions imposed by the material factors of this crystallization and the objective principles have to be carefully weighed and fulfilled.

Secondly, the conditions, categorial regulative principles of the constitutive genesis carrying the objective *life-world* into which the object is destined to break in, have to be taken fully into account.

It is then the whole chain of *interwoven creative operations and activities* which enters into play to accomplish the transition from the *inward* quest after an authentic form and its *outward* incarnation.

Style, artistry and skillfulness, form one of the three pivotal phase-segments of the operative thread running through the creative orchestration of the human functioning as it unfolds emerging from the anonymous springs of Nature on the one side, and inscribing its vision in a specific interpretation within the intersubjective world of life, on the other. Indeed, in order to invent, select and develop the appropriate style, the creative orchestration, of which the creative agent is the center, has to transmute the natural, constitutive line of the stereotyped human functioning into one appropriate for the purpose.

In fact, the trial-and-error procedure by which, as it appears in a direct observation, the artist, inventor or scientist seeks to adjust his projects to his construction material, on the one hand, and to his instrumental means on the other hand, is an expression of an in-depth probing of the principles and virtualities of the elementary Nature which prescribe the range of ways in which the material may be handled, manipulated and utilized as physical supports for the projected outline, but foremostly of its hidden resources for the molding of the form itself. The revelation of these hidden resources offers inventive stimulation for the creative quest. On investigation of the constitutive rules and principles of the *life-world* which have to be taken into consideration in the incarnation of the creative project, we also find constraint and stimulation for imagination. And yet, in the scrutiny and selection of both the creative intent (guided by the transcendental élan of the vision) has an essential role to play.

Style brings together essentially both: the nature of the intent on the one side, and the artistry and skill of the artist as the maker constructing the creative object on the other side. To invent the uniquely fitting style, to convey the creative vision in its transcending élan by means of the object to be constructed, is the significance of the essential segment of the creative process, namely, of the passage from the inward to the outward stage of the execution of the project.

Artistry is the expression of both: of the originality of the creative object and of the transmutation of the anonymous system of human operations into the unique and unprecedented *style* most appropriate for the purpose.

Style and artistry appear, then, as invented along with the invention of the originating creative work.

They represent the thread of unity which the creative process maintains between its two extreme poles: the *subliminal* realm of the creator and the *universal condition of the constituted world*. The choice of the style entails considerably the nature of the artistry and inversely, their selection pertains as much to the nature of the created object as to its actual constructing: that is to the "physical" means and operations of the creator as maker of an object, according to the means offered by and postulates raised by the real world.

Their role in the progress of the active making relies essentially upon the "skillfulness" of the maker. The type of this skillfulness is postulated by the qualitative aspects of both, the object and its making. This issue leads directly to the problem of "making" usually reduced to the notion of a physical chain-action and that of the movement as its vehicle. Its inner, pre-constitutive springs, have to be retrieved.

Style and the artistry are invented simultaneously with the development of the "skill." The artist, scientist, inventor, dealing with both his inward project and the material for its incarnation, has to be able to transform his already established, set ways of manipulating; it has to be transmuted according to the stimuli on the one extreme and limitation on the other extreme. Skillfulness in his physical dealing with the construction material, indispensable to the development of the creator's endeavors, draws upon the complete scheme of invention in order to accomplish the transformation of the working means of the creator. However, once attained, it consists in repetition. Once acquired, the skill of the creative agent in the execution of his project becomes as automatized as the procedures of the constitutive genesis of the natural man within his *life-world*.

c) *Skill and movement*. Reinach and Edith Stein after him, have distinguished between the mechanical and the lived movement. In the lived movement we are in various ways, more or less conscious, solidary with our own body. The mechanical movement would be the motion of inanimate organic elements. They lack consciousness, life, intrinsic force, and yet they "move".

This distinction corresponds to that between our body as experienced and our body as an anonymous agency on the one side, and the strictly organic movements which might take place within it while they take place simultaneously in the circumbiant Nature on the other side. Is there any link between them that we might retrieve in our phenomenological discourse?

We propose, indeed, that this crucial link can be retrieved as a continuing segment of the transitional thread of the creative process. It is the essential relationship between the skill and movement that projects this thread, and the movement is a hook by which we may plunge into the springs of nature and bring to the surface its innermost virtualities.

In point of fact, our hands, our eyes, our legs, the major instruments of our intended movements, are known to us as parts of our "body as experienced," and furthermore, as bodily "instruments of experience". We know from the extensive studies of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty how extremely complex is the shaping of each of the movement in order that it may occur. Moreover, these studies have also shown how complex is the network of our experiencing them as "instruments" of experience.

And yet the movements that we know as such, we know in the form of a specific organisation of our complete system of functioning. In their complexity, their elements are selected for composition to fall into the pattern of the constitutive system subservient to the natural progress of life within the *life-world*. Thus, movement as we observe and analyse it, is in itself nothing elementary nor originary; we may decompose it in myriads of kinesthetic moments, and yet we deal still with the pattern of the stereotyped constitutive schema. Hence it falls so harmoniously into the automatized routes of life that we are not aware of the intricate steps that lead to its occurrence.

In the effort to adjust the movement of the hand, of the eyes, legs, etc. to the exigencies of the particular type of skill that the artist, writer, inventor attempts to acquire, this pattern of the already established mobility of our "bodily instruments" has to be broken to pieces. We have to disintegrate its current components in order to seek for other ones that could compose

together into a type of movement in which the expected skill is incarnated. In short, we invent the movement of our body.

Disintegrating the complexity of the automatized movements, we do not plunge into a void. As of a sudden behind the scattered dynamic moments, discarded as useless, we discover within our own organic system the mute presence of new virtualities to draw upon. In the half light of awareness, by trial and error we immerse our experienced bodily instruments into a contact with the mute virtualities of the inexperienced body. From this contact, we draw to the half-light of awareness virtualities of Nature itself. In fact, by seeking the appropriate line of contact with the organic virtualities of our body, we also investigate by means of our virtual operations, the virtualities of motion as such.

Although we cannot draw to the surface of conscious awareness the mute virtualities of mobility and yet in our process of probing into them, not with a searching eye but *with operations seeking a contact with natural sources*, we bring out these virtualities *in the transformation of the movement* as such. The created movement of our hand, eyes, legs, arms, in order to have acquired the skill prescribed by the style of the created work, holds tight to the virtualities of the mobility of Nature, *condition of every motion*. Moreover, it keeps it bound to the creative thread.

Concluding with this succinct analysis our lengthy inquiry, we might state that the thread of the creative activity brings together the complete network of Nature's virtualities. In its inventive role the creative function of the human being may decide about man's life, human destiny and his *possible worlds*.

NOTES

¹Cf. the article by the present writer, 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl - The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology', *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. IV, pp. 241-418.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*

COMPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

ASSOCIATION

This study intends to determine the relationship between intentionality and association. Association is not simply a concept belonging to psychophysics; I will offer a personal idea about how it works. I will argue that the intentional conception of the mind propounded by Husserl does not supersede an associationist conception of the mind's functioning.

I will examine their relationship with special reference to language. But intentionality functions beyond the narrow zone of linguistic behavior – and I think association does too.

I. THE FORMS OF RECOGNITION

The act of recognition can have three forms: it can be an act of identification, a process of association, or a dissociative recognition of simple alterity.

1. *Identification Synthesis*

Something is identified in the shifting flux of patterns presented by the sensibility when a succession of sensuous patterns – differentiated in spatial position and layout, in quality and in intensity, staggered across time – are taken specifically as the manifestation of one object. This operation effects a synthesis of a diversity of sensory data.

And this active mental performance gives us the experience of being in the presence of an object which transcends us. By taking each new appearance as a manifestation of one and the same thing, the mind maintains itself directed toward one selfsame term as the seconds pass, as the sensory patterns about it shift, metamorphose, pass. In this way the mind comes to experience itself to be not just in the presence of phosphorescent patterns which pass as it passes, and are thus correlates of the phases of itself, but rather in the presence of terms that transcend the moment, that endure, that are more than any sense pattern affecting the mind at the moment – objects. It is in this sense that we can speak of the mind – which here is understood not at all substantively, but just functionally – as having a

directedness. It contracts a directedness in the sense that it maintains before itself one selfsame term as the appearances disperse in space and in time.

Husserl originally understood intentionality, that is, the operation by which the mind relates itself to objects, to be this operation. Intentionality is active identification. The mind constitutes objects for itself from sensory data not by a hylomorphic, or formative, operation, but by a hermeneutic operation.

For synthesis is not just coagulation, or material assemblage; it is unification in function of meaning. The relation between the given sensory appearances and the object they manifest is not a relation between parts and a whole; it is a relation between diverse sensuous data and what those data are taken to manifest. The object itself, then, is what these sensory data mean to me. It is the sense or essence or meaning of these appearances.

The object is a term that transcends the particularity of the momentary sensory patterns, since they all manifest it. It is a constant or an invariant which subsists while the sensory patterns fluctuate. It is not itself strictly speaking given sensorially; it is the identity pole in terms of which the sensory appearances are synthesized.

While it does not, then, exist in just a time and in just a place, is transtemporal and transspatial, that does not mean that it exists and is discerned in another register than that of succession and simultaneity which orders the sensorial phenomena. It is not positively present in an inextension and an eternity; rather it exists and is present by recurrence in the very order of succession and simultaneity. Recurrent, reiterated, repeatable, re-presentable, it is in this way transtemporal rather than eternal, transspatial rather than inextended.

Universal and ideal, re-presentable, it functions to identify not only an object in a flux of sensible patterns, but a series of objects of the same distinctive characteristics.

This kind of term, then, not strictly speaking sensory but intelligible, is not given to but posited by the mind. And thus we can say that identification is an operation that constitutes the objects it recognizes.

2. Associational Synopsis

But this kind of account – which invokes the classical, metaphysical, ultimately Platonic distinction between the sensible and the intelligible – does not by itself render intelligible the emergence of recognizable objects

in perception. For if the unity of a sequence of sensory appearances is not given to put posited by the mind, how account for the segregation, or the selection, of any particular multiplicity of appearances in the sensory continuum for synthetization rather than any others? And if the intelligible identity of things is posited by the mind, how account for the emergence, or the selection, of one identity rather than another in any particular instance?

Before, then, explicit identification can take place, it is necessary that a certain sequence of sensory appearances disengage themselves from the rest and stand out in relief. And they must be linked together not by spatio-temporal contiguity only, but by immanent coherence, for even when their sequence is interrupted they can be perceived to belong together.

The identifiable unity of a sensible pattern is then not a factor purely and simply posited by the mind, by fiat, to segregate something in a continuous flux of sensory data or assemble a drifting medley of sensations. The sensory appearances are already associated before they are identified. As they emerge they associate. A continual associational synthesis, or better, synopsis, assembles elements belonging to the different registers of sensoriality (visible, sonorous, pressure, etc.) and segregates them into inter-sensorial patterns. Within the associated set the presence of each sensory element reinforces the others, brings out more strongly the contours and force of the others.

What is the nature of this associational synopsis? Perceptual patterns have not only cohesion but also coherence; they are not only assemblages but also syntheses; the sensuous elements composing them have not only tone, quality and intensity but also vectoriality, reference, or sense. The sensible field is not a plane of qualitative elements poised statically before us; each sensory element comes oriented, and affects us "from a certain angle" and as a moment of a system of phenomenal tensions. I wish to distinguish this "vectorial sense" from "ideal meaning"; this distinction is the objectal counterpart to our distinction between associational synopsis and identification synthesis. The meaning classically understood to be involved in objects constituted by what I have named identification synthesis was in fact conceived after the model of purely conceptual or linguistic meanings, which were taken to be quite transcendent to the different verbal expressions which could designate them (e.g., in the vocabularies of different languages), and are then said to be intelligible, univocal and self-identical, recurring ever the same, ideal. The "sense" intrinsic to sensory data is the perceptible way each element refers to other

sensory elements, fits in with them, mirrors their structure, leads to them or contrasts with them. This *vectorial sense* is not a factor extrinsic to and separable from the sensuous tone of the perceived data; it is perceived with and in the red, the warm, the coarse, the acute, the vibrant; it bears the sensuous quality and gives it its position, force and intensity. Where there is a perceptual unit, a gestalt, each element of the pattern perceptibly fits in with the others and contrasts with what is perceived as exterior to it, as setting or background. This kind of referentiality gives a sensorial pattern not only formal internal properties such as closure, cohesion, compactness, balance, imbalance, simplicity, complexity, but also intrinsic relatedness to the structures external to it in the positive modes of potentiality or pregnancy (instrumentality, utility), obstruction or resistance, attraction and support (the perceived things are not only in the static relations of spatial coexistence with each other, but also in dynamic relationship, in phenomenal relations of force).

It also gives a sensible pattern lateral relations of kinship with a series of like forms. As by a sort of continual reciprocal induction each member of an associated sequence of patterns confirms and contrasts with, brings out more strongly the contours and force of, the others. Our perception thus does not present us with ever new masses of sense data to be assembled and identified anew, but with sequences of forms that come as variants of one another.

There is, then, an internal association of elements within a thing perceived as a gestalt, by which each sensible element fits in with and refers to the others, and an external association among individuals perceived as variants of one another. In the first case, each element within the gestalt retains a relative individuality due to its differentiated tone or sensuous quality and spatial separation from the others – a spatial separation itself revealed by the differentiated sensuous tone and the functional vectors discerned there. In the second case each individual gestalt in the series retains its individuality due to relations of contrast with the variant of itself, and due to gestalts of another sort intervening between the members of the associated series.

Just how does association operate? Association is not, as empiricism supposed, a sort of physical or psychic attraction due to spatiotemporal contiguity or similarity, since associated patterns have not only cohesion but also coherence; it is due to a synthesizing, or, better, synopsizing, operation on the phenomenal plane (since perceptual patterns are not units materially, or physicochemically, speaking). But this synopsis does

not originate in an initiative of the mind spontaneously positing an ideal nuclear essence and taking the sensory elements that are given as tokens or signs of that essence. I propose rather that associative synopsis works by *instituting* a sensory form which has not been posited or projected by the mind, but received in an act of focusing of the sensibility – and discerning subsequent structures not “along with” but “according to” that one, without analytically seeing them as partly the same, partly different. The instituted datum, then, not only makes an impact in the *hic et nunc*; it provokes an adjustment in the sensibility which persists. The mind is then not only affected by it; it is “led by” it.

By the “institution” of sensory form that once passed before the sensibility I mean then a retention of it in such a way that it functions subsequently as a sensory type or schema, and no longer as a particular. Institution is not the simple persistence of an afterimage of an individual appearance in the mind (by which empiricism sought to explain associational unity without recourse to conceptual factors, to universals). What we once looked at we now no longer can look at, but look according to. To retain a sensory form specifically as a type or scheme is neither to abstract from it its intelligible essence nor to perceive it again in superposition on a subsequent particular form. Through institution sensible structures become sensible schemata points become pivots, lines become levels, patterns become perspectives, forms become dimensions¹ – and, already, elements become vectors, sense data acquire sense, that is, vectoriality or reference. The instituted form functions like the dominant note in a melody which is not really heard anew each time, nor recalled, but is there in that the succeeding individual notes that are heard are heard with the pitch, the tensions, the force that particularizes them in the function of the degree to which they diverge from the dominant. Or it functions like the light, whose own color is not seen, but is operative in that the illuminated surfaces get their chromatic tone, opacity and force from the degree to which they diverge from the color of the light.² In this sense what we hear we hear with the dominant, what we see we see according to the light. And it is in this sense that the structures once perceived become schemata according to which we perceive subsequent structures; to perceive a sensory form then is not to actively assemble disparate sensory elements; it is to discriminate a contrast or a relief along the levels or dimensions according to which we look and listen and explore tactually. An individual sensory form owes its individuality to the contrast, the divergency it makes with the instituted forms, become levels and

dimensions; its very individuality then appears as a variant of prior forms. To institute a level or scheme is different from positing an ideal universal; it begins not in spontaneity but in adjustment: here the mind does not simply give itself its own directedness (to an object), i.e., contract its intentionality of itself.

Thus within an object each element is itself perceived and is that according to which the other elements are perceived, and each object once perceived becomes that according to which subsequent objects are perceived. And thus a succession of sensible forms are experienced as a family of variants, without our having conceived – projected and retained constant – their ideal model or nuclear essence.

I am, as can be seen, taking the discernment of the contrast, the divergency, as an unanalyzed molar act, like Whitehead does, such that here perceiving difference is not reducible to seeing forms as partly the same, partly not the same. I distinguish between perceiving difference in the sense of different instances and perceiving difference in the sense of divergent variants. That difference then is not reducible to identity and non-identity, and consequently that perceiving a differentiation is not necessarily reducible to discerning in each member of a class one selfsame nuclear element, or class characteristic, is the underlying metaphysical principle involved here. Logically, I might also explain that if object-recognition is a sort of prelinguistic proposition, the intentionality theory takes the predicative proposition to be primary, whereas associationism would take the relational proposition to be primary.

* * * * *

I distinguish, then, the associational unity of a sensible thing from its ideal identity, and associational sequences of things perceived as variants of one another from classes of objects identified by their ideal essence. Identification synthesis is a true constitution of an object in function of an intelligible or conceptual term which transcends the sensory order, and it operates as a perceptual interpretation of the sensory in function of an ideal term; associational synopsis proceeds by institution and contrast of sensory forms. Here the unity of a sequence of appearances is not due to a conceptual term posited by the mind itself, but is due to the institution of sensory forms by a sort of dimensionalizing sensible memory, a dimensionalizing retention which focuses and orients the perceiving. In identification synthesis each sensory appearance is taken as evidence of one and the same meant term; the synthesis then is vertical, each sensory pattern linked to the next as so many parallel manifestations of an identity that

transcends them and transcends the sensible order. In associational synopsis the synopsis is effected laterally, for each appearance is perceived as a variant of a prior one, contracting its sense by an enmeshing or mutual induction of vectors.

How are identification and association related? The classical analysis held that one could not see one appearance as a variant of a prior one unless the identity of each were already disengaged, and that this occurs when an active initiative of the mind takes each of the dissimilar appearances as a sign indicating the same identity term. But the appearances must already be associated and be seen as variants of one another if each is to be taken as a parallel token of the posited identity. The assimilating perception precedes active identification.

And it makes the operation of identification synthesis intelligible. For we now understand how a particular multiplicity of sensory appearances is disengaged to figure as one sequence; their unity is not first constituted by the identifying operation itself. And we can understand too how the ideal term each sensory appearance is taken to manifest is produced by the mind that posits it; the ideal invariant structure used as a principle of identification is a conceptualization, a conceptual and idealized expression, of a structural unity already immanent in the differential of sensory forms.

(The exact character of this founding relationship of the identification synthesis on the associational synopsis raises further questions: (1) Just what does it mean to conceptualize a form of sensible coherence and cohesion? This is the problem of conceptualization, of idealization, or "abstraction." It involves the question whether language is not the necessary instrument of the idealization that yields identity terms. (2) What intrinsic internal modifications does a sensible unity undergo when it is transposed to the conceptual plane? This is the problem of identification as simplification, a problem formulated by Nietzsche, and, in another context, by Whitehead.)

3. *The Recognition of Simple Alterity*

There are in the world not only signs of the same, of identity, and gradations of difference, but also traces of what is simply other, traces of alterity. There are in the world moments of pure rapture, of an eruption of the strange, the uncanny, the utterly unfamiliar, the purely alien.

Simple alterity could make an impact in the world, where all forms come in sequences, series, families, only as a disturbance.³ Simple alterity

comes to disrupt the succession of instances of the same, the gradations of similarity and difference; it comes to disrupt vectorial interrelationship and meaning, it disturbs order. It is a pure disturbance – not the insertion of another order.

As a pure disturbance, it is an absence. Alterity is not something that is presented; but: what disrupts the continuity of presence. Here absence is not simply an intentional modification of presence, destined to presence or retained as it passes, not simple presence deferred. It is what is not destined to be presented and represented; it is ever absent, always already past.

But at the same time alterity, the uncanny, the utterly alien, manifests itself. It leaves traces. A trace, in the pure sense I would like to use the term, and for which I am indebted to Levinas,⁴ does not signify something, nor indicate something: it neither expresses some meaning nor indicates some thing. It marks the passing of what passes without becoming present or representable. It is that by which the passing of what passed disturbs the present, without integrating itself into the order of the present. And for him who comes upon them, traces will not express anything or indicate anything. They will be just the loci at which an order has been disturbed. They just point to a passing, a leaving, a departure, that wanted to part irrevocably. They are just the traces by which he senses something uncanny, something strange, something unfamiliar here, not lurking, not imminent, not about to present itself, and not representable, conceivable, re-presentable, but passed on without undoing its incognito.

How is the strange, the simply alien, simple alterity, recognized? It is not a comprehension in function of a term. The recognition of the strange is not a movement from the trace to some recurrently present, or re-presentable term, but a movement from the trace toward the recurrent absence of a term. In this sense it is not a con-ception, a com-prehension. Its nature has been determined by Heidegger in particular as anxiety. Anxiety is first of all the experience of being disturbed – oneself. Here the core of the recognition of the sense of the uncanny, does not lie in a *Setzung*, an active positing of a term by the mind in a synthesizing initiative, but rather in a being-disposed, a being “thrown,” a dis-orientation, an interruption of activity, an undoing of initiative. Yet not purely and simply: since there is no recognition of the uncanny unless the mind continues to project itself, of itself, beyond, into the void, into the outer darkness, beyond the present, presented world.

In every case recognition was a combination of receptivity and activity. In the purest case of identification, receptivity tends to become passivity,

and activity tends to become spontaneity: on the occasion of the presentation of a sensory manifold, the mind posits an identity term by its own spontaneous initiative. The two correspond, it was said, as matter and form, passive and active, sensory and ideal. In the case of associational recognition, the receptivity and the activity tend to merge: the unity-form the mind maintains in its experience is in fact a sensory form it has received, because to receive it it actively focused in on, adjusted itself to, that form. Its activity consists in an institution of a received form, and not in a spontaneous positing of a form. In both these cases the recognition is cognitive because it is re-presentational. But in other kinds of recognition, the activity can consist in non-re-presentational adjustments or responses.

Consider for example the exercise of skills, of games for example. In making a move in a game, the player's recognition of the move his partner makes is one with, and not prior to, the response he makes to it, and which is a systematically corresponding movement, thus an active adjustment to it, but reversed. Yet this recognition of what the partner is doing need not involve having first identified, or even being able to identify the movement to which one responds, its essential and juridical structure that makes it an instance of a rule-governed act. There is set up from the first a certain kind of correspondence-situation: I face my partner, and counter him massively and systematically across the instrumental field of a tennis court. The subsequent development of the game consists in so many specifications of that countering. In a similar sense recognizing what illocutionary move was made in a language game, where all the moves are in fact rule-governed, does not require or presuppose a representational recognition of the rule of which that move was an instance.

Thus there are forms of recognition that are not representational, whose active dimensions do not consist in the re-presentation of a form that passes, but in some other kind of response, of adjustment or counter-adjustment. And so the recognition of alterity should not be just negatively defined, as a case where the cognitive intentionality of the mind is thwarted by the absence of nonrepresentability of a term, where the differentiating discernment of the mind is frustrated by an extreme dissociation of phenomenal forms. It is first a heightening of attention – not, then, an act of identification simple, but also not a negation of cognition. What provokes attention, and even cognitive attention, is especially the strange. Attention is not only contracting a directedness with regard to a term one maintains constant for one's mind; it may also be turned to a term that absents itself from a given locus. Attention can subsequently develop into

complex modalities of response – on the emotional level; even Heidegger says that the sense of the uncanny matures from the negative moment of anxiety, pure dis-orientation, to the supremely positive procedures of inquiry and of the resolute form of action in the presented world. Probably the concrete forms of the responsive adjustment that recognizes alterity vary with the register in which it makes its eruption – emotional or affective, practical, ethical, religious.

II. EXPRESSIONS, INDICES, TRACES

In Part II of this paper, I would like to examine these three types of recognition as they operate in the register of language. In this I think we retrace the ideal genesis of, the philosophical origin of, the theories of recognition, for, from Plato to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, the theory of what it means to recognize things in the world is developed out of a theory of what it means to recognize words, such that it is as though for philosophers the world were taken as a book whose meaning we read off.

1. *The Identification of Signs*

This, in any case, is particularly clear in Husserl. The theory of intentionality was first contrived by Husserl, in the *Logical Investigations*, to explain what it means to use and to understand linguistic signs. It explains what happens when we take linguistic signs as meaningful. Subsequently Husserl contrived a new theory of perception, understanding perception intentionally, to be essentially a matter of the mind taking its sensations to be signs, taking hyletic data, sensations in us, to mean the presence of things outside of us. Thus the phenomenological theory of perception is derivative of the phenomenological theory of signs, which, in the *Logical Investigations*, is first of all cast as a theory of linguistic signs. And in as late a text as the *Cartesian Meditations*,⁵ and apropos of perception, Husserl declares that the fundamental form of intentionality is identification.

Intentionality is sometimes described in reifying terminology as a tending of the mind to something; but this movement is a purely ideal movement from the sensible to the intelligible, a metaphysical movement. It is an act positing an ideal identity term, the meaning, and taking the sensible form – a fragment of sound uttered or the visible mark seen on paper

– as referring to that term. Intentionality operates on two levels to produce language: first, I take a number of different sensible forms – different sounds uttered, different visual marks (and they are always different: no one can utter the sound “justice” or “cat” exactly the same twice) – I take the different sensible sounds or visual marks to be ideally the same. That gives me the “word.” The word “justice” as a linguistic signifier is not exactly that very sound I just uttered or mark I just inscribed, but the ideal identity of every sound anyone utters or writes conventionally taken to be “the same” as that one. Second, I take this idealized sensible form to refer to a purely ideal identity, recurrent ever the same, which is the meaning. By doing that I constitute the idealized sounds and visual marks as signs. Thus the operation of understanding language is intentionality defined as what I have named here an identification synthesis, and it is an ideal positing of meanings, a *Sinngebung*, a sense-ascription, and a veritable constitution of linguistic signs *as* signs.

Association and identification. While this theory furnishes an explanation as to why linguistic signs are meaningful, it does not explain, and indeed precludes understanding, how linguistic signs could communicate meaning from one mind to another. And in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl explicitly excludes the communicative function of linguistic signs as inessential, and derivative of their object-referring function. One could perhaps understand, in Husserlian terms, how I end up assigning to the linguistic signs the selfsame meanings other speakers of the linguistic community assign to them by some supplementary theory of a social contract involved in entering into linguistic usage. But one no longer understands how I could strictly speaking learn something from the speech of others: how the linguistic signs presented to me could induce in me meanings that are not already constituted in me. For that we need, I think, an associational theory of synthesis. Associational synopsis precedes the identification of the signs, and makes it possible and intelligible.

There are, to be sure, certain language games, ideal sign-systems, in which the meanings of the terms are indeed assigned to them by identification, and their utilization by different users does not give rise to any further supplement of meaning. I think the associational theory is required rather for so-called natural languages, where conversation gives rise to a veritable induction of meaning.

The starting point for such an associational theory is a vectorial conception of meaning, prior to an ideal conception of meaning. There

must be a type of meaning, or sense, which is already in the sensory data, in the sensible configurations of the linguistic signifiers which we perceive when we look and listen, and is not a factor extrinsic to and separable from their sensuous presence, and consequently does not originate in a different faculty. This vectorial sense will be defined as the perceptible ways the sensible elements of the linguistic substance refer to one another, contrast with, fit in with or lead to, or mirror one another. Thus a piece of speech forms a sensible fabric with its inner articulation, its contrasts, its tempo, its recurrences, its rhythms, its particular style. And there is a first sense of the words which is perceived in the style of the sensible fabric of which it is composed – one perceives a certain articulation, a certain movement presented. To perceive the use of a word or expression is, in one sense, not to grasp the rule which governs it, for I can surely be acquainted with the use of a term without being able to state a rule for that use. There is one sense of being acquainted with the use of an expression which consists in being acquainted with the contexts in which it figures, the rhetorical style of those contexts in which it would or would not be appropriate, the tone or the pacing it contributes to those pieces of speech material. This sort of sense, this vectorial sense of the verbal material, we do not grasp by effecting identification syntheses; rather we learn it by perceiving the verbal material according to the associations they form with one another and the contrasts they delineate.

Of course it will be objected that the sense of words is not a conceptualization and idealization of that vectorial sense of the sensible linguistic material, for the signifiers do not only refer to one another; they also refer via their meanings to objects. But the reference to things has to be somehow inscribed on the verbal material, and not be simply constituted by us when we identify the words and expressions, if there is to be communication. The way the words fit in with one another, contrast with one another, interrupt and echo one another echoes, mirrors, mimics, reproduces something of the way the things spoken about fit in with one another, contrast with one another, interrupt and echo one another. There is an expressive power in the sensuous layer of the linguistic material, which is like the expressive power of tones in music or in painting, and which is finally the power of one *sensum* to mirror in itself a whole intersensorial structure, the power of a color to appresent what it hides in a thing and what is invisible in a thing, the power of a line to appresent the volumes it dissects and the tangible edges of things, the power of an audible tone to appresent the pulp and denseness of a thing.

When then I identify the meanings of linguistic signs, I do not constitute

them as signs by a transcendental and positing power seated in myself, and in simple accordance with preestablished linguistic conventions; I conceptualize, I idealize, indeed I simplify, a vectorial sense which I first perceived in associative contrasts with other sensory configurations within and without the linguistic stratum of sensory experience.

How next does association work between speakers, such that the meanings of the one get communicated to the other? If understanding language is a case of *Sinngebung*, of intentionality in the fundamental form of identification synthesis, then there will be no real induction of alien meaning from another's speech. I can only understand another's speech if I am acquainted with the meaning of the language. Then when I am presented with a word or word-combination, I take this as another instance of a word or word-combination I already know, which is inwardly present to me by means of a verbal memory, and do so by identifying both as parallel instances of one and the same meaning, posited by me.

I want, on the contrary, to argue here first that for me to know the language is not to inwardly possess the words as sheer opaque sensory units; it is to be acquainted with them with their uses; that is, not: to have a representation of the sound or mark and also of the rule for its use, but rather to possess them as articulatory patterns, as vectorial patterns with an inner diagram and a set of intrinsic relatednesses to the verbal patterns external to it which make it appropriate or inappropriate in certain types of contexts. To possess it, then, to know the language, is to be able to speak it, that is, to have contracted it as an instituted schema, to have adjusted my sensibility to it, to have contracted it as an instituted motor schema. In this sense I know the word when I can reproduce it and operate with it, like the light to which I am adjusted becomes a level at which I see.

When I hear or look at a presented piece of speech, then, I do not just look at visual marks or listen to sounds, of course, but I do not just systematically identify them by positing meanings for them either. I adjust to the sound so as to follow its direction, like I adjust to the dominant note in a melody; I adjust to, follow, am led by the vectorial meaning of the linguistic substance, both the intrinsic references by which each element fits in with, leads to, contrasts with the others, and the expressive references by which the verbal substance echos or mirrors something of the way the things spoken about are articulated for other kinds of approaches, and first of all for perception.

There then occurs an associational synopsis between the verbal patterns instituted in me and those presented to me by another. I know the language

he speaks: that means that the linguistic expressions and instruments of English are in me, possessed, as so many articulatory schemata instituted, not sounds and visual marks I can see and hear again by a reproductive memory, but schemata with which and according to which I can perform operations of articulation, contrast, negation, within the fabric of the verbal material, and with which and according to which I can echo and mirror something of the articulation of the things and of the world I and others perceive. To recognize what the other is doing, then, when he speaks, is to perceive the verbal material he issues according to the schemata I possess, as variants, divergencies, contrasts along instituted schemata or articulatory diagrams.

The linguistic material has its modes of unity, of cohesion and coherence, then, not by constitution and positing of ideal identities, but by institution of vectorial schemata. But here too to perceive, to look at, to listen to, becomes, through institution, to perceive with, to look with, to listen with. I think with the other when I understand him; the articulation he effects in the verbal material, and which I can recognize because I possess its schemata in me, becomes in turn a schema – a way of articulating the verbal material, a way of echoing or mirroring the articulation of the things – which is open to variants in its turn, which I can take up and vary in my turn.

In this way, then, association is the synthetic operation by which I can synthesize what another says with what I say into patterns of sense that will be new to me. And that conversation will not be just a coding and decoding.

Thus the association of words precedes and makes possible the identity of concepts.

2. *Indices*

But it is not really words or word-combinations that are meaningful, but speech acts. When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of language, to be a linguistic sign, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions, specifically: the intention to refer to objects, and the intention to convey this intention. However, the fact that certain beings utter or otherwise produce linguistic signs is for me one of the chief and most determinate pieces of evidence I have for supposing that there are beings more or less like myself, which have certain kinds of intentions. But this situation is in fact not a circle.

For the linguistic signs that refer to objects via their meaning also function to refer to a speaker more or less like myself and to his intentions. Husserl found these two references separable, saying that linguistic signs function as expressive signs, expressing meaning, and also as indices, indicating the mental states and acts of the producer of them. He thought that they were separable enough for linguistic signs to be able to function simply as expressive signs, in the case of solitary monologue. This led Derrida to suppose, I think incorrectly, that Husserl is committed to the view that the meaningfulness of terms is of solitary, or private origin, that the ego is the origin of the ideal meanings of linguistic signs and of signs generally, for example, of sense data in perception.

An index is an empirical datum that functions as a sign referring not to ideal terms, but to something likewise empirical though presently not given. Thus smoke is a sign indicative of fire, but not expressive of it. The recognition of an indicative relationship involves a certain lack of insight, for in cases where the existence of a state of affairs is evidently inferred from that of another, we say that it demonstrates it, not that it indicates it. The relationship is neither that of antecedent to consequent, nor that of law to instantiation. Yet the indicative relationship is such that the presence of the index functions as a motive for us to believe in the reality of the indicated state of affairs.

This lack of insight in the indicative relationship is due to the fact that it is a result of association, not the minimal association that yields mere co-existence of ideas, or reactivation of past ideas on the occasion of present ones, but rather the association that makes the various empirical data appear as moments of one pattern of events with its own inner coherence, without their being there as instances of one essence or moments of one law into which we have eidetic insight.

It is then in this sense that if noises or visual marks are taken as linguistic signs, they are taken both as expressive signs, expressing meaning, and as indices, indicating the reality of a speaking person more or less like myself and involving certain mental states and acts – most immediately the intention to refer via meanings to objects with the signs he utters, and, most likely, to induce his readers or hearers to refer meaningfully to objects via those noises or visual marks by taking them to be expressive signs. Allied to this the signs produced or emitted are indicative of the quality or force of that intention – what we can call his “state of mind,” including both the *thetic* or belief-quality of that intention, as well as its affective and volitional quality. (I think that the illocutionary intention of

his utterances is perhaps jointly expressed and indicated by the nature of the noises or marks he makes. Its analysis comprises a separate problem.)

What, in the noises or marks produced, functions as indices? On the one hand, there are certain para-linguistic data which properly speaking have only an indicative role, that is, have no meaning. Such are that play of facial expression and gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent, as well as cries and respiratory sounds not linguistically codified and involuntarily produced. Then, the continuity, the pacing, the force, and the precision of the noises formed, and the precision of the visual marks produced, whereby we recognize conformity with the conventions, codes or rules, or the systematic departure from them, we take to indicate the reality of a personal being more or less like ourselves and the reality and qualities of his intentions, his expressive and communicative intentions, as well as illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions. Here the form, the precision, of the production of every expressive sign makes it function also indicatively – except, anyhow, in the problematic case of solitary monologue. Finally, there are certain conventionally regulated linguistic formations which function either primarily or exclusively as indices and not as expressions: here belong conventionalized cries and interjections which function to convey, by onomatopoeia, mimicry, or convention, the states of mind of the speaker or writer.

How do we recognize these sensory data as indices of the intentions and states of mind of another mind? Here we might be easily misled to think that the intentions and states of mind of another are rather like idealities which we identify across these signs, because they are not sensuous givens. It is to be sure true that when we read linguistic signs on paper, the reality of the writer, and the reality and quality of his intentions are invisible. But this case seems to me derivative of the situation where the sign-producer is perceivable. Then his intentions and states of mind are not invisible, for they are perceived in his posture and in the scope, pacing, force, and articulation of the movements with which he produces the linguistic signs he issues. One will now object that his posture in turn is but a sign expressive of his intention and of his state of mind. But surely his posture and movements are more than signs expressive of the affective and volitional quality of his state of mind, and even, often, of its *thetic* quality: they are rather integral moments of a “pattern of events” (in Austin’s sense) which *is* that state of mind. My own posture and motility are for me not expressive signs of, but parts of a pattern of events which is my state of mind.

Thus association is responsible for the indicative reference: the forms of certain sense data function as indices of the states of mind of the speaker, because an associative synopsis has synthetically grasped them as moments of coherent pattern of events, and, in the absence of certain moments of that pattern of events (in the absence of the perceptible experience of the posture and movements of the speaker) the association functions reproductively, to refer to them.

But this so far only functions to explain why certain sensuous data are taken as indices of certain states of mind in other beings. But I take those other beings to be more or less like myself. This recognition of kinship is not the result of an identification synthesis, that is, of an operation by which I synthesize the sensory patterns his body presents to me and the sensory patterns my body presents by taking them as parallel instances of humanity, whose distinctive essence is subjectivity, or rational animality, and where our human essence, our mentality, is not itself perceived, but rather posited by me in the measure that I take the sensory patterns before me as evidence that someone human, someone of human identity, is there. It is rather, or first, the result of an associational synopsis: my perceptual experience of the other speaker and the signs he produces, as one integral pattern of events, is from the first associated laterally with my own perceptual experience of myself, like a variant of an instituted sensible type. This does not mean, according to the associational theory I have developed here, that I observe the perceptual image he, his positions, moves, and noises, compose to be simply paired up with the perceptual image I, my positions, moves, and noises compose; rather it means that I perceive the inner lines of his posture and movement schemata according to my own, which for me is an ever-present instituted axis or level according to which I perceive what I perceive. They couple up, then, not in such a way as to form a pair, simply, or two instances of the same form, but in such a way that the one forms a variant of the other, a contrast. And so also the stream of indicative signs he produces, moments of that total pattern of events which composes an intending speaker whose states of mind have certain thetic, affective, and volitional qualities, are associated from the start with the indicative signs I might produce. That is because this linguistic association occurs on the basis of a more general association, a perceptual association, which occurs when two beings face one another, and each perceives the other as a variant of himself, perceiving himself as the level with which the other contrasts, and the other as a level from which he himself diverges.

And in this second sense, association also precedes and makes possible

and intelligible not only an eventual identification of the states of mind of other speakers indicated by the indicative function of the linguistic signs they issue, but also the identification of the meanings of expressive signs. For I shall not take the signs as expressive of meaning unless I take them as having been produced or issued by someone akin to me, and produced with certain kinds of intentions.

3. *Traces*

If the other were not a being like me, he and I would not be able to share the same language, and I would not have the experience that the signs he utters mean something to me too. But if he were not other than me we would not have to only signal to one another. The other is not only an alter ego, he is not only different from me, a variant of me, he is also, radically, other. Nothing can be more alien to me than the other who speaks to me.

Emmanuel Levinas has brought out what is specific to the alterity of the other.⁶ The alterity of the other is not manifest in that the signs he utters express meanings that diverge from my meanings, or in that they indicate intentions and states of mind that differ from my intentions and states of mind. The alterity of the other does not consist, then, in an extreme limit of his difference, his divergency, from me. It consists in a dissociation by which he stands apart from me and faces me. It consists in his arising beyond in such a way as to be the one to whom speech is addressed. Inasmuch as I speak with another, our meanings and our states of mind are revealed to be divergent, akin; inasmuch as I speak to another, I am turned to a dimension of dissociation, removal, alterity. The occurrence of this alterity interrupts the continuity of the world's presence and opens up the ideal interval across which language signifies. This absence, this interruption provokes attention, calls upon, invokes me, and contests me and my words, provokes my recognition, my response.

How is this alterity manifested? The alterity of the other is not undone, assimilated, by being manifested, by making its force felt. For it is manifested not in the indicative function, but in the vocative and imperative force of his speech. His alterity thus is manifested in language in that the linguistic signs he issues not only express meaning, different from and similar to mine, and indicate his state of mind, akin to mine and divergent from it, but also address me, appeal to me, hail me, confront me, question me, make demands on me, invoke me, as well as challenge me, judge me, commend me, contest me.

What are the signs of this alterity? I shall name the signs of speech,

inasmuch as they function to mark the alterity of the other traces.⁷ There are conventionally regulated linguistic formations that function primarily or exclusively as traces: the cries and interjections which function to attract attention, the conventionalized formulations of greetings and of contestation. There are also para-linguistic movements, conventionalized or not, such as the fixing of the gaze on you in appeal or in contestation, certain tones of the voice, certain gestures. But there is also a dimension of all speech formations which does, or can, function vocatively and imperatively: every meaningful expression does greet you and address you, and contest you, while it informs you. This is the dimension by which a linguistic sign does not only refer to objects via meaning, indicate the state of mind of its issuer, but also concerns you, disturbs you.

In particular I distinguish, against Husserl, between indices and traces. When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of language, I assume that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions. For Husserl, inasmuch as the signifying noise or mark refers to objects via meanings, it functions expressively, and inasmuch as it refers to the intentions and state of mind of the speaker, it functions indicatively. I think association sets up, as I have explained, indicative relationships by which the signs function to indicate the affective and volitional quality, as well as the thetic quality, of what I named the states of mind of the other. But I think that the signs convey his communicative intention, and indeed his expressive intention, inasmuch as they function as traces, that is, through their vocative and imperative force. Thus the dissociative recognition of his signs as traces of alterity makes possible and intelligible the associative and identifying recognition of his signs as expressive of meaning.

How then is the alterity of the other recognized in its traces? In addressing you and in contesting you the other does not manifest himself as similar to you or different from you, but dissociates, stands before you as other than you. The vocative and imperative force of his words do not serve to identify him and his attributes and represent him, but serve to mark his passing without becoming present or represented; they serve to mark his position apart and his disturbing power. You neither interpret nor associate with the traces of his alterity; you respond to them. To recognize a greeting is not to understand its meaning; it is to respond to it, to attend to someone. To recognize a contestation is not to apprehend someone's state of mind; it is to inaugurate a movement of reflection and

reiteration, of self-justification; it is to put what one has seen and has said in the perspective of another.⁸ Thus the recognition of the alterity of the other has not the representational form of identification and association, but the ethical form of attention and responsibility, what Kant named respect. The traces of alterity presented then are recognized in a non-representational recognition, in an attention which contracts its directedness not by positing a constant term, a representable term, but by turning to the recurrent absence of a terminus, in an activity of reflection, reiteration, justification, whereby speech acquires its critical, responsible or rational form.⁹

And then perhaps this extreme dissociation, this departure that leaves traces that mean nothing and indicate nothing, that disturb, deserves above all the name of association.

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NOTES

¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, Gallimard, Paris, 1964, pp. 271-227.

² Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Gallimard, Paris, 1954, pp. 358-359.

³ Emmanuel Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, 2nd ed., Vrin, Paris, 1967, pp. 205-206.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-201, 207-208.

⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, transl. Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, p. 41-43.

⁶ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961, pp. 9-10, 37-38.

⁷ Cf. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, pp. 198-201, 207-208.

⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini*, pp. 55-56, 184.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-184.

BRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF THE EVIDENT

It is well known how much E. Husserl's original project of phenomenology has been inspired by Brentano's epistemology, which may be characterized as a search for firm foundations. At the foundation of all that we know, or think we know, there must be matters which we know with unshakable certainty. Such a certainty is not merely a characteristic attitude adopted by an epistemic subject who may none the less be in the dark as to what his status is and where he stands in the whole of reality, so that his certainty might quite conceivably be shaken. On the contrary this subject, now that he has dug down to the foundations, need not fear that somewhere an evil genius might still be hiding and frustrate even his very best epistemic efforts. For there is now no longer any darkness or mystery shrouding his place in reality and his capacities to know. Husserl has developed this objective ground for certitude to the point that Brentano himself could no longer understand him.

I shall not try to sketch Brentano's entire epistemology, yet focusing the discussion upon his concept of the evident will show us a good deal of it. From the sorts of things he maintains in regard to the evident it is quite apparent that his thinking fits into that mode of philosophizing about human knowledge which I just sketched in broad outline.

Turning now to the texts, the first thing we should take notice of is the fact that the term "evident" is paired with another term "blind". Together these terms serve to mark an important contrast. We distinguish judgments, not only as true or false, but also as evident or blind, according to the author. This latter distinction can also be made in terms of justification. A judgment is called evident, it would seem, in order to mark it as an epistemic achievement in contrast to a blind judgment. He emphasizes it as a familiar and clear distinction, even if the concept of the evident is not always rightly understood, as he illustrates from the history of philosophy.¹ He also keeps stressing that the evident is not a characteristic of a presentation, of the manner in which something appears to, or is held before, the mind. Descartes' talk of clear and distinct *perceptions*, though designed to mark the same kind of contrast, is said to be objectionable for this reason. Judgment is distinguished from presentation by

the fact that the mind either accepts or rejects something presented, either affirming or denying that something exists or that it has such and such a property. And it is only in the case of judgments that we find the contrast in question.

What is evident may depend on proof and argumentation. But, as Brentano characteristically insists, the premises and the rules governing the argument must then already be assumed to be evident. Somewhere, in other words, we must have judgments that are evident without proof, directly rather than indirectly evident.

What, then, is the character of certain judgments whereby they distinguish themselves from so-called blind judgments and bespeak themselves as epistemic achievements? That is to say, what is the concept of the directly evident? To answer this question, Brentano says, we only need to examine what those judgments have in common which we all in fact quite confidently single out as evident. Since we use the distinction between evident and non-evident judgments, it ought to be possible to formulate the concept operative in that use. As he says, the method is just like the one we follow when we want to become clear about other concepts, e.g. redness.² In his attempt at such a formulation Brentano devotes a great deal of critical attention to formulations which would characterize an evident judgment as one accompanied by a feeling of compulsion which keeps one from giving it up.³ The reason for this attention must no doubt be seen in the advocacy of such views by rather prominent philosophers of his time.

His concern about this point is perfectly understandable, if we realize what is at stake. What is to be characterized is nothing less than the kind of judgment which embodies what one would have to admit to be the very best cognitive efforts of which man is capable. A so-called blind judgment, in Brentano's conception, represents an epistemic situation from which a man can free himself in order to attain a situation more favourable for judgment, namely the kind of judgment he has in mind when he speaks of an evident judgment. But to characterize this latter type of judgment in a way which suggests that in making it man is simply compelled by feelings he does not master is tantamount to discrediting our capacity to know at its best. As Brentano notes with regard to a thought expressed by Pascal in his *Pensées*, given such a view skepticism can only be avoided, if we can somehow know who the author of our nature is. The mere fact that the one who makes an evident judgment cannot bring himself to doubt what he has affirmed or denied is as such simply a fact about human nature or the

world at large in which human nature is embedded. And the fact that we cannot correct such a judgment, so that it is for us incorrigible, is also simply a brute fact about human nature. As Nietzsche once noted, our so-called truths may be no more than unavoidable errors. To recall the first paragraph of this paper, there is no certainty that there is not an evil demon at work to deceive us.⁴

Brentano's objections expressing this very basic concern are fairly obvious. If an evident judgment is characterized by a feeling of not being able to judge otherwise, how are such judgments distinguishable from engrained habits of thought, fixed ideas, and blind prejudice? How can what is seen by one person to be true be universally valid, if any person's justification in regarding his judgment as true for all is solely a feeling the occurrence of which he has (as yet) no reason to believe to be universally connected with that judgment? And if one believes that such and such a feeling does accompany a given judgment in all people, what justification does this belief have? To sum up these critical questions in one statement, skepticism would be the last word, if this feeling-theory were accepted.

It is therefore quite understandable that Brentano wants an evident judgment to be understood as excluding error as well as doubt, and that he further specifies its character as being a judgment such that the person who makes it sees it to be correct or true.⁵ That which is genuinely evident, we are told, cannot be false, though freedom from error is of course not sufficient to make a judgment evident. Any instance of an evident judgment is, to be sure, a judgment made by a subject on a particular occasion. And what is claimed on such an occasion may not be true; there is no infallible faculty of judging. But if the judgment is not true, so he holds, it cannot be genuinely evident either. Truth is inseparable from an evident judgment. And our general fallibility need not be avowed by always confining ourselves to expressions of the form "It is evident to *me* that . . ." Brentano notes: "One usually says 'This is evident' and not 'This is evident to me'."⁶ Or as he puts it in another passage: ". . . Anyone who sees something to be true may know that he is justified in regarding it as true for all."⁷

How is it possible for Brentano to see such a close link between the evident and the true? If he were an idealist philosopher, this question would present no difficulty for him. If in line with ideas I earlier injected into this discussion we take an evident judgment to be that in which our cognitive efforts reach, as it were, their highest achievement, so that all our cognitive requirements are fully met, an idealist would have no problem in

seeing this as nothing short of the truth. For him truth does not require agreement between thought and reality, so that the requirements of thought having been met the question would remain whether this self-satisfied thought corresponds with reality. This question is disposed of, if reality is nothing beyond thought.

Brentano, however, is nothing if not a realist. And he was therefore by no means ready to jettison the traditional theory of truth in favour of something like a coherence theory of truth. The above question about the connection between the evident and the true did, however, lead Brentano to subject traditional formulations of that theory of truth to very searching criticisms. And what he finally adopted as his theory is no longer a correspondence theory in the traditional sense.

I shall not deal with all the criticisms he addressed to the traditional definition of truth. I only intend to call attention to those which are more or less closely related to the preceding discussion of the concept of the evident. As I see it, there are two somewhat different sets of objections that are directed to the traditional theory. He argues against it, on the one hand, because correspondence seems to commit us to entities which he rejected as fictional, *entia irrealia*.⁸ These criticisms have no direct interest for our present discussion. But he also argues, usually in the same texts, that the idea of correspondence would make the discovery of truth impossible. Stated in terms of our earlier discussion, there is no longer any connection between the evident and the true. I will confine myself to this latter aspect of Brentano's criticism of the traditional theory, since it has a direct bearing on the concept of the evident and the place it has in his overall epistemology.

The traditional theory of truth, as Brentano sees it, poses insuperable obstacles to the search and discovery of truth.⁹ The point may be argued somewhat as follows. The search for truth leads us from judgment to judgment. The judgments we arrive at by epistemic effort and circumspection are presumed to be better than the judgments from which we started. But the best we can achieve remains a certain type of judgment. We never confront reality except in and through a judgment. Now if we look to the correspondence theory of truth for guidance in the search for truth, it seems to suggest that to arrive at truth we would have to compare judgments with reality, what is inside the mind with what is outside the mind. But – and this is supposed to be the critical objection to the traditional theory of truth – this is manifestly impossible. Even if we could envisage such a comparison, its outcome would itself be embodied in a judgment.

And the correspondence theory of truth would seem to demand from us another comparison between judgment and reality. It should be plain that it is fruitless to try and meet this demand.¹⁰ Hence the charge that the correspondence theory is an obstacle that stands in the way of our attempts to discover truth. And this in turn gives rise to the suggestion that, if the search and discovery of truth is to be possible, there must be judgments which bespeak their own truth, whose nature it is to be true.¹¹ And this is exactly what Brentano had in mind with his idea of an evident judgment. Let us examine the texts more closely.

The aspect of Brentano's criticism of the traditional theory which I want to highlight is not as prominent in the texts as the aspect concerned with the commitment to non-real entities. The clearest text for my purpose is perhaps the following:

To the question, what are we to understand by truth, it is very customary to reply: we understand by truth the agreement of thought with its object. . . . It is also the case that many did not hesitate to regard that characterization as something which enlightens us about the criterion of what is true or false. They completely failed to notice that an agreement cannot possibly be recognized unless we know each of the two items whose agreement is in question. Hence, if all knowledge were understood as knowledge of an agreement, we would be required to perform an infinite regress, which is impossible. The real guarantee of the truth of a judgment consists in its being evident. . . .¹²

Although this text is lacking in necessary elaboration, the train of thought presented should be clear in the light of my preceding remarks. If a statement about the nature of truth is to enlighten us about the way we discover truth – and Brentano does not dispute the legitimacy of this expectation, then the correspondence theory fails, because there is no way in which we could ever establish a correspondence between what is inside the mind and what is outside. If we did not have evident judgments, i.e. judgments whose nature it is to be true, we would not be able to decide about the truth of a knowledge claim. I could of course appraise the claims of others, using my own as standard of truth, but this would obviously leave me with the question whether my own claim is true. This can only be maintained, if my claim is either directly evident or can be proved in the light of those that are.

What Brentano finally adopted, I said earlier, is no longer a correspondence theory in the traditional sense. As he himself states in *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, the idea of the evident is primary, rather than that of the true.¹³ But as we already noticed earlier, an evident judgment is subject to appraisal. In the text just referred to the author states that when we

think of a judgment as being true, there is a kind of comparison, not of a judgment with an entity, but of two judgments. When we think of a person as having made a true judgment, we think of him as agreeing with one whose judgment is evident. The *adaequatio* mentioned in the medieval definition of truth must be interpreted along this line. One could call this a correspondence theory, but it is one of a peculiar kind. The definition of truth that is offered is as follows:

Truth is to be assigned to the judgment of the person who judges correctly; that is to say, to the judgment of the one who judges about things in the same way as he would judge whose judgments are evident, and who asserts what would also be asserted by him whose judgments are evident.¹⁴

This definition of truth calls for some elaboration and comment.

It should be clear that there is still a kind of correspondence or agreement essential to truth. What any judgment has to agree with, if it is to be true, is not a real state of affairs but the judgment of an ideal subject, namely one whose judgments are solely evident judgments. And I think that Brentano would also want to say that any evident judgment that is made on a given occasion by a particular person, if it is to stand as true, would have to agree with the judgment of that ideal subject. This way of thinking is reminiscent of Aristotle's way of distinguishing the real good from the apparent good in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book III, ch. 4): the real good is that which appears good to the man of high moral standards (*ὁ σπουδαῖος*). As Aristotle says, this man judges everything correctly; what things truly are, that they seem to him to be. This subject is ideal in the sense that he is looked upon as normative. We do not ask about him questions such as "Is it true what he says?" or "Is what appears evident to him really evident and therefore true?" What we instead ask are questions such as "Does such and such a judgment, made by this particular person under these circumstances, agree in what it claims with the judgment of that ideal subject?" Brentano himself does not designate this subject as ideal subject, but it seems to me that such a designation is apt to capture his meaning. For what I take him to mean is that this normative subject is hypothetical in the sense that no actual subject asserting something is to be treated as infallible, not even when he claims something to be evident.

It is unfortunate that Brentano does not further characterize this ideal subject. Instead he indicates two kinds of objects about which directly evident judgments are possible: one's own present experiences and axioms that are seen to be true solely on the basis of the concepts involved. Inter-

nal perceptions – which are judgments in his sense – are directly evident, because their objects are really identical with the affirmation directed upon them. In fact, the recognition of this identity is somehow part of such perceptions.¹⁵ An internal perception cannot be wrong, though the scope of what is claimed to be so perceived may on occasion be taken to be greater than it actually is. The perception as such cannot be wrong, since it would be contradictory to suppose that, although the affirmation exists, its object does not, the affirmation and its object being identical. If the perception of a psychical phenomenon were a separate act, as a memory-claim is separate from that to which it is directed, then there would be no such contradiction. And neither would it then be directly evident. It is therefore apodictically evident, as Brentano puts it, that in matters of fact only internal perceptions are directly evident.¹⁶

He remains faithful to the doctrines earlier discussed, when in one passage he goes out of his way to ward off the idea of correspondence in the sense in which it would apparently require a comparison of thought with reality. Internal perceptions are not epistemically better than external perceptions, because in the former case we are able to execute such a comparison, while this is impossible in the latter. It is not the case, he writes, that there is something within us which we can compare with what we in internal perception of it affirm. Its certainty is not to be explained in that way.¹⁷ We are therefore left with the above characterization: inner perception stands out as directly evident on account of the fact that we cannot without contradiction entertain its falsity. External perception, on the other hand, is such that no contradiction arises upon entertaining its falsity, since the perceptual act does not include the object in the way in which an internal perception forms a unity with its object.

This argument involving the idea of contradiction is not very satisfactory. Talk about what is logically possible or impossible addresses itself to propositions as such and ignores the epistemically decisive question as to the situation in which such and such a proposition is asserted. That is to say, the position of the epistemic subject in relation to a given proposition has not yet entered the discussion. What Brentano deals with is the quite different question as to whether or not a certain form of unity holds between subject and object. The status accorded to internal perception seems to depend on a peculiarly intimate form of unity, rather than on a specifically epistemic excellence. From the way the concept of the evident was introduced, namely as related by contrast to so-called blind judgments, one would expect, it seems to me, that more emphasis would be

placed on epistemic situations and less on the kinds of propositions involved. As things stand, it is not surprising that the concept of the evident cannot be carried over into the analysis of external perception. One might still want to agree with Brentano that this kind of perception is in a peculiar sense fallible. But if the concept of the directly evident in matters of fact had been specifically developed with an eye on distinctively epistemic achievement, one could not deny it achievement in every sense.¹⁸

When we turn to Brentano's epistemological evaluation of external perception, we notice that its outcome is determined by an argument that has nothing to do with any of the preceding points. The epistemic worth of external perception, in his view, has been undermined by science. Colours, sounds, temperatures, etc., exist only phenomenally and intentionally. What the external world is really like we do not at all know directly; we can only make causal hypotheses which try to explain the course of sensations. The so-called physical phenomena can in no way be demonstrated to be true and real:

They are signs of something real which by its causal influence produces their presentation. But for that reason they are not an adequate picture of this reality and give us knowledge of it only in a very imperfect sense. . . . In and for itself that which truly exists does not manifest itself, and that which is manifest does not truly exist.¹⁹

In other words, our knowledge of the external world is made up of judgments arrived at on the basis of the data of internal perception plus the various *a priori* axioms which are also directly evident.

When one finally turns to Brentano's application of the concept of the directly evident to the *a priori*, one learns little that is new. One is told, for instance, that the fact that there are some principles or axioms which are directly evident does not mean that we possess a faculty which infallibly recognizes them. On the contrary, there is much disagreement as to which axioms are thus evident. One learns that the author rejects accounts that would introduce the structure of our mind or the nature of our rational capacity as that which compels our assent to these axioms, because this would not guarantee their truth.²⁰ The point, it is clear, is one we already discussed earlier. His own position is that in this area evident judgments must be understood as judgments recognized as true from the concepts involved. For our purposes it is not important that he also wished to see them as essentially negative and as referring to persons who judge, rather than to non-real states of affairs. These considerations add nothing to an understanding of his concept of the evident.

It seems to me that one would wish to address critical questions to Brentano on two main points. In the first place, although many of his remarks about the nature of the directly evident can count on our assent, the concept as such is not sufficiently clearly embedded in the context of cognitive inquiry. That it belongs to a theory of inquiry is clear enough from the author's own observations, but the concrete manner in which it functions in the search for truth remains rather obscure. It is, for instance, clear that it marks a kind of achievement in this context of search. But it remains unclear how it is related to other stages of inquiry, e.g. to so-called blind judgments. The second point one would want to focus one's criticism on involves the relation between the evident and the true. What precisely do we have to suppose about the metaphysical status of the subject, if one accepts the reduction of truth to the evident? Brentano's realism suggests this question, but it does not answer it.

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NOTES

¹ Franz Brentano, *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1962, p. 61f. (52). Throughout the notes I will add in parentheses the page number of the English translation, *The True and the Evident*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143 (125).

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 63–69 (54–59), 141–2 (123–25).

⁴ In his book, *Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth*, The Hague, 1965, Jan Srzednicki states that Brentano's own view of the evident "comes to saying that it is a brute fact about our world that I am sometimes sure of the truth of some of my judgments" (p. 96). However difficult it may be to interpret his doctrine with regard to the evident, this statement surely betrays the flavour of Brentano's thought (see, for instance, his own characterization of psychologism on p. 125 (110)). In fact, Srzednicki's entire discussion of the evident shows little understanding of the issues involved.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144 (126). I choose the locution "seeing a judgment to be correct," because it nicely captures the contrast with "blind judgment." The author, however, uses a variety of expressions: *etwas als wahr einsehen, sich als richtig kundgeben, uns einleuchtend sein, eine Eigentuemlichkeit haben, die es (das Urteil) als richtig charakterisiert, einsichtig sein*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 144 (126).

⁷ "... Wer etwas als wahr einsieht, (mag) erkennen, daß er es als eine Wahrheit fuer alle zu betrachten berechtigt ist" (*Ibid.*, p. 64 (55)).

⁸ This aspect is dealt with at length in Srzednicki's book, mentioned in footnote no. 4.

⁹ It may be worth noting that many idealist philosophers have also criticized the correspondence theory along this line. It is also present in pragmatism.

¹⁰ It should be noted that all this follows, if we look to the correspondence theory for guidance in the search for truth. I cannot now elaborate, but it seems to me that this is an important mistake.

¹¹ The substance of this way of reasoning is scattered throughout Brentano's texts. A short but excellent statement may be found in Meinong's *Ueber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, pp. 31–2.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 137 (120). Cf. p. 125–6 (110) and p. 133 (117).

¹³ *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1956), p. 195.

¹⁴ *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, p. 139 (122).

¹⁵ *Psychologie* III (Meiner Verlag, 1968), p. 6. Because this recognition must be part of the perception, Brentano takes unkindly to Lichtenberg's well-known suggestion that the Cartesian *I think* should be replaced by the impersonal *There is thought* (*es denkt*).

¹⁶ *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, p. 150 (132); *Psychologie* I, pp. 128–9, 137, 196–7; III, pp. 6, 12, 98–9; *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, p. 154f.

¹⁷ *Psychologie* I, p. 196f.

¹⁸ Although my formulations are quite different, the point I am making seems very similar to that made by Husserl in the appendix to his *Logische Untersuchungen*, second edition, II, 2, pp. 222–244, esp. pp. 232 and 239.

¹⁹ *Psychologie* I, p. 28.

²⁰ *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, pp. 162, 165.

EVIDENCE AND THE AIM OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

An analysis of Husserl's opus makes it quite clear that the phenomenon of evidence preoccupied his mind. His continuous interest found its expression in the various explorations formulated along with his intellectual development. In the first place it can be said that the phenomenon of evidence was germane to Husserl's trend of thought and the structure of his philosophical thinking and system. If we take, in general terms, evidence to connote that which is actually present and conspicuous in the mind, consciousness or subject, as well as that which by its presence provides immediately the ground for holding a view or a position formulated in a proposition in the consciousness, or, to put it differently, a content or a proposition whose very presence implies its justification – the affinity between that phenomenon at large and Husserl's own concern with it is telling. For a philosopher so much engaged in the analyses of contents which are given by themselves to consciousness – *Selbstgebung* – or those originally given to consciousness and thus given *by* consciousness, the reference to the phenomenon of evidence and to the historical explorations of that phenomenon appear to be built-in in the structure of Husserl's own thinking. Husserl was concerned with the issue of certainty and presence, and thus he was led to refer to the phenomenon of evidence and therefore to explore it.

Yet the consistent analysis of the phenomenon cannot obscure the fact that Husserl made various attempts to criticize the reliance on evidence in the sense described before as the primary synthesis of the presence of content and the certainty concomitant with that presence. That analysis found its formulation in different ways and eventually brought about a change in the relation to the phenomenon of evidence, namely the transition from conceiving evidence as the ground or presupposition of cognition to conceiving it as the aim of cognition. We are about to attempt to shed some light on the different analyses present in Husserl, without pretending to exhaust the whole spectrum of the analyses as it is formulated in his whole *opus*.

I

Already in the *Ideen*, Husserl voices a critical comment on the reliance on evidence or the feeling of evidence (*Evidenzgefühl*). He says in this context that the alleged feelings of evidence or of necessity in thinking are but theoretically invented feelings (47).¹ He demands, to say the least, an analysis of those feelings in the sense of exploring the manifold differentiations inherent in them, which have not been explicated in the prevailing tradition of appealing to evidence and of relying on it. The general motto of the phenomenological analysis which goes by the title of *Sichklarmachen* (clarifying to oneself) has two parallel and mutually supporting directions: the one is that of processes of making things intuitively present (*Veranschaulichung*), and the second a heightening of the clarity of that which is already intuited (*Steigerung der Klarheit des schon Anschaulichen*) (159). The two steps are significant: the first points to *Veranschaulichung* as the end of the process or as the process as such and finds its expression in the continuous turning of contents into contents of *Anschauung*. We can surmise at this point that *Anschauung*, and *Veranschaulichung* as a process leading to *Anschauung*, are just the other side of the coin of the presence of the content, the implication being that knowledge refers to present contents, *Veranschaulichung* being taken as the medium and *Anschauung* as the locus of that presence. We do not know, to add this comment, the table as a table nor the number two as number two, unless they are present in our minds as contents; the position of presence and the level of *Anschauung* are mutually supporting. By the same token it is not enough to leave these contents appearing in their locus as *Anschauungen*; we have to be engaged in the continuous explication of those contents in the direction of clarity, since in the course of that process we are involved with *Anschauungen* which are impure (*unreine Anschauungen*). We should not take the leap from the intuited presence of contents to their true presence which can be ascertained only through and after the intensification of the clarity. Hence it is already at this juncture that we find a hint in the direction of an evidence which will be continuously asserted and achieved; evidence cannot find its realization in the already given intuited contents. It has to be projected from the beginning of the cognitive process beyond that beginning.

But Husserl adds some points of exploration which go beyond the positional aspect of evidence – and two of these have to be mentioned in the present context: Positively speaking, in the majority of cases that which is given to us is embraced by other contents, or by what Husserl des-

cribes metaphorically as a ring of indeterminable interminability (*Hof von unbestimmbarer Bestimmbarkeit*). Hence the process of explication and clarification takes place against the background of different contents: the clarification is on the one hand an isolation of contents. On the other hand it is a continuous reference to the embracing contents vis-à-vis which the isolation takes place. If we understand this comment from the point of view of the phenomenology of evidence, it can be said that Husserl could not adhere to the view that there are certain propositions whose justification is immediately given, since such a view of evidence amounts to a primary isolation of those propositions as well as to their primary clarity. Once isolated, propositions are in themselves achievements of the cognitive process. Clarity becomes the result of clarification – the view that evidence amounts to a groundwork of knowledge or to the pre-suppositions for it is precluded.

There is a second comment in Husserl about the aspect of evidence, which refers to the distinction between general or generic essential differences which indeed are immediately grasped, and the concrete realization of those differences in terms of data. The examples adduced by Husserl are again rather telling. He refers to the distinction between colour and sound, or that between perception and will. He says that we are aware directly or immediately of those differences as well as of the species among which these differences pertain – colour in general, sound in general. Yet this awareness does not amount to an awareness of the concrete examples which can be classified according to the essential differences among the species. Here again the process could be called not one of clarification but one of identification or realization, that is to say, that vis-à-vis detailed facts or occurrences we apply the species and their essential characteristics in order to grasp the details on the one hand and in order to give them concreteness (*Konkretion*) on the other (160). Hence, if we understand Husserl correctly, we are entitled to say that the primary evidence exhibited in the cognition of essences or species cannot be self-supporting unless we supplement the apprehended species by the concrete data which fall within the scope of the essences. This in turn is a process of clarification, since we clarify the primary essences by the data on the one hand, and we clarify the data by recognizing them as belonging to their respective essences on the other. Obviously this particular correlation between essences and data becomes problematic in the sphere of cognition, but not in the sphere of pure logic, because in the latter sphere we are solely concerned with pure logical relations (309).

The wider consequence derived from the difference between the sphere

of cognition and that of pure logical relations is that no proposition referring to a given appearance can be final (*endgültig*). (338–339). Moreover, the analysis of cognitive acts in general and the distinction between the noetic and the noematic aspects calls essentially (336) for an equilibrium between the two aspects, even in terms of the intended evidence. To put it differently in Husserl's own terms: the noematic aspect has to be seen in the context as related to a fulfilment (*Erfüllung*) and to the fulfilment of the intention (336). Hence, to bring about that equilibrium, let alone the harmony between noesis and noema, cannot be safeguarded at the beginning of the process or with the thesis only. Hence we have to see the broad theory of evidence as part of what Husserl now calls the phenomenology of reason (353). That phenomenology in turn will refer not only to the different noetic acts but again to the correlate of noemata. The more the object is a conjunction of different thematic aspects, the more difficult it becomes to grasp the fulfilment of the acts by the objects. In addition we have to be aware of what may perhaps be called modal differences in terms of the position of the object, such as the difference between a possible object, a probable one or a doubtful one, and here, too, we see the rather complicated interrelation between our assertions and the fulfilling objects (356). These are only examples, previously dealt with, related to the impossibility of an immediacy of the cognitive acts in terms of their concomitant certainty. Certainty becomes problematic, and thus again – only – a possible *telos* of knowledge, but not its previously conceived and grasped point of departure. We shall now see two additional steps taken by Husserl and adumbrated already in the system of the *Ideen* – both bringing into prominence the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon of evidence as well as its systematic connotation as the end of cognition and not as its point of departure.

II

Husserl adheres consistently to the conviction that evidence eventually is both the criterion of truth and the very explication of the position of true statements in consciousness. Yet at the same time there is a growing awareness in Husserl, as we have already seen in the *Ideen*, of the problematic character of evidence. Turning now to an analysis of *Formale und Transzendente Logik*, we shall find a reinforcement of that oscillation characteristic of Husserl's analysis.²

Evidence is seen, says he, as absolute apodicticity or absolute certainty

which as such is posed against all deceptions. Yet he adds immediately that such an apodicticity is totally inconceivable outside a concrete context which has a unity of essence in relation to a subjective experience (*Erleben*), and which is removed from a particular experience (*Einzelerleben*) (140). Absolute apodicticity or certainty are by definition beyond the realm of subjective experience. Yet Husserl is aware that consciousness, even in its totality, has a component of subjectivity or of conviction about truth, which cannot be disregarded even when we refer or aim at absolute certainty. In other words, the very notion of certainty contains an element of conviction, and conviction is an attitude of the subject. The question which Husserl faces is whether or not it is possible to distinguish between the mode of being grounded in a subject without being exposed to the mode of *Erleben*. And indeed, Husserl says that a proposition can be given in very different, subjective modes of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*). He goes on to say that one and the same proposition can appear as a completely vague brainwave (*ein völlig vager Einfall*) and also as an entirely vague meaning of an assertion which one reads, understands or adopts credulously (*gläubig übernimmt*) (49). To be sure, the idea to which Husserl continually keeps referring is the idea of passing statements as imbued with the fullness of clarity. That state or stage is, as he puts it, a new evidence of the self-givenness of the things with which consciousness is concerned (53–54). But we have to emphasize the position of new evidence which of course implies that we entertain in our consciousness a state of affairs, while our intentionality was accompanied by an evidence now replaced by a new one. Hence it becomes clear in the context that there are varieties of evidence which can in turn be conceived as stages of evidence and by the same token as progressive steps of evidence. In this sense evidence described by its definition as absolute certainty or apodicticity is deferred to the goal or to the end of the process. The striving for knowledge has not yet arrived at its goal. It keeps going on from one clarity to another, while the ultimate goal is indeed described as *Endziel*. The nominal description of evidence related to one's holding of that which one thinks (*die Selbsthabe des Vermeinten*) is retained, but the cognitive position of that *Selbsthabe* is now pushed forward toward the final goal of the striving for knowledge as a continuous process aiming at clarity. (54).

We have to pause at this point to attempt to place Husserl's view into the broader context of the various approaches to evidence. It is obvious that Husserl removes evidence from its position as a point of departure of

the process of cognition to its position as its aim. The various statements, propositions or contents meant by consciousness (*das Vermeinte*) can therefore not be gauged according to the pre-established evidence. On the contrary, they are deferred to the ultimate stage: we evaluate cognitively the data of consciousness in relation to the end and not to the beginning. To be sure, Husserl accepts the nominal and ideal description of evidence as clarity, but he distinguishes between clarity and absolute certainty. He sees the relationship by which absolute clarity can refer to absolute certainty in the sense that only when absolute clarity appears within the horizon of knowledge, absolute certainty can be justified. But absolute clarity in turn cannot be related to the beginning of the process. Thus absolute certainty cannot be maintained at the point of departure of the cognitive process and has to be – to some extent at least – conceived as depending upon absolute clarity. From the aspect of self-givenness it would indeed be very difficult to distinguish between evidence which is objectively justified and evidence which is but the reverse of self-givenness. Hence we can say in this context that clarity becomes the guiding principle of the meaning of evidence, and different modes of evidence are to be gauged against the principle of clarity, and not the other way round. Eventually Husserl tries to bring about an explicit synthesis of *Selbsthabe* and clarity, thus maintaining the notion of consciousness or subject, since *Selbsthabe* refers obviously to the *Selbst* who is the subject. But in order to overcome the continuous danger of subjectivity or, from the other pole, the lack of clarity which can be concomitant with mere subjectivity, Husserl has to give prominence to perfect clarity which is just the opposite of perfect unclarity (54). Thus the gamut of knowledge is delineated, starting from a mode of consciousness which lacks full clarity to a mode of consciousness whose inherent quality is full clarity. Perhaps we even have to reinforce that parallelism: the aim of full clarity is an end of cognition, and we reach that end continuously in approximation; that end is not with us, and perhaps neither is the totally opaque mode of consciousness, which would be a rendering of the full unclarity with us. Both poles are posed for the sake of describing the two opposite ends of the process.

We already hinted before at the fact that we are concerned not only with the process leading towards clarity or aiming at it, but also with the hierarchical structure inherent in that process. It is because of that structure that Husserl refers specifically to evidences in the plural as well as to truths in the plural. In order to describe the initial position of that pluralistic structure, he has to point to the individual status of the initial truth and

evidence. He does this even to the extent of conceiving the individual propositions as bound to be so a priori (182). He is not satisfied with pointing only to the psychological or developmental aspect of the accession towards complete clarity and complete and absolute certainty by empirically describing the point of departure as centered around individual propositions. By saying that it is essentially and a priori so, he elevates the individual process and *nisus* towards clarity as describing the very structure of knowledge. Clarity cannot emerge from the head of Zeus, but is bound to emerge out of the continuous aiming towards it.

It is because of this that Husserl sums up his position in a very far-reaching statement: The traditional theory of knowledge and psychology, says he, considers evidence to be a particular datum which can be isolated. A certain lawfulness inherent in experience can explain the connection between that particular datum and what he calls *seelische Innerlichkeit* (the psychic internality). Husserl does not accept this view because he shows not only that the aspect of evidence is not an isolated component transplanted into consciousness or awareness, but the whole life of consciousness, as he puts it, cannot exist without evidence. In addition, and this is even more significant, if evidence has to reach a stage of absolute certainty and clarity at all, it has to reach that stage by integrating within itself objectivity, though not objectivity as grounded in objects which do not relate to consciousness, but objectivity as a correlate of the subject. About that aspect of evidence as a synthesis of certainty and clarity Husserl says that it cannot be conceived without the stream of external experience. Therefore, it cannot be viewed as being only within the inner consciousness, or, in other words, evidence cannot be conceived in the context of the life of the consciousness in the sense of the psychic internality. It has to be seen again as related to the synthesis between internal and external experience. At this point Husserl sees the interrelation and the interaction between what he calls performances of evidence (*Evidenzleistungen*) and what he antithetically coins now *Nichtevidenzen*, which apparently replaces the notion of unclarity. Again we move from self-givenness to continuous references, and the exploration of that structure is now what Husserl affectively describes as the immense theme of phenomenology (255–256).

We have already seen that there is in Husserl on the one hand a relativization of the mode of evidence, which in turn is related to the description that each mode of cognition is accompanied by evidence. On the other hand there is an absolutization of the mode of evidence, and once it is

seen in the context of full certainty, and thus at the end of the asymptotic character of knowledge, if we may use a neo-Kantian expression. We shall see now that the introduction of this neo-Kantian term is not accidental, and indeed, looking into the *Cartesian Meditations* and coming back to the *Ideen*, we shall notice the affinity between Husserl and Kant, at least in the interpretation of the evidence as an aim or as an Idea in Kant's sense. We turn now to the *Cartesian Meditations*.

III

The *Cartesian Meditations* were obviously very germane to a further elaboration of the notion of evidence. In some sense Husserl reiterates there his previous analysis of evidence, and we shall make a comment on that presently. Yet it is apposite to start with a reference to Husserl's own description of evidence as experience (*Erfahrung*) of that which is and at that which is thus (*Erfahrung von Seiendem und so-Seiendem*). Evidence as an experience or an experiencing is for him a mode of being seen/*zu Gesicht bekommen*: obtain sight of/, in the spiritual or mental sense of awareness (12).³ The emphasis has to be placed here not only on the transformations of experience, and seeing is here a sort of experience, but on the primary synthesis of being, and of being of a particular kind, which is a paraphrase of two notions, namely existence and essence. To be aware of something as embodying that synthesis posits for knowledge a very complex task – thus we are brought back to the idea of perfect evidence, as well as of the stages leading to it. It is for this reason that Husserl superimposes on the notion of evidence not only the mode of apodicticity, but also that of adequacy (22). In the notion of adequate evidence there is, at least implicitly, an attempt to integrate into one concept two traditional descriptions or justifications of truth, namely that of a self-supporting proposition, accompanied by conviction and certainty, and that of adequacy, which traditionally refers to the relationship between a statement and a state of affairs. This again is only a nuance compared with the previous statements. Still that nuance points to the fact that Husserl, while attempting to maintain the notion of evidence, cannot leave it enclosed within the range of the immanent consciousness only.

Continuing the line of the view analysed before, namely that of the various modifications of evidence, it has to be observed in the context of the *Cartesian Meditations* that, parallel to seeing evidence as an experience, Husserl now posits experience as evidence, when he explicitly

says that experience in the ordinary sense is a particular evidence. All evidence is experience, and here again Husserl oscillates between the view of evidence as essentially uniform and evidence as basically exhibiting different modes and transformations (57). The notion of modifications of evidence takes a particular turn which has to be explained. We refer here to the notion of what Husserl calls "habitual and potential evidence". In as much as evidence is an experience, and in evidence the full correlation between the experiencing subject and the experienced state of affairs is present, evidence institutes for me an abiding possession (*eine bleibende Habe*). This abiding character of my awareness of knowledge finds one of its manifestations in the fact that I can always return to the reality which I have seen; I can always reconstruct the first evidence. The very fact that I can reconstitute my first possession implies, from the aspect of the relationship or intentionality of the consciousness, a continuous range of possibilities. To refer to a fixed and abiding possession amounts, from the point of view of consciousness, to the possibility or possibilities to reconstitute my first evidence. On the one hand we can interpret this statement as an attempt to find the subjective correlate or replacement of the abiding possession, namely data of experience (*Erlebnistatsachen*) which are repeatable *ad infinitum*; on the other hand we can see in the objective state of affairs a correlate of our subjective state of consciousness. Husserl attempts here, from the point of view of the position of evidence, to reach a synthesis between the immanence of consciousness and the correlation between consciousness and the state of affairs. This in turn is a re-rendering of the synthesis between apodicticity and adequacy. Our preceding evidence becomes therefore repeatable, and thus habitual and potential, since what we attempt is to move from the evidence already in our possession and which we are still able to retain to the evidence which becomes integrated in the process of our progressive knowledge (60–61).

Since it emerges that there are stages of evidence, Husserl eventually has to abandon the view that adherence to any particular evidence is epistemologically binding. He therefore can say that more than anything else the being of the world is obvious. He may ask the question about the existence of the world as being an assertion of a position accompanied by evidence (17). This statement calls only for the clarification or the perpetual overcoming of the vagueness of the notion of the existence of the world. The existing world will continue to exist, but the explication will show that its existence is a correlate of consciousness and intentionality and cannot be regarded as being outside the scope of either. If this is so, then our first

evidence does not close the venture of cognition, but on the contrary our horizon can be opened up by possible experiences. We refer here to what Husserl describes as the presumption or presumptive horizon (23). The very presence of the horizon again removes the primary statement accompanied by evidence or self-givenness from its initial position, and lodges it within a horizon in which we are moving when attempting to clarify, and thus both to retain and elevate the initial evidence. It cannot be denied that Husserl by using this dynamic concept of evidence introduces here a momentum of knowledge which as such leads to the continuous explication of knowledge. It is therefore no chance that evidence is eventually removed from its absolute position as the beginning of knowledge to its new position as the idea that constantly furnishes guidance to all sciences and to their striving toward universality (52). The use already at this point a Kantian expression, it has to be said that Husserl, being engaged in the exploration of the constitution of knowledge, is eventually led to the notion that a full constitution is a regulative principle which points to the direction but not to the achievement. Let us recall at this juncture that Kant himself related the notion of regulative principles to the notion of progressus in indefinitum.⁴ To be sure, Kant refers to regulative principles vis-à-vis empirically conditioned existence and knowledge of empirical data, and attempts continuously to go beyond them. While Husserl, hinting at regulative principles, posits them within the continuity from one mode of evidence to another, without the Kantian dichotomy between that which is sensuous and that which is beyond sensuality. This is so because Husserl has an all-embracing concept of a horizon of experience in which the present data and that which goes beyond them are contained. Within that horizon of experience the notions of actuality and transcendence will ultimately find their clarification. Yet Husserl comes very close indeed to the Kantian view when he says that a world in itself is an infinite idea related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiences. And, what is even more significant, it is an idea which is the correlate of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence (*eine Korrelatidee zur Idee einer vollkommenen Erfahrungsevidenz*) (62). To give even greater prominence to the affinity between Kant and Husserl, we quote here the last sentence in the context, where Husserl says that this harmony, as well as the correlation between the world as an idea and the idea of experiential evidence is described as a complete synthesis of possible experiences.

The wording here is clearly Kantian. But we cannot disregard one basic

difference between Kant and Husserl, namely that Husserl attempts to bring about a synthesis between evidence and state of affairs, that is to say to constitute ultimately one comprehensive system, where consciousness and objects will be a harmonious whole. This is so because for Husserl the constitution of knowledge does not amount to an ordering of data or unifying them in the Kantian sense, but to a continuous approximation of the basic correlation between intentionality and objects, a correlation which becomes more and more transparent to the experiencing consciousness and is not only embodied in a structure of principles detached from that experiencing consciousness. While Kant placed the emphasis on the principles, Husserl places the emphasis on evidence but, as we have seen, removes evidence from its position as underlying knowledge to the ever-removed and removable position of the *telos* of knowledge. Not only world becomes an idea but knowledge too becomes an idea and, by the same token, both are placed at the end of knowledge – they are of a teleological character. Again we can call this to-be-achieved correlation a system, but such a system is never merely an objective structure, but a structure seen through consciousness, or evidence which finds its fulfilment (*Erfüllung*) in the structure. The affinity between Kant and Husserl should not make us oblivious of the fact that the Cartesian element is retained by Husserl but, interestingly enough, Descartes' evidence as origin is turned into Kant's focus. To wind up our analysis, we have to come back to the *Ideen* and realize that, with all the transformations which Husserl's phenomenology underwent, and with his absorption of the Cartesian *Leitmotif*, the time elapsed in the development of the states of the system does not make for a discontinuity between the stages.

IV

One could at this point see the affinity between Husserl's notion of the world as the ideatum to John Stuart Mill's notion of matter or world as the permanent possibility of sensations. Yet the relationship to Kant's concept of idea appears in Husserl's own presentation and calls for an elaboration.

Husserl speaks about Kant's concept of idea as being a highly important concept, though, due to his own considerations and the aspect of essence with which he is concerned, he comes back to the root *eidos* (9). In a more specific sense he refers to Kant's idea and relates it to what he calls ideal "limits" (*ideale Grenzen*).⁵ They are ideal essences which, as a matter of principle, cannot be found in any sensuous intuition.⁶ He further refers to

the absence of limit in the progress (*Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange*), and here again the emphasis lies on the process and not on the achievement. He combines the notion of the horizon of experience with the notion of the continuous process. The stream of experience (*Erlebnisstrom*) as a unity cannot be viewed as a singular experience but, according to Husserl's own wording, it has to be conceived rather as an idea in Kant's sense. Since the reference is to the continuous process, no single experience can be viewed as self-sufficient or isolated from the whole context, though the context is never circumscribed and is continually growing and gaining in clarity. When Husserl speaks here about ideation, there is even an etymological correlation between the viewing of ideation and the idea in Kant's sense: the idea is not presented as fully determined, but it is the focus of our continuous attempts towards clarification and systematization.⁷ To be sure, some of the notions or contents which in Kant are not lodged on the level of ideas appear in Husserl on that level, such as for instance the notion of space and time, and Husserl sees from this point of view the affinity between Kant's pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*) and his own notion of ideation. Obviously the integration of different notions on the level of immanence blurs the distinction between forms of sensuality in Kant's sense, as related to pure intuition and ideas in Kant's sense, which refer to the end of the cognitive process. This particular aspect both of Husserl's own interpretation of his affinity with Kant and the difference between his and Kant's systems, is due to the fact that the borderline of sensuality does not play the same role in Husserl as that which it played in Kant. To put it differently, we find in Husserl the tendency towards immanence in a stronger version of that tendency than that which is characteristic of Kant. But precisely this point renders the affinity in terms of the notion of idea even more significant, since it can be said that within the context of immanence there is a growing trend towards apodicticity, adequacy, and thus of evidence. Yet we encounter here an immanence which is never closed and thus never reaches the summit of speculation as it does, for instance, in Hegel.

What can be described as the open immanence characteristic of Husserl as against the closed immanence characteristic of Hegel leads us to re-emphasize the affinity between Husserl and Kant. Kant describes the notion of idea in the following way: An idea is a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience – there is no object congruous with sense experience.⁸ The idea expresses only the systematic unity which is to serve as a rule for the empirical employment of reason. Being only a rule (*Richtschnur*) no experience can

ever be adequate to an idea, nor can any object be congruous with it.⁹ It seems to be clear now that the systematic position of the idea in Kant's sense as a regulative principle recurs within Husserl's context in spite of the differences, not the least one being grounded in the fact that Husserl considers experience to be one of the modes of evidence within the context of the modifications or levels of evidence. For Kant the idea is a regulative principle serving on the one hand to describe the boundaries of experience, and on the other to describe a focus directing knowledge referring to experience to move forward in order to overcome the limitations of it, accompanied by the awareness: this overcoming is never possible. Kant was concerned with the question of how to explain the progressive character of knowledge while confining knowledge to experience. Thus he interpreted transcendence as an idea; he turned the idea into the systematic principle which as such prompts knowledge to reach it, since knowledge is accompanied by the awareness of the gap pertaining between that which is already known and that which should be attempted as a possible object of knowledge to be acquired. Husserl conceived of knowledge as one continuous process, without introducing into it the regulative principle which is, as it were, the immanent equivalent of the transcendence. The motivating factor is not transcendence reformulated as an idea but the immanent *nisus* towards clarity and apodicticity or full evidence. Husserl does not need to take refuge in the reformulation of transcendence as an idea in order to explain the never-ending process of knowledge, since he refers not to the gap between immanence and transcendence, but to the gap between imperfect and perfect evidence. Perfect evidence is a projected goal of the striving towards evidence, and as a projected goal it is the aim of the cognitive activity.¹⁰

Having said this we have to reiterate that, in spite of the difference in reasoning and in background between Husserl and Kant, Husserl deliberately came back to Kant's interpretation of the notion of idea by positing the idea not only as the regulative principle of cognition but as its aim as well.

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NOTES

¹ Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und phaenomenologischen Philosophie*, Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel, Band III, *Husserliana*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950. The pages in the text in this section of the paper refer to that edition.

² *Formale und Transzendente Logik* – Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft von Edmund Husserl. Halle (Saale): Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929. All the references in this part of our exploration are to that text.

³ Edmund Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations* – an Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960). The references in this part of our analysis are to this translation which has been amended here and there, following the original text.

⁴ *Kr.d.r.V.* B. p. 537. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, Macmillan, Toronto: 1965, p. 539.

⁵ The "regulative" role of the *eidos* in Husserlian phenomenology has been presented by A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Idea and the constitutive a priori', *Kantstudien*.

⁶ *Ideen*, p. 170–171.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201–202.

⁸ *Kr.d.r.V.* B. p. 383; transl. p. 318.

⁹ *Ibid.*, B 649; *ibid.*, p. 518.

¹⁰ On the issue dealt with here consult: the chapter 'Immanenz und Transzendenz' in: Rudolf Boehm, *Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie*, Husserl-Studien, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague) 1968, pp. 141 ff.

Consult also the present author's: 'Ambiguities of Husserl's Notion of Constitution', included in *Phenomenology and Natural Existence*, State University of New York Press, 1973, pp. 151 ff. See also the present author's: 'Between Persuasion and Deeds', in: *Essays on Wiltgenstein*. In Honour of G. H. von Wright, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1976, pp. 485 ff. as well as: 'Exposition of Intuition and Phenomenology', *International Studies in Philosophy* 9, 1977, pp. 43 ff.

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